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
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
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
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
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


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HISTORY
OF THE
THIRTY YEARS' WAR

BY
ANTON GINDELY

PROFESSOR OF GERMAN HISTORY IN UNIVERSITY OF PRAGUE

TRANSLATED BY
ANDREW TEN BROOK

FORMERLY PROFESSOR OF MENTAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

WITH AN INTRODUCTORY AND A CONCLUDING CHAPTER BY THE TRANSLATOR

COMPLETE IN TWO VOLUMES
With Twenty-eight Illustrations and Two Maps

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
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
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THE AUTHOR'S PREFACE.

AT the request of my intimate friend, the publisher, I have decided to put the results of my many years' study of the Thirty Years' War into a work suited to the wants of a large circle of readers. In obeying this wish, I can also discharge to others an obligation which I have long felt. I therefore join my labors with those of the contributors to the series, entitled "The Knowledge of the Present Time,"* the purpose of which is to present to the cultured classes, in a popular and attractive style, the results of those recent investigations which would otherwise have remained more or less unavailable in the scientific forms in which specialists have stated them.

My work is divided into three parts. The first describes those events which gave immediate occasion to the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War, and proceeds thence to relate the history of the Bohemian insurrection, the judicial proceedings and confiscations which followed, and the consequent reactionary measures of religious reformation. In this I have closely followed the course of the four volumes which I have written on the history of the Thirty Years' War. My statement in regard to the part which Father Dominicus took in the council of the officers of the League and the Emperor before the battle of the

* Das Wissen der Gegenwart.

White Mountain, I have repeated, but do not support it by the authorities which I then used. The full credibility of this statement was indeed justly questioned, because it did not originate with eye-witnesses. I now, however, authenticate it by the report which Dr. Angelini, one of the attendants of Father Dominicus, has made in his account of the campaign in Bohemia. According to his report, this father, by his words of exhortation, moved Count Buquoi and several of the army officers to relinquish their original opposition to hazarding a battle. Angelini must have received this information either from Father Dominicus himself, or from one who was actually present at the council. Only the report of Angelini was known to me when this volume was completed. It was not until a few days later that a second and still higher testimony came to my knowledge, to which I now refer: it is that of the Duke of Bavaria. Immediately after the death of Father Dominicus, when facts were being collected looking to his canonization, and the Emperor Ferdinand and his wife, as also Duke Maximilian, were called upon to state what they knew of his acts and sayings, Maximilian made his statement in the following words: "When the armies of the League and the Emperor had united for the purpose of attacking, with all possible force, the enemy, and the latter had arrived before the walls of Prague, some of the highest officers were averse to the hazard of a battle. . . . When the Father observed this, he came up and humbly and modestly requested that it might be permitted him to say a few words, although he had not been called to the council. When permission was given him, he exhorted the leaders with a fiery zeal that they put their trust in God and the righteousness of their cause; they should firmly trust

that the grace of God would not be withheld, and that their hopes would be rewarded with victory. These words moved those who opposed the battle to yield, and with united forces to close upon the foe."

I shall, in the course of this year or the next, publish the evidence of both Angelini and Maximilian.

In the first part I have followed closely in the track of my previous labors. In the second also, and a part of the third, I have made little use of the numerous publications upon the history of the Thirty Years' War, but have depended chiefly upon my investigations of the archives, which I have nearly completed as far as to the beginning of the year 1636, and in the French State archives have pursued to the year 1648. What I have to offer, therefore, of new matter, and especially in regard to Waldstein and his quarrels with the League and his removal at Regensburg, I shall in my future publications bring out in detail, as also the plan of Gustavus Adolphus, as gradually developed in his own mind, concerning a dominion in Germany. Wittich, in his work, entitled "Magdeburg, Gustavus Adolphus, and Tilly," observes that he who should more thoroughly investigate and more clearly discriminate than has hitherto been done as to the degree in which the pretensions and demands of Gustavus Adolphus rose after his victories, would perform a labor worthy of grateful remembrance. In the archives of Berlin, Munich, Dresden, and Paris, I have examined everything which pertains to this subject. Sweden only have I failed to visit; and though I have not yet made use of this final authority, I have nevertheless found in the above-named archives matter of greatest importance, illustrating the gradual growth of the Swedish King's plans, which matter I have made use of, and shall hereafter pub-

lish. As to the cause of Gustavus Adolphus' death, I have set forth no new opinion, but have followed that of all impartial historians. They all regard it as an occurrence of chance and a consequence of his spirited pushing forward into the battle-throng. I was, however, able to furnish decisive evidence from the Spanish archives that there was actual negotiation in regard to the assassination of Gustavus Adolphus. To the reports relating to this subject I here call attention.

In the third volume I give an account of the Waldstein catastrophe. I write "Waldstein," and not "Wallenstein," and for reasons which ought to receive the concurrence of my readers. He himself never, so far as is known to me, wrote his name otherwise than "Waldstein," and in this form alone was the name in earlier times used in Bohemia, and it is now so written and so pronounced. It is therefore proper that a historian should, even at this late day, bring this form into use, although a poet's genius has brought into general currency the form of "Wallenstein," which was employed by the French and Italians of the seventeenth century. In relation to the treason against the Emperor, which was laid to his charge, the earlier historians were more or less convinced of his guilt, and even Schiller expresses this conviction, although he remarks at the close of his narrative that the evidence against Waldstein was not sufficiently decisive. Among the most recent authors, Foster has attempted an explanation of the facts favorable to the honor of the great marshal, by relegating to the domain of falsehood all the charges made against him. He only admits that, upon learning the plan for his removal in the year 1634, he meditated turning against the Emperor. His treason was, therefore, only the conse-

quence of the injustice designed against himself, and was clearly forced upon him. This conviction is supported by a second prominent investigator of Waldstein's history, Dr. Hallwich. He builds upon the foundation of numerous recently discovered documents; while a third inquirer, Dr. Schebeck, seeks wholly to acquit Waldstein of all guilt whatever. Ranke, in his biography of Waldstein, holds in general the view of the earlier writers, but finds a bright side to Waldstein's treason in the view that, in his transactions with Saxony, he sincerely labored for an adjustment between the religious parties. A final judgment upon this question will not be possible until all the original documents, for and against Waldstein, some of them still unknown to the public, and which lie at the foundation of my narrative, shall have been published. I shall of course early apply myself to the solution of this problem, until which time I shall claim only a provisional recognition of my judgment in the matter of this contest. The original documents, which I have myself discovered, have impressed me with a conviction of Waldstein's guilt. The facts which I have brought forward and the confirmations which I have given of my view, as also the supporting proofs from single documents which have been indicated, may serve for the conviction of my readers also, who may, however, properly reserve their decisive conclusions until the future publication of the documentary proofs.

Besides the Waldstein catastrophe, the transactions in regard to the peace of Prague form the most important subject of the narrative of the third volume, which both France and the Papal Court sought to thwart, but upon the conclusion of which the Emperor determined, notwithstanding his confessor's opposition and his own sacrifice of

those religious interests, which but for the sake of peace, he would have prized so highly. As to the manner in which Urban VIII. sought to defeat the Hapsburgs' defence, and how he was met from the side of Spain, the papers of Simanca offer many a disclosure, some of the most important of which I have consulted and used. Whatever other reasons may have influenced the Pope in his hostile attitude, the decisive cause seems to me to have been the inherited opposition to the dominion of foreigners, which led Urban to oppose the Spanish, as his predecessors had opposed the Germans.

In my narrative of the course of the war after the year 1636 and of the Westphalian peace negotiations, I have used almost exclusively the printed authorities.

Thus I now send forth to the world this work, which, notwithstanding its modest compass, is the result of long years of preparatory study. The correctness of its conclusions can, however, be finally decided only by evidence still to be published.

THE AUTHOR.

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

IN offering Professor Gindely's "History of the Thirty Years' War" to the public in an English dress, I desire to make the following observations:

I. In regard to the work itself, the Author's own preface will inform the reader as to its origin. His great work will, perhaps, if ever completed, be too large to be called for much beyond the circle of those who can enjoy it in the original. But this smaller one rests upon the same studies, and will, I trust, commend itself to the entire reading public as the best which has appeared on the subject.

Diplomacy is the point of most interest and importance in the history of a war. Battles are but incidents, and accounts of them are valuable chiefly for their bearing upon military science and art, and as indicating the preponderance of the one party or the other. These are described with sufficient fulness. Further than this, descriptions of them are but sensational, like the details of crime in the columns of the daily press. But the diplomacy of a great struggle has another significance, and its points are seldom stated with more clearness and precision than in this work. The Author's pictures of prominent individuals also commend themselves, both by their vividness and by the evident care which has been taken in securing their accuracy. I mention, as examples, the accounts of Ferdinand II., Cardinal Khlesl, the Palgrave Frederic, Bethlen Gabor, Prince of Transylvania,

Maximilian of Bavaria, Count Tilly, Prince Waldstein, Gustavus Adolphus, and Cardinal Richelieu.

Prof. Gindely's portrayals of life, and especially of the formalities of intercourse in the period of which he writes, are quite remarkable, but are at the same time so unpretending that they might be passed over without attracting the attention which they deserve. No narrative of travel could convey to the reader a picture so vivid, and few one so realistic, as the half-dozen pages describing the journey of the bride of the King of Hungary from Madrid to Vienna; while a similar remark might be made of the progress of Frederic's court from Heidelberg to Prague and the coronation which followed. Etiquette is justly regarded as a trifle, and yet it is one of those trifles which, like the straws upon an apparently smooth surface of water, show whither the current tends. So the references to etiquette which appear in the work, especially those to that which delayed the proper business of the Congress of Westphalia, yield to none in their significance as pictures of the time.

The Author states in his own preface the extent to which he has made investigation into the archives. As keeper of the state archives of Bohemia he was qualified for this work. He has been so modest in several places in his book in intimating that he has had access to original documents never before used by historical writers on this period, that the reader might overlook these intimations altogether.

II. As to the translation, I have but to observe how it arose and progressed. I was inquiring of a bookseller for so much of the Author's great work on the Thirty Years' War as might have appeared, in order to use this in writing a popular history of the same period, and

incidentally came upon the first volume of this work. I determined at once to translate this, rather than write a new book, and began the work with but the first volume in hand. I had written the introductory chapter, and was half through with the first volume, when the other two were received.

The printing and casting of the plates proceeded simultaneously with the progress of the translation, which may therefore be a little less perfect than if it had been first completed and then revised in the light gained from a survey of the whole field.

I have endeavored to maintain a just medium between that freedom which would obliterate all traces of the genius and style of an original author and that reproduction of the idioms of a foreign language which justly offends an English taste. I may, however, have erred in thinking that the reader would prefer to have a few glimpses of the Author himself rather than have him quite concealed in the mask of his translator. Willing as I am that the reader should regard himself as reading Prof. Gindely's book, not mine, I may have followed him too closely. But I prefer this error to the opposite.

My treatment of the annoying subject of proper names demands an explanation. Such is the present variety of usage, that one might without offence pursue almost any system which should be consistent with itself. The system upon which I have acted is to choose at will between permissible forms. Sometimes I could give a reason for my choice, and again I could give none. The French "Cologne" is too well established to give way to the German "Koeln." Moreover, the former answers so well to the old Latin "Colonia," that for this reason alone I would not abandon it. It is otherwise with the

French "Juliers" and the German "Jülich;" neither has become so fully established as to possess the ground by right, and I have preferred the latter. With these hints the reader will be able to trace my course through the whole list of geographical names.

As to personal names, where I regarded the usage as well established, I have followed it. I have, for instance, written "Charles" for the German "Karl," and yet "Carl" also is an English name; and I have written "Carl von Žerotín" simply because I did not like to translate the "von," and so transferred the whole name. It may be too that "Carl" has been unintentionally written in other instances where it has not been deemed worth while to change it back in the plates. I have intentionally written both "Lewis" and "Louis"—the former for Germans, the latter for Frenchmen. Those old names which used to be latinized so as to end in "*aus*," I have written after the analogy of "Nicholas," as "Ladislas" and "Wenceslas," although, if I could now revise these and others, I should introduce modifications; I should write, for instance, simply the German "Wenzel."

One thing more: I had at first planned to indicate in parentheses the correct pronunciation of a few names foreign alike to French, German, and English and of difficult pronunciation. This attempt, however, I soon abandoned as worse than useless, for two reasons: first, the dictionaries furnish all needed aid in this matter; and, secondly, I did not in the beginning intend to do more than indicate the pronunciations which varied most widely from that of our corresponding letters, as the Spanish "ñ," the Bohemian "ě," "č," and "ř," so that the reader would, after all, have been left imperfectly instructed. In the meantime, however, these first indica-


tions had found their way into the plates, and have remained, because it was not deemed worth while to correct them.

For my introductory chapter I cannot claim any other importance than as laying before the readers some preliminary information which a certain class of them will need, while others will not. All this comes out, indeed, in the course of the Author's work; but many a reader might have suffered misconceptions for want of these explanations. I cannot but hope that the concluding chapter which I have added will be found to have some distinctive value as an attempt to indicate the place which the Thirty Years' War occupies in the world's progressive course of education.

It is proper to say that this American Edition has been prepared under arrangement with, and with the full sanction of, the author and his German publishers.

The American publishers of the American Edition will be found, I think, in their part of the undertaking, to have maintained their well-earned reputation. I have no relations with any others in the matter, my obligations to critics being as yet future and uncertain; and with these statements, therefore, submit the work to the judgment of candid readers, with the hope that it may meet a just and generous appreciation. .

THE TRANSLATOR.



SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR'S LIFE.

ANTON GINDELY was born in Prague in 1829. His father was a poor day-laborer, and was unable to aid his son; the latter therefore earned by teaching a portion of the means needed in obtaining his education. Remarkable health—he never lost an hour during his entire course of study—persistence, and industry enabled him to surmount all obstacles, and he completed his gymnasium and university courses with highest honor. The revolution in the condition of Austrian affairs in 1848, and especially the founding of numerous new institutions of learning, had for young Gindely the good effect that, when but twenty-four years of age, he obtained a good position in a school of science in Prague, and but three months later was called to an Adjunct Professorship in the University of Olmutz. This gave him a fine opportunity for the study of the history of Bohemia, to the ecclesiastical branch of which he devoted himself. His attention was drawn to the Unitas Fratrum (United Brethren), founded in the fifteenth century. These adhered in their doctrine in general to the opinions of John Huss, which they further developed. Their distinguishing trait was that they willingly submitted to persecution as the early Church had done. Thus originated Gindely's first work, "The History of the Bohemian Brethren," in two volumes. He carried this down to 1609, the year in which the Bohemian Utraquists forced from the Emperor Rudolph II. the Royal Charter. Investigation of the


contemporary political history led him to extend his work; he occupied himself with a thorough study of the entanglements of the Estates of all the provinces of Austria, which resulted in a work of two volumes, entitled "Rudolph II. and His Time," which offers a picture of the last twelve years of this Emperor's reign and its attendant complications.

In the production of this second work, the most thorough study was necessary, not only of the Austrian, but of all the most important German archives, as also of the Belgian, French, and Spanish State papers. His study was at the same time directed to the history of the Bohemian insurrection, which was the immediate occasion of the Thirty Years' War. His interest in the investigation soon led him to pass beyond this narrow limit, and embrace the whole war in all its directions, even extending his study to the archives of the Vatican at Rome. He was thus enabled to begin the publication of a work which, in the history of this war, is of standard importance. Four volumes have already appeared, which cover the period from 1612 to 1623. The English historian, Gardiner, author of "Prince Charles and the Spanish Marriage," and other works, has furthered this undertaking by placing at Mr. Gindely's disposal his numerous copies of English and other State papers.

Even before Professor Gindely took upon himself this comprehensive task, now nearly twenty years ago, he had promised some friends that he would prepare a brief history of the Thirty Years' War. During the past year he has fulfilled this promise by the publication, in Leipsic, of the work now offered in translation in these volumes, basing this smaller work upon studies, the results of which are hereafter to be published. The present work

was written with special reference to a cultured public, and its form and contents have met the largest approval, twenty thousand copies of the German edition having already been sold.

It may be still further added in regard to Professor Gindely that, subsequently to the appointments referred to above, he became Professor of History in the University of Prague, and still holds that position.



THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR

INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER.

BY THE TRANSLATOR.

A N inside view of Christianity, as it now exists, offers a spectacle which, in some of its aspects, is anything but edifying. If we could suppose ourselves to survey its present state and take account of its elements, with well-developed intellects, indeed, and yet with but indifferent historic knowledge, or none at all, we might regard it as the scattered fragments of what had once been a system, but had become wholly disrupted. We might feel like joining with the infidel, who deems its sacred books a mixture of fact and fable, imposed upon the credulity of the race, or with the pessimist so far as he is another person from the infidel, whose whole utterance is a series of complaints that the world is out of joint and fast going to wreck. Indeed, the ablest, most exemplary, and most cheerful Christian minds, with this fragmentary maze before them, sometimes utter pessimistic sentiments.

All Christendom, however, in a normal state of mind—though few may be fully conscious of this, and fewer still

formulate their consciousness—regard Christianity as a *historic unit*. Christendom, as a word, bears witness to this; it has its moral code, its social life. Its parts hold together. This is recognized in international intercourse. Christian nations shape their consular and diplomatic acts according as they are to be applied to Christian, Mussulman, or pagan nations, not trusting their subjects to the laws, judiciary or executive, of the two latter. History, in those general surveys which our minds are ever taking of it, embraces chiefly the principles and events involved in the formation and growth of the fraternity of Christian nations.

If there shall seem to be exceptions to this position, they are of such nature as but to yield it a firmer support. The Hebrew commonwealth is a part of this historic unit, because in it was the germ of Christianity, and the two can no more be parted in our conceptions than can the roots and branches in our ideas of a tree. The peoples, languages, literature, sciences, arts, and institutions of Greece and Rome are almost fundamental to our historic system, because Christianity in its earliest progress appropriated them, just as young plant-life appropriates the vegetable generations as they fall into decay.

In reading accounts of modern pagan nations, we seem to ourselves to have before us foot-notes not belonging to the text of our history; and if nations have fallen off from Christendom, as did those of the Orient and Northern Africa when subjugated to the Arabian prophet, their connection with us becomes relaxed.

It is not too much to say that progress has never been at any time absolutely and in all its elements suspended in the aggregate of Christendom. A long period in history is sometimes designated as the "Dark Ages." But

the lands of Christianity were then, like the fields of winter cereals, when, after the freshness of their first autumnal growth, they lie hid under snows, or, if seen, offer to sight but faded green blades tipped with yellow, while the roots, however, are strengthening in their invisible recesses beneath the frosts and snows. To change the figure to one drawn from the clearing of the forests in our Western world: when green logs, branches, and brush are thrown upon the burning heaps, these seem, at the time, to extinguish the fires, but really add matter for the flames to feed upon when they shall again burst forth.

Such has been the advance of Christianity. Nations and tribes were, under the lead of their kings or chiefs, added nominally to the Christian family, as also, sometimes, individuals on personal convictions, but in no case was there at first much religious knowledge or improvement of life. Thus the area merely of Christianity was extended. This was the way of natural growth, the way of Providence, nay, even the way of the Spirit, as promised to the Christian Church. There have always been ambitions, high and low, and they are yet as rife as ever; but those who, from our advanced point of view, regard these early movements with censorious feelings, make but poor use of their reason. They might as well denounce the plant of the heath because it does not exhibit the thrift of its kindred of the garden. In the accumulating masses there have always been pious people, high and low, and also men of advanced thought, who never broke with the Church, as well as communities which enjoyed in secret and under Church censure their own more rational and simple views of religion. These elements broke out at times into open rebellion. The first instance

of this which deserves mention here is that of Arnold of Brescia (twelfth century). This outbreak was extinguished and its leader burned. The Cathari, or Puritans, under the local name of Albigenses (thirteenth century), next came in conflict with the Church in Languedoc, where they were put down by crusades and the newly-instituted Inquisition. Then Wycliffe (fourteenth century) appeared in England, quietly translated the Scriptures, wrote and lectured against ecclesiastical abuses and corruptions, enjoyed some royal and princely favor as well as the aid of such men as Chaucer, the poet, and his disciples never became extinct in England until they disappeared in the light of the Reformation.

Wycliffe's writings were sent to her own country by Anna, the British queen, a sister of Wenceslas, King of Bohemia, herself probably a believer in their teachings. Here occurred the greatest, up to its time, of the eruptions in the Roman Catholic Church. It kept at bay, in the long Hussite war, the armed forces raised for its suppression, received concessions in the Council of Basel, in 1433, about fifteen years after its origin, and was still strong in Bohemia two centuries later, when the war, of which these volumes treat, broke out upon the same ground.

It was an exact century after the movement of Huss, when that of Luther began in Germany. This became general, and was never put down, the last attempt at this being that called the Thirty Years' War, which opened just a century from the time of Luther's nailing his theses to the church-door.

As Professor Gindely begins his work by leaping at once into the exciting scene of the outbreak at Prague, in 1618, it will be important, to the best understanding of

it, to take a brief, preliminary survey of the parties and territories involved in the beginning of the struggle.

Charles the Great (Charlemagne), at the opening of the ninth century, made an attempt to revive the old Roman Empire. His possessions extended from the mouth of the Eider, along the North Sea and the Atlantic coast to the Ebro, in Spain. Their southern boundary was the Mediterranean. From the head of the Adriatic the line ran northward, so as to take in the territory of the later Austrian duchies and Bohemia, and strike the Gulf of Lubeck on the Baltic, crossing from the Baltic to the North Sea again on the course of the River Eider. In the year 800 he was crowned by the Pope as Roman Emperor. The partition among his sons broke up indeed this unity; but when his grandson, Lewis the German, came into possession of the territories lying chiefly eastward of the Rhine, he seemed to lay the foundation of the future German Empire, which always derived more or less additional dignity from the fiction of its relation to the old Roman Empire. It waxed or waned according to the abilities of its itinerant heads, until an interregnum led, in the year 1273, to the election of Rudolph of Hapsburg, the founder of the present Austrian dynasty, with whom began the development of the imperial dignity as it existed at the time of the Reformation and later.

I. The most important addition made at any one time to the constitutional law governing the Empire was that contained in the thirty articles of the so-called Golden Bull. This was an edict of the Emperor Charles IV. at the Diet at Nuremberg, in 1356. It fixes Frankfort-on-the-Main as the place of meeting, and determines the

powers and rank of the electors. It makes the Count Palatine and the Duke of Saxony the vicars of the Empire during any vacancy of the imperial throne.

II. Maximilian I., who died in 1519, instituted an imperial chamber of justice (Reichskammergericht), a kind of supreme court for the trial of cases between the independent members of the Empire, and having also, in some few other matters, an appellate jurisdiction, to take the place partly of those courts previously held by the Emperor himself or the Count Palatine. This gave rise to a necessity for imperial counsellors (Reichshofräthe), who also sometimes exercised judicial functions. The court varied in the numbers of the judges associated with its chief, to make out a full bench, though sixteen may be taken as the number which sometimes made up the court. Its seat was at first at Worms, afterward at Spire. It became important as connected with the history of the Reformation.

III. At the election of each Emperor there was made with him a solemn compact (Wahlcapitulation). We may take that of Charles V., who held the reins of the imperial government during thirty-nine years of the Reformation (1519–1558), as a specimen of these capitulations. This consisted of thirty specifications, in substance as follows: He was to execute the laws, make no new ones, and impose no taxes except by the action of the Diet; he was to form no alliances without the concurrence of the electors; he might bring no foreign troops into the Empire, and hold no Diet outside of it; he agreed to appoint none but Germans to office, to protect the States against the See of Rome and place no State under

the imperial ban except in conformity to the established forms and processes; to make conquests only for the Empire, and reside chiefly within it. These and other obligations were assumed in his coronation oath, to which, however, historians generally agree that he paid no very strict regard. The oaths of succeeding Emperors were of similar import. Except in the exercise of some prerogatives, which precedent had settled, the Emperors were simply the executives of the Diet's will. It was by no means uniform that they had armies at their command; indeed this was exceptional. In case of Charles V., the army was fixed at twenty thousand foot and four thousand horse, of which the States furnished their respective contingents, or paid monthly four florins (\$1.60) for each man of the infantry, and twelve florins (\$4.80) for each horseman. They did not, however, always do either; the princes might keep their troops at home, and then appear at their head when required, in which event the Prince of Liechtenstein at the head of his dozen or so of men, independent prince though he were, would make a sorry appearance by the side of the electoral Dukes of Bavaria and Saxony, and the Archbishops of Mentz, Cologne, and Treves, with their thousands.

IV. The Imperial Diet was made up of the three Estates.

1. The members of the electoral college, which we give in the order of their precedence as fixed by the Golden Bull: The Archbishops of Mentz, Cologne, and Treves; then the King of Bohemia, the Count Palatine, the Duke of Saxony, and the Margrave of Brandenburg.

2. The princes—which term must be understood to

include all who stood at the head of independent governments. On the side of the ecclesiastics were the bishops and the abbots, or heads of monasteries. The secular princes were the dukes, counts, margraves, and burggraves. Only the latter two terms will require explanation. The margrave, called in England marquis, acquired his name from the fact that his lands bordered on a foreign country, against which he must defend it, as the Margraviate of Brandenburg, for instance, bounded the Empire next to the Slavic lands. The burggrave, originally but the commander of a castle in the service of the Emperor or a prince, became in some instances himself a prince, appearing in the Diet as such.

3. The deputies of the free cities. These cities—there were also mere villages which enjoyed this freedom—were of two kinds. There were the cities composing the great Hanseatic League, which had such importance in the commerce of the later Middle Age. These were, like any of the principalities, independent governments, and, as such, represented themselves by deputies in the Imperial Diets. Then there were cities and even villages in various parts of the Empire which had, in one way and another, acquired the right of placing themselves in immediate connection (*Unmittelbarkeit*) with the Emperor. To illustrate the manner in which these arose: when, in the thirteenth century, the duchies of Swabia and Franconia were extinguished, the prevalent anarchy gave opportunity for the assertion of independence, of which many took advantage. Besides numerous smaller places, there arose in this section the imperial cities of Augsburg, Kempten, Ulm, Nuremberg, and Donauwerth. Thus, and in other ways, imperial cities and villages were multiplied. The deputies of these immediate dependencies of the Empire,

as also those of the Hanseatic cities, appeared in the Diet as the third Estate.

The three houses deliberated separately, and must all concur, and the Emperor, too, before the action could be announced as an imperial statute, and the third Estate has been known to negative the action of the others.

4 When the three houses came together, as they always did for dissolution by the reading from the throne of the enactments of the session, the Emperor sat on a throne with the Electors of Mentz, Bavaria, and Bohemia on his right, those of Cologne, Saxony, and Brandenburg on his left, and the Elector of Treves directly in front of him. The ecclesiastical princes sat on benches at his right, the secular at his left. The deputies of the imperial towns sat in front of the throne, on benches, crossing between the right and the left.

The constitution of the Empire was a growth, and changed from time to time, but the above statement is sufficiently exact for our purpose.

V. The terms of the religious peace of the Empire, as settled by the Diets of Passau (1552) and Augsburg (1555) should be steadily kept in mind during the reading of these volumes.

Charles V. would have extinguished the Reformation had he ever seen his way clear to do so without imperilling the execution of his own ambitious plans. He expected, however, to be able to effect this whenever he should choose, until, at the Diet of Augsburg, in 1530, the presentation of the Lutheran Confession more fully revealed the strength of the force which he would have to encounter.

Aside from the great numbers who had been carried along with the movement was the sole fact, which we stop

here to mention, that several of the lands governed by the ecclesiastical princes had gone almost entire with the Reformation and were governed by administrators, who, although not bishops, still had, for this purpose, the powers of bishops and seats, as such, in the Imperial Diet.

Charles, humbled by the failure of his ambitions, and especially by his narrow escape of capture at Innspruck, allowed the Diet to act more freely, and, at Passau, it was decided that Protestants should not be excluded from the imperial chamber; that the ecclesiastical property which they then held should continue in their hands till otherwise ordered; that a Diet should be summoned within a year to settle the peace of the Church, and that until that time there should be no dispute about religion.

It was not, however, within a year, but about three years, after this time, that the following points substantially were settled: That no one of the Estates of the Empire should be abridged of its rights on account of religious belief or practice; that the former spiritual jurisdiction should not be in force over those who professed the Protestant faith; that there should be no attempts on either side to forcible conversions, and that those who, on account of religion, should wish to emigrate might be allowed to do so. Two points were strongly contested in the Diet at Augsburg: The Protestants claimed that the Catholic clergy should be free to pass over to the Augsburg Confession without loss of ecclesiastical rank and position; the Catholics claimed that they should be made an exception, and could only pass over for their own persons with loss of position. The other point related to the nobility, cities, communes, and subjects in general, who held the Lutheran faith and were under Catholic princes. It was agreed that these should not be

dealt with in a compulsory way in regard to their faith and worship. The former of these two points, however, the Catholics would not yield, and ecclesiastics could accede to the Lutheran Confession only with loss of place.

The disadvantage to the Lutherans of this one enactment is incalculable. It is true that from our advanced point of view no one can be allowed to carry over to another religious confession anything but his own person. But both parties in this contest held the opposite opinion, namely, that the prince and pastor might rule the faith of their people, and only made exceptional to this rule the cases of Catholic ecclesiastics becoming Protestants. With this decision in their way, *none*, from the great ecclesiastical princes down to the parish clergy, could pass over to the Lutheran faith without the prospect of going forth as a kind of beggars in the world.

Nor is this difficulty imaginary. Gebhard, Archbishop and Elector of Cologne, toward the close of the sixteenth century, passed over to the Protestant Church, and attempted accordingly to reform the diocese of Cologne. He married a certain Countess Agnes. But he was finally driven from his position in accordance with this provision of the religious peace of Augsburg, and the territory of the archiepiscopal see of Cologne, which would, had Gebhard carried out his purpose, have become Protestant, is now the Catholic stronghold of Germany. Nor is it improbable that all the ecclesiastical princes might, at least nominally, have joined the Protestant cause but for this so-called Ecclesiastical Reservation in the religious peace of Augsburg.

We shall now notice briefly the elements of the coming struggle, which existed during the interval of about sixty years—from the conclusion of the religious peace to the

outbreak of the Thirty Years' War—under two general statements:

- I. *The rise and development of a new power in the Catholic Church, and*
- II. *The defectiveness of the peace provisions themselves, in connection with the divisions of the Protestant powers.*

I. The Society of Jesus, so-called, has, beyond all doubt, wielded, by the mere force of a perfect organization and discipline, and from the peculiar state of Christendom at the epoch of its rise, a greater power than has ever been wielded by any similar force. The Reformation had about twenty years the start of them, and was fast winning the upper hand in Europe, when seven men obtained the Papal recognition and sanction for a work not yet determined, but which came to be nothing less than to restore to the Papal See what it had lost by the Reformation and convert the rest of the world. Its vows were poverty, chastity, and obedience, with a fourth, added later, to obey without a moment's questioning the call of the Chief Pontiff for whatever service he should require. Their field was literally the world, for in the lifetime of the original members the wilds of America and the crowded populations of Asia were penetrated by them. Their influence was to be exerted through preaching, teaching, and the confessional. Such was their discipline, monastic and scholastic, that they had really no peers, at least in the Catholic Church, and though the other orders of the Church opposed, and the Sovereign Pontiff often hesitated in approving them, they became the inspiration of the whole body and a necessity to it.

There was romance in the institution. Young men of talents and enterprise entered it. Nobles and even princes

laid down their property and renounced their rank to enter its fields of work. It was not long before the education of Catholic Christendom was largely, if not chiefly, in their hands. Their first college in the German Empire was transferred to them six years before the religious peace of Augsburg, and within a few miles of that city, at Ingolstadt, on the Danube. Here the two leaders on the Catholic side in the Thirty Years' War, Maximilian, of Bavaria, and Ferdinand, of Austria, were educated. There is little doubt that they had in their constitution a provision for affiliated members, and that the Emperors Ferdinand II. and III. and other princes were such members.* In a word, they had the consciences of the Roman Catholic sovereigns and their ministers in their hands as educators, and in their keeping as confessors. They led them in the direction of this war, so that it was at the time and has since been called the Jesuits' War. They had already made such progress toward the restoration of Christendom to the Pope that they thought this might be ventured. Not to cite other examples, Ferdinand, under their lead, had already made his inherited dominions of Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola, which had become chiefly Protestant, all Catholic, and, from the ease with which this was effected, doubtless inferred the easy restoration of the Empire and then of all Christendom to the Pope.

II. The provisions of the Diet of 1555 were defective, especially as viewed in relation to the divisions of the Protestant powers. This has been shown in connection with the single enactment known as the Eccle-

* Vide Huber's *Jesuiten-Orden*, pages 70-72.

siastical Reservation. Let the following considerations be added:

The terms of the peace had no elasticity. They provided for no progress. They required the parties to remain just where they were placed, perhaps that the one might have the better chance to convert the other. They contemplated, for instance, on the Protestant side, nothing but the Lutheran Church. In the meantime part of the Empire had accepted the Reformed faith of Calvin. Their right to do so might not in time of peace be questioned, but in a civil war of the Empire it was not to be expected that a Catholic Emperor would go beyond the letter of the law and concede to another sect rights granted only to Lutherans. And then the Lutherans felt scarcely less of enmity toward Calvinists than toward Catholics. There was no union of heart between the Protestant powers.

The practical difficulty was augmented by the division of Germany into so many principalities, having their rivalships and their diverse interests. In our modern tendency to centralization, this fact in the history of the German Empire is quite ridiculous ; let us, however, before indulging our ridicule too far, remember that this very fact has tended to make Germany the world's school. Every little prince was ambitious to have his educational system culminating in a university, and to excel in these provisions. Thus has Germany, since the great struggle in the opening of the seventeenth century, become the world's school and its library, though this state of things seemed to work against the cause of freedom in that contest.

There was, however, a Union of the Protestant States formed in 1608, in prospective protection against en-

croachments which had long been felt. The new faith, at the highest point of its success, had, as has been roughly estimated, won about ninety per cent. of the population of the Empire. Force and artful measures on one side, and inaction on the other, had taken many of these back to the Catholic Church. The parties to this Union, finally incited by the forced conversion of the Protestant imperial city of Donauwerth, brought this organization into life, with the Count Palatine for its nominal head, though its most active member was Christian, of Anhalt. But the Protestants were not all in it, and did not come strongly to the aid of the Bohemian insurrection, where it might have defeated the Emperor's first movement and prevented Ferdinand II. from taking possession of the thrones of Bohemia, Hungary, and the Empire.

In short, let the reader keep steadily in mind that the Emperor was ceremonial head of the Imperial Diet, and also its chief executive. He was generally, also, a local prince, and had seats in the Diet for his several principalities, as Ferdinand II., for Bohemia and the Austrian duchies, which seats were occupied by his deputies. The princes were supreme in their respective territories, and appeared in the Diet for themselves, and not for their subjects, unless they had given their power away, as in the religious peace of 1552 and 1555. In this peace, whatever good it might have done at the time, were sown the seeds of the Thirty Years' War. Some of its provisions were so absurdly artificial, and so in contravention of the natural course of the Reformation and of all progress, that the Protestant sovereigns could scarcely be expected to observe them. They were an attempt to crystallize the Reformation. This could not be done

without violence to the constitution of the human mind. Of course the work went on : Protestant princes allowed and encouraged it, and Church property passed over with the people. When, therefore, the Jesuits had inaugurated the reaction, there was a vast amount of work for the Catholic powers to do, and there were plausible grounds in the terms of the religious peace for entering upon it. Ferdinand II., as executive of the Empire, returned over the interval and attempted to bring the movement back to the point where the Diet of Passau, about seventy years before, had agreed to have it stop, and this he did, doubtless, as a kind of legal preliminary step to the full restoration of the Empire and the world to the bosom of the Catholic Church.

With these suggestions, explanatory of the intricacies of the politics of the German Empire of those times, the reader is invited to review the history of this great struggle, perhaps the last formal one to reduce all personality in Christendom to the standard of an order—perhaps it were better to say, to annihilate all personality. It would almost seem, indeed, as if Providence had allowed this conflict between freedom of religious thought and thought in general on the one hand, and the subjection of all thinking on the other, to a process like that wrought by the implements of the artificer, to come on at a time when the artificial system was under the lead of the most perfect organization ever formed, and the party of free thought was in disintegration, in order that it might appear in which of the two systems humanity's strength, and destiny, and the divine order of development, lay.

One of the greatest obstacles to progress in historical study, indeed an objection in many minds to reading his-

tory at all, is the difficulty of mastering the geography of the countries concerned in it. Without its geography the history of a country is but as a rumor from some imaginary land. Who does not recollect, for instance, his utter mental confusion on meeting the name Burgundy in his reading as the designation of a country? At one time this land seemed to be here, and again there, and then somewhere else, and it would not be strange if many a mind well-informed in history were never relieved from this confusion. All historical reading and study have suffered from this same difficulty, which we have now the means of removing, or at least of relieving. Of these the reader is invited to avail himself, so as to thoroughly understand the map of Europe, and especially that of the German Empire as it existed in the year 1618, at the beginning of the Thirty Years' War, and then he will be able to appreciate its condition when the war closed in the peace of Westphalia, in 1648.

CHAPTER I.

THE THROWING FROM THE WINDOWS.

- I. The Principles which govern the Author's Account of the Thirty Years' War. II. The Archduke Ferdinand and his Measures for securing the Succession after the Emperor's Death. III. Thurn and the Bohemian Opposition: the "Acceptance" of Ferdinand as King of Bohemia. IV. The Liberties of the Protestants abridged. V. The Throwing from the Windows, and the Establishment of the Government of the Directors.

I.

THE cause of the murderous war which, for thirty years of the seventeenth century, lacerated Central Europe is to be sought chiefly in the incompatibility of the religious views which prevailed among the peoples of the time. The discord, indeed, continues to this day, but utters itself no longer in bloody conflicts. The ground, however, of the pacific disposition which now obtains lies either in general indifference or in spreading skepticism. While Catholics and Protestants maintained their earlier zeal for their faith, their convictions of the truth of their opinions and the errors of their opponents were of a kind which, in our time, we seek in vain, even in men of most rigid beliefs, and which is now exemplified only among the national party leaders of a land where two languages are spoken, and there, only in a milder form. Is it then a matter of wonder that religious conflict then raged more wildly than does now the political, and that satisfaction was found, not in the subjugation, but in the

extermination, of the opposing party? It would be unreasonable to ascribe to one of the religious parties alone the guilt of this fierce struggle; they were equally guilty. If, in one land, the one received harder blows than it dealt out, the account was nevertheless balanced in some other. To be just in judging the contending personalities, we may not make the efforts of our own party our rule of fitness for the dispensing of our praise and blame. We should judge them by the ability with which they filled their places and carried out their plans; by the self-sacrificing spirit which actuated them in relation to their associates, and should inquire also whether they observed, and in what manner they observed, those eternal, moral laws which are respected alike by all Christian nations. Led by these principles, we can rightly judge such men as Ferdinand II., Maximilian of Bavaria, and Gustavus Adolphus, and do them justice, although their action was so opposite that the approval of the one seems to involve the condemnation of the other.

But disagreement in religious convictions was not the sole cause of the war. The insubordination of the Estates in Austria, the avidity of the princes to enrich themselves at the cost of the Church property, the ambition of individual party leaders, who could be satisfied only in a general disorder, contributed so largely to the kindling of the conflagration as to make it doubtful to what particular the greater guilt should be ascribed. But whatever may have kindled the strife, it is certain that its long duration was caused only by material interests. Though ideal views may give rise to a war, this once begun, the material questions of possession and power advance to the front and become, in contests which the party at first defeated would have been glad to end by yielding somewhat, the

sole causes of continuance. All the princes and statesmen who came successively to participate in the Thirty Years' War wished to augment their power by triumph. This is true of Ferdinand II. and Maximilian of Bavaria; of Louis XIII., and his minister, Cardinal Richelieu; of Gustavus Adolphus and Oxenstiern. Having once drawn the sword, the question was the same with all—increase of territory and people. All the words with which they tried to conceal this purpose were empty phrases, which never deceived those who employed them. We would not, however, deny that Ferdinand II. and Gustavus Adolphus, each in his way, regarded themselves as chosen instruments of God, and that their efforts were not, like those of Louis XIII., governed by mere desire of conquest. It is, however, a sad aspect of human life, that no ideal endeavors—the religious any more than the political and national—are fully successful, except in the material ruin of antagonists, and that their representatives, however well disposed, cannot but take into consideration these consequences of success. Such views guide us in the following narrative: whether they furnish a just rule, and whether we, in every instance, rightly apply this rule, we leave to the judgment of our readers.

II.

It is known that the dissensions between the Emperor Rudolph II. and his brother, Matthias, which began in the year 1600, arose chiefly because the former would not come to a decision in regard to the succession in the lands which he ruled. Matthias had, therefore, just cause of complaint, since the house of Hapsburg was surrounded with secret and open enemies, who waited only for op-

portunity to put an end to their dominion in its several territories. In the contest which broke out between the two brothers in the year 1608, the younger was victor, and entered, while the elder still lived, upon the possession of all the countries of Austria.* As he had no children by his cousin, the Archduchess Anna, of Tyrol, the Hapsburg princes, after his entry upon the government, apprehending that the Estates of Hungary and Bohemia might take advantage of his dying without immediate heirs, and dispose of the throne at pleasure, made the same demand of Matthias that he had made of Rudolph, that he should, in his own lifetime, place the crowns of Hungary and Bohemia upon the head of the presumptive heir. His heirs were his two brothers, Maximilian and Albert; but as they were old and infirm, they renounced their rights in favor of their nearest relative and cousin, the Archduke Ferdinand, of Styria. Difficulties, however, started partly by the King of Spain, and partly by the imperial favorite and minister, Bishop Khlesl, stood in the way of his immediate recognition.

Philip III., of Spain, claimed that he had more rights than Ferdinand to Hungary and Bohemia, since, as son of a daughter of Maximilian II., he was in the direct line from that Emperor; while Ferdinand was descended but from a brother of the same. Philip would, indeed, have had the prior claim to Hungary and Bohemia, had the direct female line in these lands, as in Spain and England, been preferred to the indirect male line. This, however, was not so, and still the rights in the case were not incontestable. The Hapsburgs themselves had allowed the Estates of Hun-

* That is, Austria proper, Hungary and Bohemia, together with the dependencies of the crown of the latter, namely, Moravia and parts of Lusatia and Silesia.—TR.

gary a certain vague right of election, which was last exercised in the case of Matthias himself. This occurred also on the same occasion in Bohemia, because Matthias, on account of his brother's enmity, must renounce his hereditary right and be elected by the Estates. To all these circumstances no regard was paid on the Spanish side. Philip claimed the succession as his undoubted right, and would enter into no negotiations except with the princes of his house. Such were, however, the circumstances, that in case the right of the Hapsburgs were not contested, then the Archduke Ferdinand was the called heir, since in Bohemia, as in Hungary, precedent agreed with legal decisions that the female line could be called to reign only after the extinction of the male line.

Ferdinand, when informed of the claims of Philip, was in difficulty. If he should call upon the Hungarian and Bohemian Estates to decide the question, he might indeed hope that the Catholics would reject the Spanish pretensions. On the other hand, however, it was certain that the Protestants would use their opportunity, once for all, to set aside the hereditary right of the Hapsburgs—at least they would strongly contest this right. He deemed it therefore most prudent to enter into confidential negotiations with his Spanish cousin for the purpose of buying him off with promises—which promises, however, were doubtful as to the possibility of their fulfilment. Philip, foreseeing that his claims in Hungary and Bohemia would meet with decided opposition, showed himself inclined to enter into negotiations, which were accordingly opened between the Spanish ambassador, Zúñiga, and Ferdinand's confidential agent, Herr von Eggenberg. After a year's correspondence back and forth, Philip offered to renounce his inheritance in consideration of an indemnity, and, in

addition to other things, he demanded the cession of Alsace. The Archduke, however, at this point suggested difficulties, and the harmonizing of the claimants was adjourned to the future. In this issue no one rejoiced more than Bishop Khlesl, who hoped that no agreement would be arrived at during the life of the Emperor, that he might not be forced from his influential position by any successor to the throne.

Khlesl did not, in this respect, labor in the interests of the Hapsburgs. He was a baker's son, who, from a low position, had, by diligence and ability, won respect, and finally risen to be bishop of the new city, Vienna. His spiritual functions did not prevent his taking an important part in the political affairs of the day, by which he gained the confidence of the Archduke Matthias, with a gradually increasing influence over him. When the Archduke rose against Rudolph, Khlesl was in fact, if not indeed in name, his first minister, and the weightiest matters of both home and foreign policy turned upon his decisions. His power to labor and his knowledge of affairs fitted him perfectly for the place; and if his action did not leave decided traces, it was because circumstances forbade. What fruit, indeed, could the activity of a bishop, though ever so gifted, yield in a land whose Estates were mostly Protestant, and would not recognize a government which should interfere with the independence of the several lands, or require the subjection of these under a single princely house? His plans of reform in the Austrian state affairs, though they never came into application, prove him to have been a statesman. Among other things, he intended a reorganization of the Austrian army, which involved also a plan of finance; but his reformatory endeavors miscarried in the outset. Thence-

forth his chief action was transferred to the suppression of Protestantism, by endeavoring to circumscribe the legal position which had been won for it in 1609. His chief measure, however, to this end was to hold fast to his own power. For this purpose he labored secretly to prevent Matthias from securing to his cousin Ferdinand the succession in Bohemia and Hungary. He feared, for instance, that Ferdinand would assume the first place in the imperial council, and that his representatives—especially Eggenberg—would, by their greater influence, shove him aside. Ambition, therefore, caused the director of the secret cabinet—for Khlesl had for some years borne this title—to place obstacles in the way of Ferdinand. That the Emperor should have allowed himself to be influenced by this man to delay the determination of the succession may be easily conceived, since a living man does not like to be placed in the ranks of the dead. Matthias should, however, have remembered his own conduct towards his brother, and have acted otherwise.

Ferdinand must quietly bear the ill-will of Khlesl, that he might not offend the Emperor. But the Archduke Maximilian managed his case with more boldness, although, in the year 1615, he had to relax his efforts, as the report was abroad that the Empress was in expectation of issue. When, however, the time of the expected confinement had passed by without the birth of an heir, and the Empress had probably otherwise explained her condition, Maximilian became bolder, and charged the Bishop with inventing this fiction in regard to the Empress, in order to throw confusion into the settlement of the succession. He journeyed to Germany that he might sound for the Catholic electors the key-note in favor of Ferdinand's election; and he attained his end. He next

went to Prague, where the Emperor then held his court, with the design of extorting from him and his minister a promise of Ferdinand's immediate elevation. When Khlesl promised, "by word, by hand-grasp, and by his hope of salvation," to give him the most earnest support, and uttered the hope that by Christmas (1616) Ferdinand would receive the crown of Bohemia, Maximilian thought that he might expect with certainty the summoning of an Electoral Diet, and also Diets for Bohemia and Hungary to determine the succession, and quietly left Prague. But when a year had elapsed and Khlesl's word was not fulfilled, he resorted to threats, and wrote him "he should be careful, for his delays would not effect his purpose." Khlesl, who just at this time received the cardinal's hat, threw this threat to the winds and sought at once to awaken the Emperor's distrust of both his brother and his cousin. This conduct irritated the Archduke to that degree that he asked Ferdinand in what way they could render the Cardinal harmless; whether it were not better to make him a prisoner, or even poison him. Advised adversely as to these violent measures, Maximilian, in order by his personal presence to apply the needed pressure to the Emperor, visited Prague. He arrived there in January, 1617; but several months transpired, and he was no nearer the attainment of his end.

At this time the rival claims of Ferdinand and Philip were settled by Count Oñate, whom Philip had sent to the Archduke's residence in Gratz, for the purpose. Ferdinand declared himself ready, in case he should mount the imperial throne, to convey to his Spanish cousin all his fiefs in Italy which should become vacant. In regard to the cession of Alsace, he referred the Count to Prague, whither he then accompanied Oñate. Here the embas-

sador brought his master's demand in regard to Alsace before an imperial commission, composed of Khlesl and other members of the imperial privy council, and still further demanded that, in case of the extinction of Ferdinand's male issue, the male issue of the Spanish King should take the precedence of Ferdinand's female issue. This latter claim was conceded by all, while the other was rejected, and it was suspected—not without ground—that Khlesl expressed himself adversely simply to put off the settlement between Ferdinand and Philip. In order to end all delays, however, Ferdinand determined to yield; but he confided his decision only to Eggenberg—the two agreeing that this should be kept a secret from Khlesl and the Emperor. He gave Count Oñate a bond in which he obligated himself to the cession of Alsace, but still indirectly addressed a request to the King of Spain not to accept this sacrifice, but content himself with the smaller offers made at Gratz. He at the same time conceded the precedence of the King's male to his own female issue. Oñate then declared to the Emperor and the Cardinal that Philip would, in the meantime, be satisfied with the preference conceded to his male issue, and thus disposed of the Cardinal's excuse that the Spanish negotiations must be closed before the crowns could be conveyed to Ferdinand. Maximilian was also in Prague, and kept quiet up to this point, but now stormed more loudly than ever, hurling his threats around him, and thus forcing from the Cardinal a promise that he would call a Diet for the coronation at Prague for the month of August. The two Archdukes, satisfied with the promise, departed; but the Emperor fell into an illness of such nature that his immediate death was apprehended, and the Catholic portion of the Bohemian authorities em-

phatically declared their wish that the succession should be determined without delay. Ceaselessly tormented, and indeed carried by storm, growing more anxious as the Emperor's symptoms became more threatening, Khlesl finally consented that a Diet should be summoned for the 5th of June. The letters missive were quickly issued; and this was scarcely done when the Emperor recovered. But that which had been done could not be recalled, earnestly as Khlesl may have wished it.

The dangers which led Ferdinand and his party to urge the decision of the succession were not imaginary, as is clear from a report of Baron Christopher von Dohna, whom the Elector of the Palatinate sent, in the beginning of the year 1617, to Bohemia and Austria, as a diplomatic agent, to study the situation there. As early as the year 1608 the party of the Palatinate cherished great hopes from the discords in Austria, had formed intimate relations with the Protestant party leaders there, and desired now to gather the fruits. In Dohna's report of his journey he pictured the Austrian monarchy as on the eve of dissolution, each of its several lands having its pretender, who waited only for the Emperor's death that he might raise his head. Hungary had a prince who knew something of the Magyar tongue, and had some prospect of success in the contest for the crown; in Moravia and Austria, Prince Liechtenstein was speculating; the Union of German Protestants enjoyed, however, in these lands the highest confidence, and the wish prevailed that it should be sparing in the use of its resources that, when the sword should once be drawn, it might hold out. At the same time, also, came the Palatine Counsellor Camerarius to Prague, renewed the old alliances, and exhorted the friends not at any price to consent to the

elevation of Ferdinand. There can therefore be no doubt that danger threatened the Hapsburgs.

The convocation of the Diet to determine the succession awakened a great sensation in Bohemia, and called forth a mighty stir among the party leaders. The Catholics hailed this step with unconcealed joy, for it opened to them the prospect of being ruled by a prince who would not pursue towards the Protestants the feeble policy of his predecessor, but had given proof in his previous course that he was resolved upon aggression as well as defence.

Ferdinand, afterwards Emperor and the second of this name, was the eldest son of the Archduke Charles and the Bavarian Princess Mary. Charles, who in the division which his father, Ferdinand I., made of his territorial possessions, received Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola, died in 1590, when his eldest son was but twelve years of age, so that the government must be a regency. The youthful prince had begun his studies in Gratz, under the direction of the Jesuits, and continued them in the University of Ingolstadt, which was also a Jesuit institution. His teachers testified that he was commendably diligent, and excelled in the mathematical sciences. But he manifested above all a deep sense of religion, and was untiring in his attendance on the services of the Church, participating in processions and prayers. He had a monkish nature, which repelled him from youthful pleasures, and drew him to ascetic contemplation, and a life of self-denial. The Jesuits, without perceiving the injury they were doing their pupil by rendering him less fit for the position to which he was called, fully developed this native tendency. Ferdinand squandered his time in scrupulous acts of piety, and so continued through life. He

failed, therefore, to win the qualities desirable in a ruler, and on account of his defective education was never able to understand the affairs of war and peace.

After closing his studies at Ingolstadt, Ferdinand, not yet seventeen years of age, assumed the reins of government, which he should not have done before the completion of his eighteenth year. Soon after, and as if by way of preparation, he travelled to Italy, where he was treated with marked distinction by Pope Clement VIII. He then visited Loretto, the renowned resort of pilgrims, where, as his confessor, Lamormain, testifies, he took a vow that he would, though this should be at the peril of life, extinguish all sects and heresy in his hereditary lands. Then he visited at Florence his sister, the Grand-Duchess there, and returned to Gratz. At this time and during the ensuing years he grew still more devout. He dedicated to prayer and religious contemplation at least from two to three hours daily. After an extended morning prayer, he attended mass twice in immediate succession ; he was present also at the afternoon service, devoted during the day a stated time to self-examination, and closed these spiritual exercises with an evening prayer. On Sundays and holidays he regularly heard two sermons, and the reading of religious books was perhaps the only additional literary occupation to which he turned his attention. He often declared to his confessor that he would on no account damage the interests of the Church, and that he would go a-begging rather than act in violation of duty. In all matters of importance he sought the counsel of his confessor and some prominent theologians of the Jesuit order.

Ferdinand demeaned himself as a ruler in a manner answering to his education and his religious devotion.

He never developed a systematic and energetic action in finance, in the management of the affairs of the interior, or of war, but limited his participation in administrative affairs to an attendance of the meetings of the privy council. He followed strictly the decisions of his council-board, and especially the opinion of his confidential counsellor, Eggenberg; he decided nothing independently. He justified later his pliant course by saying that he would rather have his ministers bear the responsibility of weighty transactions than burden his conscience by acting for himself. What further time he had at his disposal he devoted to the pleasures of the chase, of which he was passionately fond, gave at least three to four days of each week to this noble diversion, and no demands of business, though ever so pressing, could keep him from it. In addition to the chase, which cost him very considerable sums, he, in common with all the Hapsburgs, loved music, and, like Maximilian II., appropriated large amounts in obtaining eminent artists. In pursuing these private pleasures, he paid no regard to the limited incomes and financial embarrassment of his lands. He was even more lavish in rewarding the labors of his confidential servants. If large sums fell into his hands, he could not keep them twenty-four hours, and either gave these away unasked, or allowed them to be begged from him, thus acting in defiance of the public needs. His expensive mode of life and his extravagant gifts reveal the secret of his sinking, notwithstanding the wholesale confiscations which fell into his hands, ever more deeply into financial distress, and of his being unable, not only in Bohemia, but also in Germany, to maintain the results of the victories which, in the beginning, he achieved.

In one branch, however, of his governmental action he

exhibited a perseverance and an energy quite in contrast with his usual laxity, and in this attained to great results: we refer to the execution of his vow made at Loretto, that is, to the contest with the Protestants. On his assumption of the government of Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola, the people of these lands were mostly Protestants; only a few of the nobility still adhered to the Catholic Church; this was true alike in the cities and among the peasantry. While yet in his youth, this ruler ventured upon a struggle with the enemies of his faith to drive them step by step from his possessions. He began the execution of his purpose by expelling Protestant preachers from the cities, and putting Catholics in their places and compelling the citizens to accept the Catholic faith. From this he passed over to the domains of the nobility, forcing the peasantry upon these to attend Catholic worship, and allowing only to the nobles themselves a little personal consideration. That he would also extend his aggressive action to them could not be doubted, for already he tolerated no Protestant in his service or about his person. Those noblemen who had as yet sunned themselves in the favor of the court, but would not renounce their faith, must relinquish their places. His mother—the Archduchess Mary—was, in the first year of his reformatory work, on a journey to Spain, whither she accompanied her daughter, who afterwards became the wife of Philip III. In her letters she exhorted her son to perseverance, gave him divers counsels, forwarding to the best of her ability the longed-for work of reformation. Her exhortations were at least superfluous; her son devoted himself to the discharge of his vow, disregarding the perils which beset the resort to compulsory

action, and casting to the winds the well-meant warnings of timid friends.

Ferdinand, combination as he was about half and half of monk and prince, was, as to person, of middle stature, compact form, with hair inclining to red, and blue eyes. His clothing and the cut of his hair suggested the Spaniard; his kind and courtly demeanor toward all who had intercourse with him showed that his inner nature was rather German than Spanish. At the period of our introducing him in action he was already a widower. His first marriage was with his cousin, a sister of Maximilian of Bavaria, who was about four years older than himself, bore him several children, and died prematurely from weaknesses which existed even before her marriage. He married, in the year 1622, the Princess Eleanor of Mantua, to which second marriage we shall have occasion to refer more particularly hereafter. His most prominent confidential counsellor was Baron von Eggenberg, originally a Protestant, who afterwards became a Catholic, and whom he adorned, after the suppression of the Bohemian insurrection, with princely honors and dignities and endowed with immense wealth. Also Baron Harrach, whom he afterwards made a count, exercised a pre-eminent influence over him; as did also, in the affairs of Bohemia, his Chancellor, Zdenek von Lobkowitz.

III.

In view of these traits of the claimant of the throne, we can conceive the delight with which the Catholics looked to the future, as also the restless discontent of the Protestants. Not without distrust could they contemplate a change of administration. It was therefore nat-

ural that the party leaders should place obstacles in the way of Ferdinand's elevation. It was not a native nobleman, however, who placed himself at their head, but a foreigner, who had never mastered the language of the country, and had nevertheless risen to the highest authority. This man was Count Henry Matthias von Thurn.

The earliest fortunes of the young Henry Matthias supplied nothing from which his later career could be inferred. His father was a wealthy man in Bohemia, and died in 1586; the young man was not, therefore, brought up in his father's house, but sent, in earliest youth, to Carniola, to his cousin, Count Hans Ambrosius Thurn, provincial governor of Carniola, with whom he grew up. Hans Ambrosius was a zealous Catholic, and one of the most trusted servants and counsellors of the mother of Ferdinand II. It is natural to infer, from these friendly personal relations, that the Styrian line of the Hapsburgs would be mentioned only with respect and love in the house of Count Ambrosius, and that the impressions first made upon the youthful mind of Matthias Thurn could not have been hostile to Ferdinand. Whether, born of Protestant parents as he was, he had, in the course of his religious education, received the faith of his adoptive parents, we are without means of knowing. This is indeed possible; but from his first appearance in public life he was a Protestant. As a young man he was in the imperial military service, fought against the Turks in Hungary, and rose finally to the command of a regiment of cavalry.

After Thurn took up his residence in Bohemia he gave much attention to the religious state of the country. In the Diet of 1609, at which Bohemia obtained the Letter of Majesty, or Royal Charter, as we shall call it, he stood

in the front rank of the opposition and held the command of the troops of the Estates when the Protestants armed themselves to force the Emperor Rudolph to terms of conciliation. He had indeed no opportunity to win military renown, and yet his name became known throughout Bohemia. His firmness procured for him great respect among the Protestants, and he was looked upon as their military head, as Budowec, an adherent of the Bohemian Brethren, was, on account of his political and literary activity, regarded as their intellectual leader.

The letters missive summoned the Estates to appear at a Diet for the purpose of "accepting" the Archduke Ferdinand as king. The word "acceptance" was used at the elevation of Maximilian II. and Rudolph II. to the throne of Bohemia, and served at that time as the symbol of the hereditary rights of the Hapsburgs. But Rudolph, having been forced by his brother to concede to him the succession, summoned the Bohemian Diet, in the year 1608, not for his "acceptance," but for his "election." The party of the government resolved, before entering into the perilous contest in the Diet, to prepare the ground by an endeavor to win over, or intimidate, the opposition, and recommended confidential negotiations as the fittest means to this end. Under the pretence of a consultation in regard to the extinguishment of the royal debts, the most prominent members of the nobility were invited to a conference in the chancery office. After some random remarks about the debts, discourse was directed to the approaching elevation of Ferdinand, which was spoken of by the friends of the Archduke as a matter not to be questioned. The majority of those present were either won or intimidated by the confidence with

which the expectation was expressed. A few, however, did not allow themselves to be surprised into an utterance; they perceived with what purpose they had been called, and refused to express their views on a subject properly considered only in the Diet. Having thus revealed their opposition to Ferdinand's elevation, they were admonished by his partisans that it would be well for them to have each two heads. Some of the opposition were frightened by this threat, and kept away from the transactions of the Diet for want of courage to maintain their opinions.

On the 5th of June, 1617, the Diet was opened. Before the ceremonial opening, at which Matthias himself was to be present, at an early hour of the morning all the high functionaries and counsellors were summoned to the Chancellor's office, where the terms of the royal proposition to be laid before the Estates were communicated to them. Those invited, with the exception of Thurn, all appeared. The chief Burggrave, Adam von Sternberg, made a friendly address, specially framed to conciliate the Protestants. He represented that the succession was settled and unavoidable; it would therefore be better quietly and peaceably to accept this state of things, thus laying the future King under the obligations of gratitude, than to embitter him by a useless opposition. He then called upon those present to deliver their views, according to station and duty. The first who declined to follow out this suggestion was William von Lobkowitz. He answered that he should not give his opinion until he gave it in the Diet; and he persisted in his refusal, although the Chancellor commanded him, as a counsellor of the King and the country, to speak. His example was followed by Ruppa, who gave utterance to his astonishment

that the "acceptance" and not the "election" of a King was proposed. He protested, in his own name and in the names of several of his friends, against this proceeding. The chief Burggrave replied: "Heaven keep me from representing such a view, unless I had two heads." The Chief-Justice, Herr von Talmberg, who belonged to the royal party, answered, nevertheless, that he had understood from his youth that to the Estates of Bohemia appertained the right freely to elect their King. To this the Chancellor replied: "It is indeed true, my good friend, that we boast of special privileges before other peoples, and especially of the right to elect our kings; but if we should aver this right, we should be in a sad case, since among all our charters there is none which establishes our elective right."

After these words the Chancellor, who was well prepared for Ruppa's objections, began a detailed statement of the facts in relation to the Bohemian succession. He showed that the crown of Bohemia, since it came into the possession of the house of Hapsburg, in the year 1526, had been transmitted, not by election, but by inheritance, from one possessor to another, and that the evidence of this was to be found in the documents and precedents of the sixteenth century. The natural conclusion from his statement was that the instance of 1608 was an innovation, and could not be cited as an authoritative precedent. The argument of the Chancellor produced a visible effect. Talmberg was the first to acknowledge that he had changed his convictions, and that in Bohemia the crown was simply hereditary. The members of the nobility also, whose opposition found its origin and nutriment in the doubtful sense of documents, and not in the circumstances of the present time, grew hesitating and

made no further objections. Even Budowec was silent, and Ruppa did not repeat his former assertion.

As to the Chancellor's proofs of the hereditary rights of the Hapsburgs, their correctness is unassailable. It is a fact that the Bohemian Estates declared in 1526 that the Golden Bull, which established the hereditary right for the house of Luxemburg, should thenceforward be valid also for the house of Hapsburg. It is also a fact that Maximilian II. and Rudolph II. were not by the Estates of Bohemia elected, but simply "accepted" as Kings. The acknowledgment of hereditary right, which lay, according to the conception of the time, in the word "acceptance," had been twice unhesitatingly given by the Bohemian Estates. It is, however, equally true that the year 1608 introduced a change. At that time Rudolph summoned the Estates to *elect* his brother as King, and they proceeded to the election. If the supporters of the Hapsburg dynasty would not acknowledge the validity of the action of 1608 as a precedent, because it was an innovation and not in harmony with the law as it had existed up to 1607, they were correct in their position as to the right of innovation.

In the meantime the Estates had assembled in the hall of the Diet. When, about nine o'clock in the morning, the Emperor sent a message to inform them that he was disposed to appear in their midst, the high officials went forth accordingly to meet and escort him into the hall. Matthias seated himself upon the throne, and on his right and left sat the two Archdukes, Maximilian and Ferdinand. The contents of the royal proposition were to the effect, that, on account of advancing age, he felt it necessary to determine the succession, and, as his brothers on like grounds had renounced all claims to elevation, he

had turned his attention to his dearly beloved cousin, the Archduke Ferdinand, and prayed the Estates "to accept, proclaim, and crown" him as King. The instrument by which the Archdukes Maximilian and Albert declined their rights in their cousin's favor was then read. The decisive transactions were begun in the Diet on the following day by calling upon the higher officials, according to usage, to express themselves in regard to Ferdinand's elevation, which was done in the order of their rank. When Thurn was called, he protested at length against the substitution of "acceptance" for "election," and against the exclusion of the dependent lands;* the Archduke Ferdinand, he added by way of moderating the tone of his protest, would no doubt prefer that his future reign should be a peaceful one, and would not, therefore, by slighting the other lands, give rise to distrust and dissatisfaction.

Instead of continuing the voting, the chief Burggrave rose and attempted to overthrow Thurn's view by making an application of the Chancellor's arguments, showing, in a striking manner and by the citation of several precedents, that the Bohemian Estates, in filling the throne, never troubled themselves about the concurrences of other lands. Thurn replied that he was free, just as any other man, and that he should persevere in the view which he had expressed. The holders of territorial rights, whose turn came next to that of the officials, voted, with the exception of Colonna von Fels, who shared the view of Thurn, for Ferdinand. All the other members of the nobility voted for Ferdinand, even Ruppa having yielded to

* The lands here meant are Moravia and parts of Silesia and Lusatia, which were attached to the crown of Bohemia.—Tr.

the Chancellor's argument. Count Andrew Schlick, on whose support the opposition had counted, expressed himself to the effect that he had originally designed to move the summoning of the dependent lands and the adjournment of the election; but the proofs of the hereditary rights of the house of Hapsburg which had been adduced had convinced him, and, as a true subject of that house, he felt himself under obligation to vote for Ferdinand's elevation.

The knighthood and other deputies of the cities, who also voted one by one, all followed the example of loyalty which had been set, and, after a few minutes of question and response, the chief Burggrave was able to announce that the three Estates of the kingdom had almost unanimously "accepted," not elected, Ferdinand as King. Thus the hereditary right of the Hapsburgs, which they themselves had a few years before almost given up, was restored in the person of the Archduke Ferdinand, of Styria, now King of Bohemia, to its full splendor.

The opposition had sustained, in the question of the King, a defeat; but they attempted to win success in another field. Usage required that a successor, whose succession was fixed beforehand in the life of a reigning King, must promise to confirm, at his entrance upon his administration, all the privileges of the land, and that too without being called upon by any detailed specifications. Nor could the opposition content itself with the general formula, but demanded that Ferdinand assent to a confirmation of their privileges entire in "all points and clauses," and they obtained for their motion the majority of the votes in the Diet. By this vote the Royal Charter was to be secured against all attacks whatever.

That this precaution was needed became more evident when we know that Ferdinand instituted a consultation among prominent theologians of the Jesuit College in Prague, putting to them the question whether he should accede to the demands of the Estates, as he should thereby indirectly confirm the Royal Charter. The answer was a unanimous affirmation, and its ground was that, although it would not have been right for him to issue it, yet, as it had already been issued, he might confirm it. In accordance with this advice, he gave his assent to the promise as formulated by the Estates, and the coronation might proceed forthwith, which accordingly took place on the 19th of June, 1617, attended with the ancient pomp and splendor.

That Ferdinand would take advantage of every opportunity to suppress the opposition of the Bohemian Estates was clear from the treatment which they received publicly under his influence. Only Thurn and Fels had voted against his acceptance as King; and yet seven of the party leaders were summoned to the royal chancery, and not only warned, but threatened, relatively to their action in the Diet. A few months later Thurn received a punishment which wounded him more deeply; he was promoted from the post of Burggrave of Carlstein, with which was connected a yearly income of about 8,000 thalers, to that of High Judgeship in the Court of Fiefs, with an income of 400 thalers. This, however, was but the initial step to further and more stringent measures for hastening the destruction of Protestantism, and for which a handle was found in the perplexed laws of the year 1609.

IV.

The Royal Charter of 1609, granted by the Emperor Rudolph for governing the ecclesiastical relations in Bohemia, was not the only law respecting these affairs. Contemporaneously with this Charter, an "Adjustment" was concluded between the Catholic and Protestant Estates, and acknowledged by the Emperor. This contained provisions of much broader import than the Royal Charter itself. The latter provided simply that each inhabitant of Bohemia, without distinction of rank, that is, the peasant as well as the nobleman, might give up the old Utraquism of the Compacts,* and receive the Bohemian Confession, which was, indeed, prepared in 1575, but not at that time recognized as a Bohemian Confession, and was of decidedly Protestant tone. They should, indeed, retain the name of Utraquist, but it should have henceforth another meaning. The right to build churches was, in the Royal Charter, granted only to the three higher Estates, that is, to the nobility, the knighthood, and the royal cities. On the contrary, the Adjustment provided (1) that the proprietary rights, as between Utraquists and Catholics to churches and other

* The followers of Huss claimed that the laity should receive the communion "*sub utraque specie*," that is, under the two forms of bread and wine. They were therefore called Utraquists. They were also called Calixtines, from the Latin *calix*, a cup. The "Compacts" were articles of agreement settled at Prague, November 30, 1433, between the Papal legate, Cardinal Cesarini and the Utraquist bishop, John Rokyczana (Rokitzana). These articles embraced four points of concession to the Hussites; the *first* related to the free preaching of the word of God; the *second* to the dispensation of the cup to the laity; the *third* conceded the demands of the Hussites that the management of ecclesiastical finances should be by the laity, and not by the clergy; the *fourth* related to the deadly sins, such as lewdness, simony, etc.—TR.

corporate property, should remain as they were in the year 1609, and (2) that subjects living upon the royal domains might build churches. To these latter, therefore, were granted a right which in the rest of the country only the higher ranks enjoyed.

On the occasion of the negotiations for the Adjustment, the Protestants made the remark that according to the old conception in the country, they reckoned the ecclesiastical with the royal domains. In this position they were right, so far as this: the Kings of Bohemia did claim a kind of manorial right over Church lands, and in financial straits often managed them at pleasure. By a peculiar law, which formed an article in the Bohemian constitution, only the domains of the metropolitan chapter were exempt from this arbitrary treatment. The Catholics also deferred to the view that the King might act at pleasure in regard to the ecclesiastical lands, and a few years before these contests the Chancellor, Zdenek von Lobkowitz, defended in a decision this royal usage. It would have been better if the Protestants in 1609 had made mention of the ecclesiastical with the royal domains, thus cutting off future occasions of strife. Perhaps they did not do this for fear of meeting from the Catholics with a resistance which they might not overcome, and hoped that they would still practically enforce their claims, since usage confirmed their view of the ecclesiastical as being part of the royal domains.

It was not long before contests over this point broke out. The Protestant citizens of Braunau—a city belonging to the abbot of the Benedictine monastery of the same name—determined to build a church, and arranged, both in the country and abroad, for collecting the means.

When the building was done, the abbot laid a complaint before Rudolph's successor, Matthias, and obtained a decision in his favor. Matthias was not therefore inclined to hold strictly to the law of 1609, or would not, in case of indistinctness or ambiguity, trouble himself to avoid strifes by an understanding with the Estates. Nor did he content himself with this decision, but transferred the oversight of all the pastors on the royal domains to the Archbishop of Prague, and thus prepared the way of bringing them over to the Catholic faith, since the Archbishop supplied all vacant churches with priests consecrated according to the Catholic ritual. In case of the Utraquists he made no other distinction than to allow them to receive the communion in both forms. In the year 1614 the Archbishop acted even more stringently than had the abbot of Braunau. The Protestant inhabitants of the small city of Klostergrab, which belonged to him, had also built a church, of which he not only prohibited the use, but shut it up, while the abbot confined himself to complaints.

In the religious laws of 1609 the Protestants were given the authority to choose from each Estate a certain number of persons who should manage their ecclesiastical affairs. These persons, who were called *Defensors*, had, since the year 1611, been dissatisfied with the course of the Emperor and the Catholics. They had allowed this long period to elapse without presenting a single complaint, but thought that they ought not longer remain silent, and so in the general Diet, held in Prague in 1615, brought in complaints, not only in regard to the churches of Klostergrab and Braunau, but also in regard to the settlement of pastors on the royal domains. Matthias for a long time did not condescend to make any reply, and only

after repeated urging called three of the Defensors to Brandeis—a place near Prague, on the Elbe—where appeared before him, in the name of the nobility, Count Thurn; for the knighthood, Ulrich von Gersdorf; and for the cities, Simon Kohout, of Lichtenfels. The Emperor received them in the presence of the Chancellor, and gave them through the latter an answer which was distinguished by its directness, its brevity, and its severity: "What ye have brought before me," said the Chancellor, in the Emperor's name, "in relation to Klostergrab and Braunau, I have understood; I am not disposed to admit that the tenants on the domains of the Church may be allowed to build churches. As to the placing of pastors upon my domains, I will not rank myself below one of you, who are permitted to receive priests from the Archbishop." In order to render this latter remark intelligible, we add, that in the "Adjustment" the holders of manorial lands were allowed to place in their Utraquistic parishes priests consecrated by the Archbishop, provided they bound themselves to dispense the communion in both forms. It is simply inconceivable that the Protestants could consent to this arrangement; in this way indeed their parishes might become Catholic, for since the Council of Trent the bishops might permit pastors to dispense the Supper under both forms. It depended only upon the proprietor of a manor what he should decide to do. In this point, so peculiarly worded, the Protestants of the time showed their complete incapacity for the framing of important and comprehensive laws. The Emperor now desired to avail himself of the same right which in the Adjustment had been conceded to the Estates, but not to himself; to this relates the remark that he "could not rank himself below the noblemen."

Matthias, after this decisive utterance, desired still further to pursue the way he had entered upon, and so contented himself no longer with simply supplying his parishes with Catholic priests, but would force the occupants of his domains into Catholicism, thus violating the chief concession of the Royal Charter—the freedom of the individual conscience. In consequence of the oppression of the Protestants, many of those who had lived upon the royal domains removed from them and filled the land with their wails, and the irritation increased day by day. Not enough: the administration issued an order which cannot indeed be deemed unreasonable in itself, to the effect that all the royal cities should be required to receive Catholics into their citizenship, by which the decision of some cities not to admit the accession of Catholics was annulled. To this provision was added the further innovation that the royal chamberlain should appoint the city counsellors, upon whom the government depended, and these places were filled more or less by Catholics.

Thus far had reactionary measures progressed under Matthias; it is perceived that their working was chiefly upon the domains of the crown and the Church; for in the royal cities no essential right of the Protestants was abridged. After the elevation, however, of Ferdinand to the Bohemian throne, it was determined to advance more rapidly and make preparations for gradually restoring all the royal cities to the Catholic Church. The suspicion, that Ferdinand not only knew of this plan but furthered it, is not unfounded. In order to accomplish the desired end, the first attempt was to be made in Prague. If success should attend the measure in this, the most populous and important city of the land, the

work could be quickly accomplished in the remaining cities. In this behalf instruction was, on the 4th of November, 1617, issued to the royal judges of the several parishes into which Prague was divided, containing new ordinances of city government. To these judges, to whom, since the time of Ferdinand I., the jurisdiction had been entrusted, larger powers were given; henceforth they were to preside over all the assemblies of the parishes; they were to examine all their acts; nothing was to be counselled or concluded without their foreknowledge; no session of the parish council was to be held without their permission; finally, all the accounts of the parish were to be laid before them for inspection and approval.

This instruction excited astonishment, indeed, as violently threatening the self-government of the parishes of Prague; but its contents are not exhausted in the points already mentioned. The judges were directed to look over the catalogues of all the corporate foundations of the churches severally, and ascertain whether each was administered in exact accordance with its charter, and if this should in any case not be found true, to see to it that all be restored to their original purposes. If one reflects that nearly all the ecclesiastical property in Bohemia originated before the time of Huss, and none later than the year 1609, it will be perceived that this point of the instructions had no other purpose than to drive the Protestants from the possession of the property conceded to them in 1609 for all future time, and either give this to the Catholics or simply confiscate it. It would be simple obedience to this instruction if the royal chamberlains at this time declined to pay to the Protestant clergy the instalments due them from established funds, on the ground that these were not specified for the adherents of

the Bohemian Confession. A few days later a press-law was issued forbidding the publication of polemic articles and severe attacks on the government, according to which every article designed for the press must be handed in to the Chancellor beforehand and printed only with his permission.

Having given orders in these two important matters, and invested ten of his highest officials with the Regency, the Emperor departed for Vienna. At the same time that he in this journey arrived in the city of Pardubic, arrived also in the same a deputation of the Protestants of Braunau, whom the Chancellor, in his name, commanded to surrender their church to the abbot, which, after a contest of several years' duration, they had not as yet done. They were to receive from the abbot a written acknowledgment of their punctual compliance with this order, and send the same to the Regents by a deputation. In spite, however, of this decision, these Protestants did not yet give up the key, but set themselves in the attitude of defence against the royal deputies, who, upon the intelligence of their disobedience, had been sent to Braunau, and most probably the matter would have terminated in violence had not the insurrection in the meantime broken out in Prague.

The Archbishop brought the business with the people of Klostergrab to a more speedy end. When, as related above, he had shut up the church and menaced them with punishment in case they should attend Protestant preaching in the vicinity, and finally had demanded of them that they for all future time adhere to the Catholic Church, he laid hands upon the church. At his command it was to be torn down; which command was immediately obeyed, and the work was finished in three

days--11th to 13th of December, 1617. If he thought that resistance would end there, he was in error. This deed of violence found an echo throughout Bohemia, and so spread the feeling of hostility to the imperial government as to open an abyss between the Emperor and his subjects which could never be bridged.

V.

The Defensors had made complaint to the Emperor, when they were first only distressed on the ecclesiastical and royal domains ; they had now a thousand times more cause to complain when the press-law and the instruction to the judges were issued involving threats still more decided and further aggravated by the demolition of the church at Klostergrab. They would not, however, turn to the Emperor with a new petition, for they had no hope of success in such an application, unless others also should unite with them in it. They resolved, therefore, to resort to a concession made to them in the year 1609, in accordance with which they might, in important crises, summon the Protestant Estates to a consultation. If such a call ever appeared imperative, that moment had now arrived. The Defensors called therefore a Protestant Diet for the 5th of March, 1618, which, however, was attended chiefly by the nobility, since the royal cities were dissuaded by the chamberlains and other high functionaries from sending delegates, and but few of them had the courage to appoint such. In the first session, which took place on the 6th of March, Count Thurn thanked those present for their prompt attendance in a long paper which he read, in which he discussed the

oppression of the Protestants on the ecclesiastical and royal domains, and showed the uselessness of the attempts as yet made to obtain relief. The audience with the Emperor in Brandeis, the demolition of the Klostergrab church, and the oppressions at Braunau, were the themes of his strong passages.

At the close of the reading the Defensors asked in what manner an end might be put to their sufferings. The Diet, however, declined to answer the question, and demanded first to hear the opinion of the Defensors themselves. After several days spent over this subject, it was resolved to address a memorial to the Regency, and, in case this should be without effect, a similar one to the Emperor. The Regents returned an immediate answer adverse to the demand, and the Diet determined not only to apply to the Emperor, but at the same time to dispatch a request to the Estates of the other lands united under the crown of Bohemia, and implore their intercession with their common King. If they should succeed in arousing the sympathy of their neighbors and drawing them from their state of inaction, then the Emperor would have to contend for his entire crown. They hastened to forward all the addresses. The purpose for which the Defensors had summoned the Diet was now gained, and they declared it dissolved. Not till answers from the Emperor and the neighboring lands should arrive, would they come together again, and, as they supposed that this would require at the most not more than two months, they fixed their next meeting for the 21st of May.

The next step of the government was awaited with intense solicitude. The Chancellor made a journey to Vienna to inform the Emperor in detail of what had oc-

curred. Doubtless there was in the court an earnest pondering as to the course to be pursued. What views were brought forward, and how these differed, is not known. We know only that the Emperor's decision was formulated by Khlesl and sent as early as the 21st of March. Matthias declared that he would not suffer another meeting of the Protestant Diet; that his forbearance was exhausted, and that he would answer their menacing fire by summoning the movers of these proceedings to trial. This paper, which threatened with severe processes the asserters of religious liberty, caused great bitterness of feeling in Bohemia, and called down thousand-fold curses upon the heads of its authors. It was maintained that it was prepared by the Regents and only sent to the Emperor for his signature; but this was an error. The real author of the imperial paper was Cardinal Khlesl, who deemed this an advertisement of the energetic language which was to be employed, and, as he expressed in a letter regarding certain secret agents, he deemed it proper that the Emperor should act, not sneakingly, "like a fox," but with the "open violence of a lion."

When the imperial paper reached Prague, the Defenders who were in the capital were requested to appear before the Regents in the chancery office, that they might learn its contents and act accordingly. They came and retired, promising an early answer, which indeed they returned in three days; it was, in effect, that it was impossible for them to conform to the Emperor's command, since they had fixed, in pursuance of a resolution of the March meeting of the Protestant Diet, the 21st of May for the reassembling of the same, and could not reverse this action. The measures of the government against the Protestants were not exhausted by the threats and

commands of the imperial letter. Its purpose was to separate the royal cities from the nobility, so that when the Protestant Diet should reassemble, it would at least have no representatives from the burghers. This plan so far succeeded that some of the cities, with Prague at their head, expressed themselves in terms friendly to the government.

Intoxicated with the result in the capital, the government would now venture an attempt to divide the Protestant clergy, and induce a part of them to return to the Utraquism, which had been abolished in 1609. The Utraquists had, in a body, in 1609, accepted the Bohemian Confession; this was evidently not done, either on the side of the clergy or the laity, with a uniform zeal; in both classes were numerous persons who did not object to the continuance of the old Utraquism. The generation of those who were indifferent, or less favorable to the innovations, had not yet died out, and the skilful use of influence might bring many of these to renounce the Bohemian Confession and unfurl anew the old banner of the Utraquists, honored in history, and, as a memorial of Huss, still ever sacred in the eyes of the multitude.

A convenient pretext for the introduction of such a split offered itself in the ordinance of worship, which had been in force since the year 1609. In the minds of those who had once been Utraquists there existed an attachment to the solemn ceremonies of the Catholic Church, and the greater simplicity of the worship since 1609 offended old prejudices and memories. In order to make use of this state of the public mind to destroy Protestantism, Michna, the clerk of the royal chancery, invited a number of the clergy, whose firmness he supposed to be wavering, and whose indifference to the existing rela-

tions he surmised, to his house, and succeeded in persuading some of these to address a memorial to the Emperor praying for the restoration of Utraquism. With this the Catholic Church would stand in close relations, and the Archbishop would be acknowledged as the ecclesiastical head also of the Utraquists. Before anything in regard to this memorial and the plans connected with it was known, the pastor of St. Nicholas, in the old city, evidently one of those won over, ventured publicly upon a decided step. On Saturday of Passion Week he celebrated the festival of the resurrection after the manner of the Catholics, by bearing the host in procession. The amazement and rage of the Protestants were not greater than was the joy of the Catholics over this breach which the latter had made in the enemy's fortress.

When the Regents reported at Vienna that the Defensors declined to revoke the order for the Protestant Diet, they were directed to repeat the demand that the appointed meeting be not held. This imperial paper, as compared with that of March 21st, was noticeably toned down; it avoided all threats, and made a milder impression also by holding out the prospect of the Emperor's return to Prague. As directed, the Regents summoned the Defensors, then present in Prague, to the castle, but again failed to obtain the desired promise.

The decisive day of the dreaded meeting drew near. Some days before the time fixed, the authors of the movement arrived in Prague, that they might complete a plan of action. They came together on the 18th of May, and resolved first to prepare an address to the people; in this they explained the present contest, and maintained that their course had been in accordance with law. The address was sent, on the following day, to all the pastors

of Prague, with the direction that it be read from the pulpits, and that the people be exhorted to pray for the successful issue of the meeting of the Estates. The direction was strictly carried out, and awakened intense excitement among the people of Prague. Such determination had been expected from the Defensors, but not from the pastors.

Promptly, on the 21st of May, the *second Protestant Diet* was opened. Before the arrival of the hour it was clear that, in spite of the imperial prohibition, the meeting would not be less fully attended than had been that of March. Of the cities, indeed, only Kuttenberg, Kaufim, Chrudim, Beraun, Jungbunzlau, and Schlan sent deputies. But even this little company, in view of the menaces of the government and the mute attitude of Prague, was noteworthy. The nobility were more numerously represented than before. Not all, however, who had arrived in Prague were as yet in the Carolinum, where the sessions were to be held, when two officials, sent by the Regents with a message, made their appearance there. The Emperor had again, in another letter, repeated his command for the closing of the Protestant Diet. He uttered himself as mildly as in the last, and declared that he had no intention to abridge the liberty of the Estates. The officers requested those present to betake themselves to the castle to learn the contents of this last imperial paper.

Scarcely a hundred persons, perhaps, obeyed from the start this request; but, like an avalanche, the company grew as it moved through the city towards its destination. Arrived at the castle, the Estates were invited into the hall of the Regents, and as there was not room for all, a part had to stand outside of the open doors. The chief

Burggrave, speaking for the government, informed those present of the receipt of an imperial letter, and had it read to those assembled. The Estates listened to the reading without the least utterance of applause or disapprobation.

While they were considering, on the next day in the Carolinum, what answer they should return to the paper, Count Thurn, by an utterance of anxiety, threw the assembly into no small alarm. He referred to a rumor, according to which the Regents had conceived a wicked plot against the freedom and safety of the Estates, and counselled precautionary measures. This warning caused great excitement among those in attendance, and they determined to send immediately a deputation to request from the Regents, in order to remove all suspicion, that the Estates might be allowed to appear armed in the castle on the occasion of handing in their answer. There was a usage, guarded indeed by law, that no one should appear in the castle otherwise than in the usual clothing, with the customary sword, and never fully armed. If the government had really plotted their injury, then they were indeed in danger of being overpowered by the armed guard of the castle, and this the more easily as the castle gates might be closed and all aid from the city cut off. Informed of the anxiety of the Estates, the Regents hastened to dissipate this by granting the desired permission.

Not fear, however, but a well-considered plan for the overthrow of the imperial power, led Count Thurn to resort to this measure. The hour had at last come when a work which he had contemplated for years was ripe for execution. The irritation of the Protestants towards the government of the Hapsburgs had reached an extreme

which prepared them for any act that might bring about a transformation of existing relations. Thurn was therefore determined to give the signal for the outbreak of rebellion, and place himself at its head. For his own security he wished, in the very beginning, to make the breach irreparable, so that the return of his companions in the faith to the old order would be impossible as was his own. The most appropriate means for bringing this about would be to assassinate the Regents, and the plan for this originated in Thurn's brain.

He gave the first indication of this design during the assembling in the Carolinum, as related above, while the answer to be returned to the Regency was under consideration. He said in confidence to some standing near him that the endeavors of the Estates would not succeed unless they made a "demonstration." His look and movements left no doubt as to what he meant by a demonstration, so that some counselled him against violence, lest this might lead to a great war. A few hours later he was visited at his lodgings by the advocate, Martin Fruewein, a resident of Prague, to whom he said that there was nothing to be done but to throw several persons from the windows. The final decision as to the fatal act was made in the course of the 22d of May, in a conference held in the palace of the wealthy Albert Smiřický [Smiritzky]. The last discussion of the subject took place there, and those known to have participated in it, or been privy to its import, were Albert Smiřický, Budowec, the two brothers Kinsky, Wenceslas von Ruppa, Colonna von Fels, and the two brothers Říčan [Ritchan]. Ruppa and Fels, may be regarded, in connection with Thurn, as sole originators of the violent act which followed, while all the others, Budowec not excepted, were afterwards won to the scheme.

In considering the kind of death to be inflicted, Ulrich Kinsky advised that the Regents be stabbed, in the royal chancery, and Thurn assented to this proposition; but it failed of general concurrence, and it was decided to throw them out of the windows, which choice was perhaps influenced by the remembrance that in Bohemia throwing out of the window has a kind of historical justification, since in this manner the exasperation of the multitude against persons disliked had repeatedly vented itself. It is thus evident why Thurn and the Estates wished to appear at the castle armed.

Thurn was, no doubt, extremely cautious in the choice of his fellow-conspirators; he could not, however, provide against the city's being filled with mysterious rumors of the approach of an extraordinary event. These rumors reached the ears of the Regents, in a form, however, which amounted only to a vague warning, to which the persons whom it most concerned did not attach the deserved importance. Michna, the detested clerk of the chancery, was the only one who rightly judged his antagonists. Well aware of the measure of resentment which he deserved, he fled before the close of Tuesday, the 22d of May, on his way to Vienna, and by this precaution caused his antagonists not their last, but still their bitterest, mortification.

VI.

So dawned May 23d, the day of Bohemia's doom, "the beginning and the cause of all the woe that followed," thus ran, in after days, the fruitless lament of Bohemian exiles. The members of the Protestant Diet gathered in the Carolinum and moved thence towards the castle to

hand in their answer to the Regents. Thurn had been busy since an early hour of the morning with preparations for the success of the insurrection. Towards nine o'clock the procession of the Estates arrived before the castle. All carried weapons; the majority were attended by one or several servants. They first assembled in the hall of the Landtag, where the answer, prepared by the Defensors, was read to them. It was a protest against the attempt to prevent their meeting, as also against the threatened judicial proceedings; it reflected, therefore, upon the first imperial letter, and closed with the question whether the Regents had any part, and if so, what part, in the drawing up of the threatening letter. The Estates resorted to the hall of the Regents, and found there but four of these, viz., the chief Burggrave, Adam von Sternberg; his son-in-law, Jaroslav von Martinitz, Burggrave of Karlstein; William von Slawata, Chief Justice; and Diepold von Lobkowitz, Grand Prior of the Order of Malta. At their side was the secretary, M. Philip Fabricius, who had not till then been named.

After a little verbal skirmishing, Paul von Říčan read the answer. The passage which put to the Regents the question whether the threatening imperial paper originated with them, was indeed most deeply significant, and its significance was not a little augmented by the appended threat that the Estates would thenceforth obtain their rights against all opposition. The chief Burggrave and his colleagues requested that before making their reply this paper might be handed to them, that they might further consider its contents. This request was obeyed, and, after counselling in whisper with his colleagues, the chief Burggrave refused all information. He said it was a thing unheard of that imperial counsellors, bound by

oath to keep all transactions secret, should have such a demand addressed to them. If the Estates wished to know who advised the Emperor in regard to the paper, it would be simpler and more appropriate to address the question directly to his Majesty. "Whether such a question," said Thurn, "was ever addressed to the Emperor's counsellors, or not, is a matter of indifference; we declare, however, that we shall not leave the place without a decisive answer—a yes or no."

Upon these words followed a confused clamor among the nobility, in which were poured forth manifold charges against Martinitz and Slawata, with the threat of punishment to both as injurious to the commonwealth. A sudden horror seized all present, and they shrank back in indecision from the intended murder. In order to prevent the Estates from returning to calmer reflection, Thurn, Fels, and William von Lobkowitz repeated again, and nearly at the same instant, their question as to the authorship of the imperial letter, and what part the Regents had in it. After consultation, which took place under the influence of wild glances, threatening gestures, and the gleam of weapons, the chief Burggrave declared that, only yielding to the storm, he would so far violate the secret as to assure them that the paper was not drafted in Prague. This declaration, though true, did not satisfy the Estates. Thurn especially was disappointed, because he designed to have the guilt of the two hated Regents, in regard to the paper, affirmed, and then to proceed to the execution. But he had been thoughtful enough to foresee this issue and provide another justification of the sentence to be pronounced. This he found in the transactions in connection with the amnesty of 1609. When, nine years before, the Estates by threats

forced the Royal Charter from Rudolph II., and demanded also an amnesty for their revolutionary acts, the desired paper was prepared and all the Catholic officials, *except* Slawata and Martinitz signed it, and they persisted in refusing their signatures. At this point Wenceslas von Budowec protested, in behalf of all the Protestants, against this conduct, and declared: "If ever in the future the Royal Patent should be violated, the Estates would be forced to the suspicion that these two men were the cause of such violation, and nothing should hinder them from defending with their lives their rights against all violation." Then followed Paul von Říčan with the reading of a declaration which he had drafted beforehand, closing with the words: "That Slawata and Martinitz are to be regarded as violators of the Royal Charter and enemies of the commonwealth, putting finally the question to his friends whether this were also their opinion. A unanimous cry affirmed the question, with which were mingled terms of regret that the "Long One"**—that is, the Chancellor, who was then sojourning in Vienna—was not within their reach.

Thus were Slawata and Martinitz declared enemies of their country, and without the protection of its laws, and the execution of the sentence was not to be long delayed. In vain besought the chief Burggrave the exasperated Estates with tears in his eyes that they would still not do what might be followed by serious consequences. As most of those he saw were related to him, he entreated their aid by the ties of blood. Fels, however, seized him by the arm and bade him leave the place, if he would escape the fate of the condemned, and William von Lobko-

*Probably a nickname applied to the Chancellor on account of his stature.
—TR.

witz seized his cousin, the Grand Prior, who had grasped Sternberg's mantle, perceiving that all was lost if the chief Burggrave should retire, entreated that he would not leave him, and that he would share the common lot, whether it were life or death, of the Regents. Sternberg would certainly have remained—Martinitz was indeed his son-in-law—but no choice was left him, or the Grand Prior either; they were crowded and shoved out, and compelled to abandon their colleagues to their fate.

William von Lobkowitz now forced his way behind Martinitz, seized both his hands and held them firmly to his back, while Thurn grasped Slawata by the hand, and both Regents were, with the aid of the other noblemen, drawn to the windows. With their feet braced against the floor, and supplicating for mercy, they attempted extreme resistance. It was of no use: the two were thrown from different windows, from a height of about eighty feet, into the castle-moat.

While this scene was in progress, the secretary, M. Philip Fabricius, was in the background of the stage, where he ventured timidly to warn some nobles who stood near him of the dangerous consequences of the act. When he saw the fate of his superiors, he pressed his way to Count Schlick and entreated protection. Just this circumstance drew the attention of the Estates and aroused the hatred which they had cherished towards Michna, and which they would now gratify upon Fabricius, whom they had never before noticed at all. Several sprang towards him with poniards to stab him; but the request of others, that the place might not be stained with blood, caused Fabricius to be seized, and without ceremony hurled from a window. It was between nine and ten o'clock in the morning, and the execution was complete.

But in a marvellous manner the intended death of the three men failed of accomplishment. Martinitz and Fabricius were uninjured by the fall, and Slawata was not so much injured by this as by striking against the window-mouldings and by blows received in his struggles to release himself. The feeling of the secretary, when he found himself fortunately lying near the two noblemen, was not so much one of gratitude to God, as of chagrin and astonishment that he, an insignificant official, should have received like treatment with the noble-born Regents. He gave utterance to this feeling in his first words, for turning towards Martinitz he inquired : "What have I then done to them that they should have thrown me out?" Martinitz answered : "It is not a time, Herr Philip, to put such a question and await the answer of the Estates. As you are the most vigorous of us, we had better just get up, help Herr Slawata, and carry him into the neighbouring house of the Chancellor's wife." He had scarcely said this when several shots came down. With boundless amazement their antagonists looked from the windows upon the spectacle which was passing before them in the moat. In most of them the earlier excitement had yielded to a more thoughtful bearing ; but others would not be satisfied short of accomplishing the murder, and shot from the windows into the moat. Slawata and Fabricius were not touched by a shot. Martinitz was grazed by three balls, though but slightly injured. Now came, however, the servants of the Regents, running into the moat to rescue their lords from their sad plight. Some were driven back by the ceaseless firing ; in the case of others, courage rose with danger ; they ran to their lords, and were followed in this by some bold and magnanimous friends. Before these reached them, Fabricius had risen ;

he rushed without hat or mantle out of the reach of the castle, and, after borrowing the two missing garments, fled from the city. Having taken a short rest in the neighborhood of Prague, he continued his journey to Vienna, and was the first to bring to the Emperor the news of what had occurred in Prague. Nor had Martinitz any need of further aid to reach the house of the Chancellor, to which Slawata, being led and supported, also followed.

The two noblemen had but just recovered themselves a little, when they heard a great troop with clangor of weapons and tramping of horses approaching. It was Thurn and his adherents. They pressed their way into the house and demanded from the Chancellor's wife, Polixena von Lobkowitz, who placed herself in the way of their progress, where the Regents were lodged. The noble lady defended herself with decision and dignity against any further molestation of her protégés, and refused to let the Count so much as see them. Whether it was the impression made by her words; whether she pictured the condition of the Regents with darkest colors in order to win for the dying a sympathy which had been denied to the living,—she caused Thurn to withdraw without offering the Regents further molestation. They might now breathe again in quiet. Martinitz, who did not trust his enemies, fled the ensuing night to Bavaria, while Slawata, confined by illness to his bed, was forced to remain. His security was not indeed imperilled, though he did, during the following year, seek by flight safety from snares which might be laid for him.

On the day after the throwing from the windows, the Protestant Estates, who now as a body pursued the direction they had taken and constituted themselves a Landtag, determined to erect a provisional government, which was

entrusted to thirty Directors, ten from each of the three Estates. It might be supposed that they would at once have felt the necessity of electing a head, or of making an arrangement for presiding alternately. It was several weeks, however, before they recognized this necessity, and invested Wenceslas William von Ruppa with the presidency. He was indeed the most eminent man the directorial government could furnish ; he had for several years been conspicuous in the front ranks of the opposition, and had become known throughout the land. For intercourse with foreign lands, which must, in the immediate future, become important, he was well qualified, for he spoke and wrote with facility several languages. He had effective ability also in matters of home administration, having been practically schooled in them. His knowledge and the manner and bearing of his action had, even before the insurrectionary outbreak, fixed upon him the attention of the agent of the Rhenish Palatinate.

Thurn was not among the number of the Directors, for he was provided with a prominent place in the work of organizing the army. If any one seemed called to place himself at the head and assume the reins of government, it was he. For years he had fomented the insurrectionary spirit, and more recently had shown no concern about the favor or disfavor of the Emperor ; he had by the window-hurling rendered his breach with the dynasty forever irreparable. His name in Bohemia was in every mouth ; he enjoyed the highest respect, and seemed therefore destined to walk in the footsteps of George of Poděbrad [Podyebrad], not indeed to wear the crown, but still as governor to guide the destinies of the country until a new King should be elected. Such a position was, however, beyond his talents, and he had never desired it.

At the moment of the formation of the provisional government he made no attempt to place himself at the head, but wished simply to command the army. The reason doubtless was that he had not fully mastered the language of the land. He but murdered Bohemian, could not carry the Landtag by any power of eloquence, was unable to sway the multitudes, and would therefore attempt to appear in no other character than that of a mercenary commander of troops with which he had begun his career in life. He was not, however, even capable of organizing for the contest the means which were at hand, and proved himself unequal to this task, which was still more fatal to the success of his work than his want of talents, which afterwards became evident, as a commander in the field.

Thurn received the title of lieutenant-general; Fels was made field-marshall. The election of these and other officers of the army was a blunder, for not one of them had enjoyed a theoretical or practical military education, as had, for instance, the imperial general, Count Buquoi, who had served with distinction in the wars of the Netherlands. The army to be enlisted was fixed at 16,000 infantry and cavalry. The Protestant Diet, having taken the action related above, and made provisions with reference to the money which would be needed, dissolved on the 28th of May.

Throughout the country the occurrences in Prague, and the action taken in reference to them, were approved, since but a very small portion of the population adhered to the Catholic Church. The only cities which did not join the revolution, but continued loyal to the Emperor in disregard of the attacks with which they were menaced from Prague, were Pilsen, Budweis, and Krummau.

CHAPTER II.

THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR.

I. Election of the King of Hungary. II. Position of the Emperor Matthias and King Ferdinand relatively to the Bohemian Insurrection : Khlesl's Fall. III. Efforts of the Emperor and the Bohemians to obtain Allies. IV. The Elector of the Palatinate, the Duke of Savoy, and Count Mansfeld. V. The Outbreak of the War, and Žerotín's [Dgeroteen] Mediation. VI. The Emperor's Attempt to adjust amicably the Bohemian Contest, and the Manner in which the Insurgents received this.

I.

WHILE at Prague was being performed the opening act of that tragedy as a consequence of which millions of human beings were precipitated into miseries unspeakable, Ferdinand was in Hungary seeking recognition there also as successor of the Emperor. To this end Matthias had convoked a Diet of the kingdom to meet at Presburg on the 23d of March, 1618, and demanded of the same that it accept and crown his cousin Ferdinand as though he were a son. Here, also, the use of the word "elect" was carefully avoided. The design of the court, and especially that of Ferdinand, was to obtain the Hungarian crown under the same conditions as were connected with that of Bohemia. The Diet in Bohemia had been pleased to acknowledge his hereditary right ; the Hungarians were expected to do the same. But the grounds were not so decisive here for the lineal right of the Hapsburgs, nor could it be hoped that Hungary would yield readily to

negotiations. The imperial court prepared, therefore, to hold the Diet in check by displaying an imposing array of troops, and so compel the acceptance of Ferdinand as King. Circumstances were more favorable to the success of this plan, because the Palatine Thurzo, whom Matthias hated and feared as the soul of any opposition which might arise, had been dead for more than a year. The centre of gravity was therefore wanting, and one or another influential party leader might be baited with the prospect of the Palatine's dignity.

The Diet initiated a conflict with the royal proposition by asking of the Emperor to attend first to filling the vacant place of the Palatine, as the statutory time for this was already long passed by. This request was so just that it ought not to have been dismissed, and Matthias, in his answer, gave assurance that, immediately after the question of the throne should be settled, this would be attended to, and justified the temporary delay with the simple remark, that it was not proper "that the servant precede his lord." Ferdinand and the royal envoys in Presburg now set their hopes chiefly upon the Catholic party in the Diet, who were exceedingly active, and embraced all the bishops and the majority of the magnates. The conduct, however, of bishops and magnates specially irritated the other members of the Diet, and so increased their opposition that the debates soon became heated. Their criticism on the wording of the royal proposition procured for the opposition at least a partial victory, so that the friends of the dynasty seemed willing without further delay to "elect" Ferdinand as King in the manner in which this had been done in case of Matthias and others of the Hapsburgs.

Thus the word "election," so carefully avoided by the

imperial party, was brought again into the foreground and ruled the debate. In course of the proceedings the royal envoys soon came to perceive that they could not get around it, and sought only to limit its meaning by epithets which should incidentally fortify the hereditary right. On the other hand, the opposition demanded that before the election Matthias should execute a Diploma acknowledging the free and "unlimited" right of the Estates to elect their King. Both parties appealed to the historic right. What is history's answer to this appeal?

The Hapsburg princes and their adherents cited first the incontestable fact that, since the times of Stephen, the Hungarian crown had been hereditary, and that precedent had developed this right into a sacred constitutional law of the land. If the throne had been filled by election, it was an offence against custom, for which atonement could not be too soon made. According to this theory, any dynasty which had once occupied the throne of Hungary was its hereditary owner. The defenders of the hereditary right cited further the treaties of Oedenburg (1463) and Presburg (1491) as securing, with the concurrence of the Hungarian Diet, the hereditary claims of the house of Hapsburg in case of the extinction of the reigning royal family. Finally, the declaration of the Hungarian Imperial Diet of 1547 favored the house of Hapsburg; on this occasion the Estates demanded of Ferdinand I. that he send his son Maximilian to Hungary as Regent, and supported this demand with the words: "They had not only chosen Ferdinand as their King, but subjected themselves for all future time to him and his heirs as their lords." Thus, therefore, according to the view of the imperial party, "precedent, early treaties,

and authoritative utterances of the Estates" favored the hereditary right of the reigning dynasty.

The opposition maintained, on the other hand, that the Estates had, in many instances, exercised the elective right, and cited those of Albert II., Ladislas, Matthias Corvinus, Ladislas II., Ferdinand I., and especially that of Matthias. They would not admit, therefore, that the hereditary right in Hungary was a fundamental law of the land, but recognized it only as one of the privileges of the Arpad* dynasty, and pertaining to no other family. It is certain that weighty reasons could be brought forward on both sides of the question at issue, and both parties felt especially moved, on the present occasion, to urge their views to a triumph. The majority of the Diet wished to secure for the future by a Royal Diploma an "absolutely" free election, and once for all to remove at the cost of the dynasty all uncertainty from the question of the succession; the dynasty itself designed the opposite.

Pazman, Archbishop of Gran, and Forgach, Chief-Justice,† the latter also a Catholic, informed Khlesl of the bad turn things were taking in the Diet, and the Cardinal endeavored to show his informants what was wrong in the position of the majority, in doing which he had no great trouble, as both were of his own opinion. Among the many reasons which he stated for the hereditary right of the Hapsburgs was one, not indeed of a judicial nature, but not therefore the less weighty; it was the immense

* Arpad is the national hero of the Hungarians, and still lives in popular songs. He was elected in the year 889, made great conquests, and died in 907. The male line of the dynasty which he established became extinct on the death of Andrew III. in 1301.—TR.

† *Judex Curiae.*

sacrifices which the house of Hapsburg had made to maintain the crown of Hungary against the Turks. He showed that the claims founded upon this service were such as ought not to be surrendered so lightly by the admission of the right of election. In closing his argument, Khlesl stated that there was but one way out of this labyrinth. The prelates and magnates should persevere in their good intentions, separate themselves from the lower nobility, and "proclaim" Ferdinand King. Pazman and Forgach were inclined to concur in Khlesl's proposition, but the former only persisted in this view, while the latter afterwards refused his consent to any such step. The opposition in the Diet was, however, brought to this, that they would not further persist in claiming "absolute" freedom of election, but would be content if the Diploma should make mention of a "free" election. Still further: they would assure the Emperor that, in emphasizing their right of free election, they had no intention to exclude the Archducal house, but "would always have a due consideration for its members." This explanation being made, the most prominent members of the Diet went to the royal envoys, and requested them to bring it to the Emperor's knowledge.

Matthias, perceiving that he would probably obtain nothing more, issued the desired Diploma, stating in it: "That the ancient right of free election of their Kings, which the ancestors of the present Hungarian Estates had exercised and bequeathed to their posterity, he now, for the present and future time, confirmed, ratified, and declared inviolable." It further said: "The above and other articles of the Diploma may perhaps give occasion to interpretations both false in themselves and injurious to the house of Austria; nevertheless the Emperor did

not hesitate to issue the same, since the most influential members of the Hungarian Diet did, on the 7th of April, verbally make to the royal envoys the declaration that it was not at present, or ever had been, the purpose of the Hungarian Diet in the election of a King, to fall away from the illustrious house of Austria, or to neglect the consideration due to it, or, finally, to disregard the royal stock and its extraordinary services and expenditures in maintaining the kingdom." These precautionary interpolations of the Diet's explanations in the wording of the Diploma would make it easier afterwards to find proof of the hereditary right of the Hapsburgs than of the Hungarian right of election.

When the Diet learned the contents of this document, the opposition felt that its acceptance would give no support to the elective right which they claimed, but rather undermine it, and so rejected it. Thus it was again quite uncertain what course the business would take, until the inventive Cardinal again found an expedient. He proposed that the Diploma should be dropped, and that the report of the Diet's action in regard to Ferdinand's elevation should be as follows: "In accordance with our [the Emperor's] recommendation, the Hungarian Estates have, after manifold negotiations and in harmony with their old and ever-observed manner and freedom, unanimously elected the Archduke Ferdinand as their King." The Hungarian Estates, whose desire for a Diploma noticeably cooled down on learning the contents of such a one as had been offered them, belabored on all sides and worn out by the long-continued discussion, yielded, and accepted the formula proposed by Khlesl; though it said nothing of a free election, it nevertheless affirmed that Ferdinand had been made King by an election, and was therefore

approved. Nor were the royal envoys dissatisfied with it, since they had inserted, by way of precaution, that little word "ever;" for the "ever-observed manner" was, as they thought, an acknowledgment of the hereditary right, and if preserved in future could not be detrimental to the rights of the Archducal house. Thus the parties understood the formula differently, and probably each rejoiced in having outwitted the other. The court, however, and the Hungarian Catholics who sympathized with it, regretted the omission of the "explanation," and took the only way of escape which remained to them. The royal deputies had the explanation, together with an account of its origin, reduced in detail to protocol in the office of the Chief-Justice. This document, meaningless at the time, might become valuable, for it was executed before the first Hungarian magistrate, and by him subscribed, and must, at least from its contents, be of weight in the future.

All difficulties removed, on the morning of May 16th, the Estates, in the hall of the Diet, proclaimed Ferdinand King of Hungary, and repaired to his lodgings to offer their congratulations. The new Palatine was elected on the same day. Of the several candidates proposed by the government, the Chief-Justice Forgach was the one elected, so that this dignity was in possession of a Catholic. The royal party wished to end the transactions relating to the succession, and called upon the Diet to fix the day of coronation. But the Estates, instead of assenting to this demand, began the discussion of certain grievances, in which twelve days were consumed. Two of these grievances had an import extending quite beyond the bounds of Hungary, and stood in close relation to all the affairs of Austria. The subject of the one was the condition of


the imperial military power in Hungary, the other the financial subordination of this country to the Austrian exchequer. The court would not yield in either case, and sought to escape by evasive answers. After various and useless debate, the coronation was fixed for the 1st of July. It is reported that the King elect but two days previous to this could not come to an agreement with the Diet in regard to a religious question which had just arisen, and that the opposition in the very last hour threatened to depart, when Ferdinand ended the discord by yielding. The coronation took place on the 1st of July, and the Diet was dissolved.

II.

The news of the throwing from the windows at Prague surprised the Emperor at Vienna—King Ferdinand at Presburg. Ferdinand had just gone to dine with the Archbishop of Gran, when the startling intelligence came to hand and caused dumbness to succeed to noisy festivity. The next day Ferdinand held a consultation with Khlesl and some others, in which it was agreed that several men should be proposed to the Emperor to be sent to Prague to gather on the ground more exact information. When the necessary understanding of the case should have been reached, then a special commission of regency with an Archduke at its head should be sent to Bohemia to restore order.

In pursuance of this counsel, the Emperor sent Baron von Khuen to Prague, where he arrived on the 6th of June, but did not meet there the consideration upon which he had reckoned. The Directory paid no regard to his rank as special envoy of the Emperor, but treated him

VIENNA IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY.



as an ordinary private man, and he became convinced that there would be in Bohemia no more submission to the authority of his sovereign unless this should be brought about by force of arms. Knowing, however, the small resources of the Emperor, he advised him to peaceable measures, and recommended that he issue a patent in which he should solemnly promise to observe the provisions of the Royal Charter and the Adjustment, and refrain from asserting that he had always hitherto observed these laws. The Emperor should, therefore, as Khuen thought, yield, and perhaps the swelling surges in Bohemia would subside.

Matthias would gladly have followed this advice, since it was only in obedience to Khlesl and Ferdinand's counsels that he had adopted the measures which so irritated the Bohemian Protestants. He would not let it come to arms, but would rather give way, that he might spend the short remainder of his days in measurable quiet. Ferdinand did not, however, share this view. A memorial was at this time prepared, the argument of which amounted to this, that the insurrection must be deemed a fortunate event, since it opened the way to put an end once for all to Bohemian disloyalty, which view he heartily accepted. The author of the memorial maintained that the Emperor would not be the loser if the war should go against him, since he would but lose that the possession of which had no longer any value. But if he should win, he would end forever the slavery in which he had been held. As Ferdinand's recommendation to employ force against the Bohemian insurgents suited the taste of the Vienna statesmen, the next thing was to consider the resources at command for the war. It was thought that 15,000 disciplined troops and 6,000 Hungarian horse could be brought into

the field ; with this force, which might be increased by Spanish aid, the war-party hoped the more readily to succeed, as they set a low estimate upon the enemy's power of resistance.

Ferdinand and his friends who favored war so far prevailed that they persuaded the Emperor, without waiting for Khuen's return, to publish a manifesto promising to observe the Royal Charter as hitherto, and threatening punishment to all who should not return to quiet. As the manifesto thus utterly disregarded the as yet unknown counsel of Khuen, so the effect of the publication of this latter was to throw oil into the fire. But even when Khuen returned and reported what he had learned, the Emperor, evidently influenced by Ferdinand, did not fall in with his envoy's advice, but sent another letter to the Directors which repeated substantially the contents of the manifesto. When, therefore, on the 25th of June, the Bohemian Diet came together in Prague for a new session, and the imperial letter was read, there showed itself no sign of peaceful feeling. The Estates approved the war preparations which had been ordered, and justified their necessity in a letter to the Emperor, which contained not a word indicating a wish for adjustment.

As the contending parties came no nearer together, and the preparations for war were vigorously carried on in Bohemia, Ferdinand desired that this should be done also in Vienna ; but his warnings were not heeded as they deserved and as had been intimated in the manifestoes sent to Bohemia. Indignation now seized all the partisans of the imperial house. Count Oñate [Onyate], the Spanish ambassador, gave utterance to this in a memorial which he handed to the Emperor, and in which he urged

upon him to move with all possible energy against the insurgents.

Ferdinand and Maximilian laid the whole blame of the delay in preparing for war on Cardinal Khlesl, and as they saw no help while he remained at the Emperor's side, they resolved upon an act of violence, of which Oñate also approved. The question was, how they could entice the Cardinal to a place where they might seize his person. To this end, Maximilian, on the 19th of July, made him a visit, which Khlesl on the following day returned. When, however, he entered the apartments which led to the Archduke he was stopped in the ante-room by confidential servants of the latter, and bidden exchange his cardinal's robes for the ordinary garments of a priest. Khlesl, who too late perceived that violence was meant, refused to obey, but was roughly handled by Count Dampierre, and threatened with an ill fate if he refused compliance. Thus intimidated, he obeyed, and was led by a covered way to the bastion, placed in a carriage, and, with a cavalry escort under Dampierre's command, driven away. The company proceeded with great haste in the direction of the new city, Vienna. When the Cardinal saw this city he thought that his journey would end there, and that he would there be held a prisoner. But this conjecture was erroneous; the course of the drive continued farther and still farther into the mountains. He perceived that his fate was sealed; that he was in a province over which the imperial authority did not extend, and tears uttered the anguish of his soul. The journey was by way of Styria and Carinthia to the Tyrol. Where the carriage could not be driven, a sedan-chair was used, and the party did not finally halt until it reached the Castle of Ambas, near Innspruck, where the prisoner was placed under strict guard.

The seizure of the Cardinal had been effected ; but now the Emperor must be persuaded to assent to this measure : and here began the most difficult part of the solution of the problem of the Archdukes. An hour after the seizure they announced themselves at the apartments of the Emperor, and were refused admission. When no other answer was returned to their repeated requests, they urged their way without the desired permission to his presence, and related what had been done. The Emperor was violently agitated, said not a word, and bit the bed-clothes in the impotency of his rage. He afterwards resumed his self-control, characterized Maximilian's act as rude, demanded the Cardinal's immediate release, and yet, however, became so far appeased as to listen to the reasons by which the two Archdukes defended their action. They failed, however, to win his concurrence, and left him unreconciled ; but they did not retreat in their measures in regard to Khlesl.

The parties at the court now fell into a violent ferment. The Cardinal's adherents, Khuen and Trautmansdorff, took up his defence, while the majority of the prominent men favored Ferdinand's rising fortunes, and labored to reconcile the Emperor to his cousin, which was not indeed difficult, since he wished Ferdinand no ill, and it was only through his minister that he had fallen into this adverse attitude towards the princes of his house. The Empress was irreconcilable, and would on no ground forgive the act committed upon the Cardinal. But as she was still less than her husband in a condition to give effect to her indignation, she also gradually adjusted herself to the inevitable, and, after several days of pouting, ceased to fight against the treatment of the Cardinal. In the course of time Khlesl was transferred from Ambas to Hall, and

afterwards delivered into the custody of Pope Gregory XV., at Rome. After several years, during which time the Bohemian insurrection had been put down, and Ferdinand had rushed on from victory to victory, he begged leave to return, that he might discharge the duties of a bishop of Vienna, and the new city, Vienna. Ferdinand yielded, and permitted him, after an exile of more than nine years, to come back. He also refunded to him the money confiscated at his seizure, which amounted to more than 300,000 florins, and which had done him good service in the conflict with the rebellion. Khlesl returned to his diocese, and devoted himself thenceforth as zealously to the duties of his position as he had formerly done to the affairs of State.

III.

Immediately after the throwing from the windows at Prague, the Emperor entered upon negotiations with the lands which were loyal to him, and requested their aid in the coming contest with the insurrection. His endeavors came in conflict with those of the Bohemians who had anticipated him in seeking the aid of the neighboring lands, where they either pleaded former alliances or represented the insurrection as a common interest. Thus they sent Prague's celebrated physician, Jessenius, to gain to their cause the Hungarian Estates, then in session at Presburg. He arrived there on the 26th of June, and although he exerted himself to the utmost, and exhausted his eloquence in the effort, yet he failed to accomplish his mission and prevent Ferdinand's coronation as King of Hungary, which took place on the 1st of July. The Palatine and the chief officials, who were on friendly

terms with the imperial house, did not hesitate to arrest the Bohemian agent and deliver him up at Vienna. This act was indeed averse to the sympathies of the majority of the Hungarian Diet; still there was no one to protest against it. The majority was content at the time to assure the Bohemian Estates, in writing, of their sympathy, and exhort them to a peaceful settlement. At the same time also the Emperor's application for aid in the contest with the insurrection was refused, and the Hungarian Estates persevered in their neutrality.

Nor was the case very different in the Archduchy of Austria. The Diet of Upper Austria, on hearing of the events at Prague, advised the Emperor to peace as early as in the month of June; prevented the march of troops through its territory; the Estates even garrisoned the defiles of the land, in order to resist this by force, and only after repeated requests showed themselves somewhat more inclined to the imperial wishes by granting a small subsidy. In Lower Austria, although there was no attempt to close the passes against the imperial troops, yet all applications for aid were rejected, and the Bohemian insurrection was viewed as a foreign matter, about which they need not concern themselves. Vienna only, whose population was chiefly Catholic, granted the Emperor a subsidy of 14,000 and a loan of 30,000 thalers.

There was anxiety in Vienna at first in regard to Moravia, while in Bohemia it was confidently expected that the Estates of this neighboring land would offer their warmest sympathies, and soon their aid, to the insurrection. If Carl von Žerotín, the honored leader of the Protestant Estates there, had raised his voice in favor of the movement, there would have been an end at once of the imperial authority in Moravia. But this remarkable

man, acting in opposition to his former wishes, and still in partial harmony with his past, gave no such signal, but pursued a course quite peculiar to himself.

Žerotín was, under Rudolph II., subjected for years to oppression for his Protestant views and his attitude of opposition. He had with manliness suffered all kinds of injustice, rendered to his party, by his firmness and his high culture, a powerful support, and, finally, by joining with Matthias, in the year 1608, and by the overthrow of Rudolph's government, procured the party's triumph. For this service Matthias placed him at the head of the government of Moravia, which he administered in such manner as to favor the full and unhindered development of freedom to the Estates, and at the same time allow no doubt of his fidelity to the imperial house to arise. In the year 1615 he laid down his office, for which no reason was evident; perhaps he was weary of its cares; perhaps he was not pleased with the course of the imperial policy, and perhaps too the revolutionary sentiments which were cherished among the Estates failed of his approval.

Free from official cares, Žerotín did not retire into the rest of private life, but still took the liveliest interest in public affairs and kept up an active correspondence with his political friends. To his judgment the greatest weight was attached, and those who sighed for a change were anxious to know his views. But a few days before the throwing from the windows he had indeed remained for a time in Prague, sought out his religious and political friends, and given great attention to the affairs of Bohemia in general. Thus he had not for a moment suspended his political activity, and might, had he been willing, in every approaching crisis, have played the decisive part. At the outbreak of the insurrection he was at once

thought of, both in Vienna and Presburg, as the person to be employed in a mediation. In the very beginning of June the Emperor invited him to Vienna to assist in the consultation in reference to the insurrection.

In spite of the confidence reposed in him in Vienna, the thought could not be concealed that the events themselves pointed out to this man his place. The struggle in Bohemia was rooted in the opposition of Catholics and Protestants, and each must attach himself to the side to which he belonged, regardless of those consequences, whether of victory or defeat, which might reach quite beyond the real object of the contest. It was therefore thought of Žerotín that he could not do otherwise than join his companions in the faith, nay, perhaps had already done this, and was acting in collusion with the Bohemians. His call to Vienna was prompted quite as much by mistrust as trust ; it was supposed that he would not, if committed to the other side, obey the call, and then it would at least be known how it stood with him. Those who were suspicious advised that, in case Žerotín should come to Vienna, he should be seized, since his ultimate connection with the Protestants was certain, and, if he should be held a prisoner, Moravia would be without a head, and would not rise.

Arrived in Vienna, Žerotín recommended the use of peaceful measures for quieting the insurrection, and especially that the Archduke Maximilian should be immediately sent to Bohemia as a mediator. His demeanor, his counsels, and his evident interest in the welfare of the imperial house, dispelled all suspicion. The Emperor praised the counsels, but did not follow them ; for instead of notifying the Bohemians that Maximilian would be deputed to them as mediator, he sent that patent which

forbade their war preparations. There was a desire in Vienna that Žerotín might be employed simply to check any revolutionary attempts in Moravia; for a measure of confidence having been fixed in him, the Emperor requested his good offices in the next Diet of Moravia. Žerotín promised these, and returned home. He arrived just in time to be present at the assembling of the Estates. The Diet was opened at Olmutz on the 26th of June.

This was the first meeting of the Moravian Estates since the outbreak of the insurrection. The Bohemians had sent an embassy thither, which invited the Moravians to attach themselves to the common cause. Those who favored the insurrection moved the election of envoys to visit Prague, ascertain on the ground the facts, and prepare the way of a union. The majority, however, rejected the proposition, and resolved to send a deputation to Vienna to advise the Emperor to the choice of peaceful measures against the insurgents. The resolution would have prevailed but for the influence which Žerotín had already exerted in the interests of the government. He now advanced with decided step in the way upon which he had entered, and at the Diet, called for the month of August, favored granting the Emperor's application for the passage of his troops through the country on their march against Bohemia. To the great astonishment and irritation of the abettors of the insurrection, he brought his efforts at this time also to a successful issue.

The interests of Silesia were not as intimately, as were those of Moravia, connected with Bohemia. Indeed there had existed for more than a hundred years a certain enmity towards Bohemia, of which there had appeared at various times unmistakable signs. It might therefore have been supposed that this land would follow the ex-

ample of the other provinces and preserve a more or less friendly neutrality, if it did not even take the Emperor's side. That the course of the Silesians was not in accordance with this supposition, but especially friendly to Bohemia, was brought about entirely by Margrave John George, of Jägerndorf. His enmity to the Hapsburgs began with a process which they had instituted against him for the possession of Jägerndorf. King Lewis, of Bohemia, had formerly granted to Margrave George, of Brandenburg-Ansbach, and his heirs this principality in fee. George's line became extinct already with his son, and the Elector of Brandenburg, Joachim Frederic Jägerndorf, took possession of it and left it to his younger son, John George. But the Hapsburgs would not consent to this occupation, since Lewis' enfeoffment included only the issue of the Margrave George. Thus John George, being without an indisputable title to this domain, stood in fear that he might sooner or later be dispossessed, and therefore attached himself to the insurgents.

When, on the 3d of July, the Diet met at Breslau, it was decided, as a result of Jägerndorf's earnest endeavors, that a force of 6,000 men be enlisted, which, for the present, however, should be retained in the land. Furthermore, the Diet resolved to send embassies to Vienna and Prague. The Duke of Brieg, who was sent to Vienna, was to censure the Emperor for driving the Bohemians to insurrection by the policy which he had pursued. The envoys sent to Bohemia were to exhort, indeed, to peace, but to advise the acceptance of this only on suitable conditions. Under these circumstances it was plain that the destination of the 6,000 men to be enlisted would not remain long in doubt, and would be in the interests of the Bohemians.

IV.

While the Emperor's prospects of help from the countries ruled by himself grew thus more and more unfavorable, his applications for aid from foreign lands were no better received. The Duke of Bavaria and the German bishops were deaf to his entreaties for money and the materials of war, and the King of Spain alone, as will be narrated hereafter, offered him help. On the contrary, the prospects of the Bohemians for foreign aid grew more favorable—at least one of the most prominent of the princes of the Empire, the Elector of the Palatinate, assured them of the most ample support. The Bohemian insurrection had indeed nowhere given rise to greater satisfaction than at Heidelberg. Without waiting for a message from the Bohemian Estates, immediately upon the first news of the events at Prague, the Elector, Frederic V., dispatched thither, as confidential agent, Conrad Pawel, in order to obtain an exact account of the range and circumference of the rising in Bohemia. The letters sent home by the envoy gave the highest satisfaction, and left no doubt that the matter involved a fearful contest with the power of the Hapsburgs. It was decided therefore to dispatch to Prague a man of high position, whom the Estates might be expected to meet with their confidence, and through whom a further union might be effected. Christian, of Anhalt, would have been the best person for this mission; but it would not do, on account of the prominence in which, for ten years already past, he had stood, to think of him, as this would alarm the Emperor at once. For this reason Count Albert von Solms, who, as marshal of the Elector's court, had won distinction, was chosen.

On the evening of July 8th Solms arrived in Prague, and on the following morning was visited by Count Hohenloe, who was present in the city in response to an invitation of the Directors, who desired to associate him with Count Thurn in the command of the troops. Their attention was turned to him because he had distinguished himself in the Turkish war in Hungary. He was ready to obey their wishes, and yet felt some scruples on account of the high position he had won in the imperial service. Solms was next officially greeted at his lodgings by the Directors. After these latter had retired, Ruppa and Budowec returned alone, and there took place a confidential interchange of views as to the causes of the insurrection and the necessity of arming. Both earnestly besought the Count to persuade Hohenloe without further hesitation to accept, in connection with Thurn, the command of the army. Solms promised this, but suggested that, in order to avoid giving offence, it might perhaps be better to place a chief commander over both generals. Ruppa and Budowec both admitted this, but added that this could not be constitutionally done, since the chief command belonged only to the King or the chief Burggrave. The ambassador laughed at their scruples, and observed that, as they had ventured the throwing from the windows, which was certainly not provided for in the constitution, as likewise several other acts, they might perhaps also appoint a commander-in-chief.

Solms employed the leisure left him, after the various greetings were over, to inform himself accurately of the feeling in Prague and learn to what extent the desire for war had spread. He received the not very satisfactory information from a respectable source that even a portion of those Directors who had contributed to bring on the

insurrection were not disinclined to a reconciliation with the Emperor, provided that terms but reasonably favorable should be offered. Solms' endeavor, therefore, was by all means to remove this peace sentiment, and this he could best effect by promises. He requested the Directory to send confidentially to him several men, to whom he would confide important information, in response to which request Ruppa, Smířický, and two others came to him, to whom he declared without reserve, and in the name of his sovereign, that the latter, in connection with several princes of the Union, had considered the question of supporting the Bohemians, and had determined that they would not allow the Emperor to enlist troops in their lands, or to march them through those lands, and would endeavor to prevent any others from rendering him aid. If, therefore, Spain from the side of Flanders, or any of the German princes—naming especially the Duke of Bavaria—should offer support to Matthias, the Union would summon all its forces to the resistance. The Palsgrave would at the same time represent in Savoy and Venice the interests of the Bohemians, in order thence to obtain subsidies. Nor would he by any means excuse himself from the rendering of direct aid, but would leave this to depend upon further negotiations. He desired, first of all, to know what was the exact aim of the Bohemian agitation, whether it were a defence against the Emperor, or an attack upon him.

A speedier and more ample support than that offered by the Palsgrave could not have been reasonably expected by the Bohemians. Ruppa first, in behalf of his colleagues, poured forth his thankful utterances for the offers, and promised that the secret should be faithfully kept in the bosoms of the Directors. He gave assurance that the

Estates designed an armed defence against the Emperor, and laid great weight upon an alliance with the Union. The deputation stated the result of this interview to the rest of the Directors, all of whom, without exception, were moved with joy; and courage sprang up in the hearts even of those inclined to peace, as they compared their own resources with those of the Emperor.

The hopes which Bohemia placed in the Palsgrave's aid were to be realized at the same time that the imperial troops should advance into the country. At the end of August the news reached Prague that the Palsgrave had dispatched 4,000 men under the command of Count Mansfeld, who accordingly entered the Bohemian territory in the beginning of September. The real facts, however, in regard to himself and his troops will appear in the following statement:

Ernest Von Mansfeld, natural son of Peter Ernest von Mansfeld, devoted himself in youth to the service of arms, and won his first spurs in Hungary, where he was intrusted, in 1603, by the Archduke Matthias, with the command of a company of the body-guard. This honorable position he had to relinquish on account of a disgraceful affair of the gaming-table and a duel. He was charged with having denied a debt because he supposed his creditor to have lost his promissory note. On his return to Flanders, his father was still living, and recommended him earnestly to the Archduke Albert, who immediately gave him the command of a regiment of cavalry. The conclusion of an armistice with Holland soon ended his new service, though he remained not long idle, but entered the service of the Archduke Leopold, who was making enlistments for the war of Jülich. He was given the command of a band of 200 cavalry, and had opportunity to improve

his native talent for supporting troops by levying contributions, for Leopold thought little of making payment.

In one of his marauding expeditions he fell into the hands of Count Solms, who, in the service of the Elector of Brandenburg and the Palsgrave of Neuburg, the two claimants of the Duchy of Jülich, held Düren with a garrison. He now expected Leopold to obtain his release; as the latter, however, always moneyless, amused him with promises only, Mansfeld, tired of his situation, helped himself, and as it seems in a dishonorable way. The story indeed goes that he bound himself to Count Solms, and those whom the latter served, to the betrayal of his master. He was in fact set free, and at once enlisted for the service of the Archduke 1,000 infantry and 500 cavalry. After long imploring in vain to be mustered into service, this was finally granted, and he was paid a part of his recently augmented demands. The money was scarcely in his hands when he brought his troops into such a position that they must surrender to the Union.* Mansfeld himself sought to avoid fighting, and called upon the soldiers to enter the service of the Union, and set them the example. He was, however, disappointed with the result. The war was soon ended, and he would have fallen into distress, had not the Union, in expectation of future services, retained him by the annual

* This was the war for the succession to the Duchy of Cleves, the Duke having just died. The two pretenders to it were the Elector of Brandenburg and the Palsgrave of Neuburg, both Protestants. They made common cause against the Emperor Rudolph II., who felt called upon to settle this question against any Protestant claims. Henry IV., of France, would have settled it quickly, but the dagger of Ravaillac interposed its veto. The Protestant Union, formed two years before, conducted the war on the Protestant side, and Count Solms commanded for the Elector of the Palatinate, who was head of the Union. This was indeed a kind of prelude to the Thirty Years' War.—TR.

payment of 1,000 florins, which amount was afterwards doubled.

This lover of war spent four years in compulsory rest and inactivity, until Charles Emanuel, Duke of Savoy, falling into war with Spain, again gave him employment. When this war was ended by the peace of Madrid, in 1617, the Duke did not at once muster his whole army out of the service, because he did not trust the Spaniards, and because one condition of the peace remained long unfulfilled. This, as it appears, was accomplished in June, 1618, and Mansfeld and the German troops which he had enrolled were supposed to be on their return by way of Switzerland. They had already reached the Canton of Bern, when Charles Emanuel received intelligence of the outbreak of the Bohemian insurrection. The prudent prince proved at this time by an instant decision his extraordinary acuteness. He perceived in the rising of the Bohemians, not a mere transient event, but a most serious attack upon the house of Hapsburg. In the struggle with this house he had for decades of years worn himself out with anxiety and effort, and now recognized in the occurrences in Bohemia his best chance for the gaining of his end. He decided upon a sacrifice which must draw heavily upon his treasury. Without having been asked to do so, he informed Mansfeld that he had determined to continue the support of the half of the 4,000 men under his command and send them to the aid of the Bohemians, under the condition that this should be kept secret, to be known only to the Elector of the Palatinate, the Prince of Anhalt, and the Margrave of Anspach. At the court of Heidelberg this intelligence caused an extraordinary joy, and awakened a hope that even more than this would be done. Anhalt made use of this secret

in the interest of the Palsgrave's policy, and determined that even the Bohemians should be kept in ignorance of the real source of this aid, and that they should be left to ascribe it to the Elector. In the beginning of September, therefore, Mansfeld advanced into Bohemia and began the siege of Pilsen, one of the few cities which remained true to the Emperor. Ruppa, and a few others who were admitted to the secrets of the foreign policy, and who still thought themselves indebted to the Palsgrave alone for this aid, were now in full sympathy with him.

V.

The enlisting and equipment of an imperial army received more attention after the seizure of Khlesl, and yet not so much as the urgency of the case demanded. Ferdinand, whose interest lay in the raising of as numerous an army as possible, was still blamably indolent. Not to mention the little he knew in regard to military affairs, he should at least have taken care that the resources at hand should have been more economically used than they were. Count Buquoi was called from the Spanish service and invested with the chief command and Count Dampierre and Baron von Khuen associated with him. The arming and equipment were based upon the enrollment of 9,600 infantry and 3,200 cavalry of German troops—that is, drilled after the German method—besides which were enrolled also 300 Hungarian foot and 1,100 hussars, so that they calculated upon 14,000 men. They had, instead of this number, at the end of July, but 12,000 ready, and still determined no longer to delay the attack. Dampierre, to whom was assigned one-half of the troops, passed, in the beginning of August, from the side of the Duchy of Aus-

tria into Bohemia near Bystritz, while Khuen advanced, from the side of Moravia, in the direction of Polna ; on his arrival at which place, Buquoi followed from Vienna, and took hasty measures to effect a junction of the separate commands, which was effected on September 9, near Deutschbrod. He then moved towards Časlau [Tchaslow], with design of offering battle to the Bohemian army which was concentrated there.

Nor had the Bohemians completed their enlistments, but had taken the field with only about 12,000 men. When the news of the approach of the imperial troops reached Prague, a great panic seized the Estates, then in session there. They regarded, and rightly too, the imperial troops as better and as commanded by officers more experienced than their own, and looked forward to defeat as probable. This calamity they might avert by an increased armament, and resolved to issue a general call for a levy in the country which should strengthen the army by an addition of at least from 20,000 to 30,000 men. In the discussion of this question, Adam von Waldstein,* Chief Court Steward, took the Emperor's side, and exhorted the Estates to reconciliation. His words did indeed find an echo in the hearts of a few individuals ; but Thurn, Ruppa, and others met with passionate words every conciliatory feeling, and the Diet repelled the attempt at conciliation, and resolved upon the proposed call for troops. The prospect which the Palatinate held out of help was the chief cause of this unyielding sentiment in Prague.

Thurn, who in the meantime had joined the army, de-

* This name is always, and doubtless correctly, written by the author, "Waldstein," which will be followed in this translation, notwithstanding the obstinate hold which the name "Wallenstein" has acquired on the public mind. This man was brother to the great commander.—TR.

signedly moved out of the enemy's way on every occasion on which the latter might have attacked him with certainty of victory, and so the two armies stood for a time watching each other. During this time a Moravian deputation, with Žerotín at its head, arrived in Prague, whither they were sent by the Emperor to make one more attempt at a settlement by mediation. The Moravians had on their way learned by their own eyes the sufferings with which numerous villages had been visited in the course of the few days' march of the imperial army into the country. Žerotín, who hoped that by picturing these he might awaken in Prague a desire for peace, was, on the 17th of September, together with his associates, ceremonially received by the Directors and a deputation from the Diet, to whom he gave utterance of his sorrow at that which had occurred, and exhorted the Estates to yield humbly to the Emperor's offers for the restoration of peace. He represented the Moravians as having so earnestly desired this that they had requested the Emperor to bring about an adjustment by the mediation of persons of princely rank. They had indeed received no binding assurance to this effect, but if the Bohemians would maintain a suitable bearing, the Emperor would be pleased to permit the mediation. This appeal, however, instead of inclining the Directors to yield, did but irritate them. They suspected the speaker of a desire to produce a division between them and the Estates, an attempt in which Waldstein, the High Steward, had failed a few days before. The audience closed, therefore, and the negotiators retired without the answer which they desired.

On the evening of the same day, Ruppa and Budowec had an interview with Žerotín, in which they discussed

the peace plan and the means for its realization : The Bohemians must first lay down their arms, because they had first resorted to arms ; they might, however, demand in return that, in case their religious liberties should in the future be invaded, they might repel the attack with force. For such an event the Moravians and Silesians offered themselves as security for a common defence against all further violation. It is clear that this proposition, with a little further explanation and an assurance that no one should be punished for the past, would have furnished an acceptable basis for adjustment. The Bohemian party of action would, however, have no more to do with negotiations looking towards adjustment, as they were on the point of entering into further engagements with the Palsgrave ; and so Ruppa answered that the basis of negotiation was not to be sought in their disarming, but solely in the withdrawal of the imperial troops. So the Bohemians inverted the spear ; while, on the side of the Emperor, it was demanded of them that they begin by disarming, they demanded of their enemies the surrender of the posts they had garrisoned and the evacuation of the land.

In the following days the negotiations were limited to private interviews, in which Žerotín and his associates became satisfied that their labors for peace were useless. Nevertheless the Directors delayed their definitive answer to the proposals of the Moravian deputation, because they were just at this time in expectation of decisive intelligence from Breslau. On the 12th of September the Estates had assembled in Breslau in order to act upon the recent Bohemian application for aid in the war. The assembly did not venture to grant the application, but determined to summon a Prince's day—for this is the name given to the Silesian Diet—to which the decision

should be referred. Then the Margrave of Jägerndorf, to whom the Silesians had assigned the command of the troops which they had enrolled, conceived the plan of marching on his own responsibility to Glatz and thence to enter Bohemia, and he would have executed his plan had he not been earnestly admonished by the Duke of Brieg not to forestall the action of the Diet.

On the receipt in Prague of the news that the hopes set upon Silesia had proved vain, there was some staggering. They had felt certain of the prompt advance of the Margrave, and saw themselves deluded. They must now specially avoid giving to the Moravian deputation that negative answer which they had originally decided upon. The Directors therefore declared themselves ready to enter into negotiations with the Emperor; but they would not listen to the suggestions of a preliminary disarming, nor would they demand of the Emperor the withdrawal of his troops. They proposed that there should be an armistice during the negotiations. With this decision the Moravian deputation started for Vienna at the end of September.

On the 1st of October the Diet assembled in Breslau, and the anti-imperial party succeeded this time in carrying through a resolution to send a force of 3,000 men to the aid of the Bohemians. The news of this result was greeted in Prague with extreme joy; the conviction was felt there that, with the Silesian troops, and those of Mansfeld, it would be easy to repulse the imperial commander, and free the land from all further ravages of war. There was, therefore, no more thought of an armistice.

The Emperor's fair prospects now visibly declined. The force of his enemy considerably exceeded his own in numbers as gradually the levy ranged itself under their ban-

ners. In addition to this, the peasantry waylaid the imperial soldiers and their supply-trains, and inflicted upon them daily many a loss. Maintenance became so difficult that Buquoi, greatly as he disliked to take this step, felt that he must retire southward without having come to an engagement with the enemy. He began his retreat at the end of October; was, however, pursued by the Bohemian army, and must fight them at disadvantage near Pilgram. The Silesian auxiliaries were first employed in this engagement. He felt more sensibly a defeat which he suffered on the 9th of November at a place called Lomnitz, nine miles from Budweis, so that he had no choice but to retreat within the fortifications of Budweis, advise the Emperor of the peril of his situation, and counsel him by all means to enter upon peace negotiations.

The war party at Vienna had nourished themselves with the hope that Buquoi would, in a few days, end the campaign by the capture of Prague, and were now compelled to see him beaten, retreating and trembling before the enemy. Their chagrin was still further increased by learning, a few days later, that Mansfeld had effected the capture of Pilsen (November 21, 1618), after a siege of some weeks, and had converted the resources of this Catholic city to the enemy's use.

In Bohemia, on the contrary, there was rejoicing over this result and the retreat of Buquoi. They were already so sure of victory as to feel that their enlisted force, which now, by the addition of Mansfeld's command and the Silesians, was raised to about 18,000 men, would be sufficient, and discharged the general levy, as they perceived that it did not fulfil the hope which they had set upon it. Instead of the 30,000 which should have been realized, scarcely



A. 8



more than the half of that number had appeared, and these were so poorly equipped and provisioned as to be rather a hindrance than a help. The government had not provided for the levy, the individual landowners and cities being responsible for the care and pay of the troops they raised ; while these, on their part, felt their duty done when the troops had been sent into the field, and gave themselves no further concern about them. So the levy came in fearful disorder to the field. Financial embarrassment in general, of all kinds, was felt even in the first months of the war, and this continually increased, inflicting even more harm perhaps than did the enemy. Vain were the efforts of the Directors to procure the needed amounts by loans ; these were everywhere refused ; the taxes were insufficient, and came in too irregularly, so that the most of their money was obtained only by taking possession of stocks belonging to the Estates of deceased persons, or in some other way, in liquidation, or confiscating these under the name of forced loans. Later they resorted to the debasement of the coin.

The Bohemian army pursued Count Buquois as far as Budweis, and as his troops had suffered considerably from the casualties of war, Thurn must rest satisfied with merely placing a corps of observation under Hohenloe to watch him, and advance with the rest of the army into Austria in order to execute a plan, formed in Bohemia, for taking Vienna by surprise and deciding the contest at once. Count Henry Schlick passed the Austrian border on the 25th of November, and, as an advance-guard with 4,000 men, prepared the way for the main force to follow. For miles along the course of this invading army the panic spread ; in Vienna itself the effects of many misfortunes were added to the peculiar dismay of the people. The

condition of affairs in Upper and Lower Austria, which had before been threatening to the Emperor, now grew rapidly worse; the orators of the Estates, especially Baron von Tschernembl, in Upper, and Herr von Thonradel, in Lower Austria, held the most hostile language. If the lead of these men and their friends had been followed, the archduchy would have joined the insurrection. But even among the Protestant nobility the ancient attachment to the hereditary family so prevailed, that its enemies could not bring about an open rebellion, and the invasion of the Bohemians had only the effect of pressing the Emperor with all sorts of demands from the Estates. Fortunately the danger threatened by the Bohemian army began to subside. Impassable roads, the want of provisions, and the clothing needed in that raw season of the year, cooled the inclination to further advance. So much the more desirous were the Bohemians to follow up the results hitherto attained in Moravia, and carry this land with them. In the Diet which assembled in Brünn, in the month of December, appeared a Bohemian deputation to which Thurn, attended by a cavalry escort, attached himself, and attempted to persuade the Estates to join immediately the insurrection. Here again, Žerotín sought to keep his countrymen from taking this step, struggling eloquently with the suspicions which rose thickly on all sides around him. Such, however, was the respect for him, that he succeeded still this once, and for the last time, in holding the Moravians true to the house of Hapsburg. Tschernembl came from Austria for the special purpose of winning him to the Protestant cause; but all his endeavors could not change Žerotín's conviction that the Bohemians, in their rising, sought political ends, and that Thurn and Ruppa, especially, had an eye to their own

advantage. He had himself never used religion to cover up political designs, and shared the views of the Bohemian Brethren, to whom he belonged, that, especially for the Church, her best condition was one of persecution. How could he then rise against his King, when he would not so much as enter a complaint in regard to the abridgment of ecclesiastical liberties?

In the meantime Buquois, as he saw his peril constantly increasing, had begun negotiations with Hohenloe, and declared his readiness to evacuate Budweis, provided an unhindered retreat to the Danube should be granted him. Fortunately for the Emperor, Hohenloe made conditions which Buquois could not accept; fortunately, we say, for if Buquois had withdrawn with his troops, the opposition in Austria would have been so increased by the calamities of the war as to have become insurmountable, and Matthias would have been compelled on some terms to conclude a peace with the Bohemians. When the negotiations for Bohemia's evacuation were broken off, then vanished also the danger which led to opening them. The Bohemians had in their expedition to Austria and in their cantonments before Budweis suffered very great losses. The sufferings from winter and the hardships of the war, with the deficiency of care and clothing, had resulted in a fearful mortality, which, during the month of January, 1619, continued to increase from day to day, and by the end of February had swept off more than 8,000 men. With those who prolonged lives so miserable that they were scarcely able to carry their weapons, no attack could be carried out against the enemy, who, from his covered position, was at least sheltered against the severest sufferings from the weather.

VI.

The consequence of this was that in the first three months of the year 1619 the war was at an end. Both parties must think either of winning new strength by armaments and alliances, or of mutual negotiations for adjustment. In Bohemia the chief thought was of new preparations for war, while the Emperor labored to prepare the way of adjustment by mediation. The Elector of the Palatinate worked against the peace movement. He set forth with increased zeal the efforts which he had begun without the knowledge of the Bohemians to connect the Duke of Savoy with the Bohemian contest.

Let us see what was done in this respect in Heidelberg in the month of October.

When the Duke Charles Emanuel, by the sending of Count Mansfeld, furnished essential aid to the insurrection, there was extraordinary rejoicing in Heidelberg. In the conviction that the moment had arrived for carrying out the plan for the rule of Protestantism in Germany, which had been much mooted in the year 1608, but afterwards delayed, the statesmen of the Palatinate advised their sovereign to send an ambassador to Turin to negotiate the conditions of a more intimate alliance with the Duke. In pursuance of this counsel, Christopher von Dohna was sent into Italy in October, 1618, instructed to offer the Duke of Savoy the crown of the German Empire on the death of the Emperor Matthias, and to assure him that the Elector would, beyond doubt, secure for him the majority of the electoral votes. In return for this he desired that the Duke should support the Bohemian insurrection more largely than he had done, suggesting 7,000 to 8,000 men.

Doubtful as was at that time the triumph of the Em-

peror, it is conceivable that the Elector of the Palatinate might have cherished the hope of wresting the Bohemian crown with the aid of these 7,000 to 8,000 men, maintained at the cost of a foreign power, from the Hapsburgs, and wearing it himself. The Duke of Savoy was not, however, so sanguine in his judgment of the situation. He felt indeed flattered by the offer of the crown of Germany, but he was of the opinion that the end could be gained only by a large alliance, in which he and the Elector of the Palatinate would be but subordinate members; this should, as he thought, include France, England, and especially the two wealthy republics of Venice and Holland; if all these powers should join it, then he would consent to enlarge his aid—otherwise not.

When Dohna returned with this information, it became evident that the demands of the Duke must be taken into the account, and an ambassador was accordingly dispatched to England to make a beginning by gaining James I. to the measure. It was thought in Heidelberg that this would be attended with less difficulty, since James, by his relation with the Elector, to whom he had given his daughter Elizabeth in marriage, would feel himself specially obligated to the protection of his interests.

Unfortunately for the expectations cherished in the Palatinate, the English King had no thought of supporting the Bohemian insurrection. From the views which he held of the inviolable legitimacy of kingly rights, he disapproved the movement from the first, and repeatedly expressed himself to the Spanish ambassador accredited to his court in words friendly to the rights of the house of Hapsburg. When Dohna applied to him for aid to the Bohemian Estates, and further intimated that they might elect the Palsgrave as their King, he was by no means grati-

fied with this intimation, and although he gave no distinct expression of dissatisfaction, he did, nevertheless, observe that the elevation of Frederic to the Bohemian throne could scarcely be thought of before the death of Matthias, nor then either unless it were shown that the crown was elective. The position in relation to the Bohemian contest, which he held as most suitable, he showed by offering to mediate a peace between the insurgents and the Hapsburgs, and to send Lord Doncaster to Germany for the purpose. It was evident, therefore, that unless he changed his views, the hopes placed upon him were vain.

As yet no news had been received of the unfavorable attitude of James, when the Prince of Anhalt, the Margrave of Ansbach, Count Solms, and the Counsellor Camerarius of the Palatinate met (November 25th, 1618), in Crailsheim, in order to receive the report of Ahaz von Dohna, who had been sent to Prague for further information of the condition of things there. Dohna stated that the desire there was to know whether the Palsgrave would fulfil the hopes there placed upon him, and not decline an offer, should one be made him, of the Bohemian crown. Especially Ruppa, President of the Directory, had expressed himself to this effect, and requested a clear and definite answer. Opinions were now exchanged as to whether Ruppa's question should be answered affirmatively or not; and as they still thought that aid might be expected from England, those present agreed to advise the Elector to accept the Bohemian offer. When Frederic received the news of this decision, terror seized his soul, for in spite of his youth and inexperience, there came a presentiment of the perils to which a participation in the Bohemian troubles would expose him. After much delay he entered only provisionally into Ruppa's proposal, and

adjourned a definitive decision until after some questions which he put should have been answered. Ahaz von Dohna was instructed to inform himself thoroughly as to whether the Bohemian Estates were justified in their movement, and whether they possessed the right of election. In case of a solution of these questions satisfactory to the Elector's conscience, Dohna was to look into the difficulties in which Frederic might be involved by the acceptance of the crown, and to have it understood that its simple bestowment upon his person, without at the same time securing it as the inheritance of his posterity, would not be a gift worth the outlay which it would require. The Palsgrave, however, promised to aid the Bohemians with a loan of 100,000 florins. At the same time he sent Count Mansfeld, who could for the present, after the capture of Pilsen, be spared from the theatre of the war, to Turin, in order to pursue the negotiations there, and by all means to urge the Duke to furnish ampler aid. Mansfeld found the Duke still inclined to respond to the hopes which were set upon him, but, in this instance, upon a condition in regard to which it was doubtful whether either the Bohemians or the Elector would accept it. Charles Emanuel would enter with all his might into the cause of the Bohemians only on the condition that the crown of their land should be conferred upon him, and that the Elector of the Palatinate should content himself with the gaining of the provinces of Hither-Austria.* On this condition he was ready to support 6,000 to 7,000 men and still add a subsidy of one and a half million ducats.

* This of course means the Austrian possessions in the Netherlands and on the Rhine, bounded partly by the Palatinate.—TR.

When the news of this plan reached Heidelberg, another meeting was appointed at Crailsheim for the last of March, 1619, in which, besides the persons already named, the Elector of the Palatinate also took part. It was now known that the King of England was opposed to the plans of the Palatinate, on which account the offer from Savoy did not meet with so unfavorable a reception as might otherwise have been supposed. There was a disposition on the part of the Palatinate to concede Bohemia to the Duke of Savoy and be content with Hither-Austria. There would be, indeed, an advantage in this, as the immediate proximity of this territory to the Palatinate made its possession of more importance than that of Bohemia. And the prospect of the Bohemian crown itself also would still be open, for it might be expected that, in any future election, this might fall upon the Elector of the Palatinate, instead of the son of the Duke of Savoy. But it would not suffice to accept in Heidelberg the proposal from Savoy; they must endeavor to gain the Bohemians themselves to this plan, and to this end decided that Anhalt should visit Bohemia and invite Hohenloe and Ruppa to meet him at Taus, where the necessary statements should be made. This interview was to take place on the 10th of April, and it was hoped that by the end of this month the further determinations might be brought about.

As we perceive, the party of the Palatinate made use of the winter months in considering the final consequences of the insurrection in Bohemia and in planning to wrest the crown of this land from the house of Hapsburg. It was, however, otherwise on the imperial side. Here the effort was at the same time made, as remarked above, with more energy than ever before to bring about a

peaceful settlement. The answer of the Moravian deputation, on its return from Prague, and the defeat of Buquoi, had convinced the Emperor that in opening negotiations he must recognize the Bohemians as more nearly an equal party. He retreated entirely from the view that he could demand of them to lay down their weapons, while he remained armed. He now directed his entire action to the conclusion of an armistice, upon the basis of the present possessions of the parties; he accepted, therefore, the proposal which had been made in Prague to the Moravian envoys. He sent the High Steward of the court, Adam von Waldstein, to Prague to give notice of his assent to the armistice and to offer a peace mediation, in which several of the prominent German princes should be the mediators, naming, on the Catholic side, Duke Maximilian, of Bavaria, and the Elector of Mentz, and, on the Protestant side, the Electors of the Palatinate and Saxony. Ferdinand agreed to this mediation, for he too was frightened by the events of the war, and had, moreover, confidence in the Bavarian prince that he would make no material concessions. The mediation itself was to begin on the 20th of January, 1619.

But earnestly as Waldstein may have labored to move the Bohemian Estates to an armistice and a definite promise in relation to the opening of peace negotiations, he did not gain his end. By various evasions, Ruppa and his friends sought to delay a definitive answer. It was equally in vain that Waldstein attempted to call forth a better feeling by the offer to exchange Jessenius, now held a prisoner in Vienna, for several less important prisoners; they continued in their ambiguous attitude. It was more difficult for the Directors to maintain their

evasions towards the Elector of Saxony, who sought through an ambassador to win them to the measure of an armistice, and labored earnestly for a peace with security of their religious rights. When the Heidelberg cabinet was informed of these efforts on the part of Saxony, it attempted to defeat them by advising the Directors to encumber the armistice with conditions which the Emperor could not concede. Thus the imperial side would be compelled to abandon the attempt to open the negotiations with the conclusion of an armistice and rest satisfied with simply fixing the time when these negotiations should begin. The 14th of April was fixed as the day and Eger as the place for the meeting of the imperial and Bohemian envoys to discuss the points of difference and prepare the way of an adjustment under the mediation of the four princes named above.

It required the most strenuous effort of the Emperor, and especially of King Ferdinand, to persuade the Duke of Bavaria to act the part of a mediator. Maximilian at first promptly declined, declaring plainly and without reserve that his conscience forbade him to take part in a transaction tending to give force or rather enlargement to the Royal Charter, by which he would pollute his soul and become partaker of the sin of others. Nor would he enter into any discussion of the question as to whether the Royal Charter ought to have been granted, or, having been granted, should be suspended. If in the negotiations an extension of the Royal Charter in relation to the ecclesiastical domains should be demanded, he could never consent to this invasion of the Church property, and thus cause himself to be looked upon as a disturber of the peace and the occasion of further strife, and but injure his own reputation. He had for years

set himself against the Protestant Estates of the Empire in Germany. How could he now deny in Bohemia the principles he had hitherto maintained? When Ferdinand was informed of this negative answer, he wrote the Duke once and again, praying him, for God's sake, to take a part in the negotiations, since his sentiments would be his only warrant that every demand of the Protestants would not be granted. As his entreaties became at each repetition more urgent, Maximilian finally, on the 17th of January, promised that he would deliberate on the subject. A few days later he gave his word that he would take part in the mediation, provided only that nothing should be required of him in the transactions which would tend to the disadvantage of the Catholic Church. This condition was quite satisfactory to Ferdinand, and the Duke's participation in the meeting at Eger was therefore looked upon as settled.

We have hitherto but remarked that the Directors, and especially Ruppa, viewed with disfavor a peaceful adjustment with the Emperor. What attitude the country itself would assume towards this new phase of adjustment became apparent when the Diet called for March 18th (1619) came together and the Directors reported upon the state of the army and the necessity of a new armament. The Diet perceived that the resistance could not be maintained without further sacrifice, and was therefore willing, by imposing new taxes, to provide means for filling up the ranks of the enlisted troops, and also to augment the number of fighting men by repeating the call for a levy. In view of the evils resulting from this latter measure during the previous year, it may well be wondered that resort should again be had to a call of so many thousands of men, unused to war, poorly supplied, into the service;

it was, however, thought that evil consequences might be avoided by limiting the numbers of the levy to about 12,000 and by adding provisions against the recurrence of the difficulty of insufficient supplies. The deficiency of the taxes it was thought might be met by requiring the landholders and royal cities to bring in the products of the soil, which, indeed, if promptly delivered, would be better than money. Finally the Diet resolved to resort to the confiscation of the estates of those noblemen who were hostile to the insurrection. This proved a perilous measure, which was afterwards employed with hundred-fold severity against the defeated insurgents. The confiscation was carried out against thirty-three noblemen who had shown their attachment to the imperial cause by leaving the country. Finally the Diet selected the men who were to take part in the negotiations at Eger. It did not, therefore, as the Directors had openly and secretly done, seek to prevent these, but hampered them with conditions which would render their successful carrying out impossible, and be, therefore, equivalent to a rejection of the mediation. The Bohemian Estates would not be content with the settlement in Eger, of the religious questions at issue, and especially that the question of the ecclesiastical domains should be adjusted by the Eger mediation; they further demanded that the King should permit them to conclude an alliance with the Estates of all the other Austrian countries for the purpose of maintaining their political and religious liberties, and through which alliance they might control the resources of the country in case of invasions of their rights by the King. If Matthias could not yield this demand because it would make his power a mere illusion, much less could he yield a second one relating to a recognition of

the confiscations which the Diet had ordered. He could not burden himself with the disgrace of abandoning his own adherents to beggary on account of their loyalty to him.

In the midst of these negotiations death overtook the Emperor. He had long been infirm. Already, when he succeeded his brother Rudolph, he suffered from severe attacks of gout, and, as related above, it was thought in the year 1617 that he would scarcely survive the Easter festival. To these bodily ailments was added, after the abduction of Khlesl, dejection of spirit; he had lost in Khlesl not only a faithful servant, but also a companion and friend. It was not to be wondered at that he saw all things shaded with his own gloom. His sadness and sense of solitude received a fresh accession as his wife preceded him in death; he saw himself surrounded by strangers who waited impatiently for his end, and this feeling of sadness aggravated of course his ill bodily condition. His last and only diversion consisted in looking daily at the jewelry which his brother had left him, which he arranged anew, and felt pleasure in its artistic value. Having given in the last days of his life visible signs of complete exhaustion, he died on the 20th of March, 1619.

A few months before, on the 20th of November, 1618, had died the Archduke Maximilian. In the last moments of his life he still manifested the same anxiety for the prosperity of his house which he had so unselfishly shown in behalf of Ferdinand. When Count Oñate visited him in his last struggle with death, he so far revived as to request the Count to convey his farewell to the King of Spain, and in his name to beg of him to extend his protecting hand over the interests of the entire house. In the hope that this request would be attended to, the Archduke closed his life.

CHAPTER III.

THE IMPERIAL ELECTION AT FRANKFORT AND THE ELECTION OF A KING IN BOHEMIA.

I. Spread of the Insurrection over all the Lands of the Bohemian Crown, and Sympathy of the Austrians with it. II. The Protestants of Lower Austria before Ferdinand. Thurn before Vienna. The War in Bohemia. III. Ferdinand goes to the Imperial Election at Frankfort. Doncaster's Negotiations. IV. The Deposition of Ferdinand at Prague, and Election of the Elector of the Palatinate as King of Bohemia. V. The Elector's Acceptance of the offered Crown, notwithstanding the Want of King James' Concurrence.

I.

FERDINAND had now the responsibility of determining his own position in relation to the Bohemian contest. He had hitherto continually complained that the Emperor had neglected the necessary defensive measures, and although, after the abduction of Khlesl, the most important ground of complaint was removed, yet the war preparations did not take on the dimensions of the original plan, and were not in proportion to the means at command. The unfortunate events of the war caused Ferdinand to appear less hostile to the Emperor's desire to mediate a peace than might have been expected from his first action ; he hoped indeed that the Duke of Bavaria would, in the mediation, take care of his interests, both as a Catholic and as a sovereign. Immediately after the death of the Emperor his conduct indicated that he

would trust in the support of Spain and in the auxiliary force which Philip III. had given him reason to expect, for he would have no more to do with the Eger mediation, but seek to settle in his own way the contest with the Bohemians. He therefore executed a copy of the articles in regard to the Bohemian privileges, which he had obligated himself at his coronation to conserve, and sent them to Prague, with a notification to the chief functionaries who had carried on the government under Matthias, before the outbreak, confirming them in their places, and accordingly denying the right of existence to the usurpation of the Directors. Knowing, however, that the opposition against him was still on the rise in the other provinces, and that it would be long before the Spanish auxiliaries would arrive, he made use of mild terms and sent a new dispatch to the Bohemian Estates, in which he invited them to send envoys to Vienna to treat of the questions at issue. He thus confessed the existence of a contest and his willingness to enter into negotiations in regard to it, but gave no clue to the manner in which he would conduct these. As appearances upon the theatre of the war were growing still more unfavorable, he went a step further, and consented to the mediation of two men of princely rank, naming the Dukes of Bavaria and Saxony as the persons, which he regarded as a movement of the character of the projected meeting at Eger.

All these overtures were, however, declined in Bohemia, because, after the death of the Emperor, all thought of negotiations had been given up. The plan there was very simple; it was to revolutionize the other lands of the Bohemian crown, together with Austria and Hungary, and the hope was that this would soon be effected. The first step was taken in Silesia. The Silesians had really,

by sending auxiliary troops, already joined the Bohemian movement, but the alliance was not yet so intimate as was desirable, and the Silesians had not appeared on the field in the ratio of their strength. Just at this juncture an embassy from Breslau had arrived in Prague, sent to take part in the interposition at Eger, and this offered an opportunity to negotiate a closer alliance, which led to the desired result. The envoys promised that Silesia would join the movement with all its forces, if but assured that their country would be allowed the same rights in the alliance of the Bohemian crown as were enjoyed by Bohemia itself. Their first demands related to the right of electing the King. If the throne was to be filled again, this should not be done by the Bohemians alone, but the adjacent lands should also be summoned. Further, they desired that the Bohemian chancery should be divided into two parts, having equal rights; in short, there should be erected two interior departments. On the side of Bohemia the demands could not be contested, for it was clear that the insurrection could succeed only with the aid of the other provinces, and so the Directors promised to represent in the Bohemian Diet the wishes of Silesia, and obtain their sanction. In consequence of this, the Silesians rejected Ferdinand's demand for the assumption of the government in the land, on the pretext that this could not take place until after he had assumed the government of Bohemia.

The Directors effected also a union with Lusatia, by which the latter was bound to furnish a contingent of troops which should serve on the side of Bohemia, through the war with Ferdinand.

Of greater importance to the success of the insurrection was the accession of Moravia, for which the Bohe-

mians had hitherto so constantly and yet so vainly hoped, Žerotín having thrown all his influence on the imperial side. In Bohemia it was thought that this end could not be gained otherwise than by attempting an armed invasion of the land, thereby offering the Estates an opportunity to give a free expression of their sympathies with the movement. Žerotín, having been by a friend informed of this plan for injuring the house of Hapsburg, was indeed startled by the intelligence, but did not lay upon it the weight which it deserved. In Bohemia preparation was made to strike the intended blow, not only by continuing secret negotiations with friends of the cause, but by making another attempt to win Žerotín himself. The attempt could not, however, have been more unskilfully made, for the letter which Budowec addressed to him was couched in cutting terms, cast reproaches upon the Moravian magnate, and wounded him with its ironies. The course was unwise, and but irritated this man, proud as he was of his opinion, so that he violently repelled the reproaches; and when Budowec, in a second letter, sought by milder and flattering language to win his old friend from the way upon which he had entered, he met with no better success.

On the 18th of April the Bohemian Directors sent to Count Thurn, in the camp before Budweis, an order to start upon an expedition to Moravia. Leaving there with Count Hohenloe the greater part of the troops, he marched at the head of the smaller part to Deutschbrod, and upon the way thither received a portion of the newly-organized levy, so that his entire force numbered from 8,000 to 10,000 men. As he entered Iglau, the inhabitants most earnestly welcomed him, some of the Bohemian nobility also having gathered there to participate in the

greeting. His reception was everywhere equally sympathetic, and he was able to assure the Directors that, with a few exceptions, the whole nobility of Moravia and all the cities were ready to take their side. Thurn came next to Znaim, where a large portion of the Moravian nobility were gathered, and it was there arranged that the alliance between Moravia and Bohemia should be concluded at the Diet which Ferdinand had called for the beginning of May, at Brünn. The Catholics were paralyzed with fear ; already their leaders, Cardinal Dietrichstein and the Prince of Liechtenstein, were seeking to place themselves in a more favorable attitude towards the movement ; only Žerotín was steadfast in the part he had chosen. Living in retirement at a country-seat, he neither troubled the leaders of the agitation with counsels, nor made any promises contradictory to his recent action, but waited for the assembling of the Diet, that he might there raise his voice, and that surely not in harmony with the views of Thurn.

During the march of the Bohemian army to Znaim the Moravian troops under the command of Cardinal Dietrichstein remained quietly in their quarters, as no other order had reached them. The cavalry was commanded by two colonels, George von Náchod and Sedlnicky [Sedlnitsky], and were quartered at Brünn. But the infantry was under the command of Albert von Waldstein, who became afterwards so distinguished as a commander, and were stationed in Olmutz. Náchod adhered to Ferdinand, and desired therefore to save his troops for the King by leading them out of the country, but did not effect his purpose, as he was deserted by his soldiers. Thurn had therefore in the rest of his march to Brünn no enemy to encounter.

In the meantime Cardinal Dietrichstein, Prince Liech-

tenstein, Žerotín, and a considerable portion of the Catholic nobility had come together for the approaching Diet. Their spirits, already depressed, were made still sadder by Náchod's unsuccessful attempt, and they deemed it best to soothe the enemy by friendly advances. When the company of nobles on their way from Znaim had approached within about seven miles of Brünn, they saw a procession of the Catholic nobility coming from the city to greet them, which they regarded as less an act of civility than a recognition of their inceptive power. Arrived in Brünn, the Protestant Estates took, in the public square, an oath that they would, at the cost of property and blood, stand together in the defence of their cause. On the same day, or the day following, came the news in Brünn that Waldstein had attempted a stroke similar to that of Náchod, and had in like manner failed.

On the next day the Estates went to the lodgings of the Cardinal and asked him whether he, as the General appointed by the Diet for the defence of the land, had been privy to the defection of Náchod and Waldstein. Before the Cardinal had time to protest his innocence, some noblemen threatened him with the fate of the Bohemian Regents, and pointed to the window where he might be thrown out. Dietrichstein was frightened to death, and averred with the exaggeration which his fright inspired that he had had no suspicion of the intention of the two colonels, much less any complicity with them. He was willing to lay down his command, that the Estates might provide at pleasure for their defence, and promised that he would obligate himself with them to fidelity and firmness. The humble assurances of this ecclesiastical prince, hitherto so proud and defiant, banished the thoughts of murder, if such had indeed really been entertained, and

the Estates retired thence to the house of Žerotín. Here was repeated the scene which had been enacted with the Cardinal, only that Žerotín maintained an attitude of more decision, and simply denied being accessory to these acts. Finally, the Estates went to Prince Liechtenstein with similar charges, though they pressed these less violently—indeed they took of him a somewhat friendly leave, as the Prince not only declared his innocence, but even promised that he would thenceforth hold himself bound to them for life and death, and he sealed his promise by the hand-grasp: at least the Estates, on the very same day, assumed a more friendly attitude towards Liechtenstein than towards the Cardinal and Žerotín; for while they did not restrain the freedom of the former, they subjected the two latter to imprisonment at their own houses, and placed over them guards of musketeers.

From this moment Žerotín's part was at an end; he was now with those politically dead. He had, with a rare persistency, sought to maintain peace and reconcile oppositions, unmoved by losing the sympathies and incurring the suspicions of his own party by seeming to have become untrue to his own convictions. When he had reached the extreme, and the parties were intent upon each other's ruin, his mission of peace was fulfilled. His real inclination and his religious confession would have thrown him into the arms of the Protestants, but he would not recognize this connection. Whether he was so deeply convinced that the grounds of the insurrection were reprehensible that nothing could move him, or whether new alliances brought about by a marriage into the family of the Waldsteins held him too strongly, none can know. He belonged now at least to the party of the King—no longer, however, as an active member of his

council, but as a silent protégé. Ferdinand, under the extreme menaces of the Estates, no longer employed a mediator, but an energetic commander, and when victory declared in his favor, he employed courts of investigation and agencies of conversion which trampled into the dust the enemy who lay in complete prostration.

The business properly of the Moravian Estates, who formed themselves, on the 4th of May, into a Diet, began with the removal of several offensive persons from the highest offices, and taking full possession of the government. The Viceroy, Ladislas von Lobkowitz, was deprived of his office, and the Cardinal of his chief administration of the finances of the Estates. The several regiments were placed under command of Sedlnický, Frederic von Tiefenbach, and Ladislas Welen von Žerotín. A few days later the Estates organized their government, after the model of that of Bohemia, by placing it in the hands of thirty Directors, twelve of whom were chosen from the nobles, twelve from the knights, and six from the citizens. On the next day the Bohemian deputation, which had just arrived in Brünn, received the answer that the Moravians were ready to enter into an alliance with them and add their troops to those of Bohemia. Thus the Moravians joined the insurrection, and threw their weight into the balance against Ferdinand.

In further pursuit of the well-begun work, an order was sent to Thurn from Prague to push forward with his own troops and those of Moravia into Austria. The hope of being joined by the Austrian Estates was the more justified, because, since the Emperor's death, the dissensions in Vienna and Lintz had increased. The Protestants were disposed to take possession of the government on the pretext that until their hereditary sovereign, the

Archduke Albert, should arrive, its administration rightfully belonged to the Estates. In Vienna, Ferdinand frustrated these claims by calling attention to the Archduke's letter of renunciation in his favor; but in Lintz, where Tschernembl and Godfrey von Starhemberg bore rule, and where the adherents of Ferdinand had no armed force to support them, the first named of these men brought it about that the executive of the Estates seized the administration and summoned a Diet for April 2, 1619, to advise in regard to further measures. This body, when assembled, elected Herr von Polheim as its executive, entrusted him with the government of the land and the care of the Archducal domains, and thus deprived the King at once of his authority and his income. The direction in which they were disposed further to proceed appears in their attitude towards the Bohemian envoys, who had arrived in Lintz with the purpose of entreating the alliance of Upper Austria. Their request was granted, and it was determined that the armament be completed. Only the prelates opposed this and similar action, but without any effect.

When Ferdinand was informed of these events, and called the attention of the Estates to their arbitrary assumptions, they replied that they were ready to defend, even to the last drop of their blood, the cause of the Bohemians as a righteous one. They went further, and sent a deputation which should request of the King the recognition of the government established by them and open intercourse at the same time with the Estates of Lower Austria, and inform them that they had effected an alliance with the Bohemians. In Upper Austria they began to enlist and arm men for the war, and sent, towards the end of April, 300 men to Hohenfurt, in order to intercept the auxiliaries which were being enlisted in Germany

for Ferdinand and were on their way to Bohemia. Godfrey von Starhemberg, the colonel of the Upper Austrian troops, urged Count Thurn to hasten into Lower Austria, where the people were waiting for him as their Messiah.

Ferdinand, who was informed in detail of the increasing hostility to him which was spreading in Lintz, sought to meet this by inviting Tschernembl to a personal interview in Vienna, in the hope that he might win this man to his cause by a few friendly words. But Tschernembl declined the invitation, and in his letter advised the King to refrain from assuming the government, as it did not belong to him; furthermore, that he should summon the Estates of all the provinces to Vienna, and have the matters at issue adjusted peaceably. It is possible that the insurrection would have been ended, if Ferdinand had taken this advice; but the price which he would have had to pay for the settlement would have been the dominion of Protestantism in all Austria, the administration would have fallen into the hands of the aristocracy, and the hereditary right of the ruling dynasty would have been circumscribed. Neither the existence of the State nor that of the dynasty could have been secured by an adjustment.

The example of the Estates at Lintz and the presence of their deputation in Vienna caused the Protestants of Lower Austria to act more energetically and to importune the Catholic nobility and the King with various requests and demands, in order either to protect their own interests, or cut off from the King all the means of his defence. To this end they sent envoys to Presburg, and made complaint to the Palatine in regard to the auxiliary troops which were enlisted in Hungary for Ferdinand. They sought to guard the interests of their faith by requesting the toleration of Protestants on the domains of

Catholic landholders and their admission to city offices and to the university. These and other demands were denied by the Catholics, and the parties stood thus in an attitude of as great mutual hostility as if they had not been the sons of a common country, but hereditary foes.

On the Protestant side there was now hope of forcing matters, by the aid of Thurn, who finally, in the beginning of May, 1619, advanced into Lower Austria and encamped before the city of Laa, to a decision. After Ferdinand, as the result of negotiations to which he had resorted in order to gain time, had withdrawn his troops from this city, Thurn could garrison Laa and advance further without danger. In order to take possession of the passage of the Danube, he dispatched the two Moravian regiments of Tiefenbach and Žerotín towards Fischamend, where they arrived before the break of day, and by stratagem seized all the boats, including four large flat-bottomed ferry-boats. A secret understanding with the proprietor of Fischamend, Baron von Teufel, facilitated this undertaking, and removed nearly all its danger. When Thurn was informed of this success, he followed with the rest of his army and passed over with it to the right bank of the river. He drove back several thousand Hungarian cavalry, who were just then approaching to Ferdinand's aid, and then drew near the suburbs of Vienna, and as he found these without garrisons, he took possession of the parts which lay nearest, and waited for a signal from Vienna to direct his further action.

II.

When it became known in Vienna that Thurn had marched from Laa, the city presented a picture of the

most fearful agitation. The prospect of a siege of itself threw the citizens into consternation ; but their alarm was greatly increased by the stories of those who had fled for refuge before the Hungarians and Bohemians out of the neighboring villages and towns, and who could make the hair of listeners stand up by descriptions of the invaders' appearance, and all the better if these had not come in sight of them. The situation became one of extreme peril for Ferdinand's personal safety ; for he had not only external, but internal, enemies to guard against, and could not know whether the Protestant Estates and their adherents had come to an understanding, and, if so, what this might be, with the enemy. In fervent prayer he sought the needed consolation. His confessor, coming in one day to visit him, found him stretched before a crucifix. "I have," so said he to the astonished father, "weighed the perils which beset me on all sides, and as I know of no human help, I besought God for help ; if it be, however, God's will, so let me perish in this struggle."

While Ferdinand was doubling his pious exercises, and at the same time not neglecting the needed care for strengthening the garrisons of the city, the Catholics of Lower Austria were making efforts to meet the threatening danger by new negotiations. On the 3d of June they sent a message to the Protestants, inviting them to an interview upon the existing points of difference. It may well be supposed that they were now ready to make the broadest concessions, but it may also be conceived that they would wish, first of all, to know whether the Protestants would enter into a league with them against the further advance of Thurn. The hope of an arrangement was cut off when the latter declared that they should maintain their alliance with the Bohemians, and they de-

sired the Catholics also to join them. So the business ended in mutual irritation. The Protestants determined to give up all connection with the Catholics, to have their separate system of finance, and institute a government for the management of their own affairs. On the 5th of June, towards 10 o'clock in the forenoon, they went to the castle to inform Ferdinand of these determinations, and hand him a paper in which they attempted to justify their alliance with Bohemia. They made Herr Paul Jacob von Starhemberg their spokesman for the audience, though several others took part in this remarkable interview, which, both in the recollections of contemporaries and in later historic works, plays so prominent a part.

When these Protestants of Lower Austria were received by the King, and Starhemberg handed in the paper referred to, and added some words of compliment, some other noblemen broke in, and especially Andrew Thonradel, with caustic words. The interview soon became heated ; the deferential tone which marks the intercourse of sovereign and subject gave way to defiant language, in which Thonradel was especially prominent. The later tradition charges him with having been so disrespectful to the King as to take hold of the buttons of his waistcoat and press him to yield what the Protestants demanded. This much only is certain : the Estates demanded that Ferdinand should abandon the further prosecution of the war against Bohemia, and that they brought the charge against their Catholic fellow-citizens of having caused the division.

The violent language of the Protestants, and their demands in regard to the Bohemian question, looking as they did to his ruin, left the King in no doubt that the situation was one of fearful gravity. He stood alone

against the Estates, not a counsellor was at his side to speak in his behalf and turn the storm from his own person. Should he meet violence with violence; should he answer threats with charges; or should he break off the audience? His ascetic nature and habits he turned to account on this occasion, though unconsciously, yet in a masterly manner. Not for a moment did his needed self-possession forsake him. He blamed with well-sustained moderation those present for their alliance with Bohemia, and, descending even to entreaty, sought to turn them from the path upon which they had entered. He mingled appeals to their patriotism, praying them to unite with him in a defence against the approaching enemy, only, however, to learn anew at each turn that his words were powerless.

This scene had continued for nearly an hour, and its bitterness grew even more intense for Ferdinand, when all at once there came a change. A day or two before, the King had directed that the defence of the city should be strengthened by calling in the small garrisons of some neighboring places; the execution of his order came exactly at the opportune moment. While Ferdinand was subjected in the Hall of Audience to the deepest humiliation which in his whole life he ever personally experienced, and it could not be perceived how the contest would end, there was suddenly heard the sound of a rapidly approaching cavalry troop. It consisted of four companies of a regiment of cuirassiers which was just being formed, and which on the day before, with a strength of 400 men, had set out from Krems, and about 11 o'clock in the forenoon arrived in Vienna, where the commander of the arsenal, Gilbert von Saint-Hilaire, placed himself at their head. Their appearance did not fail of its effect in the Audience

Hall. The Estates, who, by their bold action, sought to frighten the King to yield, were not in their turn without anxiety, lest they should receive a sudden blow at the hands of the Catholic party. They had been warned of this before they entered the castle; some journeymen mechanics in a country-house had besought them, in the name of God, not to enter the castle, as they would there be seized, and that their execution was a settled matter. This rumor, so far as concerns its origin, may have been due to the excitement of the Protestants, who perhaps felt that their efforts designed for the overthrow of Ferdinand might be paid back in the same coin. The sudden galloping up of a cavalry troop, which they could see from the window of the Audience Hall, might be so interpreted, and in fact the Protestants saw in it an evil omen. Some at once ran in fright as if all was over with them. Their language, which a moment before was bold even to daring, changed suddenly, and as if by magic the usual forms of intercourse between prince and people resumed their sway. With a few utterances answering to this state of things, the deputation took their leave. Their appearance in the street quieted their friends, for in the city it was already thought that evil had befallen them.

It was in the following night that Thurn reached Vienna; but the expectation, that with the aid of the party hostile to the King he would be able to force his entry into the city, was not realized. What ground there was, however, for this expectation cannot now be certainly known. It is known only that Thurn himself repeatedly expressed such hopes, and that the Catholics of the time charged the Protestants with having made treasonable propositions, and that in the judicial proceedings instituted, after the victory by the imperial government, a citizen of

Vienna, named Gold, was sentenced to death on his own confession that he was ready to open the way of the enemy's entry into the city. In the last moment, at least, the courage of the revolutionary party failed. The garrison of Vienna had, by the volunteering of citizens and students, and other accessions, risen to nearly 5,000 men, against which a few resolute men in the opposition, or if these were even numbered by hundreds, could not venture such a stroke as the surrender of a gate. When Thurn perceived that he had been deluded in his hopes, the conviction could not but be forced upon him that, with his defective armament and his want of artillery, his project had ended in a failure, and that nothing remained but to return to Bohemia. Moreover, he was repeatedly called back by the Directors, as the daily increasing force of Buquoi gave them great solicitude.

Thus the expedition against Vienna would have proved itself a wholly abortive enterprise, if Thurn had not, in the last moment, found an opportunity to speak with some members of the Hungarian Diet and win them to the cause of the insurrection. All the exertions which the Bohemians had put forth the previous year to this end had been unsuccessful. Now, for the first time, the sympathies of the Hungarians showed themselves strongly in the newly-called Diet, in a resolution to offer a mediation in the Bohemian contest, and thus promote the pacification of Bohemia. For this purpose they sent a deputation to Vienna. One of the members of this was Count Thurzo, who, on this occasion, visited Thurn in his camp, and assured him that he should employ his whole influence to bring the Hungarians to favor still more the cause of his countrymen. This promise, and the intimate relations with Hungary which followed, were the result of the

expedition to Vienna, which, however, might have been gained at less expenditure of force and time. In the night of the 13th of June, Thurn broke up his camp and marched to Schwechat, where he passed the Danube and entered upon his return to Bohemia. In taking leave of the Protestants of Lower Austria, he exchanged with them hopes for the future, and encouraged them to perseverance.

In Bohemia, in the meantime, the war force was very considerably increased on both sides. Since the month of March the insurgents had made the utmost exertions to fill up the army by new enlistments, and as Thurn in his expedition to Moravia was accompanied by few besides the levy, it followed that Hohenloe, who still stood before Budweis, drew all the reinforcements to himself. Reckoning the troops under Mansfeld at Pilsen and the Silesian auxiliaries with them, the Bohemian army numbered, after the month of May, 14,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry.

As the army commanded by Buquoi was greatly reduced, the imperial government must also give its attention to new enlistments. Matthias' resources were so trifling that, immediately after the insurrectionary outbreak, he had applied to the King of Spain through Count Khevenhiller for aid. At first Philip resolved upon a subsidy, and in October, 1618, upon sending 3,000 men armed and maintaining them, and to this he afterwards added, in January, 1619, a sum sufficient to arm 7,000 men who should move from Flanders to the scene of the war. A few weeks later he directed the enlistment of 17,000 men in Italy. The Italian auxiliaries dwindled down on the march to less than one-half, and did not reach the theatre of the war until the winter 1619-20. The enlistments in Flanders, on the contrary, were quickly made up to a

strength of 11,000 men, including, however, in this number those enlisted on Ferdinand's own account, and towards the end of May (1619) nearly doubled the strength of Buquoi's army.

The result was, that in the headquarters of the royal army aggressive action was resolved upon, and Thurn's retreat was still further hastened. Mansfeld, at the head of 3,000 men, left Pilsen in order to strengthen Hohenloe at Budweis. Buquoi, informed by spies of the direction of his march, determined to attack him by surprise, and, leaving his main force in Budweis to watch Hohenloe, he proceeded with 5,000 men against the enemy. The meeting took place on the 10th of June near Záblat, a village lying northeastwardly from the small city of Netolic, to which Mansfeld had retreated when he became aware of his enemy's superior force. Buquoi at first only skirmished with the enemy, and, sure of a victory in the end, sent some detachments of troops to cut off the way of the flight which he anticipated. When he had thus arranged, he proceeded, about noon, to the attack, and the victory was complete. The infantry was either hewn down or captured, and only a portion of the cavalry escaped. Waldstein, the future commander, took part in this engagement at the head of a regiment of cavalry which had been enlisted for him among the Walloons of the Spanish Netherlands. Mansfeld behaved bravely and with undaunted intrepidity so long as resistance was possible, but when he saw that all was lost, he sought, with but fifteen mounted companions, his safety in flight to Moldautein. This defeat, which, notwithstanding the small forces engaged, has preserved its memory to the present day, rendered the Bohemian army unable longer to maintain the siege of Budweis, and obliged it to withdraw. Hohen-

loe broke up his camp near Rudolfstadt on the 15th of June, and retired to Soběslau (Sobyleslau), to await there the arrival of Thurn. Buquoi availed himself of the leisure thus given him for the purpose of assailing the castles of Southern Bohemia which were not already in his possession, and having nearly accomplished this work, he turned northward one day before the junction of Thurn with Hohenloe. The united forces of these two commanders formed an army of perhaps 30,000 strong, making it numerically quite superior to that of Buquoi, though much below his in their preparation for service in the field. The levy was without practice, and was wanting, as were also the enlisted men, in discipline, since the Bohemian Estates constantly grew more slack in the payment of their troops. The soldiers deserted, the officers seized every pretext to absent themselves and hang around in Prague, and those who held high commands did much the same.

At the headquarters of the royal army it was determined so to order the aggressive movement as to transfer the war to Moravia. With this intent, Dampierre separated from Buquoi and entered this country, and near Wisternitz came upon the Moravian troops under Tiefenbach, and was defeated. This was early in August, 1619. Although Buquoi could not hope that the events of the war in Moravia would compel the Bohemians to send a part of their men thither, and knew, therefore, that he would have to prosecute his plan against the enemy with a diminished force, he was, nevertheless, encouraged, by the growing disorder caused in the Bohemian camp by the failure of their pay, to proceed to decisive action. The state of the Bohemian finances was such that the army was near the point of dissolution. The regiments would

not fight or suffer hardship, but sent deputation after deputation to Prague to demand the removal of the manifold causes of evil. The pay still due to the Bohemian troops from the Directory, after the payment of considerable instalments, amounted to 1,800,000 thalers. This great sum can be conceived only by knowing that the enlisted men had been offered higher wages than had been usual in Germany, and higher than had, for instance, been paid in Silesia. It should also be further considered that the men were very seldom mustered, to ascertain the deaths from wounds and sickness, and reduce the rolls of those for the payment of whose wages the captains were respectively bound. Had these two errors been avoided, the back pay due would have been scarcely half so much.

Buquoi now entered upon his march against the enemy, and advanced slowly but without interruption or resistance, until he reached Milčin, a place situated six miles north of Tabor, although the Bohemian army had been reinforced by 2,000 Silesians and 1,000 musketeers enlisted in the Netherlands, and were numerically more than double his own. In August, Buquoi attacked Pisek, and, although intelligence of this had reached the enemy, they took no measures for the relief of the city, and let it fall into his hands, together with its very considerable treasures and stores of provisions. He then proceeded to Miowitz, intending there to await the arrival of Mansfeld, who, in the meantime, had enlisted fresh troops, and was approaching from Pilsen to join the Bohemian army. But by a skilful manœuvre of Mansfeld, his plan was defeated. Hohenloe withdrew to Zalužan to cover Prague; and left to Buquoi an unobstructed way to Pilsen, though he could not reach Prague without risking a battle. Had he made the attempt, such was the demoralized spirit of the Bohe-

mian army, that victory would doubtless have declared for him ; but a sudden occurrence prevented this, and made it impossible for him longer to remain upon the Bohemian war theatre. Bethlen Gabor, Prince of Transylvania, had appeared as an ally of Bohemia in the war, and was marching against Presburg and Vienna. The latter city Buquoi could not abandon to capture, and so must withdraw and relinquish the advantages which he had thus far gained.

III.

While these things were taking place, two events had prepared the way of an influence destined to be more controlling of destiny in the future than even the alliance of Bethlen, to which events we must call attention before proceeding to any further account of the war: these were the election of an Emperor at Frankfort, and that of a King by the insurgents at Prague.

King Ferdinand had set out, on the 11th of July, 1619, for Frankfort, and on his way thither had reached Salzburg, where he fell in with Lord Doncaster, the English ambassador, whom James had sent to the Continent as mediator in the Bohemian quarrel. How thoroughly the English sovereign was disposed to protect the interests of the Hapsburgs against all harm appears in this, that he instructed his ambassador to see to it that Ferdinand should be elected Emperor, and that the Bohemian dispute should, however, be adjusted on the basis of Ferdinand's recognition as King, and in his obligating himself, in return, to carry out the promises which he had made on the occasion of his acceptance as King. The Protestants should accordingly be subjected to no abridgment

of their religious freedom, and, on the other hand, the Estates should repeal their acts of confiscation. It is apparent that James would recognize only so much of the Bohemian quarrel as related to questions of religion, and would not support the political demands of the Estates; in general, he would sincerely labor to bring about an adjustment, if this should be desired on both sides.

Doncaster had travelled to Salzburg, by way of Heidelberg, where the Palsgrave and his wife had received him kindly, and attempted to win him to their views, which was not difficult, since his views as a Protestant made him hostile to the demands of the Hapsburgs, and consequently he did not hamper himself specially with the instructions of his sovereign. When, therefore, he met Ferdinand, he offered him indeed James' mediation, but not in the sense in which he had been instructed, and perhaps used some expressions which did not dispose Ferdinand kindly. This fact and the progress of his arms caused him to decline the mediation; and when the astonished Doncaster, who shared his King's mania for greatness, intimated that he was not satisfied with this decision, and still further commended the services of James, and urged their acceptance, Ferdinand informed him that he could not form a definitive conclusion until he reached Frankfort, and there might perhaps accept the mediation, but that some other princes also must be connected with it. Ferdinand then proceeded to Munich, where he met the Duke of Bavaria, and renewed the friendship which he had formed with him at Ingolstadt, and requested his aid in the matters at issue. Though he made no definite promise, Maximilian gave him encouraging assurances, and Ferdinand felt secure of their realization in case of his receiving at Frankfort the imperial crown.

The call of the Electoral Diet for the 20th of July, which, according to traditional usage, had been sent out by the Elector of Mentz, was most unwelcome at Heidelberg. It has been related that the statesmen of the Palatinate had baited the Duke of Savoy with the imperial crown, and assured him that he would be elected on the ground that the Palsgrave was supposed to have control of the majority of the votes. It was now perceived that this assurance was too hasty, and effort was made to effect an adjournment of the election. The Palsgrave went in person to the Elector of Mentz, and requested this; but however great the effort might have been, the end was not gained, for Schweikhard of Mentz understood too well what Frederic's plans were, and that, in case they should succeed, not only would the authority of the Hapsburgs receive a severe shock, but that the Catholic Church in Germany would feel the same.

Frederic now endeavored to win the Protestant Electors for the adjournment of the election, and for this purpose sent his Counsellor, Camerarius, to Dresden, but was repulsed, because John George not only stood in friendly relations with the Hapsburgs, but was, moreover, concerned about his own Electoral hat in case the insurrection should triumph. The Dukes of Weimar had not forgotten how their ancestor, John Frederic, had been by Maurice of Saxony deprived of his dignity and his land, and the revolution in the public relations which was brought about by the Bohemian movement seemed to them a suitable occasion to regain what they had lost. They did not conceal their hopes, and thus strengthened John George in his friendship for the Hapsburgs.

The Palsgrave personally visited the Duke of Bavaria, and attempted with flattering words to gain him to his

policy. Here also he failed, and all his labors to this end were fruitless: the election would take place according to the summons unless he should resolve to defeat it by an act of violence. This plan, also, Frederic meditated; and it was perhaps with the design of gaining confederates in the execution of this plan that he, as Director of the Union, called at Heilbronn a meeting of the members to take counsel. The majority, however, only advised another attempt with the individual Electors to have the election put off. For violent interference but a few members, by no means the majority, expressed themselves. He again pursued the way proposed, but failed of the desired end, and was obliged to resolve, whether for good or for ill, to send his envoys to the Electoral Diet. He enjoined upon his ambassador to labor above all for the adjustment of the Bohemian quarrel, and to prevent the election from taking place until peace should have been restored. Only in case the other Electors would not unite on this proposal, were they permitted to take part in the election, and then they were not to vote for Ferdinand.

Together with the three ecclesiastical Electors, who were present in person, appeared in Frankfort-on-the-Main the envoys of the Palatinate, Saxony, and Brandenburg; the Bohemians had also sent envoys to protest against Ferdinand's participation in the election, but they were not admitted. The sessions of the Electoral College were opened with the consideration of the question, whether the election should be immediately proceeded to, or whether the Bohemian dispute should first be settled. Ferdinand, who was already in Frankfort, though he took no part in the counsels, declared to the ecclesiastical Electors that he would not enter into any negotiations with the Bohemians until he should be acknowledged as

their King and the Estates could be dealt with as his subjects. This declaration was favorably entertained by the ecclesiastical Electors ; and as it would be necessary to inform the insurgents of this decision of Ferdinand, and to have various preliminary counsellings before the negotiations with them could be opened, the spiritual Electors were in favor of proceeding, in the next following session, to the election of an Emperor, after which the Bohemian dispute should be settled under the mediation of the whole Electoral College. The envoys of the Palatinate declared themselves against this proposal, as required by their instructions ; those of Brandenburg joined in this declaration, and those of Saxony declared that they were without sufficient authority. The representatives of the temporal Electors were then requested to seek new instructions from their sovereigns, and, until the arrival of these, all further business was to be adjourned.

In the meantime Lord Doncaster arrived in the neighborhood of Frankfort, which city he might not enter, on account of the imperial election, and besought Count Oñate, who had made the journey to Frankfort in Ferdinand's company, and taken lodgings in Höchst, for an interview, in which he again urged the immediate entrance upon the peace negotiations, and again proposed his sovereign for this business. But neither this interview, nor a second one, at which the Imperial Privy Counsellor, Count Trautmandorff, was present, secured his end ; he was entertained with evasions, which showed him distinctly enough that Ferdinand reckoned upon the triumph of his arms, and was not at all sincerely thinking of the mediation of the Electoral College. The rage which seized the party of the Palatinate, as they observed this ever-increasing obstinacy, showed itself during these days, when a cavalry

battalion of 500 men, which had been enlisted in the lands of the Rhenish Bishops, and had entered upon their march to Bohemia, was attacked near the village of Roden by a force three times as great, and dispersed. The intelligence of this occurrence, when brought to the King, produced no depressing effect upon him, but confirmed him only in his determination to confide the present matters of dispute to the sword for solution.

In the latter part of August the instructions for the envoys of Saxony and Brandenburg arrived, authorizing them to take part in the imperial election, if the majority of the Electors should declare themselves in favor of doing this before negotiating peace for Bohemia. The instructions of the ambassadors of the Palatinate were even yet not changed; but as they were in the minority, their opposition effected nothing. Before they proceeded to the election itself, the Elector of Treves went to Ferdinand and officially put to him the question whether he would, after the election, admit the mediation of the Electoral College in the Bohemian dispute. The King would answer affirmatively only on condition that Duke Maximilian of Bavaria should also be added. When the Elector of Treves declined to accept this condition, on the ground that other princes, and especially the King of England, could not be excluded if Maximilian were admitted, and the settlement of this matter was a home affair, Ferdinand finally handed in the written declaration that he would consent to the mediation of the Electoral College. A few days later the Bohemians were informed of this decision, and set down the opening of the negotiations for the 10th of November, an appointment which was prevented, by the following events, from being kept.

Now began the business of the election-capitulation

[Wahlcapitulation]. The necessary conditions were first stated, the same to which the Emperors Rudolph and Matthias had to subscribe. Although these reduced the imperial power to the narrowest limits, the representatives of the Palatinate endeavored to restrict it still further, while individual Electors, especially those of Treves and Cologne, attempted utterances looking towards Ferdinand as a candidate. When Count Solms, one of the representatives of the Palatinate, declared, in reply to the Elector of Cologne, that his sovereign, in case Ferdinand should mount the imperial throne, would furnish no aid against the Bohemians, the Elector put him to silence with the remark that there would perhaps be some way of escape, and added: "If it be indeed true that the Bohemians intend to depose Ferdinand and choose another King, a war of twenty, thirty, or forty years may be expected, as Spain and the house of Austria would sooner stake all that they hold in this world on the issue than relinquish Bohemia; indeed, Spain herself would rather let the Netherlands be lost than allow the dominion of the house in Bohemia to be so shamefully and violently wrested from it." How fully the events which followed confirm this sad prophetic utterance!

For the election itself, the Imperial Chancellor, the Elector Schweikhard, of Mentz, fixed the 28th of August. On that day the Electors who were in attendance, and the envoys of those absent, assembled at 7 o'clock in the morning, in the celebrated old Council House, called The Römer. Here the Archbishops put on garments of red cloth, Ferdinand one of red satin, and placed a new Bohemian crown upon his head, as the one which descended from Charles IV., and generally used in these ceremonies, was kept in Karlstein, and had thus fallen into the hands

of the insurgent government. The Electors took the oath that they would act in the election which was to follow according to their best knowledge and conscience, and then proceeded to the Election Chapel (Wahlkapelle) each of the Electors and of the chief envoys attended by three counsellors, who were to act as witnesses in the execution of the capitulation. A notary read the document, and the Electors bound themselves that, in case one of their number should be chosen, he would faithfully observe the terms of the capitulation. Then all but the seven Electors * withdrew.

The Elector of Mentz began the proceedings by calling upon the Elector of Treves for his vote; to which call he responded by naming King Ferdinand, Archduke Albert, of Austria, and Duke Maximilian, of Bavaria, as suitable candidates, and closed by giving his vote for Ferdinand. The Elector of Cologne followed with the declaration that his brother Maximilian, of Bavaria, declined to be regarded as a candidate, and he therefore gave his vote, for weighty reasons, in favor of King Ferdinand. It was Ferdinand's next turn to vote; but the Elector of Mentz did not call upon him, but turned, as if in forgetfulness, to Count Solms, as representative of the Palsgrave. Solms drew forth a paper which contained the vote, and read it. In this were named as fit persons for the place, on the Evangelical side, the King of Denmark and the Elector of Saxony, and, on the Catholic side, King Ferdinand, Archduke Albert, and the Dukes of Bavaria and Savoy. The Palsgrave desired that the Empire have a head capable of putting an end to the present sad condi-

*The seven Electors were in this instance the three Archbishops and Ferdinand, King of Bohemia, who were there in person, and the chief ambassador of each of the other three Electors.—Tr.

tion of its affairs, and he found in the Duke of Bavaria the fittest person for the imperial crown. Mentz next called for the vote of Ferdinand, who, however, requested that the other Electors should first be asked; and the Saxon envoy was called upon, and declared himself, in short, decidedly for Ferdinand. The envoy of Brandenburg named King Ferdinand and the Archduke Albert, and ended by declaring himself for Ferdinand, on the ground that Maximilian declined the election. Mentz, then, after mentioning Albert and Maximilian, gave his vote for Ferdinand, who himself also, as it now came his turn again to vote, declared that, as the majority had decided for him, and, according to the Golden Bull, he had a right to vote for himself, he would avail himself of this right and vote for himself. The Elector of Mentz now put to the envoy of the Palatinate the question whether he would separate himself from the majority; upon which Solms, too, declared himself for Ferdinand. The election was over, and was unanimous. Deeply touched by the gravity of the occasion, Ferdinand gave expression of his thanks for the dignity conferred upon him, and pledged himself to preside with fidelity and earnestness over the Empire.

The election signified, not only the triumph of the Hapsburgs, but a defeat of the party of the Palatinate, such as could not have been more decided. The Palsgrave had moved heaven and earth to prevent, or at least to delay, it; he had, in the end, even meditated a resort to violence, and his endeavors had not only failed, but his envoys had at last, however unwillingly, given their vote for Ferdinand.

IV.

While these events were taking place at Frankfort, the Directors had summoned a General Diet of the Bohemian crown, to be attended by representatives of the adjacent lands, at which Diet not only further measures of defence were to be decided upon, but also the question of the attitude to be assumed towards Ferdinand and that in regard to the election of a new King in his stead, were to be settled. The business was opened on the 8th of July, and centred at first around the drafting of the articles of Confederation, which were not only to govern the relations of the lands of the Bohemian crown, but to include also certain provisions in regard to the rights of the States. The first and weightiest subject of deliberation was the right to elect a King. All agreed that the kingly office was not to be regarded as hereditary, but as elective, and that the elective right should not thereafter belong to Bohemia alone, but be shared in common with the other lands. Bohemia should have in the election two votes, Moravia and Silesia each one, and Upper and Lower Lusatia, together, two votes.

The further business related to the religious Confessions. The old name, "Utraquist," which the Bohemian Protestants were obliged still, at the time the Royal Charter was granted, to retain, was dropped, and for it was substituted the title, "Adherents of the Evangelic Confession of Faith." The Bohemian State was impressed with a Protestant character; it was provided that none but Protestants should hold the higher offices, and that a preference should be given to these in filling the places of counsellors in the royal cities. In regard to the royal chancery—corresponding with the department of the interior for the lands of

the Bohemian crown—this should be divested of all power to act with severity, so as to secure the self-government of the lands severally. These retained, too, their freedom and independence of action in all political, financial, and military affairs. Finally, provision was made for the election of Defensors in each land, who should exercise a kind of oversight over the King, who was to be elected; they were to see to it that he observe the new constitution, and, if he should not observe it, to call them to resistance. Eight cases were specified in which resistance was declared to be justified, among which were violation of religious liberty and illegal appointments to the highest positions. At the close of these provisions, which embraced all the Bohemian lands, the Diet of Bohemia so regulated for itself alone the right of building churches, that all the inhabitants of Bohemia, without distinction of rank, should enjoy the right to build evangelical churches. The right to build Catholic churches should, on the contrary, be limited to the nobility, the knighthood, and the royal cities. On the 31st of July the session was closed, and the "Act of Confederation," which all who took part in its enactment confirmed by a solemn oath, was made public in Prague.

Between Bohemia and Austria there was also, during the days immediately following, a treaty concluded. The Protestant Estates of Lower Austria had transferred their sessions from Vienna to Horn, and continued them in the latter place, where, under the promptings of Tscher nembl and in union with the Upper Austrians, they had resolved to take part in the General Diet at Prague. In the treaty referred to, Bohemia and Austria bound themselves to a common defence against all enemies which should assail the prerogatives of the Estates and the

Evangelical Confession. They guaranteed to each other the right to put an end to all the evils from which they had hitherto suffered, and to make all arrangements which the common good might require. Finally, it was determined that this alliance should be of perpetual obligation, and that, at intervals of five years, general conventions of deputies from Austria and Bohemia should be held, to take counsel in regard to matters of common concern. The session was closed on the 15th of August, and on the 16th the treaty was formally read to the Diet and confirmed by the oaths of the Directors and the Austrian envoys.

These matters settled, the Directors called the attention of the representatives of the lands of the Bohemian crown to the contemplated deposition of Ferdinand. The business was introduced by reading, in the Bohemian Diet, a biographical sketch, in which the King's deeds and omissions for twenty years were subjected to a thorough review. He was reproached with having crushed the Protestants in Styria, and with having obtained the Bohemian crown by artifice and deceit, at the peril of the country's ruin. After exhausting the arguments drawn from Ferdinand's previous action, a second paper brought forward still other grounds for his deposition; the enormous burden of debt which would fall upon Bohemia, in case it must pay the expenses not only of its own defence, but also the debts contracted for the war brought against the land, was specially emphasized. With the reading of these papers ended the business of August 18th. The next day the Estates were severally called upon to vote upon the question of Ferdinand's deposition on the grounds which had been brought forward. Every person of the nobility and knighthood, and after them also the deputies of the

royal cities, voted for the deposition. Count Albin Schlick reported to the Silesian and Lusatian deputies the result of this voting, and called upon them for their opinion, while Ruppa brought the same question to the test of a vote with the Moravians. They asked for one day to think upon the subject, and the next day concurred in the vote of the Bohemian Estates.

With the deposition of Ferdinand came now into the foreground the question who should be chosen to the throne. Three princes were proposed and considered : the Duke of Savoy and the Electors of the Palatinate and Saxony. Upon the prospects of these candidates, and the negotiations which had been carried on with them up to the moment, the following narrative will throw some light.

It will be remembered that, in November of the previous year, Ruppa made to the ambassador of the Palatinate, then present in Prague, a proposal in regard to the election of his sovereign as King of Bohemia, and requested his concurrence. But when the Duke of Savoy expressed to the ambassador of the Palatinate his desire for the Bohemian throne, and suggested Hither-Austria as the Palsgrave's part of the spoils, the Heidelberg cabinet felt bound to support the Savoyan plans, and sent, when the proposed meeting of the Prince of Anhalt with Ruppa and Hohenloe had come to nought on account of the Emperor Matthias' death, Ahaz von Dohna to Prague again to work there for the Savoyan candidate. Dohna revealed to the astonished Ruppa that the merit of sending Mansfeld's auxiliaries belonged, not to the Palsgrave, but to the Duke of Savoy, and that the latter alone had really aided Bohemia. This intelligence cooled down somewhat the enthusiasm for the Palsgrave, and Ruppa

and Hohenloe, after Dohna's report, seemed to have agreed that, in the coming election of a King, they must look to Savoy.

In order to bring the business to a conclusion, and obtain from Savoy increased aid, the Prince of Anhalt set out (last of April, 1619) for Turin, announced the favorable reception which Dohna's report had found in Prague, and attempted to bring the Duke to the definite terms of a treaty. He did not, however, find him so favorably disposed as previous intelligence had led him to expect. Charles Emanuel had learned from his diplomatic agents that the hopes which he had upon the accession of Venice and France to the alliance were without foundation, and indeed that France would rather oppose than favor his plans. Still further, from James of England, whose support the Palsgrave deemed so certain, no encouraging assurances had arrived, and the special condition, therefore, under which the Duke was ready to support Bohemia was not fulfilled. But as the Prince of Anhalt re-instilled into him the spirit which had been checked, persistently urging the conclusion of an alliance, he finally yielded to the pressure; but one can scarcely avoid the suspicion, in view of his later bearing, that he did this only to be rid of his annoyer. In the treaty he bound himself to the further support of 4,600 men to prevent, in the service of Bohemia, the passage of Spanish troops from Italy to Germany, to send 6,000 men to Alsace, and, finally, to the monthly payment of 100,000 ducats to the Union. In return, the Palsgrave was bound to fit out an army of 10,000 men in aid of the Bohemians, and to use with them his influence for the Duke's election to the crown. In a second draft of a treaty, made on the same day, it was provided that the Duke of Savoy, in case it

should on any ground occur that he should attain to the imperial and not to the Bohemian throne, should still pay the 100,000 ducats monthly, provided that the Bohemians should effect an election to their throne which should subserve the common interest. These two treaties, made at Rivoli, were to be ratified within two months.

These transactions over, the Prince of Anhalt set out for Heilbronn, where, in the beginning of June (1619), a Diet of the Union assembled, before which he laid the result of his mission. Here appeared also envoys from Bohemia to solicit money and troops. Their request was granted to this extent, that the Union should stand security for them for a loan of 200,000 florins, which was afterwards effected in Nuremberg. The Union would do nothing towards raising auxiliary troops, but resolved to enlist from 13,000 to 15,000 men to prevent the passage to Bohemia of the force to be enlisted in Flanders or on the Rhine, in aid of Ferdinand, and we have already seen how they executed this resolution at Roden. From the Diet of the Union, Anhalt went to Amberg, where he usually resided, having been invested by the Palsgrave with the Regency of the Upper Palatinate, and held an interview with de Bausse, the agent of Savoy, and Count Mansfeld, giving them instructions as to the manner in which they should advocate the claims of the Duke of Savoy to the throne of Bohemia.

Scarcely, however, had de Bausse and Mansfeld departed, when both Anhalt and the Palsgrave regretted the giving of such instructions. They could not forgive themselves that they had renounced the crown of Bohemia in favor of the Italian prince, and hastened to retrieve their error by sending Ahaz von Dohna again to Prague to work against the Savoyan candidate. Dohna hastened

thither, and at once sought to win Ruppa, the president of the Directorial government, back for the Palsgrave, and of course was not wanting in promises to gain his end.

Nor did it cost much effort; there was not in Prague a kind feeling towards the Duke of Savoy, who had not for more than six months sent any money to Count Mansfeld for the support of the troops, and now, notwithstanding the treaty concluded at Rivoli, declined any further aid because James of England would not join the alliance. By his conduct the Duke himself, in effect, renounced all claim as a candidate, so that Dohna was received with double favor by Ruppa, and was assured of the use of his whole influence for the Palsgrave's election. Ruppa made but the one condition of the fulfilment of his promise, that the Palsgrave obligate himself to accept the throne if elected to it.

When Dohna returned with this report to Amberg, he met there also the Elector of the Palatinate. Frederic felt flattered by the hopes thus given him, but would not make the required promise until he should be sure of the concurrence of his father-in-law in his acceptance of the Bohemian crown, and therefore entreated that the election be deferred until he should have received news from England. With this intelligence Dohna returned to Prague, where he arrived on the 18th of August, the very time when the deposition of Ferdinand was under consideration. He did as instructed, but neither the Directors nor Ruppa would consent to put off the election. The General Diet had assembled for this purpose, and could not be adjourned; furthermore, things had taken the unfavorable turn narrated above on the theatre of the war, so that a favorable change could be hoped for only by securing the alliance of some prominent prince, and

conveying to him the crown. Dohna was therefore informed that the election could not be delayed in order to receive James' concurrence.

These statements make it clear that those who were then at the head of Bohemian affairs had their minds firmly fixed upon the Elector of the Palatinate, and had let the Duke of Savoy drop as a candidate just as soon as Frederic gave the first sign of readiness to identify himself with their cause; and yet, for all this, he would never perhaps have obtained the crown of the country, if another candidate—to whom, not indeed the leaders of opinion, but at least the majority of the people, looked with earnest desire—that is, the Elector of Saxony, would have consented to connect himself with the cause of the Bohemian insurgents.

John George was the nephew of that Maurice of Saxony who, by his alliance with Charles V., brought about the defeat of the league of Smalcald, and received Electoral Saxony as his reward, the owner having been cared for and indemnified with Weimar. John George was not indeed in good repute; he was everywhere spoken of for his drunkenness, for the coarse manner in which, like an Oriental despot, he maltreated those around him, and hid from sight many a clever trait of his character, especially his faultless order in household and state. The Bohemians had a sharp eye for the skilfulness of the Saxon administration, perhaps because they hoped that by the Elector's careful use of his well-ordered financial resources they would be able most easily to effect the overthrow of the Hapsburg rule. This conviction arose also from the confidential communication which Thurn, Andrew Schlick, and Wenceslas Kinsky, as early as the year 1614, sent by a Saxon agent to the Elector, directly inviting him to a

canvass for the Bohemian throne. Nothing but the perfect indifference of the Elector to suggestions of this kind caused this subject to be so little mentioned in Bohemian circles.

When, in the year 1618, the insurrection broke out, a few promises and a little service on the side of John George would have sufficed to bring its leaders to seek in him their future head. Thurn, Hohenloe, and Andrew Schlick did not fail to give hints and utterances in this direction. But the Elector was still deaf to all flatteries. There was not the smallest act to justify the conclusion that he was in sympathy with the insurrection. After the battle at Záblat, when the war took so unfavorable a turn for Bohemia, and the want of money and of all the necessities of war was felt, the Directors sent Count Andrew Schlick to Dresden to prevail upon the Elector to render some aid, and offered him in security, not only such crown-lands as he should choose, but also the release of all the Saxon territory which was as yet held as a fief of the Bohemian crown. Schlick did not limit himself to the authorized offers, but used the occasion to indicate to the Elector how great his prospects were for the throne of Bohemia. Nevertheless his answer was adverse to the prayers of the Directors in all their parts and as cold and formal as possible.

If this answer had become generally known, the sympathies of the multitude for Saxony would have been cooled; but the secret was carefully kept, in order not further to depress the feeling already so low. Thus the great multitude, who knew nothing of the transactions with the Palatinate, remained true to their partiality for Electoral Saxony, and were still further strengthened in it by the peculiar bearing of Schlick. This weak-minded man would

not comprehend that his mission had failed, and tried still to keep alive the hopes placed upon Saxony, and excused the delay of the Elector on the ground that the lands of the Bohemian crown had not with sufficient energy declared their intention to elect a new King. The Elector, so Schlick maintained, was so inclined to the cause of Bohemia as to give them cause for earnest rejoicing, and those who asserted the opposite of this were either ignorant or they lied. So it came to pass that, in the beginning of the transactions relating to the confederation in Prague, the opinion still prevailed that, in the approaching election of a King, Saxony would prevail. Even the agent of Saxony thought this; at least he wrote, two days before the confederation was concluded, that the most prominent of the Directors were captivated by Electoral Saxony, and the reasons were earnestly stated which would determine this prince to accept the offered crown. When the confederation had been formed, he reported that the three Estates all equally desired the Saxon rule, and were ready to pledge for it property and blood. Still he did not conceal the fact that there was also intriguing for another candidate, the Duke of Savoy, though he did not think that this rival could become specially dangerous. And yet all the hopes and reports rested on illusions. The Elector did not obtain the election, because he did not at all aspire to it.

The election was begun in the Bohemian Diet on the 26th of August. The decisive session was opened with a prayer, after which one of the Directors, Bohuchwal Berka, called attention in a few words to the purpose of the meeting of the Estates, and then called upon Field Marshal Fels to declare his vote. Fels, who belonged to the Saxon party, wished to protract the election, and desired

that they attend first still another solemn religious service; and then, when he found no sympathy with his unseasonable piety, he wished that the election take place precisely as in earlier instances, naming that of Ferdinand I., that is, by a committee, and as he did not carry this proposition either, he still further proposed that the voting be by Electors,* and not individual. In all these propositions his design was to prepare the way of an endless debate, and as he did not succeed in carrying any one of them through, he finally moved simply the adjournment of the election. After Ruppa had declared in excitement that he was opposed to all waste of time, the Diet, by a decisive majority, declared against the motion for adjournment. This episode finished, Berka again called upon the Field Marshal for his vote, which he gave for the Elector of Saxony. Carl Mracky, who next followed, voted for the same; as also, after some interruption, still two others of the nobles, Count Albin Schlick and Ulrich Kinsky. All the other members of the nobility, thirty-four in number, voted for the Palsgrave; two of these, Paul von Řičan and Ruppa, stated the grounds of their views in extended speeches, in which they not only praised the excellent traits of their candidate, but also called attention to his merits hitherto in the cause of Bohemia, and especially to the surprise which he had inflicted a few days before upon the cavalry enlisted for Ferdinand's service. Ruppa emphasized the alliances of the Palsgrave with the Union, with England, Savoy, and Switzerland, and mentioned also his wealth, as enabling him to give lasting aid to the Bohemians. This speech may in the last moment have brought a considerable

* Nach Kurien und nicht einzeln.

number of votes into the camp of the Palatinate. Ruppa understood, as did no one else, the relations abroad. If he spoke of the alliances of the Palsgrave with an almost apodictic assurance, as though these all existed in fact, and would be as a whole and severally productive for Bohemia, who of all present did not listen with pleasure to his words? Who did not yield himself to the belief that the finished picture of the orator was true to life, and that the Palsgrave would be their deliverer in this day of need?

The voting of the knighthood gave a still more brilliant result for the party of the Palatinate; 110 persons voted for the Palsgrave, and but three for the Elector John George. The burghers voted unanimously for the Palsgrave. But seven persons in the Diet declared themselves for John George, all the rest for Frederic—none for the Duke of Savoy.

The next day the result of the election was made known to the representatives of the other lands of the Bohemian crown, and they were called upon for their action. After brief consultation, the Moravians declared themselves unanimously with the Bohemians, and were followed by the Silesians, and then the Lower Lusatians; the Upper Lusatians alone preferred to give their vote for Electoral Saxony, although, in order not to bring discord into the general harmony, they also declared for the Palsgrave. Thus, in the sense of the new confederation, the election of the King was enacted by all the lands of the Bohemian crown. On the 27th of August, about noon, discharges of artillery announced the news to the people of Prague that the royal election was accomplished.

Ferdinand, who was now Emperor, received in apparent quietness, if it were not better to say with contempt, the

news of this action, and described its authors as "foolish and crazy." The Elector of Saxony, who had never solicited the Bohemian election, and would not have accepted it, felt the more unpleasantly affected by the election of another prince, as his own hopes of it had been the more decided, and as he had desired to make his boast of declining it.

V.

On the contrary, the Elector of the Palatinate, who still remained at Amberg, felt indeed flattered that the election had fallen upon him, but was also uneasy because the Bohemians had not waited, as was agreed, for the concurrence of James. He uttered himself confidentially to the Prince of Anhalt as ready to accept the crown, but would put off the expression of this until he should receive from the King of England, whom he had informed of these occurrences, an approving reply. The Palsgrave should indeed have concerned himself, not only about the approval and support of England, but should also have considered what opinions might be held in France in regard to the Bohemian quarrel. It was not necessary for him to inquire there; he had it without asking for it. The French Secretary of State, Puysieux, blamed the Palsgrave for his opposition in the imperial election, advised, after Ferdinand's elevation, the peaceful settlement of the dispute, and when he now received the news that the Palsgrave was elected King, warned him against the acceptance of the proffered crown, on the ground that the house of Austria would use its utmost power to hold Bohemia. But the lustre of the offered crown dazzled the young prince, so that he laid no weight upon this warning, if he might but receive the support of England.

In connection with England he set his hopes upon the Union, and so summoned its members to Rothenburg on the Tauber, in order to assure himself of the aid upon which he might reckon from that source. The action of the Rothenburg meeting was to the effect that the Union would support the Palsgrave in maintaining his hereditary lands in case he should be attacked in them on account of his acceptance of the Bohemian crown. Frederic might therefore hope that his relation to Bohemia would, at the worst, cost him only the loss of the funds which he should expend in the contest for its possession.

After the close of the meeting at Rothenburg, the presumptive King, then in Heidelberg, took counsel with his most intimate friends, especially Christian of Anhalt, and Count John of Nassau, in regard to the answer which he should return to the Bohemians. Most of them advised him to give no definitive assurance so long as he was without intelligence from James ; and he wrote in this sense to the Bohemian Estates, thanking them for his election, and at the same time declaring that he could give no affirmative answer until he should have received a promise of support from his father-in-law. Such an answer did not, however, suit the taste of the Prince of Anhalt. He knew the King of England too well not to fear that he might be slow in sending the desired answer, for the mere purpose of shifting upon the Palsgrave alone the responsibility of any subsequent misfortunes. Anhalt, therefore, urgently insisted that Frederic should come to an independent and decisive conclusion. If he should, after doing so much to secure the election, recede—such was the import of his warning words—he would load himself with perpetual shame. This energetic exhortation had the desired effect; perhaps, too, the wife of the

Elector, Elizabeth, daughter of the King of England, used similar language; it is at least certain that she never disapproved of his ambitious plans. Frederic decided, therefore (September 25, 1619), to accept the crown without waiting for the concurrence of England, and on the following day informed the King of England accordingly. Two days later he communicated his decision to the Bohemian Directors, and it was known in Prague in the beginning of October that the King elect had accepted the election.

Before giving an account of the coronation which followed, we shall here indicate what were the contents of the declaration from England, so earnestly desired by the Palsgrave, when it finally came to hand. It is evident, from the instructions which James had given to Lord Doncaster, how careful he was of the interests of the Hapsburgs, and how little disposed he was to assume in the Bohemian affairs an unfriendly attitude towards them. It might, therefore, be presumed that the news of the election would not be agreeable to him, while he would be positively exasperated by that of the acceptance. When, on the 13th of September, he was informed by Christopher von Dohna of the actual election, he stoutly rejected all prayers and representations designed to secure his sanction of it and his interest in his son-in-law. It was in vain that Dohna labored to move him; to all entreaties and flatteries of the ambassador he finally answered that he would not be forced to a decision, but would quietly think the matter over. He was not torn with anxiety for his son-in-law, but with solicitude lest it should be thought in Spain that he had had a hand in the election of the Bohemian King. He therefore wrote Philip, and assured him that he was quite innocent of the elevation of his

son-in-law. He did in reality need to make this apology if he would avoid suffering the shipwreck of his darling plan of effecting a close alliance with Spain and the marriage of his son with the Infanta Mary. When, however, in addition to this application from Dohna, he was urged also by Carleton, his ambassador at the Hague, acting at the request of the States-General, to a decision favorable to the Palsgrave, he was forced to summon his council to advise him in regard to the future course of England. During the sitting, which took place on the 30th of September, the news was brought in that the Palsgrave had decided to accept the Bohemian crown, and all the members of the council united in requesting the King to sanction Frederic's decision, and by a public proclamation make known the alliance with him. This, too, was all in vain. Two days later Dohna was admitted to an audience with him, in which he gave vent to his entire accumulation of resentment towards his son-in-law. The answer which he sent to the latter was, in substance, that he not only for himself refused him all aid, but also denied his prayer for his intercession with the King of France and the Venetian Senate, and censured him for his course of action.

The King was soon obliged, however, to use language implying that he had not yet finally declined to give support to the Palsgrave, otherwise he could not defend himself against the impetuous pressure of some of his own partisans. One of the English bishops, in a letter which came to James' knowledge, entered most warmly into the defence of Frederic and his cause, which cause he deemed to be bound up with that of the gospel, and the support of which was the most imperative duty of every believing prince. Similar language was employed by Noël de

Carron, the Dutch ambassador in England, against whose urgent appeals James could defend himself only by the evasion that he must await Lord Doncaster's report of his mission before taking further steps. The Dutch ambassador allowed himself to be deceived with this evasion, for he carried away from the audience the impression that the King would not long delay with his aid, but would merely allow a certain time to elapse, and then fully attach himself to the Palsgrave's cause. This hope proved to be vain, for in the final audience with Dohna (October 6th, 1619) there was no thought of aid, but simply a pouring forth of complaints that his son-in-law's unjustifiable and hasty acceptance of the Bohemian crown had placed him in a false light with Spain and the Emperor. To this expression corresponds also his instruction to Lord Doncaster, according to which the latter was to declare to the States-General that his honor would not allow him to take any part in the Bohemian quarrel, since, if he did, it might be thought that an understanding between him and his son-in-law had led the latter to accept the crown. He charged his ambassador in Spain to convey to King Philip a copy of the entire correspondence which he had carried on with the Union in relation to German affairs, in order to show Philip how greatly his counsels had differed from the course pursued, and that the fore-knowledge of this had not been confided to him. The result of his peculiar attitude was that the States-General, who were ready to support his son-in-law by the monthly payment of 50,000 florins, declared that they would discontinue this payment in case of James' refusing his aid.

After the Palsgrave had decided to accept the Bohemian crown, he gathered up in Heidelberg the most of his ac-

cumulated savings, and set out for Prague. When he reached Amberg, where he tarried a week, in order to make the needed preparations for his entry into Bohemia, an imperial ambassador made him a visit. Ferdinand, who had been disappointed in his hope of falling in with the Palsgrave on his return from Frankfort and dissuading him from furnishing further support to the Bohemian insurrection, desired to make still a last attempt, and to this end dispatched Count Fürstenberg to Frederic. The ambassador requested him, in the Emperor's name, to concur in the calling of an Imperial Diet, by which all existing variances might be ended, and desired at the same time an assurance from the Palsgrave that he would not accept the offered crown. In the written answer which was handed in the next day it was stated that the Elector had no hope of salutary results from the calling of an Imperial Diet, unless the manifold grievances which had long been subjects of complaint in Germany could be removed beforehand. As to the Bohemian election, he would still consider this important subject, and trusted that he should not fall into any "unjust suspicion" if he should come somewhat to the aid "of the oppressed lands which had elected him." If we clothe this language in simple words, they would indicate that the Elector would probably accept the Bohemian crown, though this was not yet irrevocable.

About the 20th of October, Frederic departed from Amberg and journeyed to Waldsassen, a place situated near the Bohemian frontier, where he arrived on the 23d. Hither arrived, on the next morning, a deputation of twenty persons to greet him in behalf of the Diet. Frederic received them in a ceremonial audience in the presence of his brother, his eldest son, Prince Christian of

Anhalt, and the most prominent members of his retinue, and gave answer to the address of Count Andrew Schlick, who acted as spokesman, and touched upon the reasons of the Bohemian royal election in a free and fluent speech. The deputation then repaired to the wife of the Palsgrave, where Ruppa spoke for the rest, thanking her Highness that she had shown herself so kindly disposed towards the wishes of the Bohemians, and that she had encouraged her husband to accept the royal crown. Elizabeth responded to the French speech in the same language, assuring the deputation that what she had done she had done gladly and for the sake of religion. Thenceforth the Electoral pair bore the royal title.

On the 25th of October, Frederic, attended by his whole court, consisting of not less than 569 persons, including servants of all kinds, continued their journey to Bohemia. In each large town which he touched a festive reception was prepared; but the most brilliant were where he passed the nights. After the last night, which was spent in the Castle of Buštěhrad [Bushtyehrad], the royal procession, early in the morning of the 31st of October, arrived before the Zoological Garden, called the Stern [Eng., "Star"], in Prague. Before the castle which adorns this garden awaited the King a numerous portion of the Bohemian nobility, many envoys from the neighboring lands, and numerous companies of mounted men festively clad and consisting partly of young noblemen and partly of citizens of Prague. The first impression made by this young man of twenty-three years upon the waiting crowd, which he was now to rule, won them. His tall and slender form and his captivating features received general applause. As soon as he saw the company in waiting for him, he descended from his carriage, took off his hat, and

extended to the more prominent persons his hand. After dining in the castle, the royal pair made their ceremonial entry into Prague by the Reichsthör [Imperial Gate]. At the head of the procession rode bands of mounted men; next followed, in the Netherlandish uniform, an infantry company, which had attended the Palsgrave in his journey; next came the royal servants and a division of mounted body-guards, followed by about four hundred splendidly-adorned mounted men belonging to the nobility and knighthood of Bohemia and the other lands. Next after the nobility followed Prince Henry of Münsterberg, Duke Magnus of Würtemburg, Christian of Anhalt, with his son, and the Palsgrave Lewis, the King's younger brother, all mounted and splendidly dressed. Behind them appeared Frederic upon a noble horse, caparisoned in blue satin, interwoven with silver, while he himself was clad in dark-brown raiment embroidered with silver, and at his sides marched twenty-four halberdiers clad in white and blue. The Queen followed in a carriage of the color of her husband's clothing and richly adorned with gold and pearls. Her little son, attended by the first stewardess of the court, Countess Solms, rode in a second carriage trimmed with red satin. Some carriages, occupied by people belonging to the suite, and several companies of cavalry and infantry, closed the train.

When this procession approached the Reichsthör, it was greeted by various guilds and great numbers of the peasantry festively clad in the old Bohemian costume, and bearing those weapons which won renown in the Hussite wars. In the city the King was greeted by the citizens, who had marched out to the number of 4,000 strong in military equipment, and formed a festal line extending from the city gate to the castle. In this line were

FREDERICK V.,
Elector of the Palatinate and elected King of Bohemia.



matrons and maidens of the nobility and the citizens waiting in their best attire for the arrival of the royal pair. As the Queen was far advanced in a delicate state, artillery salutes were, on her account, avoided. The whole pageant, the cost of which for Prague alone amounted to 50,000 florins, was admired by all, although the unfriendly weather of the late autumnal day was a drawback on the pleasantness of the impression. Superstitious people thought they could see signs from which they might draw auguries of the future of the new kingdom; of course they found what they wished, some pleasing themselves with propitious, and others troubled by unpropitious, omens.

After the festive entrance, preparations were made for the coronation in the cathedral. In spite of the great changes which had long been taking place in Bohemia, this church had remained until within a few days still in the hands of the Catholics, and the metropolitan chapter provided for a daily service there. On the 17th of October the chapter had received orders from the Directors at the Palsgrave's demand to deliver the keys of the church and vacate their lodgings in the castle and upon the Hradschin.*

The coronation itself took place on the 4th of November (1619). At the appointed hour Frederic repaired to the Chapel of Wenceslas, where he was clad with a splendid coronation mantle, after which he advanced in solemn procession to the high altar. Thirty-eight clergymen—all adherents of the Bohemian Protestant Confession—headed the procession; these were followed by the chief functionaries of the land, who bore the insignia of the

* The name given to one of the four districts of the city.

coronation ; after these came the King with uncovered head, attended by the Administrator of the Protestant consistory and his vicar. To the Queen and her retinue, as also to other high personages, were assigned special seats from which they could obtain a view of the ceremony. On this occasion there were thrown among the people several thousand memorial coins, and their good-humor was preserved by causing white and red wine to flow for an hour from a fountain prepared near the castle for this purpose, and free for every one's refreshment. Nor were the cannons on this day dumb, as the Queen held this to be no longer necessary for the sparing of her nerves. Three days later she was herself crowned, and with the usual pomp, except that no coins were thrown among the people.

The solemnities of these days were not without notes of discord. The King had, since he crossed the frontier, charmed all hearts with his obliging kindness, and especially at the coronation banquet, as he rose and proposed the health of the Estates. The evil tongue of fault-finders found in him as yet nothing to lay hold of. The Queen, however, was no longer spared. She could express herself but awkwardly in the German language—knew nothing of the Bohemian—and her attendants were mostly young women from England, so that she was separated from the Bohemian ladies as if by a Chinese wall. She could not, by courteous words, give to the first meeting a friendly character, and so was exposed defenceless to the criticism of her sex. Four days had not yet elapsed since her arrival, when it had been spied out that she had no regard for order, no hour for meals, none for attendance at church. Her toilet was quite unpardonable ; at least the modesty of the ladies of Prague was deeply wounded by

the naked breasts which the Queen and her household exhibited in public. Had it been indeed known in Prague how the Queen turned up her nose at all she saw in Bohemia, she would have made every one her enemy. Her unfavorable judgment, however, was kept as a secret in the circle of those near her person.

During the few days which had passed since Frederic's arrival in Bohemia, some of his attendants, and especially his Counsellor, Camerarius, who excelled all others in knowledge of affairs and in ability to labor, had found opportunity to form an opinion in regard to the general condition of the country. That this would be very unfavorable in relation to the state of the finances is evident; but it was just as unfavorable in regard to every part of the administration, which he described as in fatal confusion. Camerarius was so depressed when he ascertained these facts, that he fully justified the scoffing remark of the Pope. Paul V., on hearing of the Palsgrave's acceptance of the Bohemian crown, expressed himself to the effect that Frederic had entered a filthy labyrinth, in which he must inevitably be lost. Unfortunately it was not to be expected that the Palsgrave's coming would improve this state of things, since none of the men who had so miserably carried on the government might be removed. The counsellors which Frederic had brought with him could indeed inform him of this sad state of things in the country, but could not improve it, since it was strictly insisted upon that all positions, high and low, must be occupied by natives, to say nothing of that ignorance of the Bohemian language which made it, in the start, impossible to apply the remedy.

Frederic's first measure, after his coronation, and the retirement of the Directors, which took place at the same

time, was the filling of the chief places of trust. This he could not do freely, but was obliged to select one of four persons named to him by the proprietors of landed rights and other high authorities. The chief movers in the insurrection made use of this practice in their own interests, by having themselves all proposed for offices, notwithstanding their lack often of the needed qualifications. Thus the place of Chief Burggrave was given to Bohuch-wal Berka, that of High Steward to William von Lobko-witz, that of Chief Justice to Count Joachim Andrew Schlick, that of Chancellor to Wenceslas William von Ruppa, and Budowec was placed at the head of the Court of Appeals. Count Thurn was again made Burggrave of Karlstein.

CHAPTER IV.

THE ALLIANCES OF THE EMPEROR AND THE ELECTED KING OF BOHEMIA.

I. Bethlen rises against Ferdinand II. II. Retreat of Buquois to Vienna, and Advance upon the City of the Allied Army of Bohemia and Hungary. The Negotiations in Presburg. III. Ferdinand obtains Aid from the King of Spain, the League, the Pope, the King of Poland, the Grand Duke of Tuscany, and a large Promise from Louis XIII., and the Alliance of the Electorate of Saxony. IV. Alliances of the Elector of the Palatinate. V. Bethlen's Election as King of Hungary, and Frederic's as Protector of Austria.

I.

IT is now time to give account of that turn of affairs on the war theatre, already indicated, which led Buquois suddenly to abandon his movement against Prague. We have stated above that Thurn, while encamped before Vienna (June, 1619), won Stanislas Thurzo to the Bohemian cause; this latter offered to make a journey to Transylvania in order to persuade Prince Bethlen Gabor to a like determination; his activity was also effective in Hungary, where the opposition to the royal government was growing bolder than ever. It was in vain that Ferdinand labored in the Diet in July to obtain help against the Bohemian insurrection. Notwithstanding the utterances of the Palatine Forgach and the Catholic party in favor of furnishing aid, perhaps even in consequence of these utterances, the aid was refused, and he was finally

obliged to dissolve the Diet without having obtained anything. If he had not sent the Estates home, he might perhaps have had the worse experience of the Protestant nobility moving to support the Bohemians. At least the Moravian colonel, von Tiefenbach, who had come for this purpose to Presburg, labored hard for the alliance, and it is said that several of the foremost Protestant families were gained for this measure.

The dissolution of the Diet lessened for the time Ferdinand's danger; but this helped him little, since a new danger was in preparation for him in Transylvania. The Hungarian Protestants had sent from Presburg a certain Herr Zmeskal to Bethlen, at the court of which Prince Thurzo and Zmeskal probably met and united their efforts to induce him to join the Bohemian movement. This was an important moment for Bethlen; should he follow this call and enter upon a contest with Ferdinand, or content himself with the power already gained? In a confidential interview with some Bohemian envoys, held a year later, at a banquet, when he was half drunk, he stated, with an air of profound confidence, that he had not under-estimated the perils of his decision; in Hungary there was indeed a settled peace when he marched against the Emperor, and he could not know with certainty that the country would not oppose him; he had, nevertheless, taken the risks of the war. It is not to be supposed, however, that he was much tormented with anxiety about any resistance from the Hungarians, since he, as a Magyar and a Protestant, felt secure of the sympathies of most of the people; what troubled him was the Turks, who certainly would not have allowed, without hoping to reap some advantage from it, a change in the rule over Hungary; and how could he hope to oppose a stronger and

more persevering resistance to them than could the house of Hapsburg, with its abundant resources? Ambition and the passion for war, however, overcame his misgivings, and determined him to a contest with Ferdinand.


Bethlen was variously judged by his contemporaries. That the Catholics saw in him the embodiment of all evil, was natural; but among the Protestants of Germany and England, too, he has had strong opposers; they regarded him as being in close alliance with the Turks, and half a Mohammedan, so as not to be properly reckoned at all with Christian princes. This view may have been partly owing to the circumstance that Bethlen, in his youth, spent some years in Constantinople, and that he is reported to have been there circumcised. The pedantic King James entertained of him so unfavorable an opinion that he never honored him with a letter, although his son-in-law, Frederick, of the Palatinate, earnestly besought him to do so. In the way which he pursued to attain to his high position, he could not indeed always keep the path of virtue, as those may, but seldom do, who are originally destined to the princely dignity.

Belonging to the lower nobility, Bethlen had, from his seventeenth year, devoted himself to war as a trade, and in the course of his life had taken part in not less than forty-two battles, greater and less. His property was originally so small that, when occasionally embarrassed, he appeared to his creditors not to offer the needed securities, and on this account once applied in vain to a merchant in Kaschau for a loan of 100 florins. He was praised for having, when he attained to the dignity of a prince, a memory and judgment equally excellent, and also a predilection for scientific pursuits. He knew only the Magyar and Latin languages, the latter of which was

more or less fluently spoken by all Hungarians. He was a zealous Calvinist, and fond of religious conversation, in which he defended his party against all attacks. In external appearance he is described as a man of middle stature, and somewhat corpulent. His long face, which was enveloped in a thick, black beard, showed an ample forehead, but also an ugly, inward-bent, thick nose, and a broad mouth, in which the teeth were rather widely separated from each other. His outer man could, therefore, lay no claim to beauty; it did, however, indicate strength and energy—and, in fact, he made himself noted, among other things, for his severity towards those under him. He gave way to his fondness for the wine-glass, and could attend to the affairs of State only in the morning, because in the further course of the day he was always half intoxicated.

Bethlen received with favor the statements of Thurzo and Zmeskal, and was the more inclined to follow their advice, because he had once proposed an alliance with the Emperor Matthias and did not receive the desired response. So he decided to link his destiny with that of the Bohemians, and on the 18th of August (1619) wrote the Directors at Prague that he would march with his troops, and in September would, in their defence, enter Moravia. The day of his actual march from Transylvania and the number of his troops are not known with exactness. His subordinate generals, Rákóczy [Rakotssi] and Széchy [Seshy], preceded him by rapid marches—the former to the attack of Kaschau, the latter to proceed to Presburg. Rákóczy arrived with 5,000 men on the 3d of September (1619) at Kaschau, and would scarcely have been able to take the city, if Doczi [Dotssi], the royal commandant of the garrison—this was indeed small, but

GABRIEL BETHLEM,
Prince of Transylvania.



had sufficient artillery—had only been supported by the citizens. But they would make no resistance, and as the garrison itself declared for the enemy, Rákóczy was able to make his entry into the city as early as on the 5th of September. As Kaschau was almost entirely Protestant, the entering troops indulged in no excesses, and contented themselves with the assassination of three Catholic priests who, with Doczi, had fallen into their hands.

During this time, Széchy marched to Presburg, to prevent the junction of the Hungarian auxiliaries which had been enlisted by the Palatine for the defence of the city. Bethlen sought to support Széchy's movements by sending him a division of from 12,000 to 13,000 men under the command of Redey. In order to hasten their march, he sent them without their baggage, and followed them with this by slow marches.

The baggage was not, however, the sole cause of Bethlen's slow advance; other and weighty reasons made it necessary that he should remain a few days in Kaschau. He desired to secure for his undertaking the sanction of public opinion, and as this could not be effected by a Diet of the Kingdom so long as Presburg was not in his possession, he would obtain the result by a kind of extemporized meeting of the Estates. He invited, therefore, the representatives of the cities of Upper Hungary and also the magnates to meet at Kaschau, in order to obtain their concurrence in his expedition against Ferdinand. The cities and the nobility, so far as they were of his mind, obeyed his summons; he arrived at a cordial understanding with them, and thus gained a further approval of his enterprise. The news of his progress produced in Vienna the conviction that all Hungary would join the insurrection, and would therefore, with the ex-

ception of the fortresses, which were chiefly garrisoned with German troops, be lost to Ferdinand.

Before the end of September, Bethlen sent an embassy to Prague, the purpose of which was to settle the terms upon which he would serve the cause of the Bohemians. In the interview of the Directors and ambassador, the latter set forth the achievements of his sovereign : that he had in a short time subjugated all Upper and Lower Hungary, and expended almost his entire resources in the equipment and advance pay of his army. With this explanation, he connected, in Bethlen's name, the expression of a hope that Bohemia would concur in his seizing, in order to the completion of his victory and the prostration of the enemy, upon Styria and the territories belonging to it, on the ground that they had been a part of Hungary. Finally, he made the demand, which fell heavily on his hearers' hearts, that they should liberally and handsomely supply his sovereign with money, as he was not in a condition to make further outlays. The Directors' answer is not known, and it is therefore uncertain whether they concurred in the intended conquests or not ; in regard to the demand for money, their answer could have contained nothing more than fair but empty words.

Before Bethlen was informed of the kind of coin in which the Bohemians designed to pay for his alliance, he set forth his march towards the Austrian frontier. When, on the 9th of October, he reached Tyrnau, he sent thence to the aid of Count Thurn, in Moravia, 10,000 men, under the command of Redey. On the 14th of October he determined to attack Presburg. The Palatine had, a few days before this, earnestly urged upon the Archduke Leopold, the Emperor's brother, that he send a liberal reinforce-

ment to the garrison with the further addition of Dampierre and all his command. Leopold responded to this prayer only so far as to strengthen the garrison at Presburg by sending thither 1,500 infantry and 500 cavalry, entrusting the command of the same to Rudolph von Tiefenbach, a brother of the Moravian colonel of that name. This number was too small to stand against an enemy ten times as numerous, trifling as was the real value of the undisciplined Hungarian troops, consisting as they did chiefly of cavalry; and when Bethlen attacked the royal troops in the suburb of Presburg, the latter sustained a defeat, such that Tiefenbach could save but 800 men, with whom he hastily crossed to the right bank of the Danube and marched to Bruck, having been obliged to sink his cannon in the river. The city of Presburg did not prevent the victor's entry into the walls; only in the castle where the crown was kept did the Palatine maintain himself for a short time. As he could not, however, think of a successful defence, he surrendered the castle and crown, and yielded, notwithstanding his adherence to Ferdinand, to the wish of Bethlen, and summoned a Diet for the 11th of November, although he had no right to do so without the King's concurrence.

The news of the capture of Presburg caused great panic in Vienna, which was augmented by the presence of numerous refugees, especially monks and nuns, in the city. This news frightened out of their sense of security those who had fled before the insurrection from Bohemia and Moravia to Vienna, as to a safe place of refuge, and now began a new migration. The Prince of Liechtenstein fled with his wife and child into the Alps. Cardinal Dietrichstein and many other ecclesiastics sought their safety in further flight. Even the Emperor, who had just re-

turned from Frankfort, deemed himself not safe in Vienna, and turned his steps to Gratz, to which place several hundred refugees had preceded him in flight. Thus was Vienna left to itself, and the wretchedness of the poor population, who had nothing to help them off and little to live upon if they remained in the city, was boundless.

II.

It was in the beginning of September that the intelligence of Bethlen's accession to Bohemia's cause, and his intended march from Transylvania, was first spread in Prague. Already, by the middle of the month, came the first news of the success of his arms against the imperial garrisons in some of the Hungarian cities, and it may be conceived that Buquoi could not but have regarded Vienna as in danger, and therefore left Bohemia without delay. On the 29th of September he broke up his camp near Mirowic, and set out on his march to the south. Never was there offered to his enemies a more favorable opportunity than now for a successful attack, if they had but uninterruptedly pursued and harassed him in his retreat. Every attack held out a promise of success, as Buquoi's army was loaded with a large amount of baggage, which called for extended lines of protection, and many sick were dragged along with it, which rendered the retreat difficult. But to the numerous irregularities of the Bohemian army was added, just at this juncture, the fact that there was no one to command in chief. The Bohemian Diet at which the King was elected had brought about a change of commander-in-chief, and conferred the place upon the Prince of Anhalt, instead of

Count Thurn, upon which latter the Moravians had again conferred the lead of their forces, Tiefenbach having been attacked with gout. As Thurn had, as early as the 18th of September, gone to Moravia to assume the command of the army there, and Anhalt had not yet arrived on the ground, Hohenloe was in chief command, and would take advantage of the favorable opportunity to pursue and attack the enemy. In this moment of promise, however, the troops refused to obey him, and declared that they would not stir from their places until a portion of the wages—for they had for a long time been paid nothing—should have been sent them. Instead of threatening the enemy, the troops threatened their own country. A high officer hastened to Prague and implored the Directors to discharge their duty. Hohenloe sent word to them that if the soldiers were longer put off with empty words, they might make up their minds, not only to be attacked by them, but might expect with certainty that the peasantry, driven to desperation, would at the same time rise in arms.

The reproach may be made against the Directorial government that nothing but threats and present danger would remind them of their duty to provide the money needed. If the tax-resolution of August had only been partially carried out, there would have been at least a sufficient sum at command, since in the meantime several extraordinary sources of income had been opened. The embassy to the States-General had secured from them a promise of 50,000 florins monthly in support of the Bohemians, beginning from May, 1619, and the first instalment had already been received. Further, in Nuremberg the 200,000 florins borrowed, of which the Union had guaranteed the payment, had been paid; finally, the income from fines and arbitrary seizures amounted also to a con-

siderable sum. By this last item we do not mean the confiscations of real estate, which, for want of solvent purchasers, had as yet brought no advantage, but to seizures of personal property belonging to the estates of wealthy persons, for which certificates of indebtedness, without specification of times of payment, had been delivered to the heirs. To this was finally added the confiscation of all the vessels of silver and gold kept in the several monasteries of Prague, especially in the Strahow, which were taken possession of on the pretext that they would thus be secured against being purloined and carried abroad and also be better taken care of.

By its extraordinary incomes, and by the operations above indicated, the government was in September in possession of an amount which may be estimated at 400,000 florins, and which, had it been sent before this crisis to the camp, would at least have given the troops a better feeling, though it should not suffice to pay the instalment demanded. The soldiers had in the meantime, after the departure of the officer, yielded to the earnest entreaties of their generals, and entered upon the march to Tabor, in order to block up the enemy's way. The probability of success was indeed small, since Buquois, on account of this mutinous conduct, had three days the start. When they learned, near Tabor, that there would be paid them a smaller instalment than they had expected, their rage knew no bounds. They gave notice a second time to their generals that they should not obey, and declared that they would march to the estates of the Directors, and hold these in possession until payment should be made them. Again it required two days of entreaty from their generals and others to persuade them to accept the offered money and return to obedience. Hohenloe and

Fels were obliged to take a solemn oath that the remainder of the money should be brought them within eight days. Somewhat quieted by these promises, and encouraged by the retreat of the enemy, they now marched further south; but a successful attack upon Buquoi was out of the question. He had in the meantime turned his steps towards Moravia, formed a junction with Dampierre, and retired to Austria. Hohenloe also united in Moravia with Thurn, and the army was till further increased, on the 5th of October, by the addition of 10,000 Hungarians under Redey. The two Bohemian generals now thought that they might risk an attack on the imperial general without waiting for Bethlen's aid. The encounter took place on the 24th of October, near Ulrichskirchen, in Austria, but was indecisive, because Buquoi gave way, crossed the Danube, and encamped in the immediate vicinity of Vienna.

The imperialists destroyed the bridge over the Danube, and thus cut off the possibility of the pursuing enemy's passing the river at this point. After the engagement at Ulrichskirchen, therefore, Thurn and Hohenloe went to Presburg to confer with Bethlen Gabor as to further plans of operation, and were flatteringly received; but their joy at this reception was followed by a bitter after-taste, when Bethlen stormed for money. He would attach himself to the cause of the Bohemians only on the condition that they would immediately assist him to the amount of 400,000 florins, and promise further payments for the future. He desired, at the same time, their concurrence in his intended conquest of Austria, Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola, and professed himself ready to accede with Hungary, which he already regarded as his possession, to the German Empire, if the Electoral dignity should be

conferred upon him. The two generals had not the right to promise what he desired, and so sent Redey to Prague, where he found the new King, and could lay before him his business. He was not, however, met as he expected, for Frederic had no money, and could only, at best, feed Bethlen with hopes. As to Austria and the other countries of the Alps, he was the less inclined, in the interest both of Germany and those lands themselves, to make concessions to Bethlen's love of conquest, because he thought of acquiring the dominion over them for himself. •

Before Bethlen was informed of the failure of Redey's mission, he came to an agreement with Thurn in regard to the further operations of the war; after which the Bohemian army, on the 21st of November, crossed the Danube near Presburg, where they joined the Hungarians, and, having a strength of about 42,000 men, advanced towards Vienna. This advance of the allied army was disgraced by all sorts of misdeeds; all the villages and cities in the way were plundered, in which work the Hungarians especially distinguished themselves by the cruelty with which they pursued the quest of money and that which could be turned into money. On the 26th of November the army passed through Bruck, on the Leitha, and at the end of the month arrived at Vienna.

Meanwhile Ferdinand had returned, because, perhaps, he felt it his duty to raise, by his presence, the sunken courage of the people of Vienna. The wintry season made the journey from Gratz to Vienna extremely slow; he was forced by stress of weather to pass several days at the monastery of Schottwien, and the journey was rendered still more unpleasant by the complaints which he heard from those around him. There was everywhere

lamentation over the want of money, clothing, and linen; refugee monks and nuns obstructed his way, importuning him for alms; and he was going to Vienna, where there was still greater distress; where about two thousand wounded men by their moans brought to desperation those who were in health; where prices had so risen that everything was as "dear as the eye in the head." When Buquoi retired to Vienna, he quartered the greatest part of his troops on the citizens, so that many were obliged to accommodate twenty to thirty men each. The supply was deficient; the want became every day more deeply felt, and when the peasantry brought anything to market, they were plundered at the city gates by the imperial soldiers, who vied with the enemy in draining the land. In Vienna they robbed ladies in broad daylight of their cloaks and hats and their silver girdles. They deemed themselves justified in all misdeeds because their wages were not paid.

It is not probable that the allied army would have accomplished its purpose of capturing Vienna, since it wanted siege cannon, so that its further stay would have produced no other result than that of increasing devastation and famine and a final withdrawal in time of winter. A sudden occurrence, however, quite as unexpected and as decisive as was Bethlen's accession to the Bohemian cause, obliged the allied army to withdraw on the 5th of December to Presburg.

The cause of this sudden and unforeseen event lay in the action of the Hungarian nobleman, Drugeth de Homonna. This man was one of those adventurous spirits naturally produced in countries of so peculiarly developed relations as existed in Hungary. Originally he was a Protestant, afterwards became a Catholic, and had cast

his eyes upon Transylvania, with a wish to seize the reins of government there and overthrow Bethlen. As the latter entered upon his expedition to Hungary, Drugeth was doubtless aware that it might be directed against him, and therefore gathered troops to the number of 8,000 men, but suffered a defeat by one of Bethlen's generals, which forced him to take refuge in Poland. Here he attempted to enlist an army of Cossacks, in which he was aided by two envoys sent to Warsaw by Ferdinand for a like purpose. One of these was Count Althan, who applied to King Sigismund and some Polish noblemen for their support, and promised them for their services a remuneration in the Bohemian estates which were to be confiscated; the other was the Archduke Carl, the Emperor's brother, who united with Althan in his requests. Not only the two envoys, but Drugeth also, met with a kind reception, since not only a common faith inclined the King to Ferdinand's wishes, but also a family relationship, as he had married a sister of the Emperor. With the aid of the King and some of the nobles, about eleven thousand Cossacks were enlisted and placed under Drugeth's command. At the head of this force he began, on the 21st of November, his march over the Carpathians, and defeated, near the Castle Ztropko, indeed almost annihilated, Rákóczy, who was marching against him. The news of this probably reached Bethlen on the 4th of December, and gave occasion for his withdrawal on the following day, for he could not but fear that, if Drugeth won further successes, he might cut him off from Transylvania. By this withdrawal the active prosecution of the war between the Emperor and his enemies was for the time suspended.

The Emperor's first concern now was to keep his ene-

mies away from his person until he might, in the spring, realize new alliances and fresh armaments, and fall upon them with a superior force. He would therefore, by all means, get rid of the Transylvanian Prince, for his present resources for war were sufficient as against Bohemia. Scarcely had Bethlen, therefore, withdrawn from Vienna, when Ferdinand wrote to the Palatine, then staying in Presburg, and offered to enter into negotiations with his enemy, before whom he placed considerable advantages in prospect. Bethlen did not give the Emperor's offers to the winds ; but as he preferred the alliance with the Bohemians, so he would not sever his fate from theirs until he was satisfied that he should obtain no money from them. So he again stormed at Thurn and Hohenloe, who were still with him, for money ; and as neither they nor the Bohemian envoys, who were then in attendance at the Diet in Presburg, could offer him any, but tried to quiet him with promises, he perceived that the alliance with Bohemia would not place him in a condition to bear long the expenses of the war. He therefore decided to take the hand which the Emperor held out to him, and so much the more readily as it placed before him the prospect of the greatest military advantages, and so made it still possible for him, at a later day, to rejoin his present friends.

Not so egotistic were the thoughts of the Diet, which the Palatine, at Bethlen's desire, had summoned to meet at Presburg, and which was chiefly attended by Protestants. The Diet favored an energetic prosecution of the war against the Emperor, and indirectly resolved upon deposing him from the throne of Hungary ; for, on the 8th of January (1620), they elected Bethlen as Prince of Hungary, and thus openly expressed the design to transfer to him the crown of the Kingdom. The Diet entered at the same

time into negotiations with the Bohemian ambassadors who were present in Presburg, and concluded a treaty of alliance with them which stipulated that neither party might make peace with the Emperor without the other's consent.

It might be thought that the election of Bethlen as Prince of Hungary, which he did not decline, would necessarily place him and the Emperor in irreconcilable hostility, and render all agreement between them impossible ; it was not so. Bethlen continued, even after his election, the negotiations which had been previously begun with the imperial ambassadors who had arrived in Presburg, and found in them a corresponding readiness to negotiate, as they did not trouble themselves about the vote of the Diet.

The discussions centred chiefly upon two questions : the first related to the conditions of the armistice, which was to suspend the war ; the second, the price which the Emperor should pay to Bethlen for the cessation of arms which the latter was to grant. It would naturally be thought that the two questions were closely connected, and could be considered only together ; but Bethlen deemed it important that the two matters be independently treated. Ferdinand declared himself willing to cede to the Prince, and his successors forever, four Hungarian counties and the Castle of Munkács [Munkash], together with the territory belonging to it, and also to grant him for his lifetime nine additional counties. These offers, which were nearly equal to a renunciation of two-thirds of his domains in Hungary, seemed not enough ; Ferdinand would raise the Prince of Transylvania to the rank of a Prince of the Empire, and cede to him the principalities of Oppeln and Ratibor as soon as he should himself come again into

possession of them. We suspect that these two last conditions were inserted by the imperial commissioners in order to get rid of other demands of Bethlen ; they might flatter themselves that he would by these gifts become so bound to the Emperor's cause that he would not be brought to favor any further the Bohemian insurrection.

After the ambassadors had come to an agreement with Bethlen in regard to the personal concessions to be made to him, they began to treat of the conditions under which the armistice should be concluded and the final peace should, at a Diet soon to be called, be realized. Here Bethlen raised his demands so high that the ambassadors were inclined to break off the negotiations. The article which doubtless displeased them most was that which was to convey to Bethlen the administration, up to the time of the coming Diet, of all those parts of Hungary of which he was at the moment in possession—that is, to extend his rule still beyond the thirteen counties. But they were obliged to cease from their resistance, for they well knew that the Emperor had not at the moment the means to seize a foot more of Hungarian territory to himself than Bethlen chose to allow him, and because they could not but fear that they might drive him into the arms of the Bohemians in case they should refuse him this concession. Then, too, there came unfavorable news from Upper Hungary ; the irruption of Homonna, which promised a brilliant diversion for the Emperor's cause, did not result as was hoped, because Hungarian troops rushed in from all sides and forced the retreat of the Poles. Could the ambassadors otherwise than fear that their hesitation might bring a renewal of the attack upon the Emperor, which would extend to Styria and the southern provinces ?

The treaty of armistice was thus concluded on the 16th

of January, with the provision that Bethlen Gabor should provisionally remain in possession of all which he then held, and that Homonna with his Polish Cossacks should withdraw, and, in case he should not do so, should be driven out by arms. In relation to Bohemia and Austria, the treaty contained the following singular agreement: "His Imperial Royal Majesty shall, in case he shall be requested to do so, under just and reasonable conditions, cause the prosecution of arms against the Bohemians, and according to the situation and occasion, also against the Upper and Lower Austrians, to cease." After the conclusion of these negotiations, and after dissolving also the Diet, Bethlen departed, on the 17th of January, for Kaschau. It is perceived that the Emperor purchased the armistice with Bethlen at the cost of his dominion of Hungary and an indefinite promise in regard to Bohemia and Austria; and we remark here that the subsequent negotiations turned upon this point, and that Bethlen broke anew with the Emperor on the ground that the hopes which he had set upon this promise were not realized. But when a few months had passed over, Ferdinand had gained time to form new alliances and renew old ones, and so for *him* were fulfilled the hopes which he had set upon the armistice.

III.

The Emperor, as well as his enemy, the Palsgrave, perceived that they should not bring the contest to a decision unless, by winning new friends and resources, they should obtain the ascendancy, and during the winter of 1619-20, therefore, directed all their efforts to this end. Both labored at first to gain those of their respective faiths; but

while the Emperor here never failed in his applications, Frederic met no such response, but rather met opposers, who finally found their way into the imperial camp.

When the Emperor Matthias died, his successor was in a state of desperation, but still inclined to carry on the struggle, and sought by all possible and impossible expedients to bring on a change for the better. Among the plans of that time was one for the formation of a Catholic Confederacy, the members of which should bind themselves to contributions in money for the support of an army. When they considered the exertions made in the twelfth century for the conquest of the Holy Sepulchre, and remembered that the Catholic Church in Austria and Germany was in as great peril from the Protestants as were the Christians of earlier centuries from Mohammedans, they thought that an appeal to the self-sacrificing spirit of the wealthy monasteries and nobles would not be in vain, but be followed by brilliant results. The statutes of this defensive Christian Confederation were drafted by the Imperial Counsellor Arnoldin von Klarstein. It appeared, however, when it came to the carrying out of the enterprise, that scarcely more than a few empty promises could be secured, and that none were inclined to subject themselves to a taxation, the extent of which struck all with horror. Before the close of the year 1619 it was known in Vienna that, in the formation of this Confederation, birth had been given to a dead child.

More practical were the efforts for securing aid from friendly princes. Of all the princes of that day in Europe there was in Vienna the greatest hope set upon Philip III., of Spain; this grew out of his relationship to the house of Austria and the constancy of his zeal for the faith. Matthias had obtained from him a continued sup-

port, and we have seen that the troops enlisted in the Netherlands in the spring not only suspended the ruin of the imperial cause in Bohemia, but brought victory to the standards of Buquoi. But hitherto the aid in money and men had been insufficient for the rescue of Matthias' successor from the pressure which had increased with each day since Bethlen's appearance on the stage. This was universally admitted, and the Archduke Albert wrote from Brussels to the King of Spain that Ferdinand could not be saved unless he should consent to the fitting out anew of a great army. Ferdinand himself too wrote to Philip, his brother-in-law, making similar representations and requests.

Count Khevenhiller, however, who, since the days of the Emperor Matthias, had resided as ambassador in Spain, was most energetic in his labors in aid of his new sovereign. He endeavored to gain the Spanish minister, the Count of Uzeda [Ootheda], and the King's confessor, Aliaga, to his cause, but failed of his wish with both. Irritated by the confessor's unfavorable attitude, he threatened that Ferdinand, thus forsaken, would conclude a peace with the Protestants, let Bohemia and Hungary go, and indemnify himself from the King's provinces in Italy and the Netherlands. "Take heed," interrupted Aliaga, with the air of a chief inquisitor, "that you do not speak at the cost of your neck." Khevenhiller replied that he would willingly lose his life in the service of the truth and his sovereign, but would not change places with the confessor, for he would have a deeper place in hell than that of Luther and Calvin. Satisfied by this occurrence that he should not gain his end by laboring with these dignitaries, he went to the King and related the substance of the interview with Aliaga. This occurred in the beginning of January, while

Philip was still suffering from the effects of an illness with which he had been seized in November, and brought near death, and was therefore still under the impressions of awe in view of the divine judgment. Khevenhiller struck the right string, regarding, as he did, the support of Ferdinand, not as a family matter, but as a matter of conscience. In this sense he set forth in detail the heavy responsibility with which he would load himself in case he should allow his servants to keep him in leading-strings, and by his own neglect should bring losses to the Catholic Church. At the last Judgment he would be unable to answer; thousands and thousands would implore the Almighty's vengeance upon him, because, with his wealth of resources, he had done nothing in this struggle to prevent their loss. The impression which this speech of the imperial ambassador made upon the monarch was further strengthened by those persons with whom the latter took counsel on the following days; these were the Archduchess Margaret, a daughter of Maximilian II., who lived in a nunnery in Madrid, and was an enthusiast in the cause of the Church and its rights, the Duke of Infantado, Cardinals Capata and Balthasar de Zuñiga, all of whom interceded earnestly for the support of the Emperor. On the 12th of January, therefore, the King decided upon a course of action, and set his signature to a letter to the Archduke Albert, informing him that he would send 12,000 men from Italy to Flanders, and furnish money for further enlistments, so that from the side of Flanders an attack might be made upon the Lower Palatinate, and thus a considerable diversion be effected. At the same time he declared himself ready to pay an army of 12,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry, and 3,000 Polish Cossacks, for the service of the Emperor—that is, in reality to support the entire

army. On the 13th of February (1620) the news of this decision reached Vienna, and called forth boundless joy.

All these promises would not have sufficed, however, to restore the Emperor to his former dominion, had not part of Germany also attached itself to his cause. The first place among his German allies was occupied by the League, as revived. The League, as is known, was founded in the year 1609 as a defence against attacks which were apprehended from the German Union, but after an existence of several years was dissolved, on account chiefly of the disfavor shown it by the Emperor Matthias. When the Bohemian outbreak occurred, an attempt was made from Vienna to secure the aid of the Catholic princes of Germany, for which purpose embassies were sent to them. All efforts were, however, in vain; none of the princes and bishops were ready to act; only the Elector of Mentz, after much entreaty, gave some money. But as the danger was evidently on the increase and the conviction was felt in Germany that the Bohemian movement was not only an attack upon the Emperor's possessions, but upon the Catholic Church, then the bishops, in a meeting held in Oberwesel, took counsel in regard to their future attitude, and were ready to furnish aid; which, however, they made conditional upon the revival of the League. Maximilian of Bavaria, when informed of this action, declared his readiness to assume the command of troops which should be enlisted for the defence of the Emperor, but added, as a condition of this, that the armament must be conducted in such manner as to insure success. Thus the bishops had made their co-operation to depend upon the renewal of the League, the conducting of which Maximilian was now to take in hand on exactly the same conditions as were con-

nected with its founding. It is perceived that this prince was greatly respected by the Catholics; at least it could not be otherwise than that the sharpness with which he declined to take part in the mediation, and his yielding finally only to urgent entreaty, and on terms which assured the maintenance of his own position, should win their favor. Was his decision the result of a rigid faith, or a deep conviction, or a varied experience? It will be worth while to bring before our readers an account of Maximilian's previous development, for in him we have to do, as the issue will show, with the most important Catholic prince of his time, whose influence overbalanced that of the mightiest kings.

Maximilian, eldest son of Duke William of Bavaria and Princess Renata of Lorraine, was born in the year 1573, and received in his youth a strict, Catholic education, because both parents adhered so devoutly to the old Church that they repelled everything new with horror. The boy was not only carefully instructed in the sciences, but was required also to give diligent attention to the exercises of piety, such as pilgrimages, processions, and church services. He had great talents and thirst for study, made in Munich considerable progress in his studies, and became, therefore, by the reading of the Church Fathers, so thoroughly schooled in the ancient languages that, in the later years of his life, he could occupy himself with the works of Cæsar, Tacitus, and Xenophon without encountering linguistic difficulties. In the University at Ingolstadt, where he continued his studies under the direction of both clerical and lay teachers, he enlarged his knowledge of languages by the study of Italian and French literature, and at the same time attended to jurisprudence and engineering. After spending four years in Ingolstadt,

he was called by his father to Munich and introduced into the practical work of government, where he proved, by his knowledge and his prudent judgment, the real worth of his ability, and gave promise of important services for the future. In order to secure a larger culture and become acquainted with persons of greatest eminence, he made a journey to the imperial court at Prague, and proceeded to Italy, where he visited a series of the most noted cities, ending with Rome. Having been received with special kindness by Pope Clement VIII., because his reputation for ability had become public in advance of him, he employed his limited time in Rome in the study of art and politics, visited also Torquato Tasso, the author of "Jerusalem Delivered," who celebrated the distinction thus conferred upon him in a sonnet. From Italy, Maximilian travelled, by way of Switzerland, to Lorraine, visited in Nancy the family of his mother, and at the same time made the acquaintance of his cousin, the Princess Elizabeth, who afterwards became his wife.

The magnificence in which Maximilian's grandfather and father had lived had gradually loaded the latter with a burden of indebtedness from which he knew no way of escape. In his perplexity he associated with himself in the government his son, after the latter's return, having in his mature judgment and orderly economic management the greatest confidence; and the son did not merely aid his father, but, from the very beginning, bore the whole burden of the administration. As the young prince exhibited such vigor and self-dependence, the Estates showed their readiness to submit to heavier taxation than formerly; and yet the condition of the finances did not improve, because the enormous court of the old Duke and his irrational generosity swallowed up such large

sums. About the year 1598 the debts of Bavaria amounted to nearly five million florins, a sum the greatness of which will be appreciated when it is known that at that time the whole Austrian debt scarcely exceeded three times that amount. Bankruptcy was threateningly near. As William could no longer close his eyes to the evil consequences of his financial management, he determined to abdicate and hand over the government entirely to his son, then but twenty-five years of age. For his own support he agreed to accept 40,000 florins and means of subsistence to the value of 13,000 florins annually ; and although this ought to have been sufficient, considering that this money had at that time, in Bavaria, fifteen times its present value, - still it did not suffice him, and he tormented his son with perpetual complaints, to which the latter, however, as it appears, did not pay much attention. Order and parsimony had been developed in Maximilian in contrast with the ancestral manner of life, and to these traits his own father was offered in sacrifice.

The young Duke now fitly ordered his government. Instead of the epicures whom his father had kept in the most important positions of administration, he called men of talent, industry, and rectitude, and insisted that they should be incorrupt, keep official secrets, and be untiring in the discharge of duty. The sciences and arts found in him, notwithstanding his poverty and parsimony, appreciation and support. Some prominent works, which owe their origin to his promptings, still to this day bear witness to the character of his rule. Most of all, however, did the results of his activity appear as order gradually rose out of the involved condition of his finances, which first appeared in the reduction of the expenses of his court from 400,000 florins to 122,000 florins ; in paying up in-

debtors subject to high interest, and making new loans at lower rates; in the better management of his landed estates, and the sale of those unfavorably situated; in the construction of better conductors for the brine from his saline springs, by which he made these a real mine of gold; and in general he knew how to manage skilfully as a merchant his money and his incomes.

Our judgment in regard to Maximilian we might therefore finally sum up in this: that he was a prudent and sagacious man, jealous indeed of his princely rights, but penetrated also with the conviction that he owed duties to his subjects, and was bound to provide for their welfare. Averse to all ideal innovations, he sought to realize his end only on the ground of old views and doctrines, though he was, on the contrary, accessible to suggestions of material improvements and changes, and endeavored to turn them to account in the interests of his State affairs. He was a model of domestic management, was never even charged with an unbecoming act in his family, and as he allowed no faults in himself, so he demanded a like purity in the morals of those around him and from his subjects. He regarded himself as their father, and as possessing over them the conceded power of punishment.

After having, in the course of a few years, attained his end, he called, in the year 1612, the appropriate committee of the Estates to him, and informed the members, to their supreme surprise, that he had paid up his father's debts and had already accumulated a considerable surplus. This remarkable result was greatly facilitated by the fact that he paid no attention to the complaints of the Estates in regard to taxation, and tolerated no opposition to his plans. He now entered also the province of legislation, and, building upon the foundation of an old statute-book

and numerous ordinances, created a unique legislature. If his endeavors in this direction also are worthy of praise, we should not, however, suppress the fact that he is to be blamed for not tolerating any spontaneous action among his people; he subjected all to compulsory regulations. Everything must bend to his measures; trade and industry must keep the place assigned them; the high and the low must submit to his discipline and rules, and suffer most keenly if they transgressed them. Even the clergy, who were only pleased when they sat in judgment over the laity, must adjust themselves to the reformatory decrees which the Duke visited with the strictness of an inquisitor, not only upon heretical opinions, but upon every improper course of life. The industry of the land he sought splendidly to elevate, by calling from the Spanish Netherlands the most skilful laborers, or sending numerous orphan boys thither to have them brought home again educated into skilled mechanics. In view of this economic ability, which showed itself also in the department of army organization, it is readily conceived why the German Catholics directed their attention to him, when, in the year 1609, they formed, in opposition to the Union organized a year earlier, a federation, afterwards generally known as the League, and gave him, in connection with the Elector of Mentz, its direction, which, as a matter of fact, was exercised by him alone.

The Papal Nuncio, Caraffa, drew, on the basis of a close acquaintance which he formed with the Duke in the year 1623, and with the master-hand of an Italian diplomat, a sketch of his character, which, as a whole, would answer for the year 1619, and as to its entire contents is confirmed by Maximilian's course of action, whether as related to the State or to his household. On account of his severity

he was extremely feared by his own family, and his behests were blindly carried out. His household was on a brilliant footing, although he paid his servants but small salaries. He jealously guarded his rights and possessions, and by his prudent measures was able constantly to increase his income. The fact that Maximilian always had at command the money that he needed, and still laid some by in store, produced upon the Nuncio's mind an impression of especial respect. He further makes mention of the report that, in obtaining supplies for the League, and in the spoils which he acquired in the numerous victories of his army in enemies' lands, he won large sums of money. Although Caraffa asserted his disbelief of the statements in regard to these sources of income, it is nevertheless certain that he did not quite close his ears to these calumnies, for he could not, any more than could other contemporaries, conceive how the Duke, with his small extent of territory, could arrange to support his army and pay his officials. We are, however, satisfied that his frugality and his productive administration of the government alone wrought these wonders ; for, of all the treasures of gold and silver which the army of the League obtained as booty, only the spoils which he took in Prague found their way into the treasure which he had hoarded in Munich. And if, in procuring supplies for the army of the League, he may often have found his accounts turning to his advantage, yet he certainly did this without overreaching any one, and saved to himself only the merchant's profits.

The picture which has been sketched for us of Maximilian's external appearance shows that he was not adorned with any dazzling traits of this kind. He was of medium stature, slender, had red hair, and did not enjoy firm health, but suffered constantly from catarrhal affec-

tions, and was, on this ground, extraordinarily moderate in his eating and drinking. His voice was as that of a eunuch. Externally he was not, therefore, captivating, and gave no indications either of his persistent endurance or his power to labor; but in spite of his sickliness, he really did more than the strongest princes, and by his careful manner of life attained to the advanced age of more than seventy-eight years.

When Ferdinand was on his way to the imperial election at Frankfort, he visited Maximilian at Munich, and urgently sought his aid. The Duke promised this, and under his influence the Catholic Estates of South Germany held (August 25, 1619) a meeting in Eichstadt, at which an immediate arming was resolved upon, which action was almost simultaneously joined in by the Rhenish Bishops. When Ferdinand, on his return from Frankfort, came again to Munich he learned there that an important forward movement had been made. But this was not accomplishing everything for him. Maximilian would employ the troops of the League in the service of Ferdinand only on condition that a treaty should be concluded with him, and his pay for his services and his prospective expenditures should be secured; he did not, therefore, mean to render gratuitous service to the Emperor, as the Bishops offered to do. Ferdinand was obliged to yield to this wish, and therefore concluded, on the 8th of October, 1619, in Munich, a treaty in which he bound himself fully to indemnify his cousin for the expenditures and losses which he should incur. To secure the fulfilment of this promise, Ferdinand pledged all the provinces of his house and empowered his ally, as soon as he should have brought a portion of the Archduchy of Austria into his power, to exercise in this all the rights of

a prince of the land until he should have received his full compensation.

To these written concessions the Emperor still added a double verbal promise, the import of which extended quite beyond that of the written treaty. It was that, in case the Palsgrave should, by accepting the crown of Bohemia, be put under the ban of the Empire, the Duke should be invested with the Electoral dignity and also with the possession of those parts of the Palatinate itself which should fall into his hands in course of the war. Whether these possessions were promised in free ownership, or only as a pledge of payment, was afterwards contested between the Duke and the Emperor, which we here omit to notice. Count Oñate, who, on the occasion of this negotiation, was staying in Munich, sought to quicken the Duke's zeal by offering him the support of a cavalry regiment to be maintained by Spain; in fact, King Philip III. afterwards paid 24,000 florins monthly for its maintenance. After the alliance between the Emperor and his cousin had been concluded, the latter called a meeting of the League, which took place in Würzburg in the beginning of December, 1619, and there moved the increase of the armament to 21,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry. The motion was carried, and the chief command was conferred upon him. It was with certainty to be expected that in the spring of 1620 the required force would be organized.

Ferdinand II. sought support also from the Pope. Paul V. had already, several months before the outbreak of the insurrection, helped his predecessor Matthias with a monthly subsidy of 10,000 florins, and afterwards declared that, if the League should be revived, he would send it aid to the amount of 200,000 florins. During the winter

of 1618-19 he received constant applications from the side of Spain for an increase of his contribution, and Maximilian also attempted, by sending to him an embassy, to move him to such increase. These efforts produced for a long time no results, as the Pope was inclined to appropriate all his savings to his nephews, and nothing to other purposes. In November, 1619, however, he could no longer avoid, in response to the still repeated entreaties, to promise the increase of his subsidy to Ferdinand—who had in the meantime been made Emperor—to 20,000 florins monthly,—not to begin, however, until the ensuing March. Now came the League, however, and demanded the keeping of the promise of the previous year. The Pope imposed a tax of a tenth on all the ecclesiastical incomes of Italy to meet this demand; and although we are not fully informed of the amount of this tax, it was at least several hundred thousand florins, and reached the League in the latter half of the year 1620.

From Poland Ferdinand could really expect no aid, and only hoped that the kindness of his brother-in-law, the King, would allow him to enlist a few thousand Cossacks—and, in fact, the latter offered to do so by giving his support to the enlistments of Homonna. When Homonna was routed by Bethlen's troops and forced back over the Carpathians, King Sigismund sent the Cossacks, by way of Silesia and Moravia, to Austria, and afterwards increased their number by sending, at Easter, 1620, a few thousand more. Ferdinand was obliged to pledge himself for their support, and to promise them further that all the booty they should take in their expedition against the enemy should be their own. The Cossacks rendered the Emperor very little service in battle, as they were neither used to war, nor had they been drilled; but by plunder-

ing and laying waste for miles around all those sections in which they were stationed in the course of the campaign, they inflicted upon his enemies the kind of losses which were most deeply felt, and thus fulfilled the end for which they had been called into the service.

Another brother-in-law of the Emperor also, the Grand Duke of Tuscany, yielded to his entreaty for the enlistment of a regiment of cuirassiers, and assumed for the time the payment of their wages.

All these aids Ferdinand had obtained as results simply of his urgent entreaties; but at the end of the year 1619 a prince from whom he had asked nothing offered him his support. This was no other than the Duke of Savoy, who was now about to change his alliance. He did not do this willingly, and would have preferred the alliance of the Palsgrave, if the conditions under which it was entered into had been kept; but James of England would consent to no part in it. To this was added the fact that the French ambassador, residing at his court, advised him against the rendering of any support to the Palsgrave, and alarmed him by observing that the Bourbons would not follow their old hereditary policy, and would not injure the house of Hapsburg. He then applied to Count Khevenhiller, the Austrian ambassador in Spain, offering the hand of his daughter to Ferdinand, who had been for several years a widower, and at the same time an armed support in the so "righteous" war which he was carrying on. At a later time he sent an ambassador to Vienna with the same overtures; he was now willing to enlist and maintain for the Emperor's service 12,000 men, and required in return only the title of King, and a certain consideration in case the Duchy of Mantua, the holder of which had no issue, should become vacant. His offers

were not, however, kindly received in Vienna. Although nothing was known of his Bohemian transactions and his treaty with the Palsgrave, it was nevertheless suspected that his hand was in some way in the game, and the Emperor would not, therefore, accept of either his daughter or the proffered alliance, and sent this answer to the ambassador of Savoy through Baron von Eggenberg. When Spain now demanded, for the troops to be sent from Italy to the Emperor's support, a passage through the Duke's territory, he was obliged, for better or for worse, in order not to irritate the Hapsburgs too much, to yield this demand, as he could not at present depend upon any support from France. He informed Wake, the English ambassador, of this permission for the passage of troops, adding his regrets, and remarking that he would even then do otherwise if the King of England would declare for the Bohemians.

Nevertheless, the change in the attitude of the Duke of Savoy was not so much a result of James' reluctance to come to the support of the Bohemians as of the view which had sprung up in France in favor of relinquishing all enmity towards the Hapsburgs. In the French court, as also in the higher Parisian society, the war which had broken out in Bohemia was judged, not by its political, but by its religious, bearings. The priesthood regarded the interests of the Bourbons and the Hapsburgs as identical, and this judgment came gradually to be accepted by the statesmen also, who were, moreover, displeased with the criminal act committed upon the Bohemian Regents. Louis XIII. therefore preserved towards the German Hapsburgs an attitude of kindness, and not a word was spoken either by him or his ministers which the Palsgrave and his party could seize upon as encouraging

them to mix themselves up with the Bohemian quarrel. The English ambassador, Edward Herbert, labored to inspire the French statesmen with a friendly feeling towards the Bohemian movement; but his labors brought no result. At this time the Duke of Luines offered him the hand of the Princess Henrietta, the King's sister, for the Prince of Wales, evidently in order to thwart the marriage negotiations then in progress between England and Spain. When James learned of this, he made no answer to it, because he much preferred the Spanish to the French marriage, and thus silently rejected the French princess, and deeply wounded the national self-love. Had he acted otherwise, France would doubtless have silenced her religious sympathies, and assumed another attitude in the contest of the Hapsburgs with Bohemia and the Palsgrave.

In the meantime the sad turn which the affairs of Ferdinand had, since Bethlen's appearance, taken, grew more and more notorious in France, and in many reports this was described to be worse than it really was. The clergy were zealous for the support of the persecuted and maligned Emperor; the Papal Nuncio, by direction of Paul V., stirred up this zeal, and the priests did all in their power to shape public opinion in this sense. Nevertheless, the King and his Secretary of State, the Marquis de Puysieux, would not stir from their neutral position, so that Count Fürstenberg, whom Ferdinand had sent to Paris with an entreaty for aid, and who arrived there in the beginning of December (1619), could report to his sovereign nothing encouraging. He did not, however, give up the matter for lost, but sought to gain the support of influential persons, and succeeded with the King's confessor, the Jesuit Arnault, who probably only followed

the instructions of his general in offering his services to the Emperor's ambassador. On Christmas-day the Father admonished the King of his obligation to furnish aid to the hard-pressed Emperor, and his eloquence celebrated a victory like that of Bernard of Clairvaux, when, five centuries before, he, from the altar, warned King Conrad III. of his duty to join the crusade. At evening there appeared a messenger at Fürstenberg's lodgings with the news that the King had decided to send an army to the Emperor's support.' In the coming month of March it was to be concentrated in Champagne, to enter upon its march to Germany.

It may be conceived what surprise and joy this news gave the Count, and, on the other hand, how the English ambassador was saddened as he received it. But as early as January there was a revolution in the court; it was regretted that the promise had been so hastily made, and various ways of escape were sought. Jeannin was charged with the business, and justified first the policy which the French Kings had pursued of opposing the too great power of this house. But now he maintained there need be no concern of this kind, for the Hapsburgs had grown old, their power was broken, and the Emperor was on the point of losing all his possessions. If he should be defeated, the Catholic religion would be suppressed, and the ecclesiastical property would become a prey to the Protestants. The triumph of the latter would not at the present time be desirable, on account of the Huguenots, and on this account it would be well if the King could mediate a satisfactory peace. Whether, in the peace negotiations, the restoration of Ferdinand to his former possessions should be made a condition, the memoir expressed no opinion; it only discussed the way in which

the peace could be effected, and to this end proposed the sending of an embassy, consisting of prominent men, to Germany. The sending of these men would procure increased respect for the King of France, bring the troubled Emperor some help, and direct the current of future negotiations. Only in case the Emperor should be inclined to peace, and his enemies should persevere in refusing it—only on this supposition—would the moment have arrived for France to place her power on the Emperor's side of the scale.

Jeannin's explanations were approved by the Council of State, at which the King was himself present; and accordingly, in the beginning of February, it was determined to send an embassy which should undertake the mediation. The hope of aid from France, which had for a time been entertained in Vienna, was indeed disappointed; but it was of infinite importance to the Emperor that France was not numbered with his enemies. The sending of the embassy was not indeed without its value to him, since it did for a time mediate in his favor. When the rumor of a turn of the French policy in favor of the Emperor spread in Germany, the Union sent two ambassadors in succession to Paris to secure the renewal of the old relations; but neither effected their purpose, any more than had an agent whom the Prince of Anhalt sent thither with the same design.

The Catholic princes to whom the Emperor had applied for their adhesion had yielded to his desires, and even in France he had so far succeeded that he had abundant reason to be satisfied. That he should also gain Protestants to his cause, and might use them in putting down the Bohemian insurrection, was an occurrence for which his enemies were not prepared; and yet this unexpected event occurred.

Ferdinand, in his simplicity, at first hoped that when his election as Emperor should have been accomplished, all the Estates of the Empire, with the exception perhaps of the Palsgrave and his adherents, would gather around him and give him their support in the recovery of Bohemia. Indeed, if his elevation to the throne of Germany was in real earnest, there can be no doubt that the Estates of the Empire were under obligation to support him in maintaining his possessions, just as he was himself also under the same obligation towards the Estates of the Empire. He summoned no Diet, before which he might bring his petition, but sent ambassadors to the individual Protestant princes, though the receptions with which these met soon convinced him that he could reckon upon no support from this source. Only in Electoral Saxony and by the Landgrave of Hesse Darmstadt was his application kindly listened to. The Elector's sense of injury at the Bohemian royal election grew deeper with the lapse of time, although it was only through his own forbidding attitude that the votes were directed to the Palsgrave. To this was added his concern about his cousins of Weimar and their claims upon the electoral dignity, and the territories of the Electorate ; to all which was added further that his court preacher, Hoë, was daily poisoning him with bitter utterances against the Bohemians, the effects of which increased with time. Hoë had, several years before, experienced a deep mortification in Prague ; he had settled there, after the granting of the Royal Charter, as preacher, and as he adhered decidedly to the Augsburg Confession, he fell into contention with the adherents of the Bohemian Confession, which ended with his being attacked in his house, insulted, and compelled to leave the country. In Dresden he found not only a friendly reception, but a

prominent position, which he was disposed to make use of to avenge the insult which he suffered. The imperial ambassador, Elvern, who met him at this time, wondered not a little at the hatred for the Bohemian rebels which the court preacher treasured in his heart, and remarked that he should not have deemed it possible that Hoë could be so attached to the Catholics as his utterances indicated. In view of these feelings of Hoë, it is readily conceived that the presents which Elvern brought to him in the Emperor's name were gratefully received, and had the effect of increasing his enmity towards the Bohemians.

In the beginning of January, 1620, came Lewis, Landgrave of Hesse Darmstadt, to Dresden, for the purpose of taking counsel with the Elector in regard to the public condition. John George declared to him that he was as well convinced of the Emperor's right to Bohemia as he was of the duty of the German princes to aid him. He desired to this end to summon a Diet of the Estates of the Upper Saxon Circle to take counsel on this subject, and to do the same also with the Circle of Lower Saxony; but it was necessary that a difficulty be first removed. The Emperor must secure to the Estates the undisturbed possession of the former Catholic institutions, which had fallen into their hands since the convention of Passau. If he should do this, it would cause the complaints to cease, which had hitherto been preferred against the Protestants, confirm to them once for all their possessions, and in this way issue a new edition of the Convention of Passau; there would then be hope of their acceding to him. He advised Lewis, therefore, to meet the heads of the League, come to an agreement with them in the matter, and then he would himself be ready to join them,

and for this purpose to meet them at some appointed place.

The Landgrave reported this interview to the Elector Schweikhard of Mentz, who called a meeting of the Princes of the League for the purpose of taking counsel with regard to the Saxon demand. The meeting took place at Würzburg (February 18, 1620), and the Duke of Bavaria, by his ambassadors, there declared his concurrence in the demand that the ecclesiastical property should not, either by violence or by processes of law, be wrested from the Estates of the Saxon Circles. He would not, therefore, disturb their possession—would not, however, on the other hand, recognize their rights to seats and votes for these in the Diet. The representatives of the Bishops would not go so far as Maximilian; they were only willing that no violence should be used against the Protestants: but in regard to judicial proceedings, they would consent that these be terminated after some years at longest. Electoral Saxony was admitted to this consultation.

When the Elector of Saxony and the Princes of the League met, the former expressed himself also in regard to the conditions as relating to the Emperor under which he was ready to render his aid—set up, however, greater demands than those which he had stated to the Landgrave Lewis. Beyond the securing of the Protestant Estates in the possession of their ecclesiastical property, John George demanded a promise that Ferdinand, when he should have gained the victory, should not persecute the Lutherans in his territories; that he should give him, in pledge for the costs of his support, Upper and Lower Lusatia; and, finally, that he should convey to him a German principality which should become vacant by the subjecting of his enemy to the imperial ban. To the first of

these demands the Emperor answered that he must wait for the decision of his friends of the League ; to the *second*, that he should observe the provisions of the Royal Charter towards those who should submit themselves to him ; to the *third*, that he would give Lusatia to the Elector in pledge ; and, *finally*, that he would, according to time and circumstances, gladly convey to him a principality.

When the 11th of March—the day on which the Princes of the League met the Elector of Saxony in Mühlhausen—arrived, the alliance between the Emperor and the Elector had really been concluded, and its coming into force depended only upon the settlement of the question of the Church property. Besides the Elector of Saxony and the Landgrave of Hesse Darmstadt, appeared the Electors of Mentz and Cologne, while Maximilian and the remainder of the Bishops were represented by ambassadors. After the Princes and their attendants had passed their friendly greetings, and declared themselves relatively to the Calvinists to be bound by common interests, the business in relation to the Church property was taken up. After some debate, they agreed that the Estates of the Lower Saxon Circle should be assured that they were not in any wise to be forced out of their possession, but that this favor should be shown them only so long as they should be quiet and behave themselves towards the Emperor as obedient Estates of the Empire, and not lay claim to either seat or vote in the Diet. The League expressly reserved to itself the right to bring complaint ; but as this reservation was not entered in the original record to which it belonged, the Catholics could afterwards lay claim to no further rights growing out of this reservation. They next came to an agreement in regard to the support to be rendered to the Emperor. John George bound him.

self to gain the Estates of Upper and Lower Lusatia to the alliance.

The question was also mooted at Mühlhausen as to whether the Emperor should begin the war by subjecting the Palsgrave to the imperial ban for accepting the Bohemian crown. It was the desire of the Duke of Bavaria that the ban be pronounced as soon as possible, for only in this lay his own hope of the Elector's hat. But the Saxon Elector opposed the infliction of the ban; he did not like to sacrifice a Protestant Elector; he preferred that success should be won by arms, rather than that an enemy should be irritated by the infliction of the ban, which would indeed be meaningless, unless at the same time it should be enforced by victory on the field of battle. It was decided to counsel the Emperor that he at present only threaten the assailant of his rights with the sentence of the ban. Ferdinand was informed of these decisions, and thus saw stone placed upon stone in the building of his alliances, and this in process of rising into a magnificent structure.

After the alliance with Electoral Saxony was completed at Mühlhausen, Ferdinand issued to the Elector, on the 22d of April, the deed of power which authorized him to march into the Bohemian lands, that is, Silesia and Lusatia. In order that the Elector's mission might be made easier, he was permitted to pardon individual rebels; while in relation to the religious question, on the contrary, the deed of authority contained no instructions, either of an assuring or threatening nature in relation to the Protestants. When this was learned in Dresden, an extension was desired; the Elector desired to be empowered to enter the northern province of Bohemia, and to be more definitely informed as to the matters of religion. Ferdinand

replied to the just representations from Dresden that he had no thought of persecuting the adherents of the Augsburg Confession, or of limiting the provisions of the Royal Charter. These assurances satisfied the Elector the more, because the patent under which he was to act had been modified to his wishes, and he was permitted to enter Bohemia. The remodelled patent was transmitted to him on the 6th of June, and on the same day one was also prepared for Maximilian of Bavaria.

IV.

An almost opposite course was taken in the efforts of the Palsgrave, now elected King of Bohemia, to win by alliances the strength for the contest. While the party of the Palatinate, in the negotiations of 1618, multiplied their exhortations to the Bohemians to perseverance in the struggle against the Emperor, and—we freely admit, not in a spirit of intended exaggeration, but in that of sincere conviction—offered them the prospect of aid from the half of Germany, from France, England, Holland, and Venice, and these numerous allies constantly figured in negotiations with Savoy, it now appeared, to the supreme surprise of the Palsgrave, and to his still greater pain, that these alliances were scarcely more than air-castles. As early as the time of his coronation in Prague, the necessity was pressing that he endeavor to secure considerable aid in both money and troops, if he would carry on the contest with the Emperor to a half-way successful issue, and especially if he desired to maintain the alliance with Bethlen Gabor. His first aid he hoped to obtain from the Union and the other German Protestants, and for this purpose called, under the title of a Correspondence-

Diet, not only the members of the Union, but nearly all the Protestant princes of Germany and the King of Denmark, to a common consultation at Nuremberg. The hope that all those invited would be present proved itself erroneous, for at the appointed time, the middle of November (1619), besides himself and the members of the Union, none were at Nuremberg in person but the Palsgrave of Neuberg and three Dukes of Saxe Weimar, while the Elector of Brandenburg and the Dukes of Lüneburg and Brunswick were represented by envoys. These alone were the new friends who were about to join the Palsgrave; but even in regard to these it may be supposed that they had come to hear more than to help, and that they would scarcely aid him with anything beyond good counsels.

When Frederic arrived at Nuremberg, his counsellors of the Palatinate attempted to effect an alliance between Bohemia and the Union, by which the latter should assume the obligation to participate in the Bohemian contest, and, at all events, to send their troops to Bohemia. The Union would, however, consent to no alliance of the kind; it would take up arms only in defence of the Palatinate. This view corresponded also with the answer which the Baron von Kuffstein gave when he appeared at Nuremberg, and sought to persuade the Union to form an alliance with Lower Austria. His request was indeed received and answered in a friendly spirit, but the aid was refused; as the Union would not mix directly in the conflict in Bohemia, so it would not support Austria in that with the Emperor.

This policy of the Union Diet, which gradually drew its lines more sharply to limit itself to Germany, showed itself also in this, that the Union censured the Palsgrave

for causing himself to be attended at his entrance into Bohemia by a part of the troops of the Union. The Palsgrave was required to send the troops back without delay, and also to decline the monthly pay of 6,000 florins which he, as commander of the Union's troops, was to receive, because he could not now render this service. Although the party of the Palatinate desired by all means to reverse these two decisions, the members of the Union persisted, and compelled the Palsgrave to yield. It is perceived that the Correspondence-Diet, in which the party of Bohemia and the Palatinate set so great hopes, and in which all Protestant Germany was described in advance in a united body, realized none of those expectations, and placed neither money nor troops at Bohemia's disposal. Frederic must enter upon his return, unable in any way to conceal the fact that the Union would limit its action to Germany proper.

This sad result forced him to make another attempt to change his father-in-law's feeling and win him from his adverse decision. To this end he sent Ahaz von Dohna to England, whither he arrived in January (1620); he received, however, in this instance, no more encouraging assurances. The King indeed asked of him a detailed statement of the reasons by which the Bohemians could support their right of election. It was, however, manifest that he did not ask this question intending to regulate his action by the answer, but simply to gain time. Only in one instance was he more yielding. The Palsgrave had entrusted a Scotchman, named John Gray, with the command of a regiment, the enlistment of which he desired to have set on foot in England. When Gray brought this request before the King, and asked his concurrence, James could not do otherwise than give it, for he had

given similar permissions to other princes, and especially to the King of Spain. The application of the ambassador, sent at the same time by the Union, for money, he dismissed just as he did that of his son-in-law; and yet no more favorable opportunity than this to aid the cause of Frederic, with money at least, ever occurred. The whole English clergy, from the bishops down to the lowest curates, favored the Bohemian cause, animated its representatives, and were ready to make free-will offerings themselves, and institute collections in the churches; the merchants were ready to loan any amount if the King would but secure its payment; and Parliament was ready to take this upon itself, if the King would but draw the sword for the gospel. All this self-sacrificing spirit was to James an abomination. He would not tolerate the creation of a loan, if his name was to be mentioned in connection with it, and it cost an effort to gain his consent to voluntary contributions, which, on account of his ill-will, amounted in the end to but the trifling sum of £13,000. All that he could be persuaded to do was to promise to pay to his son-in-law £25,000 for the defence of the Palatinate, and to intercede with his brother-in-law, the King of Denmark, for a loan of £50,000. Thus the Palsgrave had but a single friendly power ready to make sacrifice in his cause, and that was Holland. The Hollanders, after the outbreak of the insurrection, gave the Bohemians frequent aid, and finally fixed their support at the sum of 50,000 florins monthly; and if they sometimes threatened that they would suspend its payment unless the King of England would participate in the support of this cause, these threats were not earnestly meant.

The Bohemians were therefore compelled to think of making great exertions themselves, if they desired to re-

new their alliance with Bethlen, which they had lost by their non-compliance with his demand for money, and by his treaties with the Emperor. They desired first to bring the accessory lands of Bohemia to greater offerings than they had hitherto made, and then in a General Diet, which was to assemble in March, 1620, they would finally formulate the conditions of the Hungarian alliance. To this end the Estates were first called to meet at Brünn and Breslau. The King, having passed, after his return from Nuremberg, a few weeks in Prague, during which time the cathedral was remodelled, and, to the infinite annoyance of the people of Prague, cleared of all its pictures and other church furniture, departed for Brünn, received homage at the Diet there, and received from the Moravians an increase of their contingent of troops, but no money. Such had also been the result of the Diet which met at Breslau on the 23d of February, 1620. Here, too, after the homage had been performed, nothing more was determined upon than a new arming and the providing of the money needed to this end.

Although, therefore, on the side of the Palatinate, after the lamentable failure of all the exertions made, no money could be offered to Prince Bethlen, still effort was made to persuade him to renew his former relations, and break off the armistice concluded with the Emperor; and for this purpose Christopher von Dohna was sent to Kaschau, where Bethlen was then staying.

The Emperor had ratified the Presburg treaties, but had not extended the armistice to Bohemia, and as Bethlen earnestly persisted in his demand for this, he was informed that this would be applied to the Bohemians only in case of their entire submission. The Prince could not doubt that the Emperor would turn his weapons against

him when he should have triumphed over the Bohemians, and so determined (March 17, 1620) to follow the Bohemian suggestions and again attack the Emperor, unless he should in the last moment yield. Indeed a few days later he refused to be satisfied with the mere concession of the armistice, but demanded that Ferdinand should accede to the terms of peace offered from Prague, according to which he was to renounce his rule over Bohemia, in consideration of a yearly pension of 300,000 florins. If he should not, within twenty-five days, receive an assent to this demand, he intended to unite his arms again with those of Bohemia. This was the substance of a letter which the Prince, on the 31st of March, directed to Vienna, and which might there be regarded as a notification that the treaties were terminated.

A few days before this he sent to Prague, Count Emerich Thurzo, for the purpose of extending, by new and more exact stipulations, the alliance which had already been concluded in Presburg, and at the same time also to represent him at the baptism of Prince Rupert, who afterwards became so distinguished in England. At the time of Thurzo's arrival in Prague, the General Diet was in session, at which were also envoys from Austria. The transactions in regard to an alliance between Bohemia, Hungary, and Austria were soon ended. Its conditions were that the lands of the Bohemian crown should pay to the Hungarians yearly the sum of 103,000 thalers, to Upper and Lower Austria, each, 30,000 thalers, and that beyond this, in case of need, these lands should mutually aid each other with troops. On the 25th of April the consultations were terminated, and the Hungarian-Austrian-Bohemian "Confederation" was read, as to its substance, in a solemn assembly in the cathedral. At the same General Diet the King's

eldest son was elected his successor on the Bohemian throne, which gave his father so great delight that he merrily leaped for joy in the drawing-room when a deputation brought him information of this action. The disapproving judgments to which this childish performance gave occasion the reader may be left to conceive.

Although Bethlen now sent a few thousand horsemen to Bohemia's aid, as the Emperor refused his assent to the conditions demanded, yet the latter deemed it more prudent not to regard this as a breach of the armistice, lest he should provoke a direct attack upon himself, and render impossible, in a future Hungarian Diet, the negotiations provided for in the Presburg treaties. At the end of May, the Prince of Transylvania called such a Diet at Neusohl, to act in regard to the concessions of the Emperor. The Bohemians and Austrians also sent envoys to this, and it was thought in Prague that the deposition of Ferdinand and the transfer of the Hungarian crown to the Palsgrave would be determined upon. A plan no less, therefore, occupied the minds of the statesmen of Bohemia and the Palatinate, than that the whole Austrian monarchy should recognize in Frederic their sovereign.

V.

Bethlen, in his speech at the ceremonial opening of the Diet, laid upon the Emperor the blame of all the present complications, and called upon the Diet to take counsel in regard to preparation for war and the granting of the necessary supply of money to cover the expenses of the war which might follow. The Diet entered into his proposal, refused a friendly hearing to the envoys which Ferdinand had sent to Neusohl to prevent the break, and

finally broke off all efforts at conciliation by electing Bethlen King of Hungary (August, 1620). The Emperor did not, in this instance, preserve the composure which he had shown when informed of the Bohemian election ; he called Bethlen "a beast," an expression which he employed only in extreme excitement. The Diet then made the necessary provision for the inevitable war, declared the confiscation of Catholic property, ordered that the number of the bishops should be reduced to three, and that to each bishop should be paid a salary of only 2,000 florins.

To the Bohemian envoys, Bethlen, during the business of the Diet, gave, unceasingly, the assurance that he would advance to the attack with perhaps 40,000 men ; but as he had not the money for the necessary outlays, he was compelled to insist upon the payment of 400,000 florins, or at least two-thirds of that sum. When this was reported in Prague, it produced the conviction that the Prince was no longer to be put off with promises alone, and it was determined to send him an instalment of at least 100,000 florins. Frederic pledged a portion of his silver plate and many crown jewels to Jewish and Christian dealers, and collected the amount mentioned, which was then sent, by Herr von Plessen and Doctor Jessenius, to Neusohl. When the Prince received the money, he felt the greatest delight, and assured the two bearers of his cordial attachment. He discussed, in repeated conversations, in Plessen's presence, his plan of campaign, by which he would force Count Buquois to a battle which must end in the latter's defeat. Plessen approved of the plan, but desired that Bethlen should apply to the Sultan for aid, since, in the increasing dangers, he might not be able otherwise to repel the enemy. The latter, however, dreaded the effects of

calling upon the Turks for aid. His conviction was, that if they could enjoy a friendly neutrality on that side, it would be better not to invite their active aid, for who could assure them that they should enjoy for themselves the benefit of a success which the Turks should help them to achieve? After manifold suggestions and counsels from Plessen, he set aside his scruples and declared himself ready to call the Turks to his aid in case of danger. In fact, an embassy, consisting of Hungarians, Bohemians, and Austrians, numbering, with attendants, one hundred persons, went from Neusohl, bearing valuable presents, to Constantinople, there to implore Turkish aid. The embassy set out on the 27th of August (1620), and could not, therefore, as is evident from this date, arrive in Constantinople until the 27th of November, nineteen days after the battle of the White Mountain, and therefore quite too late to solicit Turkish aid. Nor would they have obtained this, if the decisive day had not been past, for although the ambassadors were kindly received and heard various promises, the Turks were not in earnest in these, as their attention was then fixed chiefly on Poland and Persia. Towards these two countries all their war preparations were directed, and they would take part in the Austrian contest only by way of promises at most, since this could be agreeable to them only in case the contest between the Emperor and his enemies should rage for a long time and both parties should have become to the last degree weakened by it.

In summing up the efforts of both Ferdinand and Frederic to form alliances, we have the following result: The former, besides his own means, was supported by money and troops from Spain, troops from the League, from Electoral Saxony, Poland, and Tuscany; by money

from the Pope, and promises and diplomatic services from France. On the other hand, Frederic had, for the defence of the Bohemian crown, only the confederation with Austria and Hungary, and the money received from Holland; for the defence of his own possessions, only the troops of the Union, the Danish loan, and the English alms. To which side victory, under these circumstances, would incline could not be for a moment doubtful.

CHAPTER V.

THE WAR IN THE YEAR 1620 TO THE BATTLE OF THE WHITE MOUNTAIN.

- I. The War in Austria and Bohemia in the first Months of the Year 1620.
- II. The Treaty of Ulm, and the French and English Embassies in Vienna.
- III. March of the Army of the League into Austria, and its Junction with the Imperial Army.
- IV. Maximilian and Buquois advance into Bohemia.

I.

WHEN the Bohemians and Hungarians withdrew, in December, 1619, from Vienna, they were obliged to remain fourteen days on the right bank of the Danube, because the bridge of boats at Presburg had been broken up, and could only with difficulty be restored. How great the devastation was which the Hungarians had spread around them during their invasion of Austria, the Bohemian troops now experienced to their detriment, for they did not even find shelter from the inclement weather, because the Hungarians had not merely robbed the houses of the peasants, but had, in their senseless madness, shattered their windows and stoves. The soldiers of sections of the army received for many days not a mouthful of bread, and the higher commanders not a drop of wine, and must seize upon roots and vegetables to quiet their hunger, while they quenched their thirst with the water of the Danube.

As the Bohemian army was again in want of the needed clothing, the distress rose to a height which suggested the frightful days of the previous winter, and sickness raged to such extent that the bloodiest battle could not have claimed more victims. Thurn's regiment, which at the time of the enlistment numbered 3,000, sank to 1,200, of which loss at least half was to be ascribed to the recent sufferings, and the other losses in the Bohemian army were in the same ratio, so that the whole force now under the standards could be estimated at not more than 5,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry. The Silesian and Moravian troops also suffered fearfully, although their suffering from want was less, because they were more regularly paid. Thurn had already, during his campaign against Vienna, pictured in high colors the distress of the Bohemian troops, and pressingly urged further payment, so that an application had been made to the Prince of Anhalt for a loan of 60,000 florins, which amount had been afterwards supplemented, and in the beginning of December a month's pay for the Bohemian troops had been forwarded. But those entrusted with the transportation of the money were in fear of being robbed of this by the Hungarians who held the passage of the Danube at Presburg, and must be passed in reaching the Bohemians. The money remained, therefore, in Moravia, and one readily conceives that the soldiers cursed those whose lot fell in the expedition beyond the Danube.

Before Christmas the troops finally crossed the Danube and separated. The Bohemians marched to the neighborhood of Langenlois in Austria, the Moravians to Brünn, and the Silesians home. The army was, therefore, dispersed, and the Bohemians enabled to offer resistance to Buquoi's expected attack only because the Austrian

Protestants had joined them and placed their troops under the one command. Ferdinand labored to keep the Estates from this hostile action; but all his representations were frustrated by the opposition of the notorious Thonradel, who, with passionate warmth, urged to decisive action. The frightful war sufferings with which Lower Austria was now visited, and which brought poverty into the houses of those who otherwise would not have been required to deny themselves any luxuries, had generated a deep hatred, so that the people no longer shrank back from placing their lives and future weal at stake. The Estates, therefore, in Horn, whither they had, on the 14th of January, retired, formed the resolution to regard and to treat the imperial army as enemies. In pursuance of this resolution of the Lower Austrians, the Bohemian army was increased at Langenlois to about 9,000 men.

The first conflict of the opposing forces took place February 1st, at Nikolsburg, which strong castle was besieged by the Moravian troops and forced to surrender. Soon after this, however, Dampierre crossed the Danube, drew to him the Polish Cossacks, with their aid invested Nikolsburg, and forced it, on the 6th of February, to surrender back again. To this result was added, a few days later, a successful attack of Buquoi upon the combined Bohemian and Austrian forces at Langenlois. The defeat was due chiefly to the want of a unity of command in the Bohemian army, as the Prince of Anhalt, its commander-in-chief, had not even yet reached the camp; but now, however, he delayed no longer to make his appearance, and as the Bohemian army was at the same time reinforced by some enlistments, the Prince could think of avenging upon the enemy the defeat of Langenlois, and when he attacked them at Meissau he did inflict a con-

siderable loss; but the want from which his troops still continued to suffer prevented his gathering the fruits of his victory. The army of Bohemia and Austria spread for miles around them want and misery, since, in spite of all the promises made them, they were again paid no money, and the soldiers were obliged to supply their wants by compulsory demands. The imperial troops also, and especially the Cossacks, lived only upon plunder, and behaved themselves like very devils. In a written complaint which the Estates at Horn, notwithstanding their own connection with the insurrection, addressed to the Emperor, they were charged with maliciously reducing villages and cities to ashes, plundering poor and rich, violating boys and girls, and practising inhuman cruelties; also with stringing men and women on ropes and then shaking them; with squeezing them between blocks of wood; with tearing pieces of flesh from their bodies with pincers; with boring through their shin-bones and knee-pans, and hanging them up by their feet—all to force money out of them. The complaint further sets forth: thousands of persons died of their manifold torments, as there was no sparing of any who were Lutherans. The Abbot of Melk, whose fidelity was marred by neither stain nor suspicion, and who should have been spared by the imperialists, complained that every day great numbers of imperial soldiers, Poles, Walloons, Italians, and Germans, forced their way into his and his friends' castles, market-towns and villages, and everywhere robbed the people according to their hearts' lusts, injuring them in an unheard-of way, tormenting and cutting them down, and finally to plunder adding fire. Still worse were the complaints of the inhabitants of the imperial domains in Lower Austria, whose weal was the Emperor's special interest. If nothing were left them

—thus wrote they to the Emperor—but their fields and vineyards, still they might have cherished the hope, under the protection of the imperial arms, of cultivating these, and giving to naked life itself a further respite; but the ignominy which they now suffered made life unendurable. Cossacks in companies of 200 to 300 men were daily passing in all directions, not content with simple plunder, but striking down men, women, and children in the fields, or committing beastly violations upon matrons and maidens. Death were a thousand times preferable to living longer under these outrages committed upon their flesh and blood. These prayers and representations led Ferdinand to address an earnest admonition to Count Buquoi to see to it that his troops should not resign themselves to such beastly excesses, which, if not checked, would call down immediate divine vengeance. He represented that he could not cherish the hope of victory to his arms, but should live in fear and anxiety lest a righteous judgment should overtake him. These warnings, however, bore no fruit, and Lower Austria was obliged to empty to the dregs the bitter cup of war's sorrows. The sufferings had their end only when the people abandoned the domestic hearth, and desolation came in place of active industry. It was a misery suggestive of the times of the migrations of the nations, and indeed the Hunnish hordes could not have proceeded more cruelly than did the soldiers of both parties, who may well be regarded as the offscourings of all lands.

As it was necessary, on the Bohemian side, whatever it might cost, to see to it that a more systematic provision for the care of the troops be made, since they every day threatened mutiny, so the Prince of Anhalt hastened to Prague, in order to secure from the General Diet, just as

sembled there, a grant of the needed money. It may be ascribed, in part, to his representations that the Bohemian Estates obligated themselves to larger payments than hitherto. The King also decided personally to loan to the country 200,000 florins; and so an amount sufficient to cover three months' pay was gotten together and dispatched to Austria. During the time which Anhalt spent in Prague the troops in two engagements suffered considerable losses. The first of these took place at Sinzendorf, on the 12th of April, and cost the lives of Baron von Fels and 600 men. The second occurred on the 30th of April, at Gars, where a regiment of Lower Austrians was annihilated.

The Bohemians had instituted new enlistments; the Moravians and Silesians had returned to Lower Austria; and, finally, the Hungarians, in the beginning of May, appeared on the war theatre, and sent a few thousand cavalry to the allied army, so that Anhalt had, when, on the 15th of May, he left Prague for Austria, perhaps 30,000 men subject to his command. He attempted, on the 10th of June, an attack upon the city of Hadersdorf, which he surrounded with a superior force, intending to bring it to capitulate; but Buquoi had strengthened the garrison in time to defeat the plan. Irritated at the failure of a result which he deemed certain, Anhalt sent a trumpeter to the Count and challenged him to a battle which should end the war. The imperial general declined this challenge, because the field was unfavorable to him and his force was far from being equal to that of his enemy. Neither the League nor the King of Spain had as yet made good their promises; their troops were now but on their way, and he had under his control but his old force, increased only by a few fresh enlistments.

In spite of Buquoi's declining, Anhalt might perhaps

have found a fair chance of bringing on a battle, if, on account of the failure in paying them, a mutiny had not again (June 30) broken out among the troops. Thurn's regiment refused to accept a new colonel in the person of Count Solms, while at the same time the Moravian regiments refused obedience, although their unpaid dues were trifling, and the example thus set was followed by Hohenloe's Bohemian regiment. Promises, negotiations, and an allusion to the commissioners which had been sent to Prague brought the soldiers, in course of two or three days, to submission; but on the 9th of July broke out a new revolt. On this day the regiment of Thurn again renounced obedience, and was appeased only by an extreme effort on the part of Count Hohenloe. When, however, the news reached Eggenburg that Maximilian of Bavaria had entered Upper Austria, the restraints of order were again dissolved. The example in this instance was set by Žerotín's Moravian regiment, which, on the 27th of July, drove its officers from the camp. To all the exhortations and representations of Anhalt, the mutineers replied that they would wait only till the next day for the return of the messengers who had been sent to Prague for money.

As these messengers did not arrive at the time fixed, the regiment marched out of their quarters to Stockerau, elected a mere musketeer as their colonel, and declared that they should thenceforth not look upon the imperial troops as enemies. The mutineers expected that the regiments of Thurn and Hohenloe would join them; but as this did not occur, they entered upon their march alone to Znaim, in order to collect their pay by force in Moravia. When, however, Anhalt sent after them a lieutenant-colonel to admonish them of their duty, many regretted the offensive step taken, and two days later they were

ready to return to duty. But now again the Prince had difficulty in holding Thurn's regiment to their better feeling; for when he praised them for their behavior, the soldiers answered him that they would wait but three days longer for the satisfaction of their demands, and, in case of failure, they should collect their pay by force. At the moment, therefore, of Maximilian's advance against Linz, the army encamped at Eggenburg was in danger of being deserted by a portion of its troops and of being itself dissolved. This danger was for the moment escaped by the return, on the 2d of August, of the messengers from Prague, bringing the news that three months' pay for the army was on its way. This money had been obtained partly by a loan from the citizens of Prague, partly by a barbarous oppression of the Jews, partly, in fine, by an extortion exercised towards the Catholics. We further remark, in conclusion, that Buquoi richly deserved the charges made affecting his capacity; for to attempt no attack upon an army in such state of disorganization shows at least a want of that initiating force which is necessary to a commander.

While the situation of the Bohemian army on the Austrian side of the Danube swayed hither and thither, in indecision, it was still worse on the Bohemian side. Here Colonel Marradas, who maintained the occupation of Budweis and several other places, had, since the month of May, made various attacks upon other places. As it was not deemed necessary to post a special force to operate against him, he inflicted upon the garrisons of Sabslau and Wodnan effective blows, and even ventured an attempt upon the strongly-fortified Prachatitz, though his attack, made on the 8th of May, was unsuccessful. In order to hinder further

advances, Count Mansfeld, who had till then remained in Austria, was ordered to Bohemia, there to collect under his command some newly-enlisted regiments, as also a part of the levy now again armed, and with these troops, amounting to about 10,000 men, to hold Marradas in check. While he successfully carried out this order, the cause of Bohemia experienced another disaster. In the province of Bechin and Prachin there was a rising of the peasants to avenge themselves for the indescribable vexations inflicted upon them by friend and foe. Although this rising was, by force and promises together, soon quieted, yet the example had nevertheless been set, and, during the few months' respite which still remained to the insurrection, risings of the peasantry were continually occurring, and completely exhausting the country's power of resistance. And never was a severer exercise of energy needed, for at this moment the troops of the League and those of Spain which had been enlisted in the Netherlands were entering upon the theatre of the war.

II.

The arming of the League occupied the autumn of 1619 and the winter of 1620. On all the highways of Germany were seen about this time bands of men in motion towards the various recruiting-places. At first the Union attempted to prevent the recruiting, and for this purpose quartered their troops upon the ecclesiastical provinces. When, for instance, at the Correspondence-Diet at Nuremberg, it was decided to fit out an army, although it was not then known whether the Emperor would attack the Palatinate and necessitate a war there, it was feared that the

maintenance of an enlisted force would exhaust their resources. This fear induced the Princes of the Union to impose this burden of maintenance upon the ecclesiastics; moreover, they already contemplated the confiscation of their possessions, and proposed in this way to begin the execution. They did not much fear any resistance from the Bishops, except as they, in case of an attack, might unite their forces with those of Maximilian of Bavaria, the most powerful of the Catholic princes. The Elector of the Palatinate and the Union, therefore, determined to enter into negotiations with Maximilian, in order to secure his neutrality. Should he raise objections, Frederic was willing to limit the quartering to Mentz, Würzburg, Eichstadt, and the Abbey of Ellwangen, and to spare the episcopal sees of Augsburg, Freising, and Regensburg, which were situated near him. Count Solms and Herr von Plessen were entrusted with the negotiations in Munich, whither they went after the dissolution of the Correspondence-Diet. In addition to the demand for neutrality, they were instructed also to enter complaint of various arbitrary acts, and to make demands relating to important matters of the Empire—such, for instance, as the equal rights of the religious parties to places in the imperial council and imperial chamber. They were to demand from Maximilian a clear and decisive answer, to be rendered within two months; on the failure of which the Union would “take into consideration its occasion and necessities”—that is, would proceed to aggressive measures against the Catholics.

Maximilian—who had long looked with displeasure upon the ambitious attempts of the Palatinate prince, and had determined, in alliance with the Emperor, to oppose them,—was not at all frightened by the threatening message

which now reached him, nor did he avail himself of the respite allowed him, but seized his opportunity so that his answer should not fall short of the Nuremberg threats. He first rebuked, as assumptions, the Protestants' complaints of restrictions, while the Catholics, on the contrary, really had grounds for the most manifold complaints, and he warned his enemies against seizing their weapons in case their wishes were not satisfied at the instant. The fortunes of war he represented as doubtful, the party who least expected it often drawing the blank. The envoys were not content with this answer, but assumed a still more menacing speech, and finally expressed the hope that the Duke would not oppose the Union, if it should attempt to enforce its rights in arms. Nor did he remain in debt for a sharp reply to this declaration.

When the League (beginning of March, 1620) met at Würzburg, to take counsel in regard to the negotiations to be entered into with the Elector of Saxony, it was in full accord with the answer which Maximilian had given to the envoys, and added also its own answer to the Elector of the Palatinate, in which it referred him with his grievances to a future Imperial Diet, protesting in relation to them that their removal would be categorically demanded. If, however, the Protestants desired war—thus substantially closed the letter—the Catholics would accept it without fear. The design to intimidate their enemies, which evidently controlled the Palsgrave and his friends at Nuremberg, failed, and there remained to the Union nothing but to support their army on their own soil, since the Catholics were fully prepared by the armaments, which they had in the meantime begun, to defend their territories. The Margraves of Anspach and Baden doubtless wavered, but still promised that the Catholic armaments should be

forcibly prevented ; but as they wanted courage to do this, the League, as well as the Union, effected without hindrance its preparations, and towards the end of May, 1620, was able to concentrate its forces on the Danube. The troops of the Union, 13,000 strong, encamped at Ulm ; those of the League, 24,000 strong, at Lauingen and Günzburg.

When Frederic of the Palatinate was informed of the concentration of the forces of the League, he attempted still, at the last moment, to prevent the intended attack of the Duke of Bavaria upon Bohemia, and to this end sent his Counsellor, Camerarius, to Munich. It was, however, in vain to attempt to bring the Duke to assume a friendly attitude towards the Palsgrave ; Camerarius was coldly treated, and was obliged to return with nothing accomplished. This promoter of the plans of the Palatinate was now perfectly aware of the peril into which his sovereign had precipitated himself ; he saw how much better prepared and stronger the enemy was, and how insufficient were their own resources for the struggle.

The proximity of the two armies might easily have brought on a bloody conflict ; but this Maximilian desired to avoid. He sent, therefore, two of his counsellors to the commanders of the Union army at Ulm, and offered them peace—that is, he demanded from them the declaration that the Union would observe peace in Germany and invade no territory of the League. He was willing to make the corresponding declaration, and wished therefore only to allow that the two parties should direct their forces to Bohemia, and there, as friends and enemies of the Palsgrave, fight it out. The Union did not, however, wish to send its troops to Bohemia, because it contemplated the acquisition of the provinces of the German

Bishops, and if it might not be permitted to disturb the peace of Germany, then it preferred to disband its forces. It would consent to Maximilian's demands only on the condition that the hereditary possessions of the Palgrave should not be invaded, which would require that the Spanish troops stationed in Flanders should be employed in Bohemia, and not in the Lower Palatinate. Maximilian declined, however, to make any such promise, since the Archduke Albert—who, with his wife, the Infanta Isabella, ruled the Spanish Netherlands—was not a member of the League, and he (Maximilian) could enter into no obligations in behalf of one whom he had no authority to command.

What results these negotiations might have led to, and whether the parties might not have been drawn into immediate conflict, cannot be known; for they were at this moment interrupted by the arrival upon German soil of the embassy from Louis XIII., which had been announced two months before. At the head of this was the Duke d'Angoulême, and with him MM. Bethune and Préaux. These gentlemen now sought to fulfil their trust and mediate a settlement of the contest between the Emperor and his enemies. Their instructions were not definite as to how the mediation should proceed—whether the Emperor was to be fully restored or not—but the views which prevailed in the royal cabinet left no doubt that Louis XIII. wished to initiate the negotiations chiefly in the Emperor's favor. For this reason they placed themselves, after their arrival at Ulm, upon the side of Maximilian of Bavaria, and demanded of the Union that it should not ask of him any assurance in regard to the Archduke Albert. The ambassadors urged this view upon the Duke of Würtemberg and the Margrave of Anspach so decid-

edly, adding representations of the disgrace which their sovereign would incur, that nothing remained to them but to yield and conclude a treaty with Maximilian, which was subscribed on the 3d of July, 1620. In this the Union and the League mutually obligated themselves not to invade each other's territories. The Union, as well as the League, was left free to send its troops to Bohemia, there to take part on the one side or the other. In fact, the Union could not, had it even desired to do so, make any use of this permission, but was obliged to employ its troops in the immediate defence of the Lower Palatinate against the Spanish troops who were advancing into it, and so Maximilian was free in his movement against Bohemia. When information of the treaty of Ulm reached Prague, it did not change there the view of the situation, and irritation was added to astonishment.

After the conclusion of the treaty, the French ambassadors journeyed to Vienna, where they were received with distinction. Their expectation, however, that they should, from the imperial side, be charged with the mediatorial office, and that they should now enter really upon their work, was disappointed. The desire in Vienna was to leave the solution of the matter in dispute only to the sword, and effort was therefore made to convince the ambassadors that all the proceedings inaugurated by the Bohemians and Hungarians were in violation of right. This course offended the ambassadors ; they declared their mission at an end, and determined to depart without having effected anything, which, however, startled the Vienna statesmen a little, and led them to consider whether it would do to let these men go home, and thus declare to the world that the alliance with France was ended, or whether it were not better—only for the sake of the ap-

pearance of course—to open negotiations with them. They decided upon the latter expedient, and thus gained time; for the French gentlemen must now send an agent to Bohemia and one to Hungary, to invite to participation in the negotiations, and during the time thus taken up a decisive blow could, with the help of the troops of the League, be dealt; all negotiations could then be broken off, and the longer stay of the French ambassadors in Vienna would be a matter of indifference.

When the Frenchmen were thus entrusted with the mediation, they sent a certain Monsieur de Saint Catherine to the Prince of Anhalt, and a certain Monsieur de Sigogné to Bethlen at Neusohl. Anhalt, who was well satisfied that this was not earnest on the side of the Emperor, and that the latter did not mean to abate his demands upon Bohemia, received the French agent in a somewhat unfriendly manner, and assigned as his reason for not entering into the proposed mediation that he had not the necessary authority. Sigogné was better received in Neusohl, but yet had no better success, as all parties now looked to the battle-field for a decision, and not to fruitless negotiations. The French ambassadors were, therefore, under the necessity of waiting until an occurrence on the battle-field should bring the parties nearer together, and so spent their time, until the middle of August, in Vienna, in useless suggestions and representations relating chiefly to the affairs of Hungary.

Towards the end of August appeared at the imperial court an English ambassador, Wotton by name, who also desired to aid in the mediation. James had finally replied to the continual complaints and entreaties of his son-in-law, that he had determined to send an embassy to the Emperor in order to make an attempt at finishing the

work begun by Doncaster. He had come to this conclusion in June (1620), and had afterwards further concluded to send also an embassy, consisting of Messrs. Conway and Weston, to his son-in-law, in order to importune him to listen favorably to whatever proposals and demands the Emperor might make. Conway and Weston arrived in July in Brussels, where they sought of the Archduke a promise that the troops gathered in Flanders should not be employed for the invasion of the Lower Palatinate; but they received only evasive answers. A few days after their departure Albert wrote, informing the Princes of the Union that he should send the troops under the command of the Marquis of Spinola to execute the Emperor's behest against the rebellious Palsgrave. In fact, the Marquis advanced over the Rhine, at Mentz, on the 5th of September, and on the 10th attacked Kreuznach, a city of the Lower Palatinate; and thus began a war of which, in its proper place, account will be given.

Conway and Weston in the meantime proceeded to Dresden, where they made an attempt to enlist the Elector in the interests of the Palsgrave; but did not attain their end, and were obliged to submit to further outrageous treatment, in the searching of their trunks, to know if they contained gold and silver for the Palsgrave. Had money been found, it would have been confiscated; but as no more was found in the trunks than that needed to meet the expenses of the journey, they were allowed to go on without further molestation. They arrived on the 20th of October in Prague, discharged their commission as to Frederic—though of course without effect, as the latter was not in a condition to enter into negotiations with the Emperor and to discuss or decline his proposals.

Wotton reached Vienna as early as the end of August,

and on the 2d of September was granted an audience with the Emperor, whose acceptance of the English mediation he labored to bring about. The Emperor was therefore urged to this measure from the side of England as he had been from that of France; but would, in fact, have nothing to do with either. And not only did Wotton earnestly recommend James as mediator, but also the acceptance of the proposal spoken of on the occasion of the transactions at Ulm. There the French ambassadors had been informed by the Union that an adjustment could be effected only in case the Emperor would renounce his claim to the government of Bohemia, which should be carried on by the Estates, and content himself with the receipt of the royal income; that the Palsgrave should also give up the kingly title, but might, after the Emperor's death, resume it with its implied rights. The ambassador made this proposal, indeed, on his own responsibility, in doing which he acted as did all the English diplomatists of the time. The representatives of England in France, Savoy, and Germany interested themselves warmly in the Palsgrave, notwithstanding the different and even opposite instructions which the King had given them. Wotton's overture was rejected; and so he supplied for the time—for the troops of the League had already advanced into Bohemia—a not unacceptable society for the French ambassadors, and they passed their time in idle talk.

III.

While Maximilian was arranging with the Union at Ulm for a mutual neutrality, he was also seeking an understanding with the Elector of Saxony in regard to a common plan of attack. He desired to advance into Austria,

put down the insurrection there, and then proceed to Bohemia, while the Elector should invade Lusatia and Silesia, and thus compel a division of the Bohemian forces. John George, when informed of this plan, was not satisfied with it; his wish was that the two armies should at once proceed in conjunction against Bohemia. He feared that if the army of the League should enter Austria, the two would be so widely separated that he might be exposed defenceless to an attack from the Bohemians. Maximilian paid no regard to this apprehension of Saxony, which arose from excessive timidity, and determined without further delay to advance into Austria. He entered upon the march thither, not with the entire army, but with 22,000 men, while he sent 7,000 men to Furth to aid the Saxons in case it should be necessary.

Although Maximilian had made all the arrangements for the war, and had been entrusted by the League with the chief command of the troops, he declined the immediate conduct of the war, and transferred the same, with the title of lieutenant-general, to Baron von Tilly, formerly a colonel in the imperial service, but who now entered the service of the League. A few days before he passed the Austrian frontier, there presented themselves, at the camp of Maximilian, some deputies of the Estates of Upper Austria, and made inquiry of him as to the occasion of the advance of the army of the League. He promised to answer this question by a special ambassador in Linz, and sent thither Herr von Wensin, who delivered the simple declaration that his sovereign intended to force the Upper Austrians to obedience and homage. The sending of a second deputation had no other effect, except that Maximilian, who passed the Austrian frontier on the 24th of July, hastened his march.

It had not been expected, either in Linz or in Prague, that the army of the League would advance so rapidly and without further negotiation over the frontier, and no measures had been taken to direct thither the forces at command. Not till they reached Haag, did the invading army encounter any opposition: there some thousands of peasants had barricaded the road with trees, but as they had neither experience in war nor regular weapons, they were quickly dispersed. Although but few soldiers fell in this contest, the peasants were obliged to pay dearly for their resistance; for the troops of the League behaved towards them with an inhuman fury, burning down the surrounding villages, and, in general, subjecting all to desolation by fire and sword. During the following days also this barbarian warfare was continued; so that the dwelling-houses in the vicinity of Haag and Aistenheim, for several miles around were burned down, and man and beast forced to take refuge in the neighboring forests. Nor was it the Hungarians and Poles alone, but also the newly-enlisted and well-paid troops of the League, who distinguished themselves by this rude mania for destruction; there was, however, this difference, that this cruel warfare had not the approval of the leaders of the army of the League. Indeed, when Maximilian learned, by the complaints of the Estates of Upper Austria, of the devastation caused by his troops, he ordered that the guilty be punished, some even by crucifixion, and strictly forbade the repetition of such barbarities; as a result of his stringent measures, a better discipline was introduced, and, as the news of this spread, it contributed not a little to the putting down of the insurrection.

The rapid advance of the army of the League, which, as early as the 31st of July, was at Wels, and its leader's

refusal to entertain any negotiations, taught the Estates of Upper Austria the fearful earnestness of their situation and the necessity of either throwing themselves at the Emperor's feet or defending themselves in the deadly conflict. As the courage for the latter alternative was wanting, they sent another deputation to the Duke, offering submission on condition that the political and religious liberties, which they had enjoyed under the Emperors Maximilian and Matthias, should not be abridged, and that a general amnesty should be granted them. It is clear, both from the conditions and from the demand attached to them, that they did not deem their situation as bad as it really was, for they demanded that the army of the League should immediately withdraw from Upper Austria and occupy none of its cities with garrisons. They even refused to dissolve, as was required, the "Confederation" with Bohemia, on the ground that this would subject them to disgrace; it would be sufficient, they maintained, that the Emperor should declare the Confederation as not valid. As Maximilian postponed all negotiation to the time of his arrival in Linz, the envoys declared themselves ready to surrender to him the city and castle. Thus the Upper Austrians had abandoned all resistance, and their only hope rested now upon negotiation, for which the Duke declared himself ready.

This hope, however, was destined to prove vain, as Maximilian had been instructed from Vienna to enter into no treaty. When, therefore, he arrived at Linz, he demanded from the Estates unconditional homage, and referred them to the Emperor with their prayer for a general amnesty. The Estates attempted to show that they could not conscientiously take the oath unconditionally; but they bethought themselves finally of another

form, and notified the Duke that they would render the homage provisionally, on the supposition, however, that this should not tend to the abatement of their rights and liberties. When they appeared (on the 20th of August) for this purpose, Maximilian declared that, in relation to religion, he could give them no quieting assurances; in relation to their political charters, however, he gave them such assurance, by remarking that the homage should not effect them prejudicially any more than it did the supremacy and rights of the Emperor. The alliance with Bohemia, as they no longer refused to surrender the original document of Confederation, was declared to be void.

While Maximilian was making his preparations against Upper Austria, and shrewd men perceived the danger which threatened Austria and Bohemia, the feeling of hostility to the Emperor reached, in Retz—whither the Estates of Lower Austria had finally removed their session—its extreme pitch. Although they had joined their arms with those of Bohemia, the Estates had all the time been treating with Ferdinand for a reconciliation; their demands, however, had in every instance been repulsed, and those who had remained true to the Emperor had, without regard to the others, rendered him homage. Yet, in these circumstances, the body voted, on the first of August, to break off the negotiations, elect the King of Bohemia as their "Protector," and bind themselves by an oath of allegiance to him. When the news of this action reached Vienna, there was no haste in pronouncing sentence of punishment against those who had taken part in it. Not until Maximilian had advanced from Linz into Lower Austria was the patent published by which thirty-three persons of the most respectable families of the land who had taken this oath were declared to have for-

feited property and life, and thus was inaugurated that wholesale confiscation which so sadly culminated in Bohemia.

On the 23d of August, Maximilian broke up his camp at Linz, to effect a junction with Buquoi. As he was without the boats necessary to convey his army from Linz to Krems, and thus hasten the union, he had to perform the march by land, which was rendered very difficult by the state of the roads, and it was not until the 8th of September that the armies came together. The union was not desired by the imperial general, who was jealous of the Duke, as he had heard that he had requested the Emperor to confer upon him the chief command of the entire army. Although Ferdinand had not acceded to this request, but had left Buquoi in his independent position, yet the latter perceived that in the presence of the Duke he would play but a subordinate part, and sought, therefore, to prevent the union, by advising the Duke to march by the direct way into Bohemia. By this course Anhalt would have been compelled to divide his army, and it would have been easy for Buquoi to defeat the enemy's force, reduced by half. This plan was not, however, approved at the Bavarian headquarters, and Buquoi, whether for good or for ill, was obliged to concur in the union.

This effected, the news was received that Anhalt had withdrawn to Drosendorf, and would probably not stand a battle. A council was now held as to what should be done; should they pursue the enemy, who evidently designed to retire to Moravia, and thus give up their connection with the Danube, or should they, without any reference to Anhalt, enter upon the march to Bohemia? It was possible indeed that Anhalt would follow them,

and also that he might form a junction with Bethlen, who was approaching with a considerable force, and march upon Vienna. After weighing various considerations, they determined to pay no regard to this danger, but to rely upon the garrison for the defence of Vienna, and to send Count Dampierre with a few thousand men to the Hungarian frontier to ward off Bethlen's menaced attack. We may remark here that Dampierre entered with energy upon the discharge of the duty assigned him, advanced rapidly to Presburg, assaulted the castle there on the 9th of October, and lost his life on this occasion, though the purpose was gained, as Bethlen made no attack upon Vienna, but merely sent 8,000 cavalry to the aid of the Prince of Anhalt; this detachment did not, however, join the Prince, but pursued its march directly to Bohemia, proceeding so slowly that it reached the vicinity of Prague only at the moment of the decisive battle of the White Mountain. Only, therefore, so much of the Hungarian cavalry force as Bethlen had sent on to his allies since the month of May, the entire number of which may have been also about 8,000, took any part with the Bohemians in the war.

After Maximilian had formed an agreement with Buquois in regard to their further course, and they had resolved upon the march to Bohemia, the two passed the Bohemian frontier (September 20), and advanced towards Budweis.

IV.

In Bohemia itself, towards the end of July, Counts Mansfeld and Thurn—which latter had also been ordered thither—made a successful attack upon the fortifications at Wallern, the purpose being to prevent the passing of

the re-enforcement which was advancing from Passau to join the imperial troops. At the same time the general levy was completed by new drafts, and a war council was appointed which was charged with all the affairs of the army, including the commissary and pay departments, and the fortification of several important places. The establishment of such an authority as this was a great need, but it was resorted to quite too late to serve any useful purpose. Among other members of this council were the Austrian General Hofkirchen, Erasmus von Tschernembl, and the Bohemian Caplif von Sulewic. As Tschernembl had by the power of his eloquence wielded a controlling influence in Upper Austria, and driven his countrymen to insurrection, so also in his new position he was eminently active. He advised the imposition of new taxes, the avoiding of useless expenditures, a reduction of the pay of high officers, force-loans, debasement of the coinage, and the abolition of slavery, so that the common man, attracted by a higher reward, might serve as a volunteer in the contest. These proposals formed the only anchor of hope to which the Bohemian cause could still cling; but as they—for instance, the increase of the taxes, or the abolition of slavery—had the views and rank-prejudices of the nobility to encounter, they were rejected, and the war council exerted no considerable influence, except that probably under its pressure, and in pursuance of Maximilian's example, Frederic resolved to join the army, and on the 28th of September left Prague for this purpose.

When Frederic joined the army of Anhalt, it was already at Klingenberg in Bohemia, a castle situated at the confluence of the Wottawa with the Moldau. Anhalt had reached this place by a long and circuitous march, having first set out from Drosendorf for Znaim, in order to draw

the army of the League from its stores. As the enemy did not, however, fall into this trap, Anhalt was obliged to change his direction, and himself also march to Bohemia. The number of his troops at this time cannot be definitely known. Immediately after the withdrawal from Eggenburg, the force may be placed at 30,000 men, consisting of 9,000 infantry and 3,500 cavalry, which constituted the Bohemian army proper, 4,000 Lower Austrian and 4,000 Silesian troops, 8,000 Hungarian cavalry, and some Moravian mercenaries, of which the number is not known. After retiring from Eggenburg, however, these troops had suffered great losses, so that their numbers were no longer, by any means, equal to this estimate. At Neuhaus, whither Thurn and Mansfeld had withdrawn from Wallern, Anhalt could not have received any re-enforcements, since Mansfeld had in the meantime moved to the westward to divert the accession of 7,000 troops of the League which Maximilian had ordered to Furth and Taus. The first successes which attended Maximilian and Buquoj, after they entered Bohemia, were before Wodřan and Prachatic, both of which places they took by storm. A few days later they inflicted the same fate upon Pisek, which had been seized again by the Bohemians, and which suffered now from the imperial army a terrible wasting and plundering. Instead of proceeding directly to Prague, the army was directed against Pilsen in order to force this city—through which the connection with Germany might be cut off—to capitulation. As the troops of the League and the Emperor, in their thitherward march, arrived in the vicinity of Grünberg, they obtained a sight of the Bohemian army. Side by side marched the two hostile bodies until near Pilsen, where the imperialists encamped, while the Bohemians took up their quarters chiefly about Rokytzan.

The unhappy land in which the war originated must now again suffer all its horrors. On the Bohemian side the Hungarian cavalry disgraced themselves as always by unbridled cruelty and robbery. They fell upon the Bavarian General Haslang—who, from his exposures in the war, had fallen sick of fever, and was on his way home—robbed him of all he had, even to his boots, then set him barefoot upon a horse, and brought him in this condition into the camp at Rokytzan. Frederic and Anhalt tried to comfort him in this maltreatment, and to respond to his earnest entreaty and free him from the hands of the Hungarian General Bornemissa, but could not, gladly as they would have done this, effect it, as Bornemissa would not at any price give up his prisoner, and Haslang died in a few days for want of care. The Hungarians carried on their robbery and plundering more largely than ever, nor did they confine these to the enemy. When they took prisoners they stripped them naked, as in case of the surprise of a number of Bavarian officers' wives, whom they robbed, not only of their money and ornaments, but of every garment they wore. They swept around for miles in all directions, and finally fell upon the royal manor of Zbirow, robbed the peasants of all they had, and treated in the same manner the royal farm-houses. The villages in which the Bohemian army had, since the end of September, been quartered, vanished, leaving scarcely a trace ; they were not set on fire, but all their woodwork was torn off to keep up the camp-fires. According to the contemporary account of a noble lady, the places which had been occupied as camps looked as clean as if their vicinity had been swept with a broom. Mansfeld had, before the arrival of the army on its advance from Pilsen, reduced robbery to a well-defined system ; he in succession fell upon

the estates of rich noblemen with strong detachments of troops ; for instance, those of the High Steward of the Court, William von Lobkowitz, and robbed them of all their cattle, whether these belonged to the lord or his tenants. But all his robberies, and those of the Hungarian troops in the army of Bohemia, fell quite behind the misdeeds visited upon the land by means of the imperial soldiery.

Ferdinand had repeatedly, in writing to Maximilian, requested him to spare, in his advance, the estates of Catholics, even though these might be in Protestant hands, and also in like manner to respect the property of Jews, as these had secretly declared themselves on the imperial side. In his answer the Duke defended the army of the League against all reproaches, stating that he had as far as possible rigidly dealt with all excesses. He remarked, however, that Ferdinand's warnings, if directed to his own army, would be in place, and then he proceeded to picture, in substantiation of this charge, the fearful misery which attended their march into Bohemia. "I cannot," so wrote Maximilian, "conceal from your Imperial Majesty that, notwithstanding my many well-intended admonitions, this army has spread along the line of its march robbery, plundering, fire, and the indiscriminate slaughter even of innocent Catholics of both sexes, attended with demand of ransoms from the loyal, seductions of matrons and maidens, and the most ruthless plundering of churches and monasteries, in addition to all which they have attacked, with intent to rob, my own commissary train. The common people are ruined, and driven to the extreme of desperation, and will not in many years be able to recover themselves ; and your Imperial Majesty will not, therefore, in many long years, in case of your triumph, enjoy any in-

come from this ruined and devastated kingdom. * * * * I write thus, your Imperial Majesty, because this kind of complaint comes to me from various places almost daily, and I see partly for myself how well grounded they are."

This barbarous treatment to which the native people were exposed shows how natural it was that the land should be laid waste by new insurrections of the peasantry. Bands of peasants of from 4,000 to 7,000 men thronged together in those sections where the enemy could not immediately cut them down, and did not now do this merely for defence against robbery by the soldiers, but they themselves proceeded to the aggressive. They surprised numerous castles, which they robbed and laid waste in a shocking manner. If the battle of the White Mountain had not soon made an end of the war, Bohemia would have become a complete waste. It must, furthermore, be admitted, that the chief officials of the land did not, in these fearful days, fail in either the attention or the energy needed to satisfy the demands of the Bohemian army. Several thousand loaves of bread were daily baked in Prague, and sent to the troops; the commissary department endeavored to procure the necessary corn supply, and ordered the purchase of cloth to meet the deficiency of clothing; but chiefly was their effort directed to raising the needed money by rigidly demanding the payment of the back-standing taxes and the loans which had been promised. All these provident measures came, however, quite too late to avert the impending calamity.

When the imperial army drew near to Pilsen, a messenger presented himself to Buquois from Count Mansfeld, who had withdrawn his troops into this city, seeking by direction of his master to open negotiations, as Mansfeld had made up his mind to sever his fortunes from those of

Bohemia. More than a year had passed since either he or the men enlisted by him had received any pay ; and as he could no longer doubt that the enemy would be victorious, he desired, before the fall of the Palsgrave's throne, to secure a reconciliation with the Emperor and indemnity for his losses. He demanded the payment of 400,000 florins and a full amnesty for himself, and, in return for this, offered to remain quietly in Pilsen, with the force under his command, until these conditions should have been accepted by the Emperor. Maximilian and Buquoи agreed to the proposal, and the former seems to have advanced 100,000 florins in order to assure the Count of the fulfilment of the further conditions and keep him more securely quiet.

As the imperialists were therefore obliged to leave Pilsen untouched, they determined to pursue their march to Prague. They hesitated only in regard to the route they should take. If they should take the direct road, they would come in conflict with the enemy at Rokytzan, which, however, they did not desire to do, and so decided to deceive the enemy by a feint, and reach Prague by a circuitous march. Tilly and Buquoи, therefore, took a northerly turn from Pilsen, as though they designed to establish themselves in the northern part of the country ; but scarcely had they reached Kralowic, when they turned to the east. The Prince of Anhalt, however, followed attentively these strategic movements, and so marched to meet the combined army of the Emperor and the League at Rakonic.

The situation of this city, fortified as it was after the manner of the Middle Age, as also of the surrounding country, seemed to the Prince so favorable for the defence, that he determined here to await the attack of the enemy,

and with all haste sought to fortify his position by new embankments and trenches ; nor would he indeed limit himself to the defence of this ground alone, but desired also to maintain against the advancing army of the enemy another height which lay extended before the city. Maximilian made an attempt to defeat this plan by precipitating the advance of his army upon the enemy. The attack was attended by a splendid result ; for although the Bohemians quickly re-enforced their troops, the army of the League spread such confusion among them, that a great defeat would have followed if night had not put an end to the conflict. This success so kindled the spirit of Maximilian's men, that they made an attempt, the next day, to force the enemy to a battle ; in some sections of the Bohemian army, on the contrary, the declining courage was at so low an ebb, that a cavalry troop of two hundred and fifty men fled before eighteen mounted Bavarians. Frederic was himself despondent, and sent a messenger to Prague to summon his wife to flight. Naught but the opposition of the chief officials, who would not consent to this, and the spirit of Elizabeth herself, who indignantly disregarded her husband's counsel, prevented its becoming known in Prague how desperate was the situation.

Nevertheless neither the troops of the League nor the imperialists succeeded in forcing the Prince of Anhalt from his position at Rakonic. The first attempt which promised any considerable success was that made by Tilly on the 30th of October, which might have been successful, if Buquoi had not been too late with his support. Indeed the two commanders succeeded, in the following night, in bringing their troops up near the camp of the enemy and throwing up the necessary embankments ; and thus protected, they held the enemy besieged in the open

field. As they did not even yet gain their end, they determined to turn aside, and, evading the enemy by taking a new route, to continue their march to Prague. But provisions failed, and they had to await the arrival of the commissary train. They occupied their forced leisure, on the imperial side, in calling out words of derision, such as heretics, rebels, peasants, comic actors, which were flung during the whole day across the interval which separated the armies. The Bohemians did not remain in their debt, but branded the imperialists as papists, robbers, incendiaries—to which they added one special designation for the Bavarians, calling them swine, a name which was at that time frequently applied to that people. The Homeric derisive laugh, with which both sides responded to the words of contempt, showed considerable taste for this kind of warfare. It was in these days also that the Duke of Bavaria received from a wag, whom he asked his opinion as to the issue of the war, the reply, that it would probably be, as in the game of cards, the sow (so the ace was then called) would trump the king. The wag took this rough way of indicating that the Bavarian Duke would bear off the victory over King Frederic.

Meanwhile, Tilly, notwithstanding the decision already made, attempted again to force the enemy from his position. To this end he attacked a cemetery situated near Rakonic, occupied by a small Bohemian garrison, which he succeeded in dislodging. On the contrary, Buquoi failed in an attack upon that part of the enemy's camp which was occupied by the Hungarians. The repulse of Buquoi so raised the sunken courage of the Bohemian army, that Anhalt desired to make an attempt to recapture the cemetery; but the position of the troops of the League was so strong that he was obliged to give it up. On the 3d of

November the imperial commanders attempted a cannonade, as they had as yet won no special success, and later, on the same day, the long-wished-for commissary train arrived, and they prepared to resume the march to Prague. Buquoi was desirous, on the following night, to make still one last attempt to force the Hungarians from their position; he was, however, defeated in this undertaking by an inundation, which was effected by opening the sluices of a pond. On the next day he was wounded by a shot in the groin, so that he was long unable to sit on his horse, and could follow the army only in a carriage. Without further delay the imperial troops set out upon their march on the 5th of November.

CHAPTER VI.


THE BATTLE OF THE WHITE MOUNTAIN, AND ITS CONSEQUENCES.

- I. The Battle of the White Mountain and the Flight of Frederic and his Adherents. II. Use made of the Victory by the Victors. III. Submission of Moravia, Lusatia, and Silesia. IV. Criminal Proceedings in Bohemia, Moravia, and Austria, and the Beginning of Reactionary Reformatory Measures.

I.

WHEN the withdrawal of the enemy was observed in the Bohemian camp, Anhalt correctly suspected that they had set out for Prague; towards evening spies confirmed his suspicion, and he moved rapidly forward in order to reach the capital in advance of them. At Unhošt, ten miles from Prague, the two armies came in sight of each other, and perhaps a battle would have ensued if Anhalt had not still further quickened his march. He reached, in the night of the 7th to the 8th of November, the White Mountain, three miles from Prague, and determined to prepare for the coming attack by constructing two redoubts, and placing his few cannon in them. The Hungarian cavalry remained in the village of Rusin at the foot of the White Mountain, and were there surprised by a rapidly advancing regiment of imperial horse, and put to flight. This surprise gave sign of the growing indecision, not to say despondency, in the Bohemian army, for although Rusin was but a few hundred yards distant

the
Bohemian



from the White Mountain, there was no attempt made to come to the aid of the assaulted Hungarians.

The next day the troops of the League and those of the Emperor came up—the former being the advance, the latter the rear guard. Tilly was decided to risk a battle; and to this end advanced rapidly over the brook which runs along the foot of the White Mountain, and there exposed himself to an attack to the advantage of the enemy. But the Prince of Anhalt and his troops had no thought of making an attack, and the imperial troops could, therefore, march on at pleasure, place themselves on the right of those of the League, and gradually advance to the foot of the mountain. Before the beginning of the battle, Maximilian, Tilly, and Buquoi, with several of the more prominent colonels, held a council in regard to the plan of attack. Maximilian and Tilly favored an immediate action, while Buquoi desired to avoid this, and proposed to pass to the enemy's right and advance by way of the valley of Košířer to Prague. If this plan had been adopted, it might have had the most unfortunate result; for if the Bohemian army had retired to Prague, a successful attack upon it and upon the city itself would have been next to impossible; at least long preparations for this would have been required. It was doubtless an effect of Buquoi's wound, received at Rakonic, that his judgment was for the moment clouded and his usual sagacity blunted. His view was opposed, not only by Tilly, but by Lieutenant-Colonel Lamotte, who had just made a reconnaissance, and found the enemy's position not specially strong. Both rejected the plan of a march to Prague, insisting that they must immediately attack, or else retreat. Colonel Spinelli, who took part in the council, suggested the middle course, of a partial attack, or a kind of skirmish-

ing, during which further conclusions might be formed. They had as yet, however, come to no fixed determination when, according to a report of Dr. Angelini, one of the companions of the Carmelite monk, Father Dominicus—who, in the character of a kind of general army chaplain, had attached himself to the Duke of Bavaria, and was held by the latter in great veneration—came forward and exhorted those present to risk a battle, relying on the divine protection. His words found the better appreciation, as Buquoi alone dissented, and it was resolved to advance to the attack. Tilly commanded the troops of the League; Colonel Tiefenbach the imperials. Buquoi, on account of his wound, remained at the foot of the mountain in company with the Duke of Bavaria, who also took no part in the conflict which followed.

The two armies were perhaps nearly equal in numbers. The troops of the League had been reduced by sickness to about 12,000, while those of the Emperor scarcely numbered 15,000. The Bohemian force may have been nearly as large, but the great moral difference between the two armies—the one consisting of well-fed and punctually paid soldiers, inspired for the contest; the other, of men put out of humor by their privations, and constantly excited to mutiny—made their strength really quite unequal.

The battle began about noon, of Sunday, November the 8th, and was opened by an attack of the imperial cavalry upon the regiment of Count Thurn, which was placed on the extreme left wing of the Bohemian army. The imperialists were forced back, and as the young Prince of Anhalt, at the same time, at the head of a regiment of horse, made a bold sally, and not only caused the imperial cavalry to give way, but threw two infantry regiments into

disorder, appearances were as if the Bohemians might win the day. When Buquoi heard of this success of the young Anhalt, he was so excited that, in spite of the pain of his wound, he mounted a palfrey that he might by his presence encourage the men to hold out in the fight. He was, however, soon relieved by the news that the assailants had been driven back by the aid of the soldiers of the League. These latter now attacked the enemy's right wing—were, indeed, thrown into some disorder by the cannon of one of the redoubts, but Tilly's rapid and decided action renewed their spirit, and they forced the foe to yield. In this encounter a Moravian regiment of infantry most distinguished itself; but, as it was left unsupported, became involved in the general defeat. Soon the two redoubts with all their cannon were in the hands of the victors, and the Bohemian army, not in retreat simply, but in disorderly flight. It was in vain that several colonels threw themselves before the flying men and attempted to press them to another stand; a panic had spread throughout the whole army and carried all with it. The Hungarian auxiliaries behaved worst; for while the rest of the army did at least meet the enemy's attack, and single sections distinguished themselves, these took no part whatever in the conflict, but rode off with hanging reins as soon as they observed the repulse of the van. The Duke of Weimar, who commanded a regiment as colonel, attempted in vain to arrest their flight, and to awaken their ambition by pointing to his own flying countrymen, and exclaiming that to-day he desired to be no German, but a Hungarian. He was forced, however, but too soon to yield to the conviction that he could win no honor in connection with this new soldiery. All the spirit which they had maintained in a hundred minor engagements was

dissipated, and they fled in the direction which seemed to promise best for their escape—not, therefore, towards the city, but over the slopes of the White Mountain to the Moldau, which they attempted to pass by a dam, in which attempt about a thousand of their number are supposed to have found their death in the stream.

Thus, in the course of scarcely an hour, the victory of the imperial cause was achieved, and the authority of the Emperor established anew in Bohemia. In regard to the number who fell, we are not informed with exactness. The number on the Bohemian side was stated at 5,000, but may have been less, at least an authentic report assures us that but 1,600 bodies were found upon the battle-field; if to these be added the thousand Hungarians supposed to have perished in the attempt to cross the Moldau, it will raise the entire number to 2,600, which, in view of the short duration of the fight, seems more reasonable than a larger number. On the side of the victors the number of the killed is given at 250. Among the higher officers, the imperialist Colonel Verdugo specially distinguished himself by his bravery and his persistent pursuit of the enemy after the battle. He boasted that he had on this day placed again on the head of the Emperor the crown of Bohemia. Ferdinand afterwards rewarded him with a present of 30,000 florins and several estates in Bohemia.

The Palsgrave took no part in the battle. He had on the day before separated himself from the army, and had hastened to the palace, that he might rest more quietly than would have been possible among the troops in a hastily-prepared camp. On the following morning he was informed, by the Prince of Anhalt, that a battle was imminent, which information was accompanied

with a request that he hasten to the battle-field, that his presence might enliven the spirit of the troops. Notwithstanding this, he thought he might yet have time to entertain the two English ambassadors then in Prague, and have an interview with them. Their meal was just over when he received the news that the foe was advancing and the contest beginning. Willing to wait no longer, he had his horse brought, and, attended by a mounted company, set out for the White Mountain. He had scarcely, however, reached the walls of the redoubt, at the Reichsthor, when, to his astonishment, he caught sight of bands of his own troops in flight, and among these Anhalt, Thurn, and Hohenloe, which made clear, without the aid of words, the fortunes of the day. He was witness how vainly Anhalt labored to arrest the flight of the troops, while none listened to him, and all was in motion from the Hradschin over the Moldau bridge to what is called the Old City, and lies upon the right bank of the river. He, too, after hastening to the palace to be joined by his wife, must follow the example of flight. After having quartered themselves in a house in the Old City, he counselled with Anhalt, Thurn, Hohenloe, and the other officers, and with the War Council, as to whether he should remain in the city or leave it at once. Among those present, Tschernembl advised further resistance, and called attention to the perilous consequences which might follow a hasty flight. The remains of the war supplies, as well as all the treasures, which might be in the palace, would, by flight, be abandoned, and the country's power of resistance would receive its death-blow unless they should hold out a few days at least, collect the scattered army, and enter upon an orderly retreat; nay, he even proposed a surprise of the enemy that night, and reminded the disheartened company of the

victory which the Hussites had won at Prague over the crusading army of Sigismund of many times their number. The younger Thurn fell in with Tschernembl's advice. He maintained that the city, under all the circumstances, must be defended, which view was supported also by the petitions of the citizens of Prague, who had in the meantime found access to them, and who offered a subsidy. These representations could be deemed worthy of regard, however, only on the supposition that the demoralization was not already too widespread among the soldiers. It was this last fact, however, which specially moved Anhalt to declare against the defence of Prague. He charged that the soldiers had, from sheer cowardice, thrown away their weapons and in order to be in a condition to treat with the enemy. He maintained that the citizens were entirely disinclined to a defence, and that there existed between them and the soldiers a hatred which might lead to bloody collisions, by which the life of the King would be imperilled. The elder Count Thurn agreed with this opinion.

Although Frederic was inclined to flight, yet he made no utterance of this inclination, but sent for the English ambassadors that he might receive their advice. They both advised entering into negotiations, for which they offered their services. Their offer was seized with haste, and the same evening the ambassadors addressed a communication to the Duke of Bavaria and Buquoi, in which they requested a free escort, on the ground that they had important statements to make. As several hours passed and no answer was received, they drew up a second paper, and sent it early in the morning.

When at break of day the generals came again to the King, the despondency seemed to have departed with the

shades of night. The English ambassadors were assured that the King would remain, and only send away his wife with their youngest child. It was now nine o'clock, and as yet no answer had come from Maximilian; it was therefore determined to hasten the Queen's departure, and the travelling-carriage was ordered to be in readiness. Now, however, the King lost the decision which he had kept up but for the sake of the appearance. When Elizabeth ascended the carriage with her son in her arms, he could no longer control himself, but mounted his horse, and thus gave the signal for a general flight. All his high officers, his counsellors, and even some of the most prominent of the Bohemian officials, joined him, forming a line which extended further than the sight could take in, the sad procession moving towards the gate of the city. For besides the refugees, who were all mounted, there followed the carriage of the Queen numerous luggage-wagons containing a part of their household goods; and as the other refugees felt the same needs, the line of wagons grew longer from moment to moment. They had intended to take with them the crown; but as they feared that the citizens of the Old City would oppose this, they abandoned the thought. An escort of a few hundred mounted men accompanied as a guard this train, of which no one knew the destination. Frederic took leave briefly of the citizens, whose eyes followed him in sadness. The High Chancellor, Herr von Ruppa, who could not bring himself to confess that he too would seek his safety in flight, resorted to the evasion that he and the other officials would accompany the King but a short distance as an escort, and then return.

Of all who left the city at this time but a single one returned, and that was the younger Count Thurn, who, in

a half hour, hastened back, that he might defend the bridge at Prague against the passage of the enemy, and thus secure the escape of the King and Queen. It required indeed the encouraging words and efforts of a man who was respected to bring the soldiers to renew their resistance and enter upon an orderly retreat. It became evident, however, that Thurn could neither defend the bridge nor persuade the soldiers to remain at their standards, for the half of the army was in disorderly flight and following the example of their leaders, while the other half remained indeed in Prague—not, however, to fight, but to demand the pay due them. Every trace of discipline had vanished, every word was a curse upon the King and the Estates. With such people defence was not to be thought of—and, in fact, no one thought of it any longer; it was, therefore, quite impossible for the young Count in this way to effect his purpose.

II.

Buquoi as well as Maximilian had sent the Emperor intelligence of the victory gained; but the report of Maximilian was probably lost on the way, and that of Buquoi, on account of the dangers to be passed, did not reach Vienna until the 23d of November. There was great joy over the brilliant success, and this was still further increased when, a few days later, a box reached Vienna containing the booty which the battle had brought to the Emperor. It consisted of the documents, including the Royal Charter which conceded to the land its liberties; he had now in his hands, and could destroy, the only sensible evidences of his obligation, and thus, bound by no statutes, could control at will the future destinies of the land. It is reported

that the Emperor tore the seal from the Royal Charter, and then cut it through the middle. We are unable to state whether this is so or not, but, as a matter of fact, the original of the Royal Charter has been preserved to the present day only in this damaged condition.

The high officers of the army the Emperor rewarded in that lavish manner which appears in the case of Verdugo. Count Buquoi, who already, in the beginning of the year 1620, had been presented with landed estates in Southern Bohemia, received on this occasion his only mark of distinction in the person of his brother-in-law, Count Biglia, the bearer of the news of the victory. While the Emperor showed his gratitude to his adherents, he did not omit to praise God for the victory. On the day after the receipt of the news, he took part with his court in a procession, under the direction of Cardinal Dietrichstein, which proceeded from the Church of St. Augustine to St. Stephen's Cathedral, and was there closed by an address from the Cardinal appropriate to the occasion. Similar festivities took place in the other churches of Vienna, and the preachers did not weary with repeating that the Emperor's victory was gained on the day when the gospel read contained the words: "Render unto Cæsar the things which are Cæsar's, and unto God things which are God's."* The opportunity was one for assaults and thrusts directed against the Protestants, and was, with more or less of asperity, thus employed. The sharpest words of this kind came from the Capuchin friar, Father Sabinus, whose talent for public speaking had won for him such a renown that the Emperor himself was present at his sermon. After the father

* Gebet dem Kaiser, was des Kaisers ist, und Gott, was Gottes ist.

had arrayed before him all the indignities which he had been compelled to suffer from the Bohemians, he passed on to the duty which the victory laid upon him. He should proceed according to the Psalmist's words : "Thou shalt break them with a rod of iron ; thou shalt dash them to pieces like a potter's vessel." It was his duty to put down the rebels of high position, so that they might never again raise their heads ; he should take from the people all their liberties and annihilate the Royal Charter : then he would reign over true and obedient subjects. If, on the contrary, he should use mildness, there would come upon him greater calamities than those which he had just surmounted. The moment was grave; the Emperor should act with determination, or the threatening pronounced by the prophet against Ahab—"Because thou hast set free one that was condemned to death, thou and thy people shall be his slaves"—would be fulfilled in him ! These words fell on fruitful soil, and, without knowing it, Sabinus developed the future programme of the government.

Although the acquisition of the land for Ferdinand was not fully accomplished by the battle of the White Mountain, this, nevertheless, contributed to a decision in his favor. The causes of this defeat, and the grounds of the failure of the Bohemian commonwealth, appear in the above narrative, from which it is clear that the financial stress was first among the causes of the failure. What service could be expected from an army which for a whole year was in a constant state of mutiny, and which turned its weapons, not against the foe, but against its very home ! Much of the fault of the bad condition of the finances must be shared between the Directory and the royal government which followed, neither of which used

properly the means at hand, and the Estates, which showed too little readiness to make sacrifices for the cause. It must, however, be admitted that the demands made upon Bohemia in the year 1620, after a war of two years, were out of proportion to the income of the land. Aside from the war forces which Ferdinand, with the aid of the lands subject to him, together with that of the Pope and the King of Poland, could place in the field, he had the troops of the Princes of the League, who were rich and had not as yet been pressed by the burdens of war, and the armies of Philip III., supported by the treasures of America, on his side. How could Bohemia sustain so unequal a struggle with but a half-support from her auxiliary lands and her other allies seeking her aid and bringing little in return! In the year 1620, when Ferdinand had all his allies at his bidding, there was, therefore, no longer any possible rescue for the Bohemians; though perhaps they might have been victorious in the year 1619, when the Emperor was not yet fully supported, if they had only had at their head a man who combined the talents of the warrior and statesman, and could have brought his allies to quick and effective decisions. But as there was no one in Bohemia to take as dictator the administration in hand, so there was no provision for a military organization which might have spared that perpetual running back and forth between the camp and Prague; nor was there any one strenuously and unyieldingly to urge to duty, and consequently the most fearful disorder reigned and prepared the way for the future defeat.

The victors did not, on the day of the battle, reap the fruits of their victory, and as they had no apprehension of the dissolution of the hostile army, they allowed themselves to be deterred from an immediate attack upon the

city by the firing of some cannon from the redoubts by stragglers, and encamped at a suitable distance. In the night, however, Buquoi's regiment of Walloons made a successful attempt to break through the fortifications at a point where a prison had been built in the city walls. When Buquoi, who, with Duke Maximilian, passed the night in the Sternschloss,* received notice of this, he ordered Colonel Verdugo to prevent, by all means, the soldiers from entering the city, as he desired to protect it against being plundered. The Duke of Bavaria issued also a similar order, and directed, in connection with Buquoi, that two regiments advance and take possession of the city gate. In order that the entry might be regulated by an understanding with the city authorities, a captain was sent with a drummer to the Kleinseite,† to call the Burgermaster and some of the council together, to open the appropriate negotiations. To the slow-pacing bearer of the flag of truce the city seemed as a city of the dead ; there was no business in the streets, no bustle in the houses ; all labor had ceased. Along the way from the walls of the redoubt to the Council-house, which is nearly a mile and a half, the captain met but one or two human beings at the doors of the houses, or espied here and there a timid and curious face watching at a window. Horror at the fearful defeat, and concern for the coming events, had produced this paralyzing effect.

* The word is left untranslated, as being, in a sense, a proper noun ; it means, however, Star-castle, and the building is so named from its shape. It was once a royal pleasure-castle, but has been turned into a powder-magazine. The large wooded park around it received from the castle the name, "Der Stern," the Star.—TR.

† The name, signifying Small-side, of one of the districts of Prague, lying on the left bank of the Moldau.—TR.

While Maximilian and Buquoi were making these arrangements, the representatives of the several districts of Prague and the Estates, so far as they were then present in the city, assembled and agreed to send a deputation to greet the victors and signify their submission. The people of the Kleinseite were first in carrying out this decision; they sent a paper to Maximilian, in which they assured him of their joy at his victory and his presence. Somewhat later came to him a paper from the Estates, in which indeed there was no hint of further resistance, but still an armistice of three days was requested. His answer was a rejection in few words; he declared to the Estates that he should not grant them three hours; that it became them, without delay and without conditions, to submit.

In the course of the forenoon the victors had taken the Reichsthorr and the redoubts near it, so that there was nothing in their way, and Buquoi, as early as eleven o'clock in the morning, made his formal entry into the city, and Maximilian followed at one o'clock in the afternoon. The soldiers rushed upon the full-packed wagons which stood in the court of the palace, and which the Palsgrave had not been able to save, as also into the unoccupied apartments, and seized, together with the royal wardrobe which had been left behind, and numerous articles of gold and silver, a part of the secret chancery records, by which the Emperor learned of all the transactions which for years had been working his injury. The same afternoon a deputation of the Estates, headed by the High Steward, William von Lobkowitz, presented themselves to the Duke; and handed him a writing in which the conditions were stated, in detail, under which they were willing again to acknowledge the Emperor as

their sovereign. They desired the preservation of their religious and political liberties and the security of their persons from punishment and their property from confiscation. Maximilian did not conceal from the deputation that the Emperor demanded an unconditional submission, and yet he promised that he would intercede for them. He felt, however, that he could even then give them the assurance that their lives would be spared. The Emperor afterwards paid no attention to this promise, and Buquoi, who was present during the audience, appeared to foresee this, for he protested against it, and observed that the Estates had, as a body and individually, deserved death. The members of the deputation received the declarations in silence, while tears ran down their cheeks. This was the only answer vouchsafed at all to the vanquished.

After the Old and New City had declared their readiness to submit, and Maximilian had caused parts of his own and the imperial troops to advance over the bridge, there arose a question in his mind as to what should be done with the soldiers then tarrying in the city. A deputation from these had applied, in their behalf, for the payment of their dues and leave of free exit from the city. Maximilian would neither pay these mercenaries thus deserted by their leaders, nor make prisoners of them, because this latter course would burden him with their care, and he desired only that they should disperse to their homes. He therefore sent word to the collected soldiers that proceedings against them as rebels against the Emperor's majesty ought really to be strictly instituted, but that he would grant them a pardon and leave of free withdrawal on condition that they should leave Prague instantly. As nothing was said of payment, the men did not feel at all satisfied with the proffered grace, and de-

manded at least immunity from punishment in case they should seize their pay from the property of the Estates. This demand, justified indeed by the stress, could not be granted, since it would be equivalent to the issue of a permission to rob the whole nobility of the country. Maximilian's messenger therefore threatened them that, in case they did not peacefully withdraw from the city, force would be used against them ; and in this way he gained, with the disheartened masses, his end. The most of them left Prague on the following day ; only a small number remained behind, seeking to conceal themselves with acquaintances and relatives : but these were mostly killed during the following days.

In all their negotiations the citizens demanded the sparing of their property, and a certain promise had indeed been given them ; but of the keeping of the promise no traces could be found. Maximilian sought, to be sure, to maintain order among his troops ; but, in spite of this, many of his own men perhaps took part in the scenes of robbery which followed. In the imperial army spread, during the days succeeding the battle, greater disorder than ever, which Buquoi was unable to control, as his wound confined him mostly to his bed. There was, moreover, a more favorable opportunity for plunder than ever before. Aside from the fact that the men of position who had fled with Frederic were obliged to leave behind them in their mansions their valuable effects, and that the people had put away for safe-keeping in their houses the last remains of their goods, there had been brought in, at the end of the preceding month, from all the surrounding parts then menaced by the enemy, numerous herds of cattle and thousands of vehicles laden with specie, ornaments, clothing, and implements, which could not be stored,

but must remain in the open air. The soldiers needed, therefore, only to look around them in order to become possessed of objects of value. The greed of the plunderers was not, however, long satisfied with the articles which had been placed in the streets and courts; they forced their way, without fear or opposition, into all houses and palaces, and stripped these in succession. It was of no avail to William von Lobkowitz that he kept a part of his treasures in the Jews' quarter; they were spied out, and seventeen boxes of gold and silver articles became a prey to the victors. Then again they resumed their robberies on the open streets, and seized the people's clothes even from their bodies. There was not the least respect paid to the vanquished; entreaties and prayers, instead of pity, called forth derisive laughter; they were not content with simply robbing, but inflicted all sorts of abuse upon the victims of their robbery. A Frenchman was so shameless as to sit naked upon a horse with his face backwards, holding the horse's tail in his hand, and attended by three fiddlers, to proceed through the city, uttering against the Palsgrave and his wife, as also against the Bohemian people, smutty words of derision.

Maximilian of Bavaria was informed of these facts, and did not rest contented until he had written the imperial general a letter of rebuke, calling upon him to stop these atrocious vexations. He repeated to the Emperor, also, the counsel several times already given, to maintain order and not to yield the property of his subjects a prize to the rapacity of his army. The misery—for thus he closed his letter—was in Bohemia so frightful, that in the end even the friends of the Emperor must be driven by it to desperation.

III.

While, in Bohemia, the battle of the White Mountain had put an end to the insurrection, it was not quite certain that the other lands would lay down their arms. Count Thurn, after he had separated from Frederic, hastened to Moravia, and attempted to encourage the Estates there to further resistance. Similar persuasions were used by Bethlen, who also added the threat, that, in case they submitted to the Emperor, he would himself take vengeance upon them. But in spite of these exhortations and menaces, the Estates looked upon the cause of the insurrection as lost, and resolved to elect a deputation to offer to the Emperor their submission, with the stipulation that he would relieve this by granting to them the conditions which the Austrians and Bohemians had sought in vain. Before the Estates had proceeded to elect the deputation, the imperialists had forced their way into Moravia, and entered the houses in their accustomed way. Dark as was the prospect that the desired terms would be granted, none had the spirit for further resistance, and even the chief executive of the country, Welen von Žerotín, who had in Moravia assumed the position of a Thurn and a Ruppa, offered his submission.


The members of the deputation, who had in the meantime been chosen, set out for Vienna; but, in spite of the free escort furnished them, were surprised and robbed by a few hundred Poles and Walloons, and so they had no choice but to return and provide themselves anew with clothing and money. On the 22d of December they started again, and this time reached Vienna without further peril. The Estates had instructed them to greet the Emperor with the profoundest reverence; to wish

him victory in his further contest with his enemies, and to assure him of their infinite regret that the insurrection had occurred. They were to beseech him to follow the divine example of pardoning the guilt of penitent sinners of pure grace, and not to consider so much their recent misdeeds as the services which they had in earlier times rendered to his ancestors; to forgive them all, and assure them that their political and religious liberties should be preserved.

When the envoys were admitted to an audience with the Emperor, the latter appeared, with austere bearing, attended by the Chancellor, and deigned not a word in answer to their entreating address. In his behalf the Chancellor spoke, pouring forth violent reproaches against the Estates of Moravia for participating in the insurrection, by which course their representatives, now present, had rendered themselves unworthy to be admitted to the Emperor's presence. A few days later they received a written reply, in which there was not a word in reference to pardon, and not a promise; it was simply a statement that Cardinal Dietrichstein had been appointed Viceroy in Moravia. This was, however, followed by a second paper repeating the Chancellor's declaration that the Emperor really ought not to have allowed the deputation to come into his presence, and had done so of his infinite kindness only. The paper informed them that the Cardinal would institute an investigation directed against those who had taken part in the insurrection, and would then proceed in each case according to desert, punishing the guilty and protecting the innocent. The imperial government now endeavored to bring about a disbanding of the Moravian troops, and were in this successful; two Moravian regiments entered under the command of their



i. The



colonels into the imperial service, while the remainder, to which a portion of the amount due them was paid, may, after they were disbanded, have been distributed mostly among the imperial regiments.

The subjugation of Lusatia and Silesia was effected with equal ease.

We have related above the transactions which were had between the Elector of Saxony and Maximilian, in regard to the execution of the plan of the campaign, and stated that the former did not fall in with his ally's views. As Maximilian would not however yield, John George delayed in executing the part committed to him until he should have received trustworthy intelligence of the success of the army of the League. At the end of August there came abundant news to this effect, and he determined to advance against Lusatia. The Silesians and Lusatians united their forces for defence against this attack, and placed them under the command of the Margrave of Jägerndorf. Before his invasion of the land, John George sent an envoy to the Estates of Lower Lusatia admonishing them to submission. As his admonition was fruitless, he advanced, on the 13th of September, against Bautzen, and, after a siege of some weeks, forced the place, on the 5th of October, to a capitulation. In consequence of his invasion of the country and of unfavorable news received at the same time from Bohemia, some of the nobility of Lower Lusatia announced, before the end of September, that they were ready to submit. The Margrave of Jägerndorf labored in vain to move the Estates to persistence. The example of Lower was followed by Upper Lusatia. On the 13th of January, 1621, the Estates of this Margraviate declared their readiness to submit, if their political and re-

ligious liberties could be secured to them. The Elector of Saxony was ready to concur in their wishes, and did not therefore employ the language of Maximilian, nor was he willing to impair their freedom, and especially as pertaining to religion, and so accepted the conditions which they offered. The Emperor blamed indeed this compliance, but John George insisted upon holding to the stipulated conditions, and Ferdinand yielded.

In Silesia matters did not shape themselves so rapidly, although less blood was shed than in Lusatia. Frederic of the Palatinate, after his flight from Prague, had taken refuge in Breslau, where he sought to persuade the Estates to further resistance. There was here also a want of decision, because the Elected King's lamentable condition was so apparent, and he felt himself so insecure, that, on the 23d of December, he fled for safety—having sent his wife and children on before him—into the territory of the Elector of Brandenburg. The Silesian Estates now entered with Saxony into measures of reconciliation with the Emperor, and for this purpose sent an embassy to Dresden, which reached that city in the last days of January, and offered submission on the condition that, in addition to a general amnesty, all their political and religious liberties, including the right of election on the part of the Estates in case of the filling of the royal throne, should be preserved. The Elector offered them pardon and security of their political and religious liberties; he was silent in regard to the right of election. He demanded, in return, that they should pay to the Emperor, as their first tax, 500,000 florins, which sum was to be deemed at the same time an atonement for the crime they had committed. These proffers were reported at the Diet called to meet at Liegnitz, in the beginning of February, 1621, and as

the Estates thought they could obtain nothing better than what was offered, they were content to accept it. They asked only a diminution of the tax imposed ; to which the Elector yielded, and fixed the amount at 300,000 florins. On the 28th of February the Elector subscribed the treaty which he had concluded with the Silesian Estates, and which was afterwards known under the name of the "Accord." In this it was expressly declared that the Estates of Silesia "have accepted the Emperor as their legally elected, crowned, and anointed King, Lord, and supreme Duke in Silesia." How it happened that in this Accord the elected King was mentioned and the elective right acknowledged, we are unable to state.

When Ferdinand was informed that the Silesian Estates had declared their readiness to open negotiations, he desired, as he had done in relation to Lusatia, that the Elector should make no promises, but should first insist upon the renewal of the homage ; nay, he even demanded that he should promise no general pardon, but reserve for him the control of the lives and estates of the ringleaders of the movement in Silesia. If the Elector had yielded to this wish, Silesia would have suffered the fate of Austria and Moravia ; but John George would not deal with more severity than in the case of Lusatia, and carried on the negotiations in the sense of the Accord which was afterwards concluded. The Emperor deemed himself defrauded, and again demanded a severe proceeding against Silesia. The imperial letter relating to this subject reached Dresden on the 27th of February, that is, one day before the Accord was executed. But even now the Elector would not act with the required severity, but requested the Emperor to confirm the Accord, and explained, at length, the motives which had induced him to deal so gently, all

of which amounted to little more than this: that he was unwilling to drive the people to desperation or abandon the land to the devastations of the war which might follow.

When the news was received in Vienna that the Accord was concluded, and the Emperor had learned its tenor, he found that the Elector had not only attached no importance to his admonitions, but had even allowed some concessions to find their way into it, which involved great perils for the future. In fact, the matter had its hazardous aspect, if the Elector made himself the guarantor of the Accord and promised to protect the Estates in the defence of their religious liberties—if, further, the elective right of the Estates was acknowledged, as also their right conceded to maintain an army of their own. The Emperor, therefore, sent a new dispatch to Dresden, in which he distinctly indicated the points to which he would not give his assent. Nor was the Elector moved by these objections, but took it hard that the Emperor found fault with the Accord, which he proceeded to defend point by point. In speaking of the "elected" King, he had not meant to enter into the contested question of election or hereditary right, or to take sides, but merely to indicate that he had obligated the Silesian Estates to acknowledge Ferdinand's rights as a sovereign as they arose in the year 1617. If the elevation of Ferdinand at that time took place on the ground of hereditary right, this right was still valid in his case, and he need not stumble on the term "elected." To Ferdinand's concern about the Silesians' being allowed in future to raise troops, the Elector did not give a clear answer, but merely remarked that the troops to be maintained by them were expressly stipulated to be for the defence of the country and the rights of

the sovereign. In conclusion, he demanded that the Accord be confirmed without further limitation. Although this reply did not dissipate the Emperor's anxieties, yet he lacked the decision to persist in his objections, and so approved the Accord as to its entire contents and wording. In addition to this, he also confirmed a series of privileges, specially mentioned, and in this way satisfied every reasonable desire. The Silesian Estates were granted an amnesty, as had been done in case of the Lusatians, for their offences, and none were to be harmed as to their property, excepting only the Margrave of Jägerndorf, whom the Emperor would not pardon, and who therefore lost his principality; besides him a few Lusatian noblemen were subjected to pecuniary fines.

IV.

The determination with which the government in Vienna, in subduing the insurrection, persisted in its demand that the Estates of the several lands should declare their unconditional submission, indicated quite clearly that the favorable opportunity would be employed for the introduction of radical changes in the matters of religion and politics. As the several countries progressed in their return to loyalty, counsel was taken as to the reforms to be brought in, and this counsel was first applied to Bohemia, then to Moravia, and finally to Silesia.

The opinion of the imperial counsellors who were consulted in regard to Bohemia was, that a change should be made in that paragraph of the laws of the land which provided for the election of the King, so as to make the crown strictly hereditary; that, furthermore, all the charters conceding privileges to the people should be revised,

and only those parts confirmed which did not clash with the royal authority. The Bohemian Brethren and the Calvinists were to be banished at once, while a little more toleration was to be exercised towards the other Protestants—still, however, keeping their suppression in view. Most rigorous, however, was the advice in relation to the manner in which vengeance should be applied to the property of the vanquished, for it advised the most sweeping confiscations. Even before the decisive battle, Slawata had recommended to the Emperor the confiscation of the property of the insurgents.

The question now was, who were to be deemed participants in the insurrection, and how the punishment was to be dealt out according to the greater and less degrees of guilt. The opinion handed in to the Emperor divided the offenders into three classes. The *first* embraced the prominent insurgents, who were to lose their entire property, and many of them also were to suffer the loss of either life or liberty. In the *second* class were reckoned all those who had held official positions before the rebellion, and afterwards connected themselves with it, or who had in general entered the service of the Palsgrave, all of which class should lose half their property. The *third* class included those who had simply joined the rebellion; for which they were to be punished with certain diminutions of property rights, as the change of freeholds into feudal tenures, or the imposition of an annual rent. The Emperor approved this opinion; but as its adoption would violate the promises which Duke Maximilian had made, according to which the right of property was to remain for the most part unassailed, it was deemed best to seek his concurrence before carrying out the recommendations, and for this purpose Count Hohenzollern was sent to him.

The Duke raised no special objections to the statements made him ; and so, without further delay, proceedings were inaugurated against the chief abettors of the rebellion, which step was then to be followed up by the above-indicated measures against the other classes.

Maximilian had, before his departure, appointed the Prince of Liechtenstein as his proxy, whom also the Emperor afterwards made Regent of Bohemia, and repeatedly signified to him that he should apprehend those whose guilt was most aggravated. He did not, however, for fear that the insurrection would break out anew, enter upon the course thus indicated, and when it is taken into consideration that Mansfeld, on the ground that the Emperor had broken the agreement made with him, still occupied with his garrisons several places in Bohemia, the reasons of this fear will readily be conceived. The reader will remember how he opened negotiations with the Duke of Bavaria and with Buquoï when they were encamped before Pilsen and the Bohemian army was at Rokytzan, and how he there betrayed the cause of Bohemia on the promise of a sum of money. The willingness shown on the imperial side in making the promise ceased when it came to payment, and Liechtenstein hoped to realize the fruits of the victory of the White Mountain against Mansfeld also ; but the latter, when he found that there was no disposition to keep the promise made him, sought not only to strengthen his position in Pilsen, but also, by new enlistments, to increase his army and to procure, by plundering numerous places in Western Bohemia, the needed supply of money. At the same time he placed himself at the service of the Palsgrave whom he had just betrayed, and went personally to Heilbronn, where the Diet of the Union was assembled, and asked

for a subsidy. He received in Heilbronn only promises; but the Palsgrave gladly accepted his offer, drew in his favor on Nuremberg for 30,000 florins, and promised him further remittances. As the bold partisan could control the resources of the adjacent Upper Palatinate, his enlistments of troops took on there, in February, 1621, very considerable dimensions. While he tarried, however, in the Upper Palatinate, he received a heavy blow in Bohemia. When he had withdrawn from Pilsen, his return thither was cut off by the troops of the League and those of the Emperor. It had long been no secret to the garrison that he had been in negotiation with the Emperor for the surrender of the place, and they feared that he would reserve to himself the lion's share of the stipulated sum. For these reasons they gladly yielded to the suggestions of imperial emissaries, and entered, on their own account, into negotiations with Tilly, which resulted, on the 26th of March, in a capitulation, by which, in consideration of the surrender of Pilsen, they obtained the right of free withdrawal, together with the security of all their baggage and the payment of 150,000 florins. The loss of several other places garrisoned by Mansfeld's troops, particularly that of Falkenau and Ellbogen, followed the surrender of Pilsen, and as the Elector of Saxony had in the meantime forced Eger also to capitulate, only Tabor and Wittingau were held by garrisons which acknowledged the Palsgrave as their King. Tabor fell in November, 1621, and Wittingau on the 2d of March, 1622, into the hands of the imperialists, from which day the last traces of the insurrection were extinguished.

The government at Vienna had by no means meditated so great delay in clearing the soil of Bohemia of the enemy; nay, it was unwilling to wait for the cap-

ture of Pilsen, and consequently issued the order to the Prince of Liechtenstein to seize at once the chief abettors of the rebellion; in pursuance of which, on the 20th of February (1621), he caused numbers of nobles, knights, and citizens to be apprehended. This produced a shock of dejection throughout the land. Till then the conviction had prevailed that the Emperor would not institute proceedings against the insurgents, and hence none of those concerned thought of flight, which, in the case of most, would doubtless have been successful. Their former decision vanished, so that a few days sufficed to transform proud barons into supplianting petitioners. They addressed a letter to the Elector of Saxony beseeching his intercession with the Emperor that he would pardon their offence, restore them to his grace, and permit them to enjoy the continued use of their estates. This paper was signed by nine of the Directors of the rank of nobles and knights, and among them Budowec. All their prayers were, however, in vain, and equally in vain were the supplications which several noble ladies addressed to the Duke of Bavaria for his mediation when they saw that the proceedings threatened an evil termination. The captain just placed in Brandeis scoffed at these efforts, remarking, in his malignant joy, that God himself could not get the prisoners out of the Emperor's hands.

Lively discussions in the meantime took place in Vienna in regard to the tribunal before which the rebels should be brought, for it would not do to pursue the usual course of law, since neither the general courts of the land nor the city courts would have pronounced such sentences as were desired. Not only, however, must the Bohemian tribunals, but the Bohemian laws, be evaded, since these protected the accused against arbitrary pro-

ceedings, required the observance of certain forms of procedure, and might, therefore, protract the trials. As the government did not wish to trammel itself by either the courts or the laws, it was determined to constitute a special tribunal, and prescribe for it a code of procedure of its own. According to this code, the prosecution was not to allow itself to be drawn into the producing of any proofs of the charges which it brought against the accused, but to appeal to the notoriety of the fact and the criminal intent implied in it, and demand sentence and execution. The judge should see to it that the process be rapid, and should assume a stern attitude towards the advocates to whom one and another of the accused should entrust their defence. Judgments of confiscation were to be pronounced against the estates of rebels who had died or fled. The tribunal was made up of a number of trustworthy Bohemian and Austrian counsellors, presided over by the Prince of Liechtenstein.

On the 13th of March, 1621, those of the members of the court who lived in Vienna arrived in Prague, and on the 15th the court was organized in the castle. After a few days Liechtenstein published the first sentence, which declared the forfeiture of the estates of twenty-two persons who had died during the insurrection. Meanwhile the trial of the prisoners was zealously pursued, the chief subject of the questions being the throwing from the windows, and whether this had been prepared for beforehand or not. Several of the prisoners frankly admitted their part in the transaction, and named Count Thurn, Albert Smiricky, and one of the brothers Kinsky as its chief authors. The judgment finally pronounced against the accused involved the confiscation of the estates of all and the death-penalty in the case of

twenty-seven, on several of whom the execution was to be in a barbarous manner. The former captain of the castle at Prague, Dionysius Černin, for having admitted the estates armed into the citadel, and thus rendered the throwing from the windows possible, was to have two fingers of his right hand cut off; the tongues of Doctor Jessenius and Martin Fruewein were to be cut out; some others were to have their hands cut off, and several were to be quartered alive. Two members of the court travelled to Vienna with the drafts of these sentences and laid them before the Emperor.

Ferdinand was conscious of the gravity of the decision which he was called upon to make, and sought, therefore, consolation and enlightenment in the Church, and vowed also a pilgrimage to Maria-Zell.* At the same time he called upon several of his most trusted counsellors—among these the Chancellor Lobkowitz and Strahlendorf, who afterwards became president of the Imperial Court Council—for written opinions. The latter advised that the sentences of all the condemned be commuted to a life-long galley slavery; but this met with no approval from his colleagues, and it was determined to propose only a few mitigations: in particular the death-penalty of five was to be somewhat mitigated, while the severe death sentence should take its course on most of the condemned. The proposed changes were put into the Emperor's hands on the 23d of May, the anniversary of the throwing from the windows, and was approved by him. A few days later the sentence of Count Schlick and several

* This is still a great resort of pilgrims, the numbers annually being about 100,000. It is a village in Styria with a population of 900. The pilgrimage church there was founded by Lewis I., King of Hungary, in the year 1363, in gratitude for his rescue in the Servian defeat.—TR.

others—who had not been apprehended until after the trial was in progress, and consequently received their sentence later—came on from Prague. Here also Ferdinand allowed amelioration, especially in case of Count Schlick, who, according to the judgment at Prague, was first to have his right hand cut off and then be quartered alive. Ferdinand decided that he should first be beheaded and that his hand be cut off after death. After these decisions he entered upon his pilgrimage to Maria-Zell, taking with him as an offering a golden crown valued at 10,000 florins. He directed Prince Liechtenstein to hasten as much as possible the execution, because he desired to visit Prague soon after his return from Maria-Zell, and wished a considerable time to elapse between the execution and his arrival there. In spite of this command, Liechtenstein delayed the execution, and repeated the request, which he had already made and the Emperor had rejected, that the prisoners before death might be allowed interviews with clergymen of their own faiths. His request was granted so far as related to the access of the Utraquist and Lutheran clergy, but not in relation to those of the United Brethren.

The preparations for the execution were now hastened. After the prisoners, on the 19th of June, had been informed of the sentence, they were allowed to receive farewell visits. The wives and children of the condemned made still a last attempt to save the lives of their husbands and fathers by repairing to Prince Liechtenstein and entreating of him with tears and heart-rending lamentations a mitigation of the judgment. Liechtenstein had not demeaned himself as a vehement persecutor, and personally, perhaps, would have inclined to mercy; but his hands were tied, so that he could give the

comfortless women no promises, and was obliged to leave them to their misery. As the news of the coming execution spread in Prague, a change was felt in the public sentiment. The leaders of the insurrection had hitherto been cursed as the authors of all the calamities of the people, but the lamentable lot which now awaited them gave rise to a universal sentiment of pity, while a sense of shame was felt at the betrayal of any of that dislike from which these men had suffered before their apprehension.

On the Sunday after the sentence was made public, the prisoners—some of whom were in the castle and some in the Council-house—were visited by the Protestant clergy (so far as these were admitted), from whom they received consolation and the Lord's Supper. These Protestant ministers were, however, here and there hindered in this work by Catholic priests, who were attempting the conversion of some of the prisoners. Budowec showed himself in this crisis a zealous adherent of the United Brethren; for, while he accepted religious consolation from the Pastor Rosacius, he did not receive the communion at his hands. Most of the prisoners bore themselves fitly in the presence of death; in some instances, however, faint-heartedness appeared, or the vain hope of pardon embittered the last moments. In the night, from Sunday to Monday, the prisoners were all conducted to the Council-house, in front of which the execution was to take place.

The government had made preparations to prevent all disturbances; to which end the garrison of Prague was considerably increased, the city-gates were closed, and a strong force was stationed at the market-place. The discharge of a cannon, on the 21st of June (1621), was the signal for the

beginning of the execution. Into the presence of the council of the Old City and the royal judges of the City of Prague the prisoners were, in succession, called one by one, and the death-penalty was executed. Count Schlick was the first, Budowec the second, and so on to the others in succession. Of the twenty-four men who were beheaded, Bohuslav Michalowic had his hand cut off, the distinguished physician, Jessenius, his tongue cut out, before the beheading. Three citizens were hanged. These sad executions mark the close of the old and independent culture of Bohemia. Sons of the greatest families of the Bohemian nobility, prominent burghers and scholars—the representatives of Bohemia's culture—here perished, and with them their aspirations. The destinies of the land were thenceforth ruled by foreigners, who had no knowledge of the former culture, and no interest in it. The next day several persons were publicly whipped and then imprisoned or exiled; while others, who at the time escaped this ignominious punishment, were afterwards confined and kept in the Castle of Zbirow.

At the same time with the trials described above, the court in Prague was occupied also with sentences against the rebels who had fled. All these were adjudged to death in contumacy, and their landed property was confiscated. The fortunes which were at this time appropriated, including the estates of the rebels deceased, of those who had fled and of those just now condemned, amounted, according to an estimate of the year 1621, to 5,000,000 thalers. The party of the government, however, regarded these large fines, which represent an amount of not less than 30,000,000 thalers of the money of our day, as by no means a sufficient atonement, but desired to carry out its programme and make every one

responsible for the insurrection who had given any utterance whatever of assent to it. Counsel was accordingly taken in Vienna as to the manner in which the remaining nobility and the royal cities should be dealt with. Prince Liechtenstein was not quite satisfied with the intended measures against the cities, fearful as he was that the persecution of the burghers would destroy the most important basis of taxation. His apprehensions found, however, no consideration in Vienna, where the desire prevailed that prosecution against all the nobility and the burghers should be inaugurated at once, in order that, by further confiscations, the daily increasing needs of the government might be met.

Notwithstanding the earnest adherence of the government to this purpose, such was the uncertainty of the situation upon the theatre of the war, that the carrying out of the plan of confiscation must be put off for a time. Another point, however, in the programme of reform which the imperial counsellors had sketched—that is, the suppression of Protestantism—was therefore the more zealously prosecuted. The Vienna statesmen had advised only a gradual course, and if the toleration which they recommended had been exercised, years would have been required to attain the end. Such a procedure was not, however, to the taste of the zealots, and especially did not suit the Papal Nuncio, Caraffa, who ceaselessly exhorted the Emperor to take decided steps; and he made use of his position and influence to stir up the zeal of Ferdinand, who now decided upon a more rapid advance. The first endeavors were directed to the restoration and ornamentation of the churches and the placing of Catholic pastors over as many as possible of the congregations. Effort was made to engage great numbers of young men

for the clerical profession, and the education of these was entrusted to the Jesuits, who were again settled in Prague, and to some monasteries, which entered zealously upon this work. It is clear that the end could have been gained in this way only by some years of labor, and as this was too long to wait, attempts were made to win a portion of the Protestant clergy. By direction of the Prince of Liechtenstein, the Administrator of the pastors of Prague was called, and the question put to him whether the pastors would conform to the Catholic Church, and keep their wives with them merely as cooks, if assured that, in case of compliance, they would not be further molested. Not a single pastor would, under these degrading conditions, conform to the Catholic Church, though it is not to be doubted that there were individuals in the country who yielded to the proposal, and that the Catholic clergy gained in this way some accessions. The obstinacy of the pastors of Prague was not to be left unpunished, and it was resolved, as the needed priests for some of the churches were at hand, to begin with the expulsion of the pastors, and the reformation enforced in the capital could not, it was thought, remain without effect upon the country. But as to inflict such a punishment for religious belief would have caused too great embitterment, and some regard must be paid also to the Elector of Saxony, it was determined to effect their banishment on political grounds. The Viceroy was directed to expel from the country all clergymen and professors who had been present at the consultation in the Carolinum, all who had promoted the rebellion in school and pulpit, all who had defended the election of Frederic to the throne, and been present at his coronation, and to inflict severe punishments upon those who

should refuse to go. Not a member of the Bohemian clergy could maintain that he had committed none of the above-named offences against the sovereign ; each one had perhaps, at least on the occasion of Frederic's coronation, made pious references to this event. Every one had, therefore, occasion to fear that, unless he fled, to-day or to-morrow hands might be laid upon him ; and so, after the proclamation, many of the clergy sought their safety in flight. The mass of them, however, remained in their places, partly from a sense of duty, partly from want of means to emigrate with their families.

The Emperor had directed that the decree of banishment should be proclaimed immediately after the executions ; but Liechtenstein, apprehensive that the preparations being made by Mansfeld and Jägerndorf might lead to the breaking out anew of the insurrection, advised the Emperor to wait until the vacant churches could be occupied by Catholics. His advice was followed ; the Emperor consented to a temporary delay in the carrying out of his order, and demanded that the Prince proceed to punish only those preachers who had notoriously taken part in the rebellion or officiated at the coronation. He insisted, however, upon the right thenceforth to fill the vacant parishes in the cities and on all the confiscated manors, and authorized the Prince to come to an agreement with the Archbishop as to the manner in which this should be done.

When, after the executions were over, consultation was had in regard to a general pardon relatively to life and personal freedom—not in relation to property, which it was the intention of the government to confiscate—the Archbishop advised that this pardon be not extended to the preachers and professors ; which advice was given

in order that these might, on the first convenient occasion, be driven out of the country. For this reason the proclamation of a general pardon was delayed; and the longer the delay the greater was the hesitation, although the Emperor, since August, 1621, had repeatedly had his attention called to this by the Elector of Saxony. It was felt that the Protestant clergy could not be excluded from the pardon, since they were not more guilty than the nobility and the burghers. The time gained by putting off the publication of the pardon was used in calling to account in quick succession individual preachers who were prominent and removing them from their places. The Papal Nuncio employed all his persuasive powers to bring the Emperor to renew the orders, which he had once given and afterwards withdrawn, for the banishment of the clergy who were politically compromised, and he finally succeeded. The Prince of Liechtenstein, accordingly, on the 13th of December, published a patent requiring all the clergy who, after the throwing from the windows, had published the proclamation of the Directorial Government from the pulpit and taken part in the coronation, to leave Prague within three days and the country within eight days. Out of "pure kindness and goodness" the exiled were permitted to take their movable goods with them, and to sell their real estate within three months. All who should not obey the decree of banishment were to be proceeded against for high treason, as were also those who should secretly give shelter to such. At the same time orders were issued to the counsellors of the other royal cities to publish the same patent and act accordingly.

The decree of banishment was so sweeping in its import as necessarily to include the few of the clergy of the

Augsburg Confession who sojourned in the land. Caraffa and the Emperor did not mean it otherwise; nevertheless Liechtenstein refused to extend it to the Lutherans, because he would not further irritate the sensibility of the Elector of Saxony. His opinion was again regarded, and he was permitted to inform the Lutheran preachers of Prague that the decree of exile did not concern them, as they were not guilty of the same crime with the other clergy. Nearly all the pastors of Prague, their Administrator at their head, obeyed the order of banishment, and took refuge in Schandau, whence they sent their complaints to the Elector of Saxony that, under the pretext of their part in the rebellion, they had been driven from their homes, and requested him to intercede with the Emperor for their restoration. This application stung John George severely; the unpleasant consequences of his alliance with Ferdinand were now glaringly manifest. The expulsion of the clergy offended their adherents among the population of Prague in their most sacred feelings, and yet they gave but slight utterance to their indignation. While, on Easter Sunday, a Catholic priest was delivering, in the Emmaus Church, a violent discourse against the further toleration of heretics, a day-laborer hooted at him; but some soldiers at once moved against the disturber, and it was with difficulty that the man escaped by flight. These and other occurrences supported the zealots in the attempt to set aside the communion in both forms (which was still authorized by ecclesiastical law); and they carried out their purpose in the first parish church of Prague, on the Thein. Here, after the removal of the Administrator, a certain Locika had been stationed, on the condition that he would serve the communion in both forms, though in other re-

spects he was to follow the instructions of the Archbishop. In his place a Catholic priest was now put, and from this time forth only Catholic service was allowed in Prague, except in case of the German Protestants. As no other worship could, according to the Emperor's command, be permitted in the royal cities or on the confiscated manors, the adherents of the Bohemian Confession had but a slight claim remaining upon private domains, and the continuance of this was secured only from week to week, since preparations were being made for wresting all landed property out of the hands of Protestants. No imperial decree had, however, as yet appeared which would have excluded the entire Protestant clergy, each and all, from toleration, though signs indicated that such a one would soon be issued, and the authorities at least acted, in their respective positions, as if such already existed.

When the Easter festival of the year 1622 was near, Caraffa admonished the Emperor that the time had now arrived for the banishment also of the Lutheran clergy. Preparations were, however, being made in Vienna to attend the Imperial Diet at Oedenburg, and the Emperor was unwilling to augment the difficulties which might be encountered in the transactions there by the banishment of the Lutherans, and, furthermore, as news came from Germany of considerable war preparations by the Margraves of Baden and Halberstadt, the publication also of the long-promised general pardon was decided upon, and the door was thus bolted against the intended expulsion of the Lutherans. But when the Protestants in Germany were defeated in battle, and the Diet of Oedenburg was over, and the reasons which had caused the Vienna statesmen to spare the Lutherans existed no longer, then

Caraffa raised his voice anew, and demanded of the Emperor that there should be no further delay of their banishment. This time he succeeded. The Prince of Liechtenstein was commanded to banish the Lutheran preachers and teachers of Prague and Brüx, where, except in the district of Eger only, congregations of the Augsburg Confession had grown up. Cardinal Dietrichstein was commissioned to execute the same measure in Moravia; and so the clergy and teachers were in like manner driven out of the only Lutheran parish, that of Iglau, in that country.

Liechtenstein began by directing Herman Černín, the city captain, to call the Lutheran clergy and teachers of Prague before him and make known to them the decree. Černín obeyed, and informed those whom he had summoned that they were to abstain from all their clerical functions, and within four days to leave Prague and the country. Although they pleaded for more time, on the ground that it would be impossible for them so soon to arrange in regard to their goods and their families, only an additional day was granted. Packed into a single vehicle, and escorted by a band of soldiers, they entered upon their journey on the 29th of October, 1622, taking the road to Dresden. A multitude numbered by thousands attended them for about two miles; and when it came to the parting, Lippach, the chief man of the exiles, mounted a hillock, and, after a powerful speech, took his leave, amid fast-flowing tears, of those who were to remain. A collection instituted among those present on this occasion yielded 400 florins, which amount was handed to the departing pastor. The pastors and schoolmasters of Brüx were banished at the same time.

On the day following that of the announcement to

the Lutheran clergy of the decree for their banishment, the sword of Damocles fell upon the rector and professors of the University of Prague. The Emperor issued the command for the adherents of the Bohemian Confession to vacate the University buildings, directing at the same time that these and all other property of the institution be handed over to the Jesuits, as masters thenceforward of the University. The measures directed to the removal of the Protestant clergy were at the close of the year still further supplemented by the publication of an order of Liechtenstein, in consequence of which all the clergy of non-Catholic confessions were banished from all Bohemia. This effected a half-completion of the work of reformation, and the Catholic clergy could now have a clear field for thorough work in which they had no opposition to encounter. Their chief attention was given to the winning of the population of Prague; and in several of the churches—for instance, those of St. Henry and St. Stephen—were stationed eloquent Jesuits, to whose labors it was due that in the last months of the year 1622 numerous accessions to the Catholic Church were reported. Divine service was a need which the people doubly felt amid the afflictions which the land suffered. Fear of the city captain and city judge, anxiety in regard to the decisions of the commission of confiscation, which they hoped to mitigate by yielding in matters of religion, contributed their part to fill the churches. And not only did the citizens begin to yield to power, but the old convictions of individuals of the nobility gave way somewhat; and the examples of the nobles and citizens were imitated by numbers of the clergy of the Bohemian Confession who still remained in the country. Of the professors of the University, even, several passed over to the Catholic

faith, one of whom, Campanus, was celebrated in his day, and employed his thorough acquaintance with the Latin language and his poetic talent in the composition of Latin hymns to the honor of the most holy Virgin ; he had formerly attempted rhythmical translations of psalms and hymns.

It is natural that the Lutheran clergy felt the bitterness of their lot as deeply as their predecessors had done, and that they filled the world with their lamentations, laying their complaints especially before the Elector of Saxony. John George complained in the bitterest terms to the Emperor of the persecution of his companions in the faith. He stated that no news in the course of the Bohemian insurrection had so excited him as that of the closing of the Lutheran Church in Prague. He admitted that the Bohemians had, by their rebellion, forfeited their rights, but claimed that some regard should have been paid to him as an ally. He should take into consideration that the German Lutherans were to have been regarded as but "strangers and guests" in the land, and had been forced to yield to the insurrectionary movement, as even numerous Catholics had done. What was the value of the general pardon published by the Emperor if the Lutherans were not free to live according to their own convictions? And what kind of gratitude was shown to him (the Elector) for helping the Emperor to save the Catholic Church from ruin? As the Elector, so also his court-preacher, Hoë, felt in regard to the measures applied to the Lutherans. He had co-operated with the greatest efficiency in bringing about the alliance with the Emperor ; he had gone to Mühlhausen, and forwarded the action there ; and now it appeared that all the warnings and reproaches which Protestants had uttered against

him were well grounded. We shall see how the Emperor, at the Diet of Deputies at Regensburg, dismissed all these complaints, and how he pursued without deviation the way upon which he had entered: Protestantism was to be rooted out.

When in Vienna it was resolved to issue the decree (end of 1621), by which the pastors of Prague were to be driven from the land, the situation on the theatre of war, as we shall hereafter relate, was favorable; and so it was determined to put off no longer the confiscation. A court of confiscation was established, and as members of this, to be associated with the Prince of Liechtenstein, were appointed Adam von Waldstein, Frederic von Talmberg, Sezima von Wrtba, and strict instructions were given as to the course to be observed. The Emperor began these rules of proceeding by assigning his financial embarrassment as a reason for not pardoning the guilty, and then proceeded to particulars: Liechtenstein was to summon before the council of confiscation all those persons who were conscious of any guilt whatever. The citation was not to be particular, but general, so that the persons concerned should become informers against themselves. The council of confiscation was to inquire "to what extent individuals had, during the rebellion, done official service in war, in the general government, in city, in court, or in council; what commissions they had executed in the country or abroad; whether they had sworn and subscribed the Articles of Confederation; whether they had been present in assemblies of rebels, and approved their action; whether they had instigated others to similar rebellion; whether they had uttered words of abuse or detraction against the Emperor, or been in any other way interested in the rebellion."

From these specifications it is clear that only "the fewest and the poorest" could feel themselves guiltless, and that, if these instructions were carried out, the entire population who held property would be reduced to beggary. The penalty pronounced by the council of confiscation against the transgressors applied to money and lands.

The prosecutions were begun in the year 1622, and in the course of two years mostly completed. The sentence of each one who presented himself before the court was that he should lose his entire personal and real property, but that the Emperor graciously left him in possession of one-half, or one-third, or one-quarter, but that in case of his real estate no part should remain in his possession, but that this should be appraised and his part paid him out of the Bohemian exchequer. Every one, without exception, whether his guilt were greater or less, was to lose all his lands: the severity of which decision becomes still more evident when it is known that the appraisements were made in a manner the most superficial as also the most hostile to the owner, and then the amount was paid in spurious money. To be specific in this latter point: in order to render the payment of the money easier, the Emperor had concluded, on the 18th of January, 1622, a coinage contract with one Hans de Witte and a number of men in high positions, authorizing them to stamp the coin with four times the actual value of the silver used. It was the intention to discharge the incumbrances which must be admitted to rest upon the confiscated lands with this debased money, and then pay in the same also the part still due to the former owner. It was further intended that, when this business was ended, the coin should be declared uncircurrent and called in at its actual value. It was at the same time provided that the purchasers of these

estates should pay the stipulated prices in the old honest money. The purchasers paid the full value; the ejected party—as also his creditor—received but a fourth part of even the amount which had been allowed him by an appraisement originally made to his disadvantage.

Ingenious as this diabolical scheme was, it did not result to the Emperor's advantage, but rather to his injury, as well as that of the condemned. In the first place, the coinage contractors committed the most stupendous fraud. Instead of stamping a mark of silver with four times its value, they gradually came to stamp it so that it contained but a tenth of the indicated value—that is, in a florin of this coinage there was present but a tenth part of the required silver. With this limitless debasement of the money, of which six-tenths of the gain was pocketed by the contractors, the Emperor not knowing the fraud which was committed upon himself, the individual contractors purchased the confiscated lands, and by their influential positions succeeded in securing the acceptance in payment for these of money which was supposed to have suffered a fourfold debasement, but was really reduced to a tenth of its nominal value. The Emperor therefore really received from his gigantic confiscations no amount worth naming; only a few speculators in high positions were enriched. The derangement of coinage took on, in consequence of the fraudulent manipulations of the year 1623, such enormous dimensions, raised all articles of commerce towards the limitless, caused such excitement and such hatred to the imperial government, that Ferdinand felt compelled to cancel the contract for coinage, which he did on the 21st of March, 1623, to return again to the regular coinage, and at a later time to call in the debased coin. That the fraud was not discovered even in the call-

ing in of the spurious coinage is one of the historical riddles of that time. In fact, it was not until the time of Ferdinand III. that an investigation of this matter was ordered, and the heir of one of the chief criminals was adjudged to the payment of 1,000,000 florins by way of reimbursement.

We may now suppose that the nobles and citizens, to whom the court of confiscation left perhaps a third of their property, and who were paid for this in money debased to a fourth or a tenth of its nominal value, received either a twelfth or a thirtieth part of their possessions. But even this small fraction was often not paid: some regard was shown to those who became Catholics, or who had powerful patrons; to those, however, who emigrated, little regard was shown, although their claims were recognized, and some of them received permission to return to Bohemia to prosecute their claims. It was simply the complete ebb in the imperial finances which occasioned this action; the government would have deemed it an unpardonable injustice to pay these stragglers in after years with good money, when those who, by a change of faith and other recommendations, had shown themselves more worthy of grace had been paid only in spurious money.

Thus the second point of the Vienna court party's programme of reform, which was brought forward at the close of the year 1621, was fully carried out. The Protestant nobility of Bohemia was reduced to beggary, and the landed property had passed into other and trustworthy hands. The prosperity, also, of the city population had received its death-blow, for not only had the property of the individual citizens, but that also of the parishes, been taken, and they were reduced to the condition of a

wretched peasant population. The woe under the weight of which the land sighed can, in its extent and depth, be compared only to that which, during the time of the tribal migrations, was visited upon Gaul and Upper Italy by their Frankish and Lombard conquerors.

As in relation to Bohemia, so also in regard to Moravia: the Emperor caused a written opinion, relative to the reforms to be introduced, to be prepared by a commission headed by Cardinal Dietrichstein. This recommended that the Catholic Church be restored as soon as possible to sole dominion, and that, to effect this end, the Bohemian Brethren and Anabaptists be immediately expelled, and the other Protestants persistently persecuted. In relation to the way and manner of founding anew his power in Moravia, it advised the Emperor to decline the acknowledgment of all those rights of the Estates for which they could not cite special charters; that is, all which depended upon usage only—in a word, that he should, in a convenient way, change the Constitution. In regard to the punishment of those who had taken part in the insurrection, the Cardinal advised the Emperor to repudiate all the debts contracted by his ancestors, to confiscate the moneys of the cities, and of the nobility to spare only those who had not taken the oath of allegiance to the pretender. The landed proprietorships of those who had committed no further offence than the taking of the oath should be changed from freeholds to fiefs, or peasant-tenures, and subjected to special rents. The rest of the offenders should lose their entire property and some of them their lives. The counsel of the Cardinal was in harmony with the views of the other counsellors, and was therefore approved and laid before the Emperor.

Either just before or just after the executions of Prague,

the order was sent to Cardinal Dietrichstein to apprehend all the prominent abettors of the insurrection. From fear of the war then threatened by Bethlen, in consequence of which the whole country was turned into a camp, it was, however, impossible to take possession of real estate as was desired, and it was necessary for the present to be content with the levying of contributions which could scarcely be realized. The Cardinal disapproved of this system of appropriation, because it was bringing ruin upon the country; and, in fact, he furnishes, in his statement, that the number of the occupied houses had sunk from 90,000 to 30,000, the ground for a conception of the misery which three years of war had produced in Moravia. He advised the Emperor not to put off the confiscation, to institute, therefore, immediate proceedings against the imprisoned nobles and appropriate their property, or more promptly carry out the debasement of the coinage which had just been projected. There might then, he suggested, a milder course be pursued towards the multitude, when payment had first been exacted from the rich.

The counsel of the Cardinal was followed, when, in the beginning of the year 1622, the Peace of Nikolsburg was concluded with Bethlen, and there was no further occasion to fear his intervention. First, the rest of the chief rebels were apprehended. It was fixed that the examination and imprisonment should not be limited to the Directors, but extended to all those who had, by letter and seal, bound themselves to the insurrection; those who had taken part in the formation of the Confederation at Prague and the message which informed the Palsgrave of his election; those who had sequestered the ecclesiastical domain, and those who had accepted positions as district officers during the rebellion. In harmony with these suggestions, the

Cardinal made out a list of those concerned, embracing about 200 names. A court was accordingly constituted for the trial of these cases, at the head of which Dietrichstein was placed, and with him were associated nine others, the majority of whom had already been connected with the trials at Prague. The judges entered upon their work at the close of June, 1622, and first pronounced sentence of death and forfeiture of their entire property against those rebels who had fled. Other sentences were delayed, because the Emperor was for some time undecided as to whether the proposed death-penalty should be adjudged or not, till he finally decided to exercise grace, and sent Colonel Morradas to Brünn with this decision.

On the 3d of November the prisoners were called for at the Council-house to be present at the announcement of the judgment of the court. Most of them were informed that the sentence was death, but that this had been commuted by imperial grace to imprisonment, either for life or for a fixed period. All the nobles were sentenced to the loss of their entire property, as the knighthood also, with a single exception, while most of the burghers had a portion of their property left them. By the judgments pronounced at this time, together with the former ones against those who had escaped, were confiscated the estates of fifty-one persons.

However large an amount the Emperor may have secured in this way, it was not enough to supply the lack which was more deeply felt each day in the imperial treasury, and the same means which had been employed in Bohemia were therefore resorted to in Moravia. All the inhabitants of the land were called upon to become informers before the court at Brünn of their own offences, and to atone for these by the surrender of a portion of

their property. The proceedings were begun in the year 1623, and during this year and the following the various sentences of confiscation were pronounced.

The reactionary reformation was carried out in exact accordance with the advice of Cardinal Dietrichstein. The adherents of the Bohemian Confession were first subjected to all possible molestations by the unceasing persecution of their clergy and teachers ; and Ferdinand then issued, September 17, 1622, a patent by which he banished all the Anabaptists from the land. These were German communities which had settled upon the estates of individual noblemen, especially those of Herr von Liechtenstein, from the year 1520 to 1530. Although no sect of the time was so despised and persecuted as this one, yet they enjoyed in Moravia a secure existence, because they prudently abstained from all proselyting and exercise of political influence, and readily submitted to taxation. The several congregations had their communistic organizations, and tilled the fields, or pursued single industries, among which was the manufacture of cloths, upon a common account. As they not only brought to their landlords, but also to the country, double the amount of the taxes paid by the Jews, self-interest itself pleaded for their toleration. They had, in the meantime, so increased that they numbered more than 20,000. They were now obliged to emigrate and again abandon the home which had become dear to them, and, almost without means, to seek new places of abode. Nevertheless the majority obeyed the command and emigrated, chiefly to Hungary, where they have been perpetuated down to the most recent times.

There was no more thought of a decided resistance to the imperial decree of reformation in Moravia than there was in Bohemia. Carl von Zerotín alone relied so much

for security upon the services which he had rendered the Emperor, that he disregarded the decree of banishment against the Protestant clergy, and harbored numbers of them upon his estates. The government tolerated for a time this refractory conduct; but when it grew to feel stronger, Zerotín was forced to yield, and, as he was unwilling to be bereft of the comfort of intercourse with those of like faith, he preferred to withdraw to Breslau.

In regard to the changes to be made in Silesia, the Emperor directed a person, not known by name, to prepare an opinion, which pursued nearly the line of the advice given for Bohemia and Moravia—that is, recommended that the Emperor disregard the liberties of the land, establish his supreme authority and his hereditary right, give the Catholics in the end every advantage, and step by step proceed to persecute the Protestants, and especially the Calvinists. But as the Elector of Saxony had rendered, by the Accord, the carrying out of this counsel impossible, the paper was laid aside, but formed, nevertheless, in later years a guide in many governmental measures. It was desired in Vienna, as a preliminary to action, to call in Breslau a Diet, in order to seal the reconciliation by a kind of renewal of the act of homage. The Elector of Saxony agreed with this wish, and in this Diet, which assembled November 3, 1621, represented the Emperor, and by means of the hand-grasp accepted the assurance that the Estates would thenceforth demean themselves with fidelity. In the succeeding days the Estates discussed the question of increase of taxes, and agreed to bind themselves to a beer-tax, to the payment of 200,000 thalers within two years, and to a contribution of 100,000 thalers for the maintenance of the fortifications on the Hungarian frontier during three successive years. They afterwards

learned by experience that increased payments were from that time forth the standing order of the day.

We shall add a few words, to indicate how the fruits of the victory were gathered from the Austrians. After the battle of the White Mountain the conviction forced itself upon every one that the government would no longer rest satisfied with the persecution of those who had in Retz moved the protectorate of the Palsgrave over Austria, but would institute a general investigation directed against the adversaries of the dynasty. In Austria, however, a roseate hue still mingled in the coloring of the view taken; indeed, the Estates even sent an ambassador to Duke Maximilian with a petition that the prosecutions instituted against individuals might be dismissed. Maximilian's answer, however, showed that the wind now blew in another direction. He reproached the Estates with their part in the Bohemian insurrection, and their alliance with Bethlen, and not indistinctly characterized their declaration of fidelity as shuffling. When the envoy supported his complaint with the argument that the oppression exercised was in violation of their rights and charters, the Duke was ready with his answer, and asked derisively whether their prince was going to adjust his conduct to their will? If it once came to extremes, then particular interests, he said, must be neglected, and the public weal alone regarded.

The severity of the answer did not yet bend the obstinacy of the Estates, for when Maximilian forbade the payment of the indebtedness which they had contracted during the insurrection, they refused obedience, and extinguished the debts with the taxes paid in, of which they had the administration. This unwise bearing, which proceeded indeed from a rebellious spirit, pre-

vented further delay in the prosecution of the ringleaders individually. The future result of the procedure was indicated in an imperial patent in which a confiscation was threatened which would not be confined to those against whom it had been pronounced—that is, those who had not rendered their homage and had fled. In fact, several nobles and burghers were arrested in Linz on March 20, 1621; and as this did not reduce the obstinacy of the Estates, and they were slow in paying their taxes, these arrests were followed up—to name a few: Erasmus von Starhemberg, Sigmund Polheim, and the wealthy Helmhard von Jörger, were arrested. In Vienna, too, a number of citizens were arrested and subjected for their action in the year 1619 to examination. The consequence of this severity was, that the Emperor summoned the Estates of Lower Austria to Vienna, and demanded of them a heavy contribution; the opposition dared scarcely to stir, and the required sum was granted. The Estates of Upper Austria, who now longed, since Maximilian had drawn the reins so tight upon them, to come under the imperial rule, sent to the Emperor a petition, which indicated no more of the old obstinacy, but entreated forbearance in financial matters and the discontinuance of the prosecutions which had been instituted. But it was too late to resort to petitions. The determination in Vienna was to deal with Austria as Bohemia and Moravia had been dealt with: to arraign the nobles and the burghers—notwithstanding that they had rendered their homage—for their rebellious alliances, and to punish the guilty with the confiscation of their estates. To take charge of the investigations and make out the judgments, a special court was appointed, which should proceed against those who had offered armed resistance, seized

the government after the death of the Emperor Matthias, carried on war preparations, concluded a confederation with Bohemia, closed the defiles against the imperial troops, and been in alliance with Bethlen and the Turks. The most of the chief criminals had fled, and could not be touched, otherwise than by the confiscation of their estates; there was, however, a milder course pursued against those who remained in the land, and only pecuniary fines were afterwards laid upon them. In this manner suffered more or less all who had taken any part whatever in the Bohemian insurrection: some with loss of life, others with loss of property, all, however, who remained at home in their personal convictions which they found themselves obliged to offer in sacrifice to the absolute authority of the government.

CHAPTER VII.

THE PALSGRAVE SUBJECTED TO THE BAN, AND THE ELECTORAL DIGNITY TRANSFERRED TO MAXIMILIAN OF BAVARIA.

I. The Palsgrave placed under the Ban. The Dissolution of the Union. II. The Negotiations at Hainburg on the Danube. III. Renewed Attempt of King James at Mediation. IV. The War in the Upper and Lower Palatinate. V. The War in Hungary to the Peace of Nikolsburg. The Diet of Oedenburg. VI. Christian of Halberstadt and the Margrave of Baden Durlach. The War in the Lower Palatinate in the Year 1622. VII. Negotiations relating to the Transfer of the Electorate. VIII. The Transfer of the Electorate at the Regensburg Diet.

I.

THE victory of the White Mountain had not only securely restored Bohemia to the possession of the Emperor, but had also paralyzed the resistance of the Bohemian dependencies and prepared in these the way of his recognition. If the Palsgrave had taken account of the change of circumstances, sought the Emperor's pardon, and offered him a pecuniary compensation, it would have been difficult to deprive him of the electoral dignity and harm him in his hereditary possessions. But Frederic did nothing of the kind : he asked no pardon, because he had not, as he thought, carried on war against the Emperor, but against the King of Bohemia—that is, against an equal in rank—and because he was unwilling, in the sight of his people, to subject himself to a humiliation, the result of which would be to brand him as a man

without depth of personal convictions and without fixed principles. In doing this, in order to secure his own safety, he would have been obliged to declare that he had done a wrong, and had deceived as well those who elected him as the Emperor. Whether Ferdinand would have taken account of any penitential bearing of the Palsgrave and forgiven him, is indeed questionable, since the measures which he took immediately after his victory gave no signs of placability; perhaps, however, his later behavior, in but hesitatingly fulfilling the promise which he made to Maximilian in regard to the Electorate, does indicate such feeling, as it intimated to the Duke quite distinctly a wish that the latter would himself, in view of the rising perils, renounce his claim to the reward which had been promised him. But the absurd course of the Palsgrave in demanding indemnification of the Emperor, instead of offering it to him, justified Ferdinand's first show of implacability, and made it necessary that he should persevere in it, since Frederic, even at a later day, regarded the Emperor as his debtor.

When the Palsgrave, after his flight from Bohemia, reached Breslau, he wished to continue the war with the aid of Moravia, Silesia, and Hungary; but on learning that Moravia had fallen off from him, he resolved to send Count Hohenloe to Dresden, that he might, through the mediation of the Elector of Saxony, offer to the Emperor to renounce his claim to the Bohemian crown. He connected, however, with this offer demands which a victor might indeed make of the vanquished, but which could not well be made when the case was reversed. For, besides claiming the quiet possession of his Electorate, he desired to leave the dominion of Bohemia to the Emperor only on such conditions as must, in the existing state of

things, lead to an early collapse. He wished the Emperor to publish a general amnesty, grant religious liberty, confirm all the charters, including the confederation of the several provinces, acknowledge the right of the Estates to the free election of the King, assume the payment of the Bohemian debt to the army, and finally indemnify the Palsgrave for the damage he had sustained.

That Frederic made his concurrence in the peace dependent upon a general amnesty and the preservation of political and religious liberty in Bohemia, is not to be taken as indicating a short-sighted view of his pitiable condition, but should be set down to his honor; for he was unwilling lightly to abandon those who had linked their fortunes with his own. But he ought at least to have borne in mind that these demands were the extremity to which Ferdinand could yield, that he could never expect him to confirm the free elective right, since, in the almost hopeless enmity into which the Emperor had fallen with his subjects, this right would have been turned to account against his successors. This demand must therefore be deemed unreasonable, if not indeed an artifice; and no other view is admissible in regard to his demand, that Ferdinand, who did not possess a farthing, should assume the payment to the soldiers of an indebtedness amounting to millions. The Palsgrave's folly, however, culminated in his demand for reimbursement of his expenditures in Bohemia, the payment of the debts incurred in the defence of his crown, and, in addition to all this, an "entertainment" (*Ergötzlichkeit*), which was not more definitely stated, but which was to consist of money or lands. It is indeed matter of wonder that neither the Palsgrave and his wife nor their counsellors had the sagacity to perceive that such condi-

tions of peace were both unreasonable and offensive. The victor should secure the vanquished from harm: the assailed, having mastered the assailant, should indemnify him for the costs of the assault!

Although the Elector of Saxony, notwithstanding his alliance with the Emperor, had never lost sight of the Protestant interests, as he showed in his action in Lusatia, he was indignant at these demands, and peremptorily declined to intercede for their concession. He demanded that Frederic should unconditionally renounce his claim to the crown of Bohemia, declare his submission to the Emperor, and ask his pardon; he added also, by way of warning, that his refusal or hesitation might be followed by great detriment to him and his hereditary possessions, as the Emperor was resolved unhesitatingly to pursue his victory. In fact, the Emperor was determined to discharge at his enemy the arrow which he had long held in reserve for him, and to pronounce against him the ban, although the Elector of Saxony had not given his consent to this step.

Ferdinand was indeed aware that the proclamation of the ban would embitter the German Protestants, and drive them to the Palsgrave's support, and that he might expect the same also from Holland, from the Kings of Sweden and Denmark, and probably also from England, and that France too might join his enemies. He was determined, however, to organize a formidable coalition, and desired first to assure himself of the continued aid of his allies, especially of the German League and Spain. He therefore decided to put the question to Maximilian of Bavaria as to how far his help might be reckoned upon, and for this purpose sent Count Hohenzollern, President of the Imperial Court Council, to Munich.

The Duke was at first reserved towards the imperial ambassador, and would give no advice, on the ground that it did not become him in a matter of such gravity to set up his opinion as an authority. Afterwards, however, he frankly advised that the ban be pronounced against the Palsgrave, and promised his aid, in case difficulties should arise, on the condition, of course, that the Catholic League should decide in like manner.

When the Emperor had thus obtained the concurrence of Bavaria, and deemed himself certain also of the aid of the League, and as he also counted upon the support of Spain, he hesitated no longer to take this step against the Palsgrave and his chief adherents. This determination was of incalculable range, since, if he might even be legally justified in it, he would still thereby cut himself off from all possibility of restoring peace, and would prepare the way for an endless contest, since this would drive the Palsgrave and his supporters to such an extreme that they would not hesitate to move heaven and earth in order to avert their own destruction. To all this, however, the Emperor paid no regard; he wished to keep his promise to his brother-in-law, the Duke of Bavaria, and invest him with the Electorate, and this must be taken away from the Palsgrave before it could be given to the Duke. He subscribed, therefore, on January 22, 1621, two patents. In the first he declared that the Elector of the Palatinate had, "by placing himself at the head of rebels, disobedient and untrue, shown himself both traitorous and injurious to the Imperial Highness and Majesty, committed an offence against the peace of the Empire and other wholesome imperial statutes, and incurred the penalty of the ban and the double ban." In the second patent he pronounced the like penalty upon

the Margrave of Jägerndorf, the Prince of Anhalt, and Count Hohenloe.

In order to invest the declaration of the ban with due solemnity, the ceremonies which in earlier times had been observed on like occasions were also in this instance adhered to. In the great hall of the castle appeared the Emperor, attended by Ulm, the Imperial Vice-Chancellor, while the remaining space was occupied by persons of the highest respectability. The Vice-Chancellor, in a long speech, explained the nature of the offence which the Palsgrave had committed, and stated the reasons why this should not remain unavenged. A secretary then read the sentence pronounced upon the Palsgrave, and handed it to the Emperor, who tore it up, threw the pieces to the floor, and shoved these from him with his feet; upon which one of the courtiers picked them up and threw them from the window. The same dramatic performance was repeated after the reading of the sentence against the Margrave of Jägerndorf, and Anhalt, and Hohenloe. The Emperor did not delay to inform the Elector of Saxony of the proclamation of the ban, which he sought to justify by the papers which had been found at Prague, in proof of the long-continued machinations of the Palsgrave's party. John George was not agreeably affected by this intelligence, since he had persistently refused his concurrence in the ban; and yet, in view of the irrational conditions which the Palsgrave attached to his promise of submission, he could the less object to the forcible measures employed, because he still hoped to reconcile the Emperor with the Palsgrave, if the latter should return to his reason.

Frederic at the time did nothing to justify this hope; for, although he had left Breslau because he no longer

felt safe there, he did not become more inclined to peace when he received the news that the ban was pronounced, but made use of it to gain new friends to aid him in carrying on the war. The hostility of the Emperor he met with defiance. While he directed his attention chiefly to the north of Germany, and hoped also to obtain aid from Denmark, his earliest allies, the members of the Union, were preparing to desert him.

The Union had been extraordinarily affected by the news of the defeat on the White Mountain; it had not, however, laid down its arms, but was defending the Lower Palatinate against Spinola. The Spanish general gradually gained ground, although the forces of the Union had been considerably increased by a re-enforcement of 5,000 men sent on from Holland and England. The winter of 1620-21, which came on gradually, caused a suspension of further operations, which the imperialists attempted to employ to their advantage by laboring, through the friendly Landgrave of Darmstadt, partly by promises, partly by threats, to bring the Princes of the Union to lay down their arms and abandon the Palsgrave. At first these efforts had no other effect than to determine the members of the Union to send deputies to a meeting where counsel was to be taken in regard to further steps. When the deputies assembled in Heilbronn (February 7, 1621), and the Duke of Zweibrücken sought to move those present to perseverance, they refused this except on the condition that the Palsgrave should renounce the crown of Bohemia. In this view they had the concurrence of James of England, who also demanded of his son-in-law this renunciation, and was at the same time ready to support him in the defence of the Palatinate, for which purpose he placed at the disposal of the Union the

sum of £20,000, and determined to send £10,000 to be paid to the English auxiliaries. The meeting at Heilbronn finally agreed to send an embassy to the Emperor, in order to conclude a peace with him upon the condition of the Palsgrave's renunciation, which was with certainty expected. Not until the Palsgrave should be in full possession of his hereditary estates were they willing to lay down their arms.

This action was ill-received by the Emperor. He demanded that the Union should separate its fortunes from the Palsgrave, and peremptorily rejected the mediation. If he desired, he said, to enter into negotiations with the Palsgrave and receive him to favor, no one should intervene. Spinola was therefore directed to end the practical armistice and advance into the Lower Palatinate. The Union was now perplexed; its members had been sure that the Heilbronn resolutions would result in the conclusion of an armistice, and that the Emperor would hasten to accept the offered negotiations: but, instead of this, offensive action was prosecuted and its inflictions were to be suffered. The imperial cities refused any longer to bind their fortunes to the Palsgrave; and when this determination was expressed, the Princes also lost their spirit: they were not willing, indeed, as the Emperor demanded, to abandon the Palsgrave, but they reduced their interest in him to the smallest measure. Through the Landgrave of Darmstadt they requested the concession of an armistice, and promised in return that, before its term should expire, the Palsgrave would renounce the Bohemian crown and crave the Emperor's pardon. They were even willing to concur in a provisional sequestration of the Palatinate, but only on the condition that, after an agreement between the ambassa-

dors which the Union should send to Vienna and the Emperor should have been effected, the concurrence of the Evangelical Princes should be sought as to the manner in which the sequestration should be executed. Spinola was not, however, satisfied with this overture; he required that the Union should submit to all the measures which the Emperor should see fit to take, and frankly added that the Emperor would dispose of the Palatinate according to his own pleasure.

If this condition had been announced at the Heilbronn meeting, the Union would perhaps have opened no negotiations, because at that time its members regarded themselves as sure of England's aid, and the money sent in by James justified their hope. Experience had however shown them that James would not hurry himself to send more money and fulfil the promises he had made, and they were unwilling, therefore, longer to carry on the struggle. The Margrave of Anspach and the Duke of Würtemberg informed the Spanish general, through the Landgrave Louis, that they were ready to yield. The last interview took place at Mentz, where Spinola met these Princes of the Union. By the treaty there concluded, known in its time as the "Mentz Accord," it was agreed that, until the 14th of May, Spinola should not advance further into the Lower Palatinate, and that he should not assail Frederic in territory not already occupied by his troops. On the other hand, the Union obligated itself to evacuate the Palatinate, and that, in case the Palsgrave should not in the meantime be reconciled to the Emperor, and the execution against him must be prosecuted, they would remain neutral. Spinola still further verbally promised the Elector of Mentz and Landgrave Lewis that he would extend the cessation of

arms to the 12th of June, if the King of England should, before the 14th of May, ask for such extension, and at the same time stand security that his son-in-law would refrain from all hostilities towards the Emperor. The promise of Spinola was not included in the treaty of armistice, but formed a separate and, in a sense, secret article. The Mentz Accord not only dissolved the obligations of the Union to the Palsgrave, but also the Union itself, which, in the year 1608, was ushered with such great hopes and plans into life. At the same time that the Union renounced its connection with the Palsgrave, Bethlen again drew the sword in his favor.

II.

When the news of the defeat of the White Mountain reached Bethlen, he acted as if he did not even think of retreating, and admonished the Moravians and Silesians to remain true to their King; and yet he was really stunned, and became still more so when he perceived how little desire there was in Moravia and Silesia to prosecute the war. He finally decided to listen to the advice of the French ambassadors, who yet remained in Vienna, and enter into negotiations with the Emperor, which, under the mediation of these ambassadors, were accordingly opened at Hainburg, on the Danube, at the end of January, 1621. The Emperor's friends, still intoxicated with the victory of the White Mountain, thought they could reap its fruits also in Hungary, and openly declared that Bethlen would now be obliged to withdraw to Transylvania and the Hungarians to renew their submission to the Emperor and ask his forgiveness. Indeed they had secretly agreed that pardon should not

be granted to all, but that here too the expenses must be paid by confiscations, the triumph of the Catholic Church secured, and the inconvenient Constitution remodelled.

In opposition to these views, which were represented by the imperial commissioners in Hainburg, appeared Bethlen's envoys with equally exaggerated demands, and would make no account of the changed circumstances. The difficulty on both sides of realizing their extravagant wishes was so obvious that they could not but be brought nearer together by the mediation of the French envoys. Bethlen was the first to moderate his demands by offering, through his Chancellor, Pechy, to renounce his claim to Hungary, if the Emperor would offer a suitable indemnity, and if the Hungarian Estates would guarantee its payment and be satisfied with the change. The French gentlemen now labored to secure a reciprocal declaration from the imperial commissioners, who were not, however, authorized to make such a one, and two of them returned to Vienna to ask for new instructions. Ferdinand declared himself, in case Bethlen would surrender the crown of Hungary, retire from the country, restore to the Catholics the manorial estates he had wrested from them, and deliver up the originals of the Articles of Confederation by which Hungary had bound itself to Bohemia and Austria, as willing to cede to him domains of the value of from 200,000 to 300,000 thalers, together with the principalities of Oppeln and Ratibor, and invest him with the title of a German Prince. The thirteen counties which, in the transactions at Presburg had been left to Bethlen, were to be restored, and only as an extremity would Ferdinand consent to his holding during his life the counties which had been left to him beyond the Theiss.

The offers which the Emperor made to Bethlen—when it is remembered that the latter was called upon to give up nearly all his conquests, though he still held them in possession—were indeed trifling; but those which he made at the same time to the Hungarian Estates were worse: they were illusory. They involved no general amnesty, for they did not secure the right of property. Nor would the Emperor consent to the conservation of the rights of the Estates; he would only guarantee the “ancient liberties”—that is, would concede nothing more than was specified in his own diploma of coronation and that of his predecessor—and hoped, if the Estates should suffer themselves to be outwitted by this promise, that he would thus be furnished with a handle for restoring the land to the Catholics and strengthening his own authority. When the French envoys inquired of the imperial commissioners whether the Emperor would guarantee that the stipulations of the two latest coronation diplomas would be observed, they promptly declined to give such assurance, because this would open the door to religious disputes. Thus the programme for restoring Catholicism was indicated with considerable distinctness, and the French gentlemen were requested, in the interests of the Catholics, to give it their support. The Hungarian Estates were expected to be content with a few general assurances. The design was, as soon as they should make definite—or, as the commissioners expressed it, “unallowed”—demands, the Emperor “would reopen the war and establish quiet”—that is, when more clearly expressed, reduce Hungary to the condition of Bohemia.

After some correspondence back and forth, two diplomas—one relating to Bethlen, the other to the Hungarian Estates—were made out in Vienna, and sent as an ulti-

matum to Hainburg. The contents of the latter are not known; there can, however, be no doubt that the wishes of the Hungarian Estates were disregarded in it, and a few generalities inserted such as would prepare the way for future persecutions. In the paper designed for Bethlen it was provided that if he should renounce the royal title, surrender the crown, mix no more in Hungarian affairs, and restore to the clergy and nobility the lands of which he had robbed them, then the Emperor would invest him with the title of a Prince of the Empire, convey to him as a hereditary possession the Duchies of Oppeln and Ratibor and Munkács, together with four counties beyond the Theiss, for life, and pay him 100,000 florins in money. These offers were not satisfactory either to the Prince or the Estates, and so the negotiations were broken off after a continuance of more than two months. The French ambassadors now returned home, and with their return the French alliance, which had previously become a fog, disappeared in vapor, for fortune had smiled on the Emperor

III.

What was the Palsgrave doing while the negotiations at Mentz and Hainburg were in progress? He did not rise to the command of those capabilities and means which a war required; he did not adjust himself to his condition. Instead of frankly and honorably abandoning all plans of subversion, he sought, as he travelled through North Germany, to hinder the peace negotiations, to enlist the individual Princes in his fortunes, and to move them to assume aggressive action towards the Emperor. It was chiefly at his urgency and with his co-operation

that the King of Denmark met in council a number of Princes of the Lower Saxon Circle in Segenberg (March 9, 1621), and determined after some discussion to fit out an army. This was done on the supposition that the Union would take part in the future prosecution of the war, and that the King of England would assist his son-in-law in money and arms. But neither of these expectations was realized. The Union withdrew from the struggle, and James would not enter it; and so the King of Denmark also, and the Lower Saxon Princes, were dilatory in their preparations, and finally abandoned them altogether.

At the expiration, therefore, of the time fixed by the Accord of Mentz, all the German Princes had dissolved their friendly alliances with Frederic, and he was obliged to withdraw to the Hague, because no Prince in Germany would furnish him an asylum. Still he would not give up his aggressive action against the Emperor; and when Bethlen resumed his weapons, he named the Margrave of Jägerndorf and Count Mansfeld as his generals, with authority to continue this aggression. Nothing but his father-in-law's constant threats to leave him to his fate forced from him at length the promise to renounce his claim to Bohemia; and even then he attached to this promise all sorts of irrational conditions, such as that the Emperor should agree to pay him a yearly pension, on all future occasions to further the interests of his house, to grant the Bohemians a general amnesty, and others of the kind. His relations with Mansfeld and Jägerndorf he would not dissolve until he should have been re-established in the possession of his inherited lands. The Emperor must first also fulfil all the terms of the Adjustment; then he would return to peace. He crowned this defiant arro-

gance in that he still sent to Vienna no declaration, much less a petition, indicating any desire for reconciliation. The conditional renunciation of Bohemia he communicated only to the King of England, and even that only for the purpose of appeasing him, and not from his conviction that it was necessary to assume a submissive behavior.

While the Palsgrave, by his irrational course, was making reconciliation with the Emperor impossible, he was also facilitating the measures in preparation for his own overthrow. The Emperor intended to rob him, not only of his electoral dignity, but of his possessions, to convey the Upper Palatinate to Maximilian of Bavaria, and thus to redeem Upper Austria which Maximilian held in pledge. The Lower Palatinate was to be given to Spain in return for its aid. The Emperor did, indeed, in the course of the ensuing months, at the request of the King of Spain, who desired that matters should not proceed to their extremity, make declarations indicating the thought of a partial pardon to the Palsgrave; in these, however, he was not really sincere. If the Palsgrave had had exact information of the manner in which the Emperor was laboring to effect his ruin, he would have been justified in that intractable bearing which we have just pictured; his error was simply this, that his conduct would have repelled the Emperor had the latter even been sincerely desirous of reconciliation.

Between the two Princes, who had become as hostile towards each other as was possible, King James now wished to make a third attempt at an adjustment. As a father, it concerned him to provide that his daughter's children should not be driven from their possessions to wander about homeless; as King of Protestant England

he desired to silence the thousand-fold reproaches which had been heaped upon him as damaging the interests of the Church. He therefore determined yet, before the termination of the armistice, to send Lord Digby to Vienna to entreat the restoration of the Palsgrave to his possessions and dignities, and offer himself as security that he would, when pardoned, adjust himself to all the conditions, and render satisfaction to the Emperor for all he had suffered by his hostile action. He was not authorized by the Palsgrave to make this promise ; he still however supposed himself secure of his final concurrence. And in fact, when once the restitution was promised, the conditions could not be difficult ; the severest would after all be to raise the money.

Digby reached Vienna on the 14th of July, 1621, and on the following day laid his request before the Emperor. In requesting the restitution of the Palsgrave, he offered a reasonable satisfaction, though he did not indicate in what it was to consist ; whether the Palsgrave was to conclude with the Emperor an alliance against the common enemy and support a few thousand men at his own cost for the imperial service, or make some other sacrifice, Digby did not specify, though he intimated something of the kind. The answer, which was returned three days later, contained no promise of the desired restitution, but deferred the decision, and stated that a successful solution of the difficulties was not to be expected until the Palsgrave should have actually signified his submission to the utterance of the imperial will, and until Digby should indicate in what, whether in money or in lands, the satisfaction to which he referred should consist. Digby expressed himself as not satisfied with the answer ; and as courage was at too low an ebb in Vienna

to persist in a definitive rejection, because just at this time, after Buquois death, the imperial army was driven back by Bethlen, and the peril might be increased if James should be irritated by the failure of Digby's mission, it was decided to consult the Duke of Bavaria.

When the Duke's opinion was sought he was not in the best humor. At the time of the pronouncing of the imperial ban he was ready to undertake its execution, that he might come into possession of the Palatinate and with it the electoral dignity. The Emperor desired, however, to convey to him only the Upper Palatinate, and by this conveyance redeem Upper Austria, and transfer the Lower Palatinate, as we have already remarked, to Spain. The Duke, on being informed of this plan, felt that he had been bitterly deceived. He refused at any price to renounce his claim to the Lower Palatinate and to undertake the execution which was expected of him, frankly confessing that he had reckoned upon receiving the Lower Palatinate also, and would yield his claim to it only that the Emperor might restore it to the Palsgrave. Only in case the Electorate should be immediately conveyed to him would he defer a more particular understanding to later negotiations and enter upon the execution. In the midst of these mutual explanations the question was put to him by the Imperial Counsellor, Kurz, who just at this time was sent to him from Vienna for this special purpose, what answer should be returned to Lord Digby's propositions.

The manner in which this question was laid before him indicated that the Emperor decidedly wished to restore the Palsgrave, for Kurz declared that the Emperor indeed remembered the promise he had made the Duke in regard to the Electorate, and would now leave to him

to decide whether the promise was to be kept. He represented that since Buquoi's death the danger was on the increase in Hungary, that Holland would espouse the cause of the Lower Palatinate, that Jägerndorf and Mansfeld were every day increasing their strength, and that the Elector of Saxony and other Princes were demanding a reconciliation with the Palsgrave. As Spain could scarcely supply all the aid needed, it must be earnestly considered whether Maximilian and the League possessed sufficient means for the defence of the Electorate, if this should be conveyed to him. The question was so put that the Duke read in it the imperial wish, that he should renounce, in the interests of peace, his claim to the reward which he so earnestly desired.

The Duke certainly felt even more deeply offended by this appeal than he had done when the offer was made to give him the Upper Palatinate, which was yet to be conquered, in exchange for Upper Austria. But he dared not on this occasion give vent to his anger by abusing Ferdinand for his timidity and untrustworthiness ; he must choke down his resentment, and study only how he might bring him to dismiss Digby's mediation, otherwise the Electorate would slip out of his hands. At first he declined to give advice in the matter. He was unwilling to be reviled in Germany as an enemy of peace, as he would be if it should become known that he had declared himself against a reconciliation with the Palsgrave. But he showed in the further course of the negotiation that his advice involved just this and no more, for he attempted indirectly, and therefore the more adroitly, to effect Digby's rejection by the Emperor. He charged the King of England with disseminating in his assertion that he had not supported the Pals-

grave, and advised caution against his dishonesty in the future. But he labored especially to awaken Ferdinand's pride by referring to the efforts of a third person who demanded the Palsgrave's full restoration, while he himself had given no sign of regret, offered no satisfaction, was maintaining a connection with Mansfeld and Jägerndorf, held several places in Bohemia with garrisons, and continued to bear the kingly title.

Three or four days after Ferdinand's ambassador had taken his leave, came the President of the Imperial Court Council, Count Hohenzollern, to Maximilian, and in his intercourse with the Count, who was an old and intimate acquaintance, the Duke broke away from his former reserve. He frankly declared that he would not relinquish his claim upon the Electorate, that the claim was based upon the Emperor's verbal and written promise, and that the Palsgrave should not be restored, or at least not in the way of England's demand. He further defended himself against the supposition that he was led by his personal interests to give this advice; he acted from a regard to the general good. The justness of this claim cannot, indeed, be fairly denied, if the matter be viewed from the Duke's own position. He had doubtless considered the danger to the German Catholics, and especially the Bishops, if the Palsgrave should triumph in Bohemia, and was therefore unwilling that he should be restored to the possession of his inheritance, because he had occasion to fear him as more hostile than ever before. The German Bishops too demanded to be shielded against Frederic's vengeance; and how could this be done unless he should be rendered harmless, by being deprived of his possessions? The Duke had carefully studied the papers which were taken in Prague, and

learned from them that the Palsgrave's party had been laboring, since the year 1608, for the overthrow of the existing order in Germany and Austria. Ambition was first in leading to the Duke's decision, but attachment to his inherited faith and the instinct of self-preservation gave it the needed firmness.

When the Emperor had learned and weighed Maximilian's views, he delayed no longer his answer to the renewed demand of Digby. He held fast to his purpose to put off the decision of the Palsgrave's fate to the meeting of the Diet, to be called at Regensburg, from which he expected advice, and declined to extend the armistice, for the reason that Mansfeld had made an offensive movement in Bohemia and the Margrave of Jägerndorf had invaded Moravia and Silesia. It was however added that the truce might still be extended, and the execution against the Upper Palatinate delayed, if the Palsgrave would follow his father-in-law's "wise counsels," publicly declare his disapproval of the course of Mansfeld and the Margrave, and dismiss them from his service. If Mansfeld should refuse to obey his commands, then the directions issued to the Duke of Bavaria should not result in the Palsgrave's injury. The Emperor would also continue the cessation of arms in the Lower Palatinate, if this could be done without disadvantage to his interests, which point would have to be decided by the Infanta in Brussels. A few days after the receipt of this reply, Digby left Vienna, intending on his way to request of Maximilian not to proceed on his expedition against the Upper Palatinate, and also to make a similar request afterwards in Brussels.

IV.

The truce in the meantime came to an end, not because the Emperor had so directed, but because the Palatinate generals commanding in these parts could not support their troops without proceeding aggressively. Mansfeld commanded in the Upper Palatinate, and in the Lower, after the withdrawal of the forces of the Union, Sir Horace Vere led the troops which had been raised with English money.

When Mansfeld, after the capture of Pilsen, was driven from Bohemia, he desired to confine himself only so long to the Upper Palatinate as he should be employed in strengthening his army, which he gradually raised to the number of 15,000 men. But as Frederic was by his father-in-law urgently admonished to peace, in order that the negotiations opened by Digby might not be hindered, so he requested his generals also not to pass the frontiers of the Upper Palatinate and to give occasion for no complaints. If the Palsgrave had really been in earnest in these directions to his generals, he would have been compelled to dismiss his army from service, for the Upper Palatinate could not sustain for a length of time an army of 15,000 men and supply them with all the needed articles of an armament. But still hoping, on the one hand, to make some gain out of his contest with the Emperor, and not willing, on the other, to surrender himself defenceless to the Emperor's grace, he failed to do just that which was necessary in order to be secure against new entanglements. So it came to pass that when Mansfeld had obeyed for a time the Palsgrave's orders, he was obliged finally to break out of the Upper Palatinate because the means of subsistence for his

army began to fail. But it was not this alone which determined him to a new invasion of Bohemia: he was stirred up to this measure by intelligence from Hungary of the energetic arming of Bethlen and his prospect of a victory over Buquoi. On the 14th of July, therefore, he advanced over the Bohemian frontiers at Waidhausen.


The Emperor committed to the troops of the League, which had withdrawn from Prague to the western part of Bohemia, the repelling of this movement. After the middle of July several engagements took place between Mansfeld and Tilly, by which the former was forced again from Bohemia, but still maintained a position near its frontier. The force of the general of the League was not sufficient to inflict upon his skilful enemy a defeat; he was obliged to wait for re-enforcements from the Duke of Bavaria, who had instituted new enlistments for the expedition in the Upper Palatinate, and expected by these to increase his force to nearly double its present numbers.

Maximilian hesitated no longer to carry out his orders, since the Emperor, as we shall relate, was about to fulfil their conditions and convey to him the electoral dignity. He passed, about the middle of September, the frontier of the Upper Palatinate, and assaulted the city of Cham, forced it to capitulate, and a few days later effected a junction with Tilly at Schwarzenfeld. Their united forces formed an army of 25,000 men, to which Mansfeld could oppose but about half that number. His peril seemed still greater than the year before in Pilzen, for in the open field he could easily be beaten and captured. The fear of this had caused him already for some weeks to listen to an agent sent on from Brussels to discuss with him the conditions under which he would abandon the

Palsgrave. The negotiations were continued by Maximilian, and an agreement was made by which Mansfeld, for the sum of 300,000 thalers, was to surrender the fortified places in the Upper Palatinate and disband his army. Exactly at the moment when this contract was to be carried into effect, Digby, on his return, met Mansfeld at Neumarkt. The English ambassador had in vain requested an interview with Maximilian in order to win his assent to the armistice, and must now learn that this general was ready to surrender the Upper Palatinate into the enemy's hands. He violently reproached him, and bade him reflect that his intended treason would fasten everlasting ignominy upon his name. Whether he was really moved by this rebuke, and on this account shrank back from his treason, as Digby maintained, or whether he had never been in earnest in this bargaining, is uncertain; it is simply known as a fact that he evaded further negotiation with Maximilian by withdrawing to the Lower Palatinate. The Upper Palatinate now fell into the hands of Maximilian, who set up his own government there and applied the resources of the land to the ends of his party.

Meanwhile the war had broken out anew in the Lower Palatinate also, and this occurred in consequence of an attack which the troops of the Palatinate, driven by their necessities—July 25, 1621—made upon the possessions of the Bishop of Spire. The Spanish—no longer commanded by Spinola, who had been transferred to the command of the army carrying on the war with Holland, but by Cordova—greeted the attack with joy, advanced rapidly, and seized a number of places, which the army of the Palatinate was in no condition adequately to defend. Cordova then directed his action against the strongly fortified Fran-





kenthal ; his greatest exertions were not, however, sufficient for its capture, and he was obliged, when he learned of Mansfeld's approach, to withdraw. This adventurer had laid heavy contributions upon all the places he touched in his march, and now arrived with perhaps 10,000 men in Mannheim, where Colonel Vere joined him with about 7,000 to 8,000 more. Instead of pursuing Cordova on his withdrawal from Frankenthal, the two leaders separated again, and Mansfeld levied war contributions upon the territory lying upon the left bank of the Rhine, while Vere remained in the cities in which he had distributed his troops.

When Maximilian perceived that Mansfeld had abandoned the negotiations with him and escaped into the Lower Palatinate, he confided the pursuit of the enemy to Tilly, who, on the 8th of November, joined Cordova in Gernsheim, and the two generals decided to lay siege to Heidelberg. Cordova reluctantly consented to this measure as separating him too far from his base of operations, and seized therefore the opportunity, when he learned that Mansfeld was exacting contributions of the Bishopric of Spire, to separate from Tilly, thus putting an end to all decisive action for the winter of 1621–22. For, although Cordova pursued Mansfeld to the left bank of the Rhine, and there attacked him, he soon retired to winter-quarters, as did also Tilly. Mansfeld, however, used the winter in subjecting Alsace to requisitions, and preparing himself by arming anew for the contest of the coming spring.

V.

We have already intimated that Bethlen, after the negotiations at Hainburg were broken off, determined again

upon war, and thus augmented, in the course of the year 1621, the perils which beset the Emperor. We shall here introduce the Hungarian episode before relating the further progress of the war in Germany.

A successful termination of the war was expected at Vienna when the negotiations at Hainburg were broken off, for Buquoи had advanced to the vicinity of Presburg, and the conviction was entertained that the undisciplined bands of Bethlen would not be able to resist him. The Transylvanian Prince did not advance against the imperial commander, but left the defence of the Castle of Presburg to the garrison stationed there, which in six days (May 6, 1621) capitulated. As Buquoи advanced, his enemy retreated, until he reached Kaschau, where he desired to reorganize his army, and had no occasion to fear being disturbed, because the imperial general would be obliged, at least before reaching him, to capture the fortified places in the western part of Upper Hungary. Bethlen at the same time entered into negotiations with the Margrave of Jägerndorf, sought to persuade him to march to Hungary, and succeeded the better because the Margrave could not any longer remain with his troops in Silesia, since this province had been reconciled to the Emperor.

The imperial troops, after the reduction of Presburg, besieged several cities of Upper Hungary, and, having taken them, advanced before Neuhäusel—which lies near where a small stream discharges itself into the Danube—and invested it. Stanislas Thurzo—a cousin of that Thurzo who once visited Count Thurn before the walls of Vienna—exhibited, in the defence of this fortified place, brilliant capabilities, and the siege was prolonged through seven weeks, without the appearance of any signs

of capitulation. Now arrived 6,000 cavalry from Käschau, and rendered the condition of the besiegers serious, as they had already been obliged to contend with great difficulties in procuring the needed provisions and to make distant foraging excursions. Thus it happened one day that Buquoi, in attempting, at the head of a small body of cavalry, to protect the return of a supply column, was attacked, and in the hand-to-hand fight was killed (July 16, 1621).

Thus closed the life of this man, against whom, during the last two years, the complaint had been raised that he lacked talent for initiatory measures, that he intentionally protracted the war, and that he shared in the greed and robberies of his troops. None of these charges are without their grounds, and yet his services in the cause of the Hapsburgs are uncontested. He had received a better military education than any of the generals who opposed him, and as the latter did not know how to take advantage of his extreme caution and thwart his theoretically well-planned movements, he sustained himself in the field in spite of his many opposers and of his being surrounded with hostile populations; and it must be admitted that his campaigns, so far as they related to purely defensive measures, are equal to the most brilliant achievements of other generals. By him—and this was his chief merit—the defeat of the Emperor's cause was prevented for the time, though not, however, retrieved until this was effected by the aid of the army of the League under Tilly, which, by an aggressive action, for that time quite unusual, put a speedy end to the course of the war in Bohemia.

Maximilian von Liechtenstein, as the colonel who had been longest in the service, assumed the command.

When, a few days later, Bethlen arrived with the rest of his troops, Liechtenstein, deeming himself unequal to the difficulties, decided upon an immediate retreat, which he began in the following night. He was obliged to sacrifice the most of his siege-guns and munitions of war in order quickly to gain a secure position. Notwithstanding the haste of his retreat, the closely pursuing Hungarians came into collision with his army at the passage of the Neutra, and nothing but the swampy nature of the ground prevented the defeat of the imperialists and secured their further retreat, in the course of which they passed the Danube and escaped to the island of Schütt. Bethlen, regardless of Liechtenstein, advanced to Tyrnau, which he forced, after a brief defence, to capitulate. In spite of many a sad experience, which the recently opened peace negotiations caused him to regard as wholesome, his spirit again arose when the Margrave of Jägerndorf here joined him, bringing a re-enforcement of 8,000 men, chiefly infantry, together with a corresponding number of cannon. He now advanced against Presburg, whither the imperialists also directed their march. As the garrison in the castle was sufficiently numerous, and he was unable to prevent the junction of the imperial army with it, his efforts to gain it proved to be in vain, and there remained to him no choice but to raise the siege in the beginning of September. He then gave his time to marauding expeditions in Moravia, which land was compelled to suffer, not only from his invasion, but also from having the imperial troops, which were now gradually moving thither, quartered upon its people.

The course of the war between the imperial and the Hungarian troops had clearly proved that in systematic

warfare the former were always victorious, because they alone possessed some knowledge of the art of war, and with this the needed artillery. It was this that caused Bethlen so to persist in his desire to be re-enforced by the Margrave of Jägerndorf with his foot-forces, and thus aided, he succeeded in making Moravia the theatre of the war. He was, however, unable long to secure this support, as he was without the means of maintaining and paying the Margrave's troops; and in anticipation of the time when he would again be obliged to withdraw to Kaschau, he was not disinclined to open new peace negotiations with the Emperor, provided only that the latter should be disposed to agree to better terms than before. This earnest desire for peace found an echo in Vienna. The recent adverse events and anxiety in regard to the war, which again rested as a burden upon the population of this city, had the effect to modify the lofty plans which occupied them at the time of the conferences at Hainburg, and to incline them to be satisfied with smaller concessions. By a mutual understanding, therefore, there was a conference at Nikolsburg with reference to an adjustment. Bethlen's chief representative on this occasion was Emerich Thurzo; and as he died during the negotiations, his cousin, Stanislas Thurzo, took his place; while the Emperor confided the guardianship of his interests to Cardinal Dietrichstein and Count Eszterhazy.

In the beginning of the conferences both parties repeated those former demands which had led to the rupture in Hainburg; but both soon came down, and Bethlen was quite willing to renounce the title of King of Hungary and to surrender the crown. Still, before an agreement was effected, the conference occupied itself

with attempts to satisfy the Hungarian Estates, who demanded a general amnesty and the confirmation of all their liberties. When intelligence of these demands reached Vienna, it was felt that their concession would be the burial of all the hopes which had been built upon plans of confiscation, the suppression of the Protestants, and the narrowing of the constitutional liberties. The Emperor consulted his privy and his Hungarian counsellors and several theologians, as also the Spanish ambassador, in order to obtain their views. If these advisory colleges had simply followed their own wishes, the Hungarian Estates would still have been entertained with the same meaningless and ambiguous phrases as before. But the calamities of the war made them beyond measure anxious, and called upon them to suppress for the time their wishes. Moreover, new dangers from the adherents of the Palsgrave threatened in Germany; so that the Duke of Bavaria earnestly desired peace with Bethlen, in order that his own forces might be strengthened by the accession of the imperial troops. In view of these unpleasant circumstances, their exalted notions gave way, and the theologians concluded that the Emperor might promise toleration to those of other faiths, and the counsellors that the clipping of the Constitution must wait for more favorable times.

In pursuance of this opinion, the Emperor prepared two diplomas—the one for the Hungarian Estates, granting all their demands; the other for Bethlen, in which, in consideration of his renouncing the kingly title and surrendering the crown and the crown jewels, the Emperor conveyed to him seven counties for life and the principalities of Oppeln and Ratibor, to be hereditary in his family, gave him the title of a Prince of the German Em-

pire, the ownership of the Domains of Munkács and Eched, secured to him the payment at one time of 100,000 florins and 50,000 florins yearly for keeping up the fortifications within his territory. Both instruments were signed by the Emperor on the 6th of January, 1622, and, as Bethlen and the Hungarian Estates declared themselves satisfied with these offers, the so-called Peace of Nikolsburg went into force.

At the time of these transactions the Emperor was anxious to bring them to a speedy conclusion, because he was occupied with thoughts of marriage, which he could not carry out so long as war raged before the gates of Vienna. His first choice fell upon the Infanta Mary, a sister of Philip IV., of Spain; but as he was made to understand that consent would not be given to her marriage to a widower who had children, he turned his attention to the Princess Eleanor, of Mantua, whom rumor made very beautiful, and he charged his favorite, von Eggenberg, with the negotiations. Under the pretext of a pilgrimage to Loretto, Eggenberg entered upon his journey, and, having by inquiry learned the praiseworthy qualities of the Princess, sued for her hand. Eleanor, who, after her parents' death, lived in a cloister, was informed of the suit, gave without hesitation her assent, and on the very same day the marriage took place by proxy, on which occasion Eggenberg represented his sovereign. The wedding itself was not celebrated until the bride reached Innsbruck, whither Ferdinand journeyed to meet her. The marriage was never blessed with children, but was nevertheless a happy one for the Emperor, for the most cordial harmony united him with his wife even to the time of his death.

After the conclusion of the peace, the Emperor took

possession of the territory conveyed to him by Bethlen. The crown was then delivered, at Kaschau, to his ambassador and in the presence of the parties; the nobility and cities belonging to the counties which were to remain with Bethlen took the oath that they would never make war with the Emperor, and would, after Bethlen's death, subject themselves again to his authority. Ferdinand now hastened to fulfil a promise which he made during the transactions at Nikolsburg, to call a Diet of the Kingdom at Oedenburg. He attended in person, and called upon the Estates for an appropriation of the money needed for a better fitting up of the fortifications on his frontiers and for the protection of the interests of his adherents who had suffered losses during the insurrection, particularly the bishops and prelates. It had been determined in Nikolsburg that all the confiscated estates which still remained in Bethlen's possession, or which he had presented to others, should be simply restored to their original owners, and that he should return the sums which he had raised on estates given in pledge. When this subject was discussed at Oedenburg, the Catholics would not listen to the suggestion, that those who held estates on these pledges, and whom they regarded simply as robbers, should be indemnified,* and it appears

* It is not easy to conceive how this ground could have been taken with any show of reason. An actual government, whether revolutionary or otherwise, which confiscates lands may be supposed by the citizens to have a right to convey those lands, and any one who in good faith advances money on such has a right to expect its return before he is called upon to relinquish his claim. Still more inconsistent is this claim of the Catholics in Ferdinand's realm who were calculating upon the simple confiscation of all the estates of Protestants. Ferdinand had indeed fully acknowledged the validity of Bethlen's government, and both had acknowledged, by the treaty of Nikolsburg, their obligations to the holders of mortgages on the confiscated

that the original owners in the counties ceded by Bethlen to Ferdinand one and all obtained their estates again without the payment of an indemnity ; at least this is to be inferred from the complaints which Bethlen is supposed to have made of the non-fulfilment of the terms of the peace. At all events, the conditions were violated in the territory which Bethlen did not cede back, for here there was no thought of the return of these estates either gratuitously or on payment of money.

At the Diet the Protestant members complained that Hungarian fortifications were garrisoned with German soldiers, which, as they claimed, was in violation of their Constitution. The Emperor was obliged to yield and to promise that he would bring no foreign troops into Hungary, except that in Presburg one hundred German soldiers should be kept to guard the crown. The chronic enmities to which he was exposed from Bethlen, however, prevented this in realization. In religious matters there was a spirited contest. The Protestants demanded the maintenance of existing relations ; while the Catholics claimed that all disputes should be settled by Ferdinand's diploma of coronation, by which many undue advantages of the Protestants would be cut off. The parties came to no agreement, and this matter concealed in its bosom the seeds of future quarrels.

As the Palatine Forgach had died in the course of the year 1621, and the place had since been without an incumbent, the Diet requested the Emperor to name the candidates whose election would satisfy him. Ferdinand

estates in the territories which fell to them respectively by that treaty. But the right of complaint seems to have been barred by mutual violations on the part of the two sovereigns.—TR.

named Count Batthyany, Stanislas Thurzo, Nicholas Eszterhazy, and Thomas Erdödi, three Catholics and one Protestant (Thurzo). It might appear surprising that he did not hesitate to propose Thurzo, who had been connected with his cousin, Emerich Thurzo, among the chief abettors of the insurrection stirred up by Bethlen, and even after the peace of Nikolsburg had actively evinced his hostility to the Emperor. But Stanislas Thurzo had in the meantime changed sides: he now thought that he could better promote his interests by joining the Emperor, and had doubtless given secret assurance that he would become a Catholic. This was the very candidate elected by the Diet. The majority were indeed Protestants, and did not yet know of his inward change of sentiments. The Emperor confirmed the election, and Stanislas Thurzo afterwards passed openly over to the Catholic Church. The Diet was then (August, 1622) dissolved.

VI.

When, in the beginning of the year 1622, the peace of Nikolsburg was concluded, the cause of the Palgrave seemed completely lost. Although Mansfeld had pushed his way into the Lower Palatinate and Alsace, and was strengthening himself by arming for the spring, still it seemed certain that he must yield to the forces of the League and of Spain; for where were he and his sovereign to obtain the means for the contest, since the Upper and the greater part of the Lower Palatinate were in the enemy's hands, and there was no longer any Prince who would espouse his cause? James of England was more than ever vexed with his son-in-law since the failure of Digby's mediation. Christian of Denmark refused his aid

because James promised him no support. The North German Princes would not expose their possessions by connecting themselves with a cause which was forsaken by its natural friends. Holland was indeed ready to continue her aid, because the armistice which she had concluded in the year 1609 with Spain expired in the summer of 1621, and it was therefore to her of great importance not to allow peace in Germany and to obtain allies there. But of what use was the little sum supplied by Holland? The Palsgrave could be no longer helped except by friends who, like Mansfeld, could enlist and keep up armies for which he was required to pay nothing but praises and promises. Where could he find such friends?

There were indeed several men ready to play this part, and follow Mansfeld's example in the defence of his cause. The first of these was the Administrator of Halberstadt, Christian of Brunswick, a younger brother of Duke Frederic Ulrich of Brunswick. As early as during the Bohemian insurrection, the "Halberstädter," as he was afterwards called, made no secret of his sympathy with the Palsgrave. As the latter was now not only to lose the crown to which he had been elected, but also his own possessions, Christian determined to be true to him and hazard his life in the contest for him. In the summer of 1621 he enlisted a few thousand men in the Lower Saxon Circle, partly at his own expense and partly at that of the independent Netherlands, and marched in the month of September in two separate columns for the Lower Palatinate. As his men on their march indulged in frequent robberies, they were fallen upon by the Princes of the Lower Saxon Circle and mostly slaughtered, so that he reached the banks of the Main with but 1,300 mounted

men. He found, however, in the Landgrave of Hesse Cassel a friend who supplied him with money and other necessaries of war. During his march he addressed an apologetic letter to the Emperor, who had cautioned him to be quiet, and who afterwards caused the same caution to be repeated through his brother. His answer throws a clear light upon the imperial administration, the course of which had been for centuries in preparation, but was now brought strikingly into view by the language and conduct of individual Princes. Christian assured the Emperor that he should be happy at some time to offer his sword to him, and that to this end he had chosen arms as the trade which he designed chiefly to follow; that he had been offered the command of a cavalry regiment and directed to proceed with this to the Lower Palatinate, and learned to his regret that this was not agreeable to the Emperor; that if he had but known this before he should certainly have declined the command offered him, but could not now retreat, and trusted that he should not be blamed for this, as he had not taken upon him a marshal's command, but fought only as a soldier in an attempt to protect the Elector of the Palatinate in his possessions; that he hoped at another time to have opportunity to serve the Emperor, and thus to win his clemency and grace. Every word of this letter was in mockery of the imperial authority. But Christian of Halberstadt brought forward all this just as naturally as though a contest with the imperial claims were but a matter of course, as though the sentence of the ban against the Palsgrave had no meaning—in short, as though the Princes of the Empire needed to pay no regard to the imperial behests. This had long been the actual, and, one might almost say the normal, state of things in the Empire. There are,

however, few documents of the time which bring this out as sharply as does the Halberstadt letter.

Christian, after a battle with a section of the army of the League which was sent against him, withdrew into the diocese of Paderborn, which he held during the winter, subjecting it to enormous war requisitions. The distress of the population, forced in midwinter to fly from places laid waste by fire, and finding neither shelter nor food, mocks all description. Christian did not allow a gray hair to grow on his head in consequence of these sufferings; his whole demeanor bespoke only his wild wantonness: he boasted that only a parson could conquer the parsons. From the silver which he captured he had coins struck with the inscription, "God's Friend and the Parsons' Enemy;" and it is said, indeed, that he compelled the nuns of a convent to serve him and his officers naked. The means which he won he applied to the enlisting of an army, which in the ensuing spring may have numbered from 15,000 to 20,000 men. Mansfeld also took advantage of the opportunity offered in the diocese of Paderborn to enlist troops for the service of his protégé, and, according to his own statement, by his enlistments in this diocese and in Alsace he raised his army in the spring of 1622 to 35,000 men.

These friends of the Palatinate were joined by a third, in the person of the Margrave George Frederic of Baden Durlach. He was an ardent partisan of Protestantism, and one of the most zealous members of the Union, had reluctantly consented to its dissolution, and now, in spite of rising perils, determined to throw the weight of his sword again upon the Palsgrave's side of the scales. He enlisted a numerous army under the pretext that he desired to obey the Emperor's command and defend the

defiles of his land against the marauding attacks of the Spanish and Palatinate soldiers. He was not trusted in Vienna, and effort was made, by negotiations undertaken by the Archduke Leopold, the Emperor's brother, to quiet him. This labor was, however, in vain. In April, 1622, his armament already complete, he decided to throw off his mask. He renounced his possessions in his eldest son's favor, and declared that thenceforth he was but a soldier, and would not rest until he had helped restore the Palsgrave to his property. There were, therefore, under the lead of Mansfeld, Christian of Halberstadt, and the Margrave of Baden, in the spring of 1622, 70,000 men ready to seize their weapons in the cause of the Palsgrave. The Landgrave of Hesse Cassel and the Duke of Württemberg would gladly have joined this alliance; they enlisted numbers of men, whom they could have sent to the Palsgrave's support, upon the first favorable results, but wanted the decision to make this venture in the start.

These armaments were made chiefly in the winter, and nothing was done on the imperial side to meet them except by way of efforts to complete the existing armaments, in order to be ready in the spring to appear upon the theatre of the war with a still greater force. It was estimated that, with the Spanish auxiliaries, numbering 20,500, the troops of the League 55,500, those of the Archduke Leopold 11,000, and several other re-enforcements, among these 6,000 imperial troops, more than 100,000 men would be ready for the service. These troops had, as in the case of the Bohemian campaign, the advantage, not only in regard to number, but also as to fitness for the service, over their enemies; they were regularly cared for and paid, while those of the other side were obliged to depend chiefly upon plunder. We remark,

however, here, in conclusion, that, in regard to the 100,000 men, there is the same inexactness as in regard to the 70,000 of the other side. Each had in reality a far less number at command; but the ratio remains, nevertheless, that of ten to seven.

The Palsgrave was unwilling, in the face of these preparations for war, to sit inactive in the Hague, and determined—regardless of his father-in-law's wrath, who warned him to keep quiet and await the issue of a fourth attempt, which was now to be made at mediation—to betake himself to the seat of the war. He originally designed to join the army of Halberstadt; but the insecurity of the journey was such that he decided to join Mansfeld. He left the Hague in strictest secrecy, accompanied by but two persons—one of these a Bohemian refugee—and travelled by way of France to Alsace. On the way he stopped at Bitsch, where he was obliged, for a few hours, to adjust himself to the society of a number of the enemy's soldiers, and touch glasses with them as they drank at their meal to the health of his foe. When he came to Mansfeld's camp, at Germersheim, he found there an envoy of the Infanta Isabella, widow of the Archduke Albert, who had just died. Several times negotiations had been opened with the Count from the Catholic side, which he had also several times entertained. Weighty offers of gold and lands were made and high and honorable positions promised him, so that his temptation was stronger than ever before; and who knows but that the sudden appearance of the Palsgrave in Germersheim wrought upon him as that of Digby had done a few months before at Neumarkt? As Mansfeld then yielded to the reproaches of the English ambassador, so he may now, in the presence of him whose

rights he represented, have shrunk back from the commission of treason. At all events, he came to a decision to break off the negotiations, and the agent of Isabella took his leave without having accomplished his purpose. Before his departure he was invited to dine with the Palsgrave, and derisively reproached with this attempt to alienate his best general.


Mansfeld now determined to assume the aggressive, and left his headquarters at Germersheim at the end of April, passed the Rhine, and came upon Tilly at the village of Mingolsheim. In the battle which, on the 27th of April, 1622, took place there, the general of the League was thoroughly beaten, his loss being at least 2,000 men and several cannon. After this collision the Margrave of Baden came up; but instead of remaining in union with Mansfeld and facing the enemy, he separated almost immediately from him — probably because they did not agree as to the chief command. The Margrave pursued Tilly in his retreat, who was much depressed over his defeat, and implored General Cordova at once to join him, as "the salvation of the Empire was at stake."

Cordova obeyed the request, and the two generals commanded about 18,000 men, while the Margrave had at most 15,000. On the 6th of May the hostile forces came together at Wimpfen, and the Margrave, burning with desire for battle and eager to equal Mansfeld, opened the conflict, between three and four o'clock in the morning, by a heavy cannonade, which was answered by the League. The Margrave desired to draw the enemy from his favorable position; but his efforts were in vain, and he effected nothing decisive in the course of the forenoon. During the middle of the day there was no fighting on account of the great heat; about two o'clock the



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Margrave renewed the cannonade, and Tilly and Cordova hesitated no longer to assume the offensive, and in a murderous battle, which lasted five hours, completely defeated the enemy. The Margrave's loss was about 6,000 men, and even this would not have fallen so heavily upon him if he had not lost also his munitions of war, including nearly all his cannon, baggage, and provisions, and, in addition to all this, money to the amount of a million thalers which had been dragged along in two wagons. The entire loss of Tilly and the Spaniards was estimated at 500 men. The Margrave was so stupefied by his defeat that he yielded to the persuasions of his son to attempt, at whatever cost, to place himself right with the Emperor; but he afterwards roused himself up again, and with the remains of his army joined Count Mansfeld.

Mansfeld, meanwhile, attended by the Palsgrave, directed his march towards the possessions of the Landgrave of Darmstadt, intending to plunder these, and then form a union with Halberstadt, who was on his way from the diocese of Paderborn. His first purpose was attained, Darmstadt itself taken, the Landgrave held to the payment of a contribution, and, as he attempted to escape this and other molestations by flight, was made a prisoner. Mansfeld could not, however, remain longer in this city, if he desired to avoid a collision with Tilly, who, since his victory at Wimpfen, was advancing against him. Instead of hastening to meet Halberstadt, he withdrew to Mannheim, in order, if necessary, to take refuge on the other side of the Rhine. This was a most unfortunate movement, as it sacrificed Halberstadt to an attack of the enemy's superior force, and brought on the final overthrow.

After Mansfeld's retreat, Tilly turned his attention to

Christian of Halberstadt, who was drawing near, and who, on the 17th of June, with scarcely 15,000 troops, reached Höchst. Tilly and Cordova had, in the meantime, been joined by a division sent on by the Emperor, and numbered in all nearly 26,000 men, with nineteen cannon, while Christian had but three. In expectation of an attack, he threw a bridge over the Main, at Höchst, and sent his baggage across, while he remained on the right bank and threw up an embankment with a desire to render his position secure. As Tilly drew on and opened the action (July 20th), the battle, which derived its name from the city of Höchst, took for Christian an unfavorable turn; he was driven, after several hours' fighting, from his entrenchment, and this gave the signal of a general flight. The half of his army perished in the battle or the flight, and with only perhaps 8,000 men he afterwards joined the troops of Mansfeld. The loss would have been much greater if Tilly had, instead of waiting two hours, given timely orders for the pursuit. What made the loss heavier than merely that of men, was that, here also, as at Wimpfen, scarcely more than the bare life itself was rescued.

When Christian with 60 mounted men reached Mannheim, a stormy scene took place between him and the Palsgrave, in which he complained of the want of support. Although the position at Mannheim was strong enough, Mansfeld could not—such was the demoralization which showed itself among the troops and the refugees who were gradually assembling, and the officers so feared a general rising—think of maintaining it. A withdrawal to Alsace was therefore decided upon. The Margrave of Baden did not continue with the retreating forces; the defeat at Höchst caused him to despair of the



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Palsgrave's cause, and he gave up for the time all further action. The Landgrave of Hesse Darmstadt was now set free.

With the retreat from Mannheim began a period replete with sorrow and humiliation to the Palsgrave. He lost the respect of the troops and their leaders, and could not doubt that they would simply act for the protection of their own interests. It was therefore not difficult for him to give heed to the warnings of his father-in-law and separate himself from them, that he might seek his safety in new negotiations. He dismissed both Mansfeld and Christian of Halberstadt by patent from his service, and by an understanding with him both commanders on the following day publicly notified Baron von Tilly of their discharge and sought admission into the imperial service. They had as little thought as formerly of entering the service of the Emperor, but desired in this way to justify the Palsgrave's declaration that he had no thought of further aggression. Frederic also addressed to Tilly a request that he might be allowed to sojourn in the Lower Palatinate, and that this be spared a further invasion. Tilly, however, made no answer, and he was obliged to accompany Mansfeld in his march; but he soon after left him and returned to the Hague.

Mansfeld and Christian of Halberstadt now directed their march to France, and offered their service to King Louis. Sham negotiations were opened with them; but when they observed—as they soon did—that these were not earnest, and that an armament was being fitted out against them, they made an incursion into the Duchy of Brabant, and came into collision at Fleurus with Cordova, who was advancing to meet them. Both parties claimed, in the battle which followed (August 29, 1622), the victory;

in fact, it resulted so far in favor of Mansfeld, who was chief in command, that the enemy, who designed to cut off his way to Holland, was repulsed with great loss. Christian of Halberstadt was wounded in the battle in his left arm, and, as he did not sufficiently attend to his wound, it became gangrenous and caused the loss of his left hand. Mansfeld now advanced without hindrance to Bergen op Zoom, and effected a junction there with the Hollanders. His army was reduced within a few weeks, by the hardships of the march and the attacks of the enemy, to one-fourth of its former numbers; he had now under his command only 6,000 men, and these were lacking in everything, but especially in necessary clothing, so that they no longer looked like soldiers, but like beggars in rags. Their appearance, however, before Bergen op Zoom caused Cordova to raise the siege of this city.

Archduke Leopold and Tilly took advantage of the withdrawal of Mansfeld to reduce all the cities still held by Palatinate garrisons in Alsace and the Lower Palatinate. They completed this work in the course of the summer and autumn. Tilly forced Heidelberg, on the 19th of September, and Mannheim, on the 2d of November, to capitulate. The English troops who held these places were discharged to return home. In the Palsgrave's possession there remained at the end of the year 1622 but the single city of Frankenthal.

VII.

When the Emperor, by the advice of Maximilian of Bavaria, had determined to return a negative answer to the King of England in regard to the armistice and the restoration of his son-in-law, he was prepared to fulfil the

conditions of the treaty made at Munich for the transfer of the Electorate. On the 22d of September, 1621, he executed a document, which was for the time to remain secret, conveying to the Duke of Bavaria the Electorate of the Palatinate which he so ardently desired, the Emperor only reserving to himself the fixing of the time when this action should be made public. He desired that all danger of war should be manifestly over before a decision of such import should be published to the world. Maximilian, who, by his own penetration and the fortunate choice of his servants, had decisively controlled the current of events, appeared now more than ever in their foreground; for it was only to satisfy his ambition that it had been necessary further to prosecute the war. He ought not, however, on this account to be charged with the chief guilt; the Palsgrave, who, by his irrational behavior after the battle of the White Mountain, really forced the enemy to continue the war, was equally guilty; and so was the Emperor, who, in consequence of his bad financial management, was unable to redeem Upper Austria from the claims of the Duke of Bavaria, and therefore indemnified him with the electoral dignity.

If the Emperor desired to transfer the Electorate to the Duke, he must, in order to secure for this act the needed recognition, obtain the concurrence not only of the majority of the Electoral College, but also that of the two most prominent foreign powers, that is, of Spain and France.

The ecclesiastical Electors had, as members of the League, helped the Emperor in putting down the insurrection; but they were not all decided to make an extreme use of the victory, and especially Schweikhard, the Elector of Mentz, felt it his duty, in the interests of peace, to ad-

vise against the further persecution of the Palsgrave. When Ferdinand sought his concurrence in the transfer of the Electorate, he gave a negative answer, which, however, was so understood in Vienna as to produce the conviction that he would, at the Electoral Diet, yield to the Emperor's wishes. The Elector of Treves followed the example of him of Mentz in counselling peace. On the contrary, the Elector of Cologne, himself a brother of Maximilian, was, from the beginning, in favor of his elevation. To gain the Elector of Brandenburg, a brother-in-law of the Palsgrave, to his view, the Emperor did not expect, and therefore made no attempt, but labored on this account the more zealously to secure the assent of Saxony. John George, as an ally of the Emperor, was at such enmity with the advanced Protestant party in Germany as to consent that its head, the Palsgrave, should, once for all, be made harmless, and declared, in a confidential interview with the Archduke Charles, a brother of the Emperor, that he should raise no objection against the transfer (November 1, 1621). This declaration did not, however, prevent his voting, at a later day, against the act, and assuring the world that he desired the Palsgrave's pardon. In Vienna no importance was attached to these assurances, and rightly, so far as this, that the Elector would not draw the sword against the Emperor. If, in the Electoral Diet which was to be called, Ferdinand should have control of the three ecclesiastical votes and that of Bohemia, the Elector of Saxony might perhaps protest, but would content himself with his protest, and Brandenburg, thus isolated, was not to be feared. In Germany, therefore, the business was arranged to suit the desires of the Emperor and the Duke of Bavaria. Spain and France now remained to be consulted.

Spain had hitherto faithfully aided the Emperor: King Philip made extreme sacrifices to rescue his German cousin from the brink of destruction, although his own interests urgently opposed any further appropriations. He died on the 31st of March, 1621, and was succeeded by his son, Philip IV., then but fourteen years of age, who, immediately on ascending the throne, dismissed the most conspicuous of his father's ministers, and gave the lead of affairs to his favorite, Count Olivarez. It must be admitted that the Count was better qualified for this than his predecessors, which he showed at once in his sincere desire to maintain peace with England, and, in his recommendation to this end, that the Palsgrave, or at least his children, be admitted to grace. His design was, however, thwarted by several zealous Catholics and friends of the Emperor or the Duke of Bavaria, among whom Zúñiga, Counsellor of State, was prominent. A profound veneration which the King himself cherished for his imperial uncle disinclined him to oppose his plans, to which was further added the influence of the Papal Nuncio, who energetically interested himself for Maximilian.

In order to bring the King completely over to his side, Ferdinand wrote him an autograph letter, the delivery of which he confided to a Capuchin monk, Hyacinth by name, who held himself at the service of the Pope for political missions. He was to bear, also, a letter to Zúñiga, in which Ferdinand sharply, briefly, and without rhetorical flourishes or set phrases, stated the reasons for depriving the Palsgrave of his possessions, which all culminated in this, that he was an implacable enemy, and no means should be left for his enmity to employ. In order to secure the safe delivery of the letters, the Papal Nuncio in Vienna, Caraffa, offered to send them to the

Nuncio at Brussels, and thence to Spain, and they were handed him for this purpose, so that Hyacinth was to make the journey to Spain without them, and receive them after his arrival there. This precaution was ill timed; for on the way to Brussels they fell into the hands of Count Mansfeld, who sent them to the Palsgrave, and thus placed in his hands the sharpest weapons of assault upon the imperial policy. The departure of Hyacinth appears to have been put off on account of the letters having been intercepted, for he did not arrive in Spain until the following year.

The Capuchin was received in Madrid as he might have expected; for a long time no favorable word was given him; he was requested to go to Brussels, and there be present at the negotiations (of which we shall soon give an account) just opened between James and Ferdinand; but he observed that the motive was simply to get rid of him, and so entered upon more decided steps for Maximilian, and appealed to the Pope. There are two versions of the answer which he finally received. Khevenhiller regarded it as so ambiguous as to admit of no more definite interpretation than that Philip wished the Duke of Bavaria to have the Electorate of the Palatinate. Hyacinth, however, stated that Philip's declaration, verbal or written, expressed a strong desire that the Electorate should be transferred to Bavaria without waiting for the Electoral College to meet. At all events, whatever might have been the answer, the Spanish policy was both weak and double-tongued, for the assurances sent on the very same year to England favored the restoration of the Palsgrave. Afterwards the Spanish government labored for the same end also in Vienna, to revoke the promises made to Father Hyacinth; but its declarations sent on for this

purpose were so wanting in energy as to assure Ferdinand that he might act contrary to Philip's wish without forfeiting his alliance.

Ferdinand was unwilling to take upon himself the negotiations with France in regard to the transfer of the Electorate, because, since the departure of the French embassy, the government of Louis XIII. had no longer manifested any good feeling towards him. He left this to Duke Maximilian, who, for this purpose, sent a special ambassador (September, 1622) to Paris. The French statesmen were then more than ever affected with their hereditary enmity to the Hapsburgs, and were on the watch for an opportunity to inflict injury upon them. The Emperor, as they felt, had gained too much ; he was stronger in his possessions than any of his ancestors had been ; he could, in his relations with foreign powers—when he should have restored his lands to the Catholic faith—play a more decisive part, and thus augment the power of Spain. All this was extremely unpleasant to the French. They had supposed that the German Hapsburgs could rise to but a sham life at best, and now the very opposite had taken place. A further cause of their rekindled enmity was that Spain was attempting to turn to its advantage the quarrel which had sprung up between the Cantons of Graubunden and Veltlin, and take possession of the latter, which was a Catholic Canton. This possible augmentation of the Spanish power caused the French to throw off all reserve, and enter with Mansfeld, whom they had just chased out of their country, into an alliance, in order to stir him up to make new enlistments with reference to another assault upon the Hapsburgs.

Such was the state of feeling in France when Father Valerian Magni arrived there and requested concurrence

in the transfer of the Electorate, and France was ready to concede this in deference to the intercessions of Pope Gregory XV. It was certain too that the Hapsburgs would not find in the new Elector a more valuable friend than they had found in the Duke. Maximilian, however, demanded not only a concurrence in the transfer of the Electorate, but sued also for an alliance with France. He designed to apply this, however, only to secure his own possession against the Palsgrave; would not therefore allow it to be employed to the damage of the Emperor, and so his proposal was rejected. The French would only grant his wish in regard to the Electorate and acknowledge the transfer.

The Emperor and the Duke of Bavaria might now hope that they would not be opposed in the transfer of the Electorate; but they had made no account of the King of England, who might, even at the last moment, bring their labors to naught. James, when he learned that Digby's attempt at mediation was without effect, applied to Ferdinand by letter (November, 1621), threatening him with war in case he should not agree to the Palsgrave's restoration. The Emperor delayed, and it was not till three months later that he sent Count Schwarzenberg to London with instructions to deal only in evasions. He was not permitted to make promise to the King of the restoration, but simply to intimate the Emperor's inclination to represent himself in negotiations for an adjustment, which might perhaps take place at Brussels. Small as was the encouragement contained in these declarations, James nevertheless clung to them, and sent Sir Richard Weston to Brussels, where he arrived three days before the battle of Wimpfen, and in his first audience demanded of the Infanta that she avail herself of the au-

thority which the Emperor had conferred upon her, and consent to an armistice. Even with the best will, Isabella could not have acted in disregard of the decision which was to take place upon the battle-field; but she was not placed in the position to make a useless promise, because her counsellors did not proceed so far as to come to an understanding with the ambassador in regard to the terms of the armistice. Weston proposed that negotiations should be opened at once in relation to the conditions of peace, and for this purpose demanded the admission of a certain Andrew Pawel, whom the Palsgrave had sent to Brussels to represent him, which was conceded.

At first the Palsgrave was inclined to pay no regard to the intended negotiations, but desired to seek his safety in arms. But when battles did not result as he had expected, and one defeat after another was reported, he concluded to draft instructions for his representative in Brussels. These instructions verified the reproach frequently before made against him, that he had neither any comprehension of the situation nor any judgment of the relations of the parties. Beaten and driven from his possessions, it was still not enough that he should be restored to his inheritance and title, but he demanded to be reimbursed of the money expended by him in Bohemia, as well as of the damages inflicted upon his lands, and claimed that his enemies should assume the payment of a part of his indebtedness to his own troops.

At the beginning the negotiations between Weston and the Spanish and imperial ambassadors were occupied chiefly with questions of form; there was hesitation especially in regard to Pawel's authority, because Frederic, in making out his commission, assumed his title as Elec-

tor, to which he was deemed to have no right after the sentence of the ban. The Emperor afterwards declined, on account of the favorable indications on the war theatre, to pursue the negotiations further, and notified the King of England of this, at the same time requesting him to send a representative to the Electoral Diet, which was to be opened in Regensburg in October. The only concession that he suggested consisted in permitting the Palsgrave to enjoy, until the adjustment should be effected, the official incomes from Heidelberg, Neustadt, and Germersheim. For an instant James was in a ferment over the further defeat of his attempts at settlement ; at last Buckingham wrote to the Palsgrave that the King was resolved to declare war against the Emperor, if he should persist in his unyielding course. But as he had fallen into a quarrel with his Parliament about some home matters, he was without money for the war, and sent Lord Digby to Spain with the hope of there obtaining that which he had failed to obtain from the Emperor.

Digby was received with distinction in Spain, because Olivarez did not underestimate the danger of a breach with England in case his sovereign should, at the same time, be imperilled by the jealousy and hostility of the French. He entered, therefore, energetically upon measures for satisfying the desires of James, and proposed a marriage of the Palsgrave's eldest son with the Emperor's daughter. The young Prince was to receive in Vienna a Catholic education, and the electoral dignity was then to be conferred upon him. This was a proposition such as might spring from the brain of the all-powerful minister of an absolute King, but could not be accepted by either James or the Palsgrave. The King of England could not, in view of the contempt of his Parliament, which he

would thus heap upon himself, consent to such a transaction, and as to the Palsgrave, he had never, in all his pitiable conduct, given occasion to the thought that he would carry on a traffic in his children's religious faith.

VIII.

Thus stood this matter at the time when the Emperor summoned a Diet of Deputies—not, as was expected, one of the Electors—to meet at Regensburg in November, 1622, for its definitive settlement. The Deputation Diet differed from a Diet of the Electors in this, that, in addition to the Electors, it admitted also to its sessions the Dukes of Bavaria, Brunswick, and Pomerania, the Landgrave of Darmstadt, the Archbishop of Salzberg, and the Bishops of Würzburg, Bamberg, and Spire. It was supposed that the decisions of this larger assembly would be more imposing in their effect. On the 24th of November the Emperor and the Empress made their ceremonial entry into Regensburg, where they were greeted by three Princes who had already arrived. The others, or their representatives, followed, except those of Pomerania and Brunswick, who remained away that they might not sanction, by their presence, decisions which to them were disagreeable.

The Emperor was obliged, in deference to Spain's energetic intercession in favor of a mild treatment of the Palsgrave, to re-open, after his arrival in Regensburg, the negotiations begun in Brussels in regard to an armistice in the interests of the l'alsgrave. A memorial of Count Oñate was assumed as the basis of the action now to be taken, in which action the counsellors of those Princes already present—Mentz, Cologne, Salzberg, Würzburg,

and Hesse Darmstadt—took part. In this memorial the terms of the contemplated armistice were discussed. They were these : The Palsgrave was to be granted the official incomes of Heidelberg, Mannheim, and Frankenthal, and the city of Heidelberg was to be surrendered to him ; in return for which he was to give up Frankenthal and Mannheim to the Infanta.

The counsellors of Cologne declared themselves against this proposition ; they would not consent to the surrender of Heidelberg to the Palsgrave, as this would involve a kind of promise of restoration, nor to a cessation of arms, because this would leave no security against the aggressions of Mansfeld, to whom the armistice could not be extended because he had no territory nor any one to support his men during the interval. Nor was Ferdinand willing to grant a cessation of arms, except on the condition that neither Heidelberg nor Mannheim should be given up to the Palsgrave, and that the cessation should be general and security be given against the aggressions of Mansfeld. If the Palsgrave would solemnly declare, and repeat his declaration in writing, that he had entirely withdrawn his support from Mansfeld, the Emperor would believe his statement, but would not admit him into Germany until he should be able to control the action of Mansfeld and Halbertstadt.

In apprehension that Ferdinand might give way at some point which they had not foreseen, the Bavarian representatives addressed to him a note in which they declared that their sovereign would surrender Heidelberg and Mannheim only in case the Emperor would fulfil his promise in relation to the transfer of the Electorate and indemnify him for the expenses of the war. On this demand all attempts at reconciliation must be wrecked.

The Emperor could not and would not pay the amount; and where was the Palsgrave or James to obtain the ten million florins of Maximilian's account for the conquest of the Upper and Lower Palatinate? The armistice was, therefore, definitively rejected, and the proposition which the Emperor, on the 17th of January (1623), laid before the Diet proved that Maximilian had triumphed at every point over the Emperor's yielding resistance.

It was on the above-mentioned day that the Emperor laid before the Diet the propositions on which they were to give him counsel. Two points were quite significant: *First*, he stated that he had, on account of his offences, divested the Palsgrave of the electoral dignity, and had transferred this to Maximilian of Bavaria, and desired solemnly to invest him with it; *secondly*, he demanded adequate aid for the expulsion of the Hollanders from the places which they had occupied, for, being again since 1621 at war with Spain, they had ventured to pass the frontiers of the Empire, and to repel in general all hostile movements. The members of the Diet were divided in counsels, forming two parties according to their faith—the Catholics declaring themselves in favor of the transfer of the Electorate, while the Protestants opposed it. Ferdinand now addressed a communication to the Electoral College, which he supposed would refute the opposing views of the Protestants. In this he claimed that his right to direct in regard to the Electorate was absolute, which declaration he softened only by adding that he was willing to receive the Palsgrave into favor and enter into negotiations with reference to reinvesting him with his possessions.

The question was now warmly taken up as to whether the Emperor was justified in pronouncing the ban against

the Palsgrave. Those who opposed this act sought to prove its illegality by an appeal to two paragraphs in the articles to which he had sworn at his election, one of which provides that the Emperor shall not, in any matter of importance, decide his course of action without having consulted the Electors; the other provides that the Emperor shall not pronounce the ban against any member of the Empire without having given him a hearing. The charge, that the Emperor had not consulted the Electors, was not strictly just, for he had sought the concurrence of all but Brandenburg, and, if his obligation was violated at this point, the violation was at the minimum. In answer to the charge, that the sentence of ban shall not be pronounced against a member of the Empire without his having been heard, the Emperor's friends sought to show that it would have been superfluous to give the Palsgrave a hearing, that he had been forewarned, that he had notoriously broken the peace of the Empire by accepting the crown of Bohemia, and that no citation or hearing would have brought out anything tending to lessen his guilt, and that in any notorious breach of the peace the guilty member does *ipso facto* incur the penalty of the ban. If the Protestants yet complained of the Emperor's violation of the articles, they too must answer for having neglected their duty to him. The Empire was bound to the Emperor, as the rightful holder of the crown of Bohemia, to defend him in its possession; instead of which the Elector of Brandenburg, during the entire insurrection, was on the most peaceful terms with the Palsgrave, the moral effect of which was to prevent the Lower Saxon Circle from joining the Elector of Saxony in his support of the Emperor, and acted in general as though Ferdinand and his possessions were not under the

protection of the Constitution of the Empire. If the Princes of the Empire had aided the Emperor in his contest with the insurrection in Austria and Bohemia, they would have had an incontestable right to demand that even the strict letter of the agreement should not be violated. But those Princes who were openly and secretly hostile to him had no right to demand its observance; indeed, they were implicitly, if not expressly, bound by oath to bear in mind their duty to the Empire. It is therefore apparent that if the Emperor is reproached with the violation of his obligations, he too may complain that the Empire neglected its duty to him.

In spite of the imperial letter to the Electoral College, the Protestants persisted in their opposition. The Elector of Mentz was lukewarm in the cause of the Bavarian Prince, and the Spanish ambassador opposed the transfer of the Electorate. The imperial cabinet began, therefore, anxiously to consider whether and how far they might safely commit themselves in Maximilian's behalf. Eggenberg, whose ears were always open to the Spanish ambassador, was the first who ventured to speak against Bavaria and Cologne, claiming that at least the hereditary transfer of the Electorate would be impossible. Maximilian himself, who meanwhile had arrived in Regensburg, felt the force of this statement, and the two parties now united upon a middle course which it was thought would satisfy the Duke of Bavaria without too greatly irritating the Protestant Princes. The electoral dignity was to be conveyed to him, while at the same time a way of reconciliation with the Palsgrave was to be opened, and for this purpose another meeting was to be called. If peace should not even by this measure be secured, then the College of Electors should determine whether the

Emperor might act his pleasure in regard to the Electorate, or whether he should acknowledge the rights of the children and agnates of the Palsgrave, and, if so, which of them he should acknowledge. The Duke of Bavaria was, on the other hand, to be bound in writing to follow the decision of the Electoral College and eventually renounce the electoral dignity.

In pursuance of this agreement, the Emperor made out his final decision, and sent it to the Diet. He declared that the Palsgrave, "on account of the great and inexcusable offences" of which he had been guilty, should be punished with the loss of his electoral dignity; furthermore, that the Emperor was ready to yield "to the intercessions of Princes friendly to him and restore him to grace" (that is, return to him his possessions) if he "would but duly humble himself, deprecate his conduct, and refrain from all further machinations." This promise Ferdinand was compelled, by the attitude of Spain and Saxony, and by the armaments in the Lower Saxon Circle, to make, and, as if this were not enough, though it would have cost him his province of Upper Austria, which he could never have redeemed, he further declared that he would examine the claims to the Electorate of the children and agnates of the Palsgrave: would, to this end, place himself in friendly relations with the King of England, and, in case this should lead to no result, would refer the matter to the Electors, and make his final decision in accordance with their counsel. His words importated almost as much as that he would raise no objection to the restoration of the Electorate to the Palsgrave's children and would gladly accept a peace; and we almost think that, even in face of the danger of losing Upper Austria, he was ready so to act, if he could have secured thereby a *real* peace and not remained sub-

ject to the anxious apprehension of renewed attacks from his enemies. The document executed for the final conveyance of the Electorate to Maximilian during his life had in its remaining contents nothing to challenge opposition, and would perhaps have been approved in Germany, if religion had not divided the Princes, and if—which fell with a still more decisive weight upon the scale—they had not repudiated all deference to the exercise of imperial authority.

The Protestants therefore made but little account of the Emperor's assurances; his fair words of promise failed to make the desired impression, and even the confidence which the less hostile felt would have quite vanished, if they had been informed of a document, which was agreed upon the next day between the Emperor and the Duke of Bavaria, the intent of which was to indemnify the Duke for the disappointment of his hope. In this the Emperor declared that it was only on account of the opposition raised by Saxony and Brandenburg, and for the sake of the King of England, that he had refrained from bestowing upon him the hereditary investiture. Further, that in case the future judgment should be adverse to the Palsgrave, then the promise of September 22, 1621, should simply come into full force; if this should be in the Palsgrave's favor, then the Emperor obligated himself that the Duke should still hold the Electorate during life. In case the decision should be in favor of the agnates, the Emperor declared that he should not follow it, but should act according to his own views of equity.

On the 25th of February the Emperor invested the Duke of Bavaria with the so warmly contested electoral dignity. The Duke did not, however, receive all that he

desired : the Elector's dignity was not made hereditary, nor were the lands of the banished Palsgrave ; but he shrank not from the contest with the overwhelming difficulties of the case ; slowly and cautiously he removed one obstacle after another, and found in this work his best ally in the rashness and unreasonableness of the Palsgrave. His resources would not have been adequate to the carrying out of his great plans, but he had made the incomes of the German Bishops tributary to him as an Emperor had scarce ever done. The Bishops regarded him as having saved them from an impending fall, and so the only one who could still protect them, and therefore readily supplied him the means of keeping up the army, the command of which he had conferred upon a competent general. They were satisfied that he would devote his entire energies and power to the conservation of that traditional state of things which would best promote the weal of the Princes and Bishops, and that, if he should ever favor a change, it would be only in the interests of the Catholic Church. With the Emperor also his word and his judgment had its weight : old remembrances of their school-days, their relationship, and then gratitude for the rescue which he had wrought, together with respect for his sober and clear intellect, and especially for his financial management, caused Ferdinand to subordinate himself to Maximilian's counsels. In this state of the case Maximilian could assure himself that the difficulties in the way of carrying out his wishes would give way before him. He now presented his account to the Emperor for services rendered, and demanded the reimbursement of twelve millions of florins which he had expended in putting down the Bohemian insurrection and in executing his decrees in the Upper and Lower Palatinate.

The Emperor acknowledged the indebtedness, and gave, in addition to Upper Austria, also the Upper Palatinate, in pledge for the amount. Thus the new Elector came into possession of a part of the confiscated lands of the Electorate, and now more confidently hoped to receive also the remainder.

The Duke of Bavaria was not alone at the Diet of Deputies in being rewarded for his services: the cornucopia of imperial grace was emptied also upon several other persons, especially the Chief Steward, Baron von Eggenberg, and the President of the Imperial Court Council, Count Hohenzollern, both of whom were raised to the rank of Princes. Finally, also, the Landgrave of Hesse Darmstadt, who was involved in a contest with his cousin of Cassel, in regard to the inheritance of Marburg, in whose favor an imperial decision was rendered.

The Emperor now communicated to the Diet his desire for aid against the new plots of his enemies. These plots assumed in the Lower Saxon Circle a tangible form. In the Diet of that Circle it was decided to arm, and even Mansfeld and Halberstadt, as also Duke William of Weimar, were engaged in enlistments, which were expected to result in the show of a considerable army by the spring of 1623. The Palsgrave was inciting his friends to extreme exertion. He solicited the aid of Holland, which was always ready to render this; of France, which was on the point of throwing off its reserve; as also of Bethlen, who again decided upon war against the Emperor. Thus a new coalition was in operation against Ferdinand, as now appeared by manifest signs. Although the Diet at Regensburg could not answer the Emperor that he was calling for their aid against imaginary dangers, still it did not concur in the demand. The representatives of

Saxony and Brandenburg excused themselves on the ground that they were not sufficiently instructed. It was now a matter of concern with the Catholics whether they should not venture to rush into action upon an independent decision. In the answer given in the Diet they but enveloped their intentions in a vague, general phraseology ; but in those side-counsellings, which they alone attended, they came to decisive and sharp conclusions. They perceived that the assaults which threatened the Emperor were directed as much against them, and that they also must arm. They determined to strengthen the regiments of the League, the numbers in which had fallen to 18,000, by fresh enlistments, and, as the Emperor offered to furnish 6,000 men, they felt secure against all attacks, and indeed felt so certain of victory that they distributed right there among themselves the possessions of those noblemen who should, in the new campaign, compromise themselves. For the time, however, they were only certain of the contest with Mansfeld and Christian of Halberstadt, both of whom had left Holland and entered German territory. Whether some of the German Princes would join them, the future would show.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE LOWER SAXON, THE DANISH, AND THE TWO HUNGARIAN WARS.

- I. The War in the Lower Saxon Circle. Battle of Stadtlohn. War with Bethlen. II. Negotiations for the Formation of a great Protestant Alliance, the Lead of which was finally assumed by Christian IV. Richelieu. III. Negotiations for a Counter-Alliance of the Catholics. Waldstein. IV. The Election of Ferdinand III. as King of Hungary. The Brunswick Negotiations. V. The Battle of the Dessau Bridge. Mansfeld and Waldstein in Hungary. VI. The Battle at Lutter. VII. Insurrection of the Peasants in Upper Austria. VIII. New Regulations for the Land.

I.

IMMEDIATELY after the dissolution of the Diet at Regensburg it became apparent how well grounded were the Emperor's apprehensions in regard to the further extension of hostile plans. The Lower Saxon Circle had resolved on an armament of 18,000, to be employed, however, only for the defence of the frontier against invasions, whether by the troops of Mansfeld or the Emperor or others. But how little sincerity there was in this resolution appears in the fact that the troops of Halberstadt were permitted freely to advance over the frontier, and confidential relations were entertained with this enemy of the peace of the Empire. The Emperor threatened Halberstadt with the ban in case he should pursue his hostilities, and offered him pardon if

he would but lay down his arms. He knew, however, that in the coming war he would have only the League to oppose him, as the Emperor was obliged to turn his own forces against Bethlen, and he therefore cast both the threat and the bait to the winds, in the assurance that he and Mansfeld combined were certain of victory, since they might with safety reckon upon the co-operation of the Landgrave of Cassel, the Elector of Brandenburg, and several other Princes of the Saxon Circle.

As the Emperor's opposers did not listen to his warnings and disarm, Tilly was ordered to advance to the north. He first directed his march against the territory of the Landgrave of Cassel, who in every way showed his hostility to the League, without, however, proceeding to an open breach. When Halberstadt, meanwhile, had attacked a regiment which the Emperor kept in Germany and had levied contributions upon the territory of Mentz, the general of the League entered the territory of the Duke of Brunswick, and thus set foot in the Lower Saxon Circle. The Estates of the Circle became timid when they saw their land about to become the theatre of the war, and sought to persuade Halberstadt either to disarm or withdraw, in order that they might be able to address the same request to Tilly. Christian did indeed leave the Lower Saxon Circle, but not out of regard for this request, but simply in order to form a junction with Mansfeld in the diocese of Osnabrück. At the time of breaking up his camp he numbered 16,000 foot and 5,000 mounted men, and the army of the League, numbering about 28,000 strong, pursued and overtook him at Stadtlohn on the Berkel, in the territory of Münster. Tilly attacked him on the afternoon of the 6th of August (1623), and in a battle, which lasted nearly two hours,

completely defeated him. Nearly 6,000 of Halberstadt's men were slain, 4,000 were made prisoners, and the remainder, with their leader, fled for refuge to Holland. Duke William of Weimar was among the prisoners; he was delivered to the Emperor, long held in custody in the New City, Vienna, and finally set at liberty on the empty promise which he made thenceforth to be loyal.

Mansfeld had meanwhile advanced into the diocese of Münster; but as he could not think of sustaining himself against the victorious foe, he marched into East Friesland, where he remained for the winter secure against further attacks. But as he did not long find there the necessary subsistence for his troops, he entered again, through the Count of Oldenburg, into negotiations with the Emperor, which, as usual, led to no result. The army of the League was now constantly advancing towards him, and, as he felt too weak to fight them, he offered to evacuate East Friesland on the payment to him of 300,000 florins. The States-General were ready to pay him this sum, if, in return, the fortified places of East Friesland should be surrendered to them. Mansfeld agreed to the terms, discharged his men, and afterwards went to England, where he solicited the means for raising another army. In the beginning of the year 1624 no considerable hostile force stood opposed to the Emperor in Germany; only discharged soldiers were roving hither and thither, and rendering the highways insecure.

It has been intimated that the Emperor's enemies, when, in the spring, they opened the campaign against him, reckoned upon Bethlen's co-operation. In fact, he declared himself ready for an invasion of Moravia if Halberstadt with a few thousand infantry would come to his aid.. This promise was made him, and, trusting that

it would be fulfilled, he resolved to yield to repeated solicitations and venture a preliminary movement with his own forces. In the middle of August (1623) he left Transylvania with somewhat over 20,000 men, and had this time the satisfaction of being supported by a Turkish army of nearly 30,000. After having established himself in Upper Hungary, he learned that Halberstadt had been defeated, and that he could therefore expect no aid from him ; so he suspended his operations.

Meanwhile as Bethlen was coming on from Transylvania, the Emperor recalled the troops which he had sent to Tilly—but 2,000 of the promised 6,000 had as yet been sent to Germany—and attempted also to strengthen by new enlistments the force stationed in Austria. With all his efforts, however, he brought together at first but 9,000 men, and placed them under the command of the Marquis of Montenegro, whom he had tempted by large promises to leave the service of Spain. Waldstein, whose previous services—especially in the year 1621—had arrested attention, took part in this campaign as second in command.

In the month of October, Bethlen resumed operations, pushed his way into Moravian territory, and at the same time annoyed Lower Austria by marauding expeditions. At Göding, on the river March, he finally came into collision with the enemy's force. However, neither he nor the Marquis of Montenegro desired to bring on a battle : but while Bethlen could without danger await any attack which might be made, the imperial army was as if shut up in its camp, because it had but few cavalry, and had Bethlen's army, which consisted almost entirely of cavalry, constantly swarming around it. If the Prince of Transsylvania had risked a battle, he would doubtless have suf-

fered a defeat, since his mounted men were not equal to the infantry and artillery of his enemy; if, however, he should confine himself to cutting off with his cavalry the connection of the imperial army with the surrounding country and hindering their supply of provisions, he could force them by starvation to capitulate.

At the imperial headquarters the danger was indeed perceived, and it was Waldstein especially who, through his father-in-law, Count von Harrach, continually importuned the Emperor for provisions and the enlistment of a numerous cavalry force; but even if a greater activity than ever before had been developed in Vienna, it would have required a longer time to satisfy these wishes. The result was that the distress in Göding increased daily, so that Waldstein, on the 18th of November, advised the Emperor to conclude, on any possible terms, an armistice, or the army would be lost. The rescue from this strait was as unexpected as it was sudden. The means of the Prince of Transylvania for further carrying on the war had failed, and, as he received but unfavorable intelligence from Germany, he had, a few days before, proposed, through the Palatine Thurzo, an armistice. The Emperor made no delay in accepting the offer; he sent the Palatine to Bethlen, and the armistice was concluded on that very day—the 18th of November. Thus at the moment of its extremity the imperial army was released from its perilous situation. The armistice was followed by Bethlen's withdrawal, and then by long-continued peace negotiations, in which the conditions of the Peace of Nikolsburg were in all important points again acknowledged.

II.

As Bethlen had laid down his arms, and the enemies in Germany were put to rest, the question arose with the Emperor and the League whether they should not disarm. From the Lower Saxon Circle came daily complaints of exactions made by the soldiers of the League which were quartered upon the people, and the Estates of the Circle grew louder in their demands for the disbanding of the army, as not an enemy was to be seen. Maximilian, when consulted by the Emperor as to the answer which he should return to these complaints, replied that it would not do at present to disarm; that the enemy was only paralyzed for the moment, and was preparing for a new assault; that Mansfeld especially, who had retained in his service the most prominent of his colonels, was feeding them with hopes of new enlistments, and the Palsgrave himself had no other thought than to re-open the war. It was therefore necessary to remain in arms in order to be in a condition to meet the threatening dangers. These apprehensions of Maximilian were all well founded. The Palsgrave now found James, who felt a sense of shame at the failure of his attempts at mediation, more ready to listen to him; the English too were giving more decided expressions of their displeasure at the King's course: he was thus obliged to act in his son-in-law's aid. France also was ready to throw its influence on Frederic's side of the scale. After the short period of its friendliness to the Hapsburgs, there had been an uninterrupted agitation of the public mind in France against them: support, by way of subsidies, had been given to Mansfeld in his contest which had just terminated unfortunately, and on this account the defeat

which he and Halberstadt had sustained was as bitterly felt by the French as if it had been their own. The King now desired to undertake a mediation in the German quarrel. If he had succeeded in carrying out this desire, the influence of the Emperor would have been crippled, and France would have played the chief part in the affairs of Germany.

The endeavors of the French statesmen were not in this instance directed to a transient result, but to the permanent weakening of the Hapsburgs, according to the plan which Henry IV. and his minister, Sully, had formed, and would have carried out, if the King had not been too early removed from the stage of his action. Under the feeble regency of the widowed Queen, Mary de Medici, this purpose was not further prosecuted, and her son was also incapable of taking up his father's great enterprise; but he found in his minister, Cardinal Richelieu, a man who enthusiastically devoted himself to the grand plans of Henry IV., and, in defiance of external and internal obstacles, gained his end, because the imbecile King subjected himself to the keener penetration and greater energy of his servant.

Jean Armand du Plessis, Cardinal and Duke de Richelieu, was born in the year 1585, entered the priesthood, and was soon made Bishop of Luçon, in which position he fixed attention upon himself as the orator of the ecclesiastical bench in the Parliament of 1615, which was effected by his statesmanlike apprehension of the situation and the zeal with which he advocated the claims of the ecclesiastics to a more prominent part in State affairs. A year later he was, by the partiality of the Queen Regent, made Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and President of the Cabinet Council. This appointment

made upon the Spanish ambassador in Paris the most favorable impression; he felt sure that no man in France—so completely was he swayed by the bland and captivating manners of the young ecclesiastical Prince—could render better service to the Spanish crown than Richelieu. At the very beginning of his public career, the new Secretary of State followed in the footsteps of Henry IV., for he assured the foreign powers that the King's marriage—Louis XIII. had married a daughter of Philip III.—would introduce no change in the hereditary policy—that is, that France would not assume the defence of Spanish interests, but would maintain its old alliances. When the King's favorite, the Duke de Luines, by the assassination of Marshal d'Ancre, undermined the influence of the Queen Regent, and her son, then but sixteen years of age, himself assumed the reins of government, in order that he might entrust them really to his favorite, Richelieu, on account of Luines' ill-will to him, left the ministry, preferring, as the Queen's true servant, to follow her into exile. In the following year a better feeling sprang up between the King and his mother; and, as the omnipotent favorite had died in the meantime, Richelieu also gained an influence with the King, and expressed himself with his wonted energy against the Spanish alliance which had been proposed in the year 1623. Puysieux, who, as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, at the time recommended this alliance, was, when the King decided against it, discharged, and Richelieu, who meanwhile had been made a cardinal, was called into the ministry. The 26th day of April, 1624, is named as among the happiest days in the annals of France, and so the French historic writers justly distinguish it; for Richelieu's chief merit is that from this day onward

France continued to take that leading position which the French people so earnestly desired, and which the Hapsburgs had previously held. In the full consciousness of his own pre-eminent strength and penetration, he vowed to the King, on the occasion of his acceptance of the ministry, that he would curb the insolence of the great, suppress, as a political party, the Huguenots, and make the name of Louis respected among the nations. He introduced the work of fulfilling this promise by sending an ambassador to the Elector of Mentz to represent to him the dangers to which the Empire was exposed by Bethlen, who had recently concluded an alliance with the Turks, by which they were to advance against Germany with a great army ; by King James, who was arming 30,000 men for the Palsgrave ; and by Spain, which power desired to possess itself of the Lower Palatinate. Against all these dangers he offered the protection and mediation of his sovereign. His proposition was first laid before the Catholic Princes. If he gained them, he was sure of the concurrence of the Protestant Princes ; for, unwilling as these latter were to yield to influences from abroad, they were nevertheless so embittered by the war of religion and the expulsion of the Palsgrave that, Electoral Saxony and Darmstadt alone excepted, they would offer no resistance to the persuasions of France. In this instance, however, the Catholic Princes maintained due fidelity. The Elector of Mentz rejected the French suggestion, as did also the Elector of Bavaria, who had obtained, by the embassy which he sent to France in the year 1622, such acquaintance with the French plans as to perceive that not only the Hapsburgs, but Germany itself, was in danger. The will of Mentz and Bavaria governed that of the other Catholic Princes ; and so, for

the time, the attempt of Richelieu to gain an influence in Germany failed.

We do not know whether James of England was aware of this step on the part of France; at all events, he also was now disposed to play a decisive part in German affairs, and not, as hitherto, in negotiations, but in arms. He concluded with Holland (June, 1624) an alliance, by which he bound himself to support 6,000 men, to be enlisted in England on the account of the States-General, to which Holland out of its own means was to add 4,000 men. At the same time he sent Sir Robert Arstruther to Denmark and to several German Princes, to persuade them to join this alliance, the chief aim of which was to be the restoration of the Palsgrave. France also afterwards gave support to these efforts by aiding Count Mansfeld in his armaments, as also by an endeavor to stir up the German Princes against the Emperor.

In the midst of these efforts the Elector George William of Brandenburg participated, though for the time only in the way of diplomacy, in a decisive manner in the preparations for the campaign. Two causes may have had their weight in calling him forth from his former reserve: *First*, his relationship to the Palsgrave, whose sister he had married; and, *then*, his dislike to the enlargement of the Catholic dominion, the way of which had evidently been prepared by the victory of the League. Nor was it the first time that he had desired to come forward in the Palsgrave's behalf. In the year 1620 he showed him much good will, if indeed he rendered him no aid worthy of mention. In 1623, when the Electorate was in Regensburg transferred to Bavaria, he was inclined to throw the weight of his sword upon the scale for him, and made an attempt, in a personal interview,

to gain the Elector of Saxony to his cause. . Nothing but the determination with which John George declined all hostile action against the Emperor kept him quiet. When, however, the troops of the League had dispersed those of Mansfeld and Halberstadt, and yet did not evacuate the Lower Saxon Circle, he would no longer allow any consideration to keep him back. The zeal which the King of England was now developing was evidently quite too cool for him, and he did not believe that James would succeed in forming an alliance as extensive as was desirable unless some German Prince, with an unselfish aim, should interest himself in bringing this about. He could safely reckon upon this favorable judgment of his own interest in the Protestants.

At the same time that Anstruther entered upon his mission to Denmark and the German Princes, the Elector of Brandenburg directed his Counsellor, Bellin, to proceed to Christian IV., Gustavus Adolphus, and the Prince of Orange at the Hague, to all of whom he was to represent with all possible energy the threatening danger and stir them up to make common cause of the defence. The States-General were already acting in harmony with this movement in relation to Spain, and had just shown this by concluding a treaty with James. No special effort was therefore needed with them. Was there need of such in the case of Denmark and Sweden? Denmark had indeed armed in the Palsgrave's cause in the year 1621, and had again disarmed simply because England would take no part. As England was now ready to help, was not the ground of Denmark's hesitation removed? The King of Sweden, too, notwithstanding his youth, awakened the attention and the hope of the Protestants. Would he not be willing to render his aid where the in-

terests of religion were thus imperilled? Bellin, who made his first journey to Copenhagen, was not received there as he had expected. Christian excused himself from taking part in the contest on the ground that the allies were not to be depended upon. It cannot be doubted that Christian gave a negative answer because he had learned that there was a desire to connect Gustavus Adolphus also with the alliance and to commit to him a share in its direction, which he would on no account allow. At that time Denmark was affected with a chronic jealousy of Sweden, which had, a short time before, led to a hostile collision, and although peace had been concluded, the mutual enmity had not been extinguished.

When Bellin came to Stockholm and reported his failure, this gave him there a reception so much the more favorable. Gustavus Adolphus was ready to conclude a firm alliance with the Palsgrave, and fit out twelve regiments of foot and 2,000 cavalry, if England, the States-General, and several German Princes would join the alliance and furnish twenty-one regiments of infantry and 6,000 mounted men and bear two-thirds of the costs of the war. Gustavus Adolphus demanded also that two ports on the Baltic should be opened to him; and his intention was to enter upon an expedition by way of Poland to Silesia, there join hands with Bethlen, upon whose aid he in any case reckoned, and so crush the Emperor. If the Palsgrave and James would accept these terms, he would, in May (1625), advance to the attack. His ambassador labored at the Hague and in London to secure concurrence in this proposition, and a treaty would perhaps have been concluded with him at the Hague, but that England hesitated, and would not give up the aid of

the King of Denmark, and even preferred him to Gustavus.

When Christian learned that in London more importance was attached to his co-operation than to that of Sweden, he and James quickly agreed upon the conditions of a mutual alliance, in case the North German Princes would also accede to the same. On the 15th of January (1625) he gave notice of this to the Elector of Brandenburg, and estimated that the allied army would amount to 31,000 men, placing Brandenburg's contribution to it at 3,000 men. He at the same time addressed an appeal to Bethlen to join the alliance, and the Palgrave also repeatedly importuned him with the same request. In short, Denmark now prosecuted with earnestness the preparations for a grand alliance, and thus forced Sweden into the background.

In France, whither Bellin had also made a pilgrimage, and where he received a favorable response, a hope still continued, however, to be entertained of securing Sweden's participation, and to this end a special embassy was sent to enlist Gustavus in the common cause of the war. Although the Elector of Brandenburg was satisfied that the King of Sweden would not consent to take a subordinate place, he sent also to him a new ambassador (April, 1625), to renew his former request, but received no other answer than that the King would take part in the expedition only in case that the conditions which he had before presented should be accepted. In a personal meeting with the King of Denmark, the Elector of Brandenburg endeavored to obtain his consent that to the King of Sweden should be conceded the command of a separate army. Christian seemed at first to agree to this; but when the King of Sweden showed a readiness to participate in the war on

this condition, the King of Denmark regretted his former compliance, and the negotiations with Sweden were broken off, although appeals were made from various quarters to Gustavus Adolphus to espouse the common cause, and he did several times take part by way of giving counsel. All effective participation in the war by him was finally rendered impossible by his own war with Poland, which required his entire attention. In Stockholm, the King of Denmark was charged with having insidiously stirred up the Poles in order to get rid of a disagreeable alliance.

At Christian's desire the Diet of the Lower Saxon Circle came together at Brunswick; the Estates were informed of the preparatory measures towards a grand alliance, and called upon for their accession to it. They resolved upon considerable armaments and upon placing the army to be enlisted under the command of the King of Denmark, he having already been elected to this command by the several executive heads of the Lower Saxon Circle. As to the purpose for which the army was to be used, nothing was said; this was, for the time, a secret known to all the contracting parties. Landgrave Maurice of Hesse Cassel joined the federation, and applied to it all his available means. It was nevertheless a considerable time before the alliance between Denmark, which represented also the Lower Saxon Circle, England, and Holland, was definitively concluded. In England, James, who died on the 27th of March, 1625, had been succeeded by his son, Charles I., and, if he did not indeed bring the negotiations to a speedier conclusion, he was at least ready to make greater sacrifices. The alliance was concluded at the Hague, December 19th, 1625, and provided that the King of Denmark should assume the

command of an army of 30,000 foot and 8,000 horse ; that England should pay £30,000 and Holland 50,000 florins monthly ; that the two latter powers should fit out a fleet in aid of the war, and that France and several other powers should be urged to interest themselves in this alliance by furnishing subsidies payable to the King of Denmark. Christian had now obtained what he desired : he was to have the command of a numerous, well-equipped, and well-paid army, with which he designed, not only to effect the Palsgrave's restoration, but also to satisfy his own lust for dominion by the acquisition of the episcopal sees of North Germany.

The support which the Palsgrave was to receive from England was not, however, limited to the concessions made to the King of Denmark. As early as the end of the year 1624 King James—who was then still living—had determined to further Mansfeld's enlistments by the use of both money and his own influence, in order to raise an army specially for his son-in-law. In January, 1625, Mansfeld had command of an army of 12,000, then stationed in Dover, and afterwards shipped to Germany, for which England paid him 200,000 florins monthly. France also energetically aided him by allowing him to enlist on French soil 4,000 men and paying him 60,000 crowns monthly. As Mansfeld enlisted 5,000 more men in Germany, he had under his command when, in the spring of 1625, he entered German territory, nearly 25,000 men.

What place did the Elector of Brandenburg now occupy in the grand alliance which he claimed the merit of having formed ? Not to overestimate this merit, Bellin's negotiations at the Hague, in London, Stockholm, Copenhagen, and Paris, greatly furthered the cause, and his call to arm against the Hapsburg's lust of dominion had

been better received than the Palsgrave's complaints. Nevertheless the Elector hesitated to join the alliance which he had been so zealous in promoting, and that because Gustavus Adolphus, under whose direction alone he expected a successful termination, had not joined it. On this account the Elector, when called upon by Denmark for the purpose, would support the alliance only with subsidies, and not with troops, nor so much as that either, if the movement was to be directed against the Emperor. This condition was as ridiculous as it was irrational. How could the Palsgrave be restored otherwise than by moving against the army of the League, which was acting in the name of the Emperor, in doing which, conflict with the imperial troops themselves—these being connected with the army of the League—could not be avoided? And how, if nothing else should prove successful, could the pursuit of the enemy to Bohemia and Austria, or wherever he might be found, be avoided? The Elector was short-sighted enough to believe, by limiting his attacks to the army of the League and refusing to invade either Bohemia or Silesia, he would, in case of defeat, be secure against the sentence of the ban, because he could plead that he had not directed his arms against the Emperor. King Christian did not, however, assent to the conditions, and so George William remained, for the time, neutral. A successful termination of the war would, however, have ended his neutrality.

III.

When Mansfeld began his war preparations, it caused at the time a great sensation, and could not be concealed from the imperial court. The court would fain have

hoped that the old freebooter, with his small means, would not have been able to accomplish much. This hope was cherished, because, in the financial stress which reigned, the creation of an opposing armament would gladly have been avoided; but Maximilian of Bavaria came out energetically against this inconsiderate view of the situation. He had learned by his diplomatic relations the extent of the coalition then in process of formation against the Emperor and his allies, and delayed not to lay the information before his menaced cousin, and urge him to make adequate counter-preparations (April 3, 1625). The Emperor still indeed sought to maintain the roseate view of the case; he was not willing to believe that Denmark was hostile, and was quite sure that peaceful feelings prevailed in the Lower Saxon Circle; it required repeated admonitions from Maximilian and warnings also from other sources—as, for instance, from the Duke of Holstein, and finally more detailed intelligence of hostile preparations—to arouse him from his felicitous confidence. It would be only by an extreme exertion that he could raise his army to 20,000 men, and this he must keep in readiness to oppose Bethlen, and could do almost nothing in support of the German League. The imperial statesmen determined therefore to move in Spain for the formation of a new alliance, which should include not only Spain and the League, but should take in also all the Princes who were willing to join it. When Khevenhiller (May, 1625) proposed this, it was indeed perceived that the Emperor was disposed to make Spanish shoulders bear the burden of the war; a favorable response was nevertheless given, and it was determined that the conditions of the intended alliance should be decided upon in Brussels, and that the Emperor and the League

should send thither their representatives for this purpose.

When the negotiators met by their ambassadors (1626) in Brussels, it appeared that each had an aim of his own. The Emperor labored to persuade the League and Spain to assume the burden of the war, in order that his possessions might not be invaded. Spain was ready to aid, but demanded in return that the allies should share with her the contest in the rebellious Netherlands, and should occupy some strong places on the Elbe and Weser and also on the Baltic, in order to control the commerce of the Netherlands with Germany. The Emperor raised no opposition to these demands; the interests of his family called for the enlargement of Spanish dominion, and to promise his co-operation would cost him but little, for he could scarcely have rendered it in any other way than by allowing Spain to enlist a few soldiers in Germany. The end which Maximilian, in the name of the League, kept in view in these negotiations was to secure the assistance of Spain in the contest with Christian IV., and for this purpose to ask for an auxiliary force of 4,000 men, or 600,000 thalers, and, in addition to this, to be protected against any invasion which might come from France through Alsace. He had no thought of employing the aid of Spain further than to maintain the position which had been gained in the year 1623, and was unwilling in any way to involve Germany in a war with Holland or to make sacrifices for the extension of Spain's dominion. These antagonistic aims of Spain and Bavaria rendered the negotiations hopeless from the beginning. When they were opened (May, 1626) the Infanta, Isabella, gave command that a few thousand Spanish troops should march into the diocese of Münster and to Hesse; but she would

send relief to Tilly only on condition that the Empire would break with Holland. Whether Maximilian would have yielded to this desire, if Tilly's danger had increased, remains undecided; the events of the battle-field raised him above the necessity of a decision, for after the battle of Lutter he broke off negotiations.

The wish in Vienna in the year 1625 was to await the results of the negotiations which were to be opened with Spain, and the arming was delayed, because the means were wanting: if Waldstein, the future Duke of Friedland, had not come forward as a deliverer in the time of need, the League would have been left to contend alone with Christian and Mansfeld. That the reader may better judge of the position which Waldstein at this moment assumed, we shall attempt a review of his previous services and his aspirations.

Waldstein was born in the year 1583. In his early youth he was placed in the care of the Jesuits at Olmutz, to be educated; after which he travelled extensively, visiting in his travels Germany, Belgium, and Italy. After his return, he served as captain in a regiment in Hungary, then returned for a time to his home, and there married an elderly but rich widow. She soon died, leaving to him several manorial estates, so that at the early age of thirty-one years he became possessed of those means of enjoying life, of which, as a younger son, he would otherwise have been destitute. This did not, however, satisfy him. His thirst for a life of action drew him again into the military service of the Archduke Ferdinand, who had fallen into a war with Venice, in which service he enlisted men, both foot and horse, whom he brought to the relief of the besieged fortress of Gradiska. When the Bohemian insurrection broke out, he took with decided earnestness the

side of the Hapsburgs, and attempted to save from revolt the regiment which he commanded in Moravia. His attempt failed, but it proved him a man of iron will, equal to the solution of great problems, and who seemed to be in reserve for a significant future. By his second marriage with Isabella von Harrach, a daughter of one of the Emperor's confidential advisers, his connection with the imperial cause became more intimate, which marriage was of pre-eminent advantage to him by bringing him into close relations with persons of decisive influence.

Few knew, indeed, immediately after the battle of the White Mountain, for what frightful criminal trials Ferdinand was making preparations; but of the few who knew his intentions, no one had a plan so well formed beforehand for hoarding gigantic accumulations from the ruins caused by the confiscations as Waldstein. He was not fastidious about his means: they consisted in the robbing of an unfortunate female cousin, and in the purchase of a great share of the confiscated lands, which he paid for chiefly in debased coin.

Waldstein's mother belonged to the family of Smiricky, which was regarded, at the outbreak of the Bohemian insurrection, as the richest in the country. It was claimed that the head of this family had an annual saving, after meeting all his own expenses and those of his family, of 100,000 thalers to use at will. In the year 1618 this family in its male line survived only in a single idiotic youth; while he lived, the women could not come into possession of the property held in trust and the fee of the lands, and an administration by a guardian must therefore be provided; to which place, Elizabeth, the younger sister of the idiotic owner, was appointed, and this sister was married to Henry Slawata. The claims of

Catharine, the older sister, were disregarded, because she had been, years before, suspected of a low love affair with a smith, for which she had been confined by her father, and was still held in confinement after his death. In the year 1619 Henry von Wartenberg offered himself for the rescue of the unfortunate maiden ; he desired to procure her release from prison and marry her. After an imprisonment of thirteen years she was not disposed to make the outward appearance of the limping bride-groom a cause of hesitation, but willingly yielded her hand to him when he had procured for her the longed-for release. The young couple hastened to Gitschin, one of the paternal manors, and placed it under attachment. Her sister and sister's husband, Henry Slawata, one of the leaders during the insurrection, made complaint to King Frederic, who directed that compulsory measures should be employed for her removal from Gitschin. This harsh treatment of the unfortunate woman by her family drove her to desperation. When the royal commissioners, Slawata among them, arrived at Gitschin, she went into the underground part of the castle where the powder was stored, in order, some think, to commit her defence to her servants, or, as others suppose, to blow up the castle. Her intention is not with certainty known ; but certain it is that during her presence in the cellar the powder took fire, the castle was blown up, many persons were killed, and among them Madame Wartenberg and her brother-in-law.

The contest for the guardianship was indeed ended ; the now widowed Elizabeth Slawata administered on the property without further hindrance. Unfortunately she was so foolish, after the battle of the White Mountain, as to take refuge abroad, taking her idiotic brother with

her. Waldstein saw at once the advantage thus offered to him, and brought it about that the idiotic heir, who in the meantime had been taken to Hamburg, was surrendered, and the guardianship was conferred upon the Emperor. He now labored to remove the difficulties which stood in the way of the escheat of this immense inheritance to himself. It was no longer necessary that he should pay any regard to the sister of the heir; but besides his own mother, there were still two of her sisters and their children who were to be reckoned as heirs. From these, one and all, he obtained a renunciation of their claims, because they had been involved in the insurrection, and only by his intercession were able to secure a milder treatment.

Thus Waldstein obtained the sure prospect of an inheritance, the extent of which might indeed have satisfied an extreme greed of gain; but he was not only covetous, but also ambitious. He did not therefore rest contented with the distinction which wealth gave him among the Bohemian nobility, but desired also to assume a rank which would place him on a level with the princely houses of Germany, and sought therefore to attain to an exceptional position for wealth. In order to gain this end, he endeavored to complete his acquisitions by purchases which increased them four or five fold, and by hunting up in Bohemia's social institutions of nearly ten centuries' duration a series of chartered rights which he knew how to wring from the Emperor's unbounded recklessness.

His first steps towards enlarging the amount left him by inheritance, but not yet conveyed to him, were taken in the year 1622. He then made numerous purchases of confiscated lands, and continued this course in the following

**'ALBERT VON WALDSTEIN,
Duke of Friedland and Mecklenburg.**



years. In regard to the payment of the earnest money, however, his case was peculiar: he remained indebted for a part of the amount, and paid part in the debased money which was coined in the years 1622 and 1623, which was worth but a tenth of its nominal value. Until now it has only been suspected that he belonged to that association which, under the lead of De Witte, so outrageously defrauded the Emperor in the matter of the coinage; at the present time Waldstein's part in this transaction is well known.

Waldstein had not as yet, however, with all his gigantic efforts at acquisition, obtained possession of all the lands lying within the limits of the principality of which he was dreaming. There were many owners of freeholds who, not being affected by the confiscation, persistently refused to sell, and as many holders of fiefs who would neither convey their tenures nor acknowledge Waldstein as their feudal lord. Any other man would have regarded the acquisition of these estates as an impossibility, and would have refrained from any endeavors looking to this end; not so Waldstein. When, by much pressure and various promises, he had persuaded the owners of freeholds to accept these as fiefs from him, he obtained (September, 1622) from the Emperor the dignity of an Imperial Count and Palsgrave, to which were added many chartered privileges; and then, three months later, the Emperor expressly declared, in an additional charter, that these privileges should be valid, not only within his own purchased domains, but throughout Bohemia, even though they should conflict with the legal usages of the country. This declaration was applicable to Bohemian holders of fiefs who had not been under obligation to acknowledge a new feudal lord in case he were of lower rank than the

previous one. Waldstein now purchased from the Emperor the feudal lordship over a multitude of vassals, and by means of this charter defeated all opposition to the change of lords.

In this manner he brought it about that all allodial proprietors and all vassals of the King declared themselves subject to the Joint-Dominion of Friedland. We say the Joint-Dominion of Friedland, because Waldstein obtained, in his charter issued by the Emperor in the year 1622, the right to incorporate all his inherited and purchased lands and those which he should yet purchase into the dominion which he designated by the name "Friedland." The Emperor yielded the more readily to this desire, because Waldstein on this occasion accepted his estates as fiefs from him, and it flattered him that such a man as Waldstein would consent to reduce in this way the value of his possessions through love to him. In the year 1623 he was raised to the rank of a Prince, and in the following year he petitioned the Emperor to constitute the Joint-Dominion of Friedland into a principality, which was accordingly done. Waldstein now labored earnestly to dissolve all the bands which connected his possessions with Prague, and to take such measures as might call into activity special forms of life in his new principality. He organized in this year and the years following the supreme administration of justice and taxation on a basis entirely independent of Bohemia, and attempted at the same time, by measures adapted to this end, to advance his domains to the highest grade of prosperity. In order to give life to manufacturing industry, he introduced skilful mechanics from foreign lands. For the fabrication of arms, he engaged both master-workmen and journeymen in the Netherlands, as

he did also for the manufacture of cloth. He prepared the way of silk-weaving by planting mulberry-trees and forming in Bohemia a new home for Italian silk-manufacturers. He sought also to increase the profits of mining, which had fallen into neglect, by introducing more rational processes. Everywhere appeared the signs of his active and organizing energy.

If his portrait, which has been preserved in the Waldstein Palace in Prague, resembles him, and of this we have no doubt, it is a clear expression of the character which we have pictured. His features do not show that nobleness and delicacy which belonged to the descendants of the family, which was a considerable one as early as the time of the Crusades; they express rather the iron stamp of a man who has been obliged to struggle through a world of difficulties to reach the goal of his ambition—in a word, they reveal energy and severity.

As Waldstein could not carry out his ambitious plans, which constantly grew in extravagance, except by gaining new resources in money and enhancing his merits, he determined still further to pursue a course answering to his aim. He knew from experience how productive a business the command of an army was, when its commander not only received large pay, but also had great amounts placed in his hands, which were entered in his account, but not used. A knowledge of the advantages which beckoned him on, determined him to take advantage of the Emperor's embarrassment in raising the necessary armament and in procuring the immense sums needed for this purpose, and so to come forward with an offer to enlist for his service 15,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry. There was a report that he made such offers as early as in the years 1622 and 1623; it is, however, only

known with certainty that he made such a one about February, 1625.

After prolonged negotiations Waldstein's offer was accepted, and in the beginning of May he was entrusted with the enlistment of 15,000 foot and 6,000 horse; in the following month he was appointed general of the imperial army, and a few days later was made Duke of Friedland. He was obliged in turn to fit out the army, bring the same into the field where it was to be employed, and meet all the preliminary expenses; its further care and pay were to devolve upon the Emperor.

IV.

Before proceeding to an account of the new enlistments, we shall indicate in few words the Emperor's efforts to secure himself in the event of a war with Hungary. He first attempted to re-establish peace with the Turks and to settle the manifold questions of dispute which had sprung up between him and the Sultan since Bethlen engaged the support of Turkish troops. After extended negotiations there was concluded, May 2, 1625, at Gyarmat, between the Turkish and imperial plenipotentiaries, with the co-operation of Bethlen, who acted a false part towards both parties, a treaty which renewed the peace of Zsitva-Torok, which left, however, unanswered the imperial demand for the surrender of Waitzen, and referred this and a number of other points for negotiation by an imperial ambassador who should be sent to Constantinople.

After the conclusion of the peace of Gyarmat, the Emperor determined to summon a new Diet at Oedenburg, where his son, with as little regard as possible to the

Hungarian right of election, should receive the royal crown. At the opening of the Diet, on the 13th of October (1625), the Emperor not only displayed at his entry an unusual pomp, but came attended, in disregard of the promise made at the last meeting of the Estates, by several thousand German troops, which he designed not merely for his own protection, but also for the intimidation of the opposition. On the day after his entry he informed the Estates as to the points upon which action was to be taken, and which related chiefly to the taxes. He made no allusion to the election of his son, although this was his chief purpose in calling the Diet; his desire was, not to request this, but that the Estates should themselves move his son's elevation, and thus deal a blow to their own elective right. He drew into his confidence none but Pazman, Archbishop of Gran, and Count Eszterhazy, and demanded of them that they should privately dispose the Estates to assume the initiative, as if in spontaneous compliance with his wish. But whatever measures the imperial confidants may have taken, the peril to which they exposed the Hungarian right of election was apprehended, and the Protestants were the less inclined to consent to that which was expected of them because Bethlen's ambassador, who was then present in Oedenburg, stirred them up against it.

The imperial party did all they could to silence the opposition; and, as the Catholics were in the majority in the Diet, their first desire was to bring the strength of the voters to a test, which, as Thurzo was dead, the election of a Palatine would furnish. According to traditional usage, the Emperor named four candidates—two Catholics and two Protestants. One of the former was Count Eszterhazy, the most prominent representative of

the Catholic interests and the bitterest foe of Bethlen; he had remained true to the Hapsburgs in the year 1619. Eszterhazy was elected by 150 against 60 votes. It was now hoped that by a resort to bribery the majority of the opposition might also be won for Ferdinand's elevation, and it is supposed that the use of 20,000 florins in the desired way revolutionized the convictions of the most of them.

Before Eszterhazy, now sure of the great majority, brought the matter before the Diet, a consultation was held in the imperial council as to whether the coronation should immediately follow the election, in the discussion of which question the Spanish ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, and Lamormain, the imperial confessor, took part. They differed in opinion: some said that the elevation of Ferdinand would not be certain if he should simply be elected and not crowned, and that Bethlen would in this fact find capital for his intrigues. The Nuncio and the imperial confessor, on the contrary, opposed the coronation, on the ground that this would require the Prince to take the coronation oath and obligate himself to conserve the political and religious liberties of the country; they maintained that Bethlen's death and the Emperor's success in arms might so favorably change the situation that the new King would be able to extend his authority if his hands were not tied by an oath. The Emperor ended this conflict of opinions by accepting the view of the Nuncio and Lamormain.

The Palatine now made preparation for winning the favor of the Diet to the proposed action. He gained almost all the members, except a few adherents of Bethlen, who persisted in their opposition, and declared that they would not acknowledge the lawfulness of the election of

the young Prince unless he should obligate himself by oath to conserve the freedom of the Estates and of religion. The rest of the Estates accepted this declaration, and the imperial court perceived that nothing would be gained by putting off the coronation, unless they felt already strong enough to show their cards; so they decided to proceed to the coronation and have the Archduke take the oath. The Palatine dissipated the manifold grounds of hesitation by observing in the council that the promises contained in the oath would not be of perpetual obligation, since the King, acting concurrently with the Estates, could change at will the Constitution, and needed only their consent to the desired changes. "If the accessions"—for these were his words—"to the Catholic Church should increase hereafter as they had done hitherto, for which there was every reason to hope, the Diet of the Kingdom would, in spite of all former laws, exterminate heresy in the country." The last hesitation was swept away by this remark.

Meanwhile Waldstein's enlistments were rapidly progressing. He facilitated the work by enlisting a great part of his troops in the territories belonging to the several imperial cities, especially in the Franconian Circle, and by having the expenses paid on the ground. It was a pressing need that the preparations should be hastened. Tilly had been ordered again to direct his march to the Lower Saxon Circle, and attack the Danes who were encamped at Hameln beyond the Weser. He passed this river on the 28th of July (1625), and two days later Christian IV. was precipitated with his horse from a wall, a height of forty feet, and so injured that for a few hours he was regarded as lost, and even afterwards his recovery was considered doubtful. This mischance caused great

alarm among his adherents, and the Danish army, now without its leader and unwilling to risk a battle with Tilly, withdrew. The Estates of the Lower Saxon Circle were also seized with fear. If the King died, they could not assume the conduct of the war, and they therefore sought to avert the danger by opening negotiations. They sent envoys to Tilly, by whom they represented that their arming was designed only for the keeping of the peace, and attempted to persuade him to withdraw. Of course the general of the League paid no regard to these statements, and replied that the Circle could expect a better treatment—that is, the eventual withdrawal of the imperial troops—in case they should immediately disarm, and persuade the King of Denmark to do the same. Tilly received instruction from the Emperor to enter into peace negotiations with the Circle only in case the Estates should agree to a contribution of at least 1,200,000 florins. If the Estates of the Circle should demand the restoration of the Palsgrave, Tilly was to say that he could be received to grace only upon a proper "submission." From other sources it is known that the Emperor upon these conditions would not have restored to the Palsgrave the Electoral, but simply the Lower, Palatinate.

In the month of August, 1625, Waldstein had progressed so far with his armament as to be ready to march. He advanced through Franconia and Thuringia to Brunswick, entered the territories of the sees of Halberstadt and Magdeburg, and finally joined Tilly. In the ensuing winter he further added to his armament, so that in the spring of 1626 he already commanded 50,000 men. The increase of the force was not unwelcome to the Emperor; it augmented the respect which was entertained for him, and he was not specially concerned in regard to its main-

tenance. Although even in the autumn of 1625 the forces of the Emperor and the League were superior to those of their enemies, yet no collision ensued, because the request of the Estates of the Lower Saxon Circle in regard to opening negotiations was not dismissed by the Emperor, and the Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg—the latter, indeed, not sincerely—offered their mediation. Saxony was willing to mediate a peace on the condition that the Lower Saxon Circle and Denmark should disarm, and that the Emperor and the League should withdraw their forces southward. These terms were in substantial harmony with the Emperor's demands, except in regard to the money indemnity.

The negotiations were begun between the representatives of Denmark and the Lower Saxon Circle, on the one side, and those of the Emperor, with the assistance of the ambassadors of the Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg, on the other, in Brunswick, in the beginning of November. The inclination of the Estates of the Lower Saxon Circle to lay down their arms, which showed itself after the mischance at Hameln, disappeared on Christian's full recovery, and they declared that they would disarm only on the condition that Tilly and Waldstein should leave the Circle with their troops, that they should be indemnified for the losses they had sustained, that their right to the ecclesiastical lands of which they had become possessed since the year 1555 should not be contested, and that the free, elective right of the cathedral chapters should not be interfered with. Since, on the other hand, the Emperor demanded an indemnity in money and an acknowledgment of the action taken by the Diet of Deputies at Regensburg, the views of the two parties were as wide asunder as possible.

While these negotiations were in progress in Brunswick, the alliance of Denmark, Holland, and England was consummated, December 19, 1625, at the Hague, and at the same time France also obligated herself to pay a stipulated sum to Denmark. Christian had not, however, completed his armament, and so did not break off the negotiations, but allowed the debates in Brunswick, in which the parties constantly increased their demands, to go on. Finally, on the 24th of January, 1626, influenced by him, the Lower Saxon Estates presented an ultimatum, in which they demanded, in addition to the indemnity and the secure possession of the ecclesiastical lands, that the Emperor should not only withdraw his troops from their Circle, but that he should discharge them before they would discharge theirs. The mediators proposed a middle course between these demands and those of the Emperor, the purpose of which was to obviate the threatened hostilities by arranging for a subsequent peaceful settlement of the points in dispute. They moved that Christian IV., Mansfeld, and the Estates of the Lower Saxon Circle should, without any delay, disarm and conform to the laws of the Empire, which forbade all hostile action against the Emperor. On the other hand, the imperial Generals were to promise that they would evacuate the Lower Saxon Circle and levy no further contributions, and Ferdinand was to obligate himself not to disturb the Estates in the possession of the ecclesiastical territories. It is perceived that the proposition of the mediators, or, more properly, of the Elector of Saxony—for Brandenburg secretly played another part—involved a practical acknowledgment of the new order settled at the Diet of Deputies at Regensburg, for it neither exacted of the Estates of the Circle a recognition of the sentence of the

ban against the Palsgrave, nor recognized its right of protest against that sentence.

Tilly, who represented the League, in so far agreed to Electoral Saxony's proposition, that he was willing to renounce the claim to indemnification, to which the envoys of the Elector made no allusion. Waldstein, on the contrary, would not consent to a renunciation of this claim. Tilly and Waldstein, however, agreed in refusing to the holders of ecclesiastical property any assurances. The Estates of the Circle were willing to concur in the Saxon proposition, if the Emperor should at the same time disarm and the League should be dissolved. As these offers satisfied neither the demands of Waldstein nor those of Tilly, Christian IV. broke off, on the 8th of March, the negotiations. Brunswick was now relieved of its guests, whom it had for four months entertained, and the decision was left to the sword. The Elector of Brandenburg, in reply to the recent request that he should join the alliance, said that he would still further, under cover of neutrality, do all that could properly be done for the protection of the common interests; that he should therefore tolerate Christian and Mansfeld in his territory, and at the same time supply them with provisions.

V.

As Waldstein desired to operate independently and not in conjunction with Tilly, so Mansfeld decided to proceed by himself, and not in union with Christian IV., the result of which was that each of the two hostile armies chose its own field of operations. Mansfeld, who, as early as December, 1625, had crossed the Elbe at Artlenburg, and proceeded thence to Lauenburg,

now, by an understanding with Christian IV. and the Elector's permission, directed his course towards the Marches of Brandenburg. It was apparent that he would, in the approaching conflict, operate chiefly against Waldstein, while the King of Denmark arranged to fight with Tilly. Mansfeld desired to carry on the war on the left bank of the Elbe, and, supported by the troops of the Lower Saxon Circle, attacked the intrenchments at Roslau constructed by the imperialists at the bridge which leads over the Elbe to Dessau ; but Waldstein advanced just at the right moment, and inflicted upon him (April 25, 1626) a defeat attended by a loss of 4,000 men.

This defeat produced an extreme sensation of alarm in Berlin, because it could not but be expected there that the defeated army would return into the Mark of Brandenburg and exhaust it, and that it would be followed by Waldstein. This apprehension was realized. The Mark was obliged to sustain Mansfeld's troops, whose officers were not satisfied with ordinary provisions, but wished to riot at the cost of the burghers and peasants. Waldstein made complaint to the Elector of his entertaining the Emperor's enemies, and demanded of him to make common cause for their expulsion. George William now perceived with alarm the peril which he had invited by his support to the Protestant coalition, and requested Christian IV. and Mansfeld to withdraw their forces from his territory. Both assured him of their intentions to comply with his wish ; and he accordingly informed the imperial commander that he did not need his aid to expel them. Perhaps Waldstein would have yielded to the Elector's desire, if his enemies' troops had, according to the promise of their generals, been immediately withdrawn ; but Mansfeld could not promptly withdraw, be-

cause he desired to repair the losses which he had sustained at Dessau, and because he must confer with Christian IV. as to the direction in which he should proceed. The conference resulted in a decision to make an incursion into Silesia, one of the Emperor's hereditary possessions, in order to follow out the understanding with Bethlen.

Between the Prince of Transylvania and the Palsgrave there had been, as early as soon after the peace concluded with the Emperor in 1624, an exchange of embassies and assurances, and this intercourse became more intimate when the Transylvanian Prince, after the death of his wife, who was of the family of Karolyi, married the Princess Catharine of Brandenburg. Having twice, though perhaps not in earnest, sued for the Emperor's daughter, and been rejected on various pretexts, he appeared by an ambassador as a suitor in Berlin, and was accepted. The marriage soon took place, and Bethlen became brother-in-law to the King of Sweden, who had married the Elector's eldest sister.

In an offer of alliance which Bethlen sent to the Hague (January, 1626), he asked for a monthly aid of 40,000 thalers and an auxiliary force of 8,000 foot and 2,000 horse, which should march through Bohemia or Silesia and unite with him. This does not appear to have been the plan originally formed at the Danish headquarters, because Mansfeld could as well have been ordered to Silesia early in the spring; as he had, however, been defeated and had withdrawn into the Mark of Brandenburg, where the Elector was unwilling he should remain, the decision was formed to escape the increasing difficulty of subsistence by sending him to Silesia.

Mansfeld, therefore, in July, at the head of nearly

20,000 men, including a division of 7,000 destined by Christian IV. to this service, and commanded by Duke John Ernest of Weimar, advanced into Silesia. The bearing of the Silesians towards these invaders showed that, in spite of the trials with which the invasion threatened them, the cause represented by Mansfeld had their approval, so that his expedition was able, stronger, rather than weaker, to enter Moravia. Having reached Leipnik, he was, however, disinclined to advance further, but wished to turn and march through Bohemia to Alsace. This was an adventurous change of the original plan, unjustified by the circumstances, and the Duke of Weimar opposed it, as did also the other officers, in the council of war which was held. The march was therefore continued to Kremsier.

When Waldstein learned that Mansfeld had gone to Silesia, instead of pursuing him with due promptness, he sent after him at first an insignificant force, intending himself to take part in the contest with Christian. But he was not unaware of the danger which might follow from leaving Silesia a prey to the enemy, and as he mistrusted that the Prince of Transylvania might favor this expedition by an invasion on his own account—for he did not as yet know that such a movement had been arranged between Bethlen and Christian IV.—he determined to leave 8,000 men with Tilly, and with the rest of his army to pursue the enemy. He but leisurely even now carried out his decision, and did not come until the beginning of September in contact with Mansfeld, who then hastened his march towards Hungary and passed the Waag at Trentschin (September 18, 1626), to form a junction with the Prince of Transylvania, who was advancing to meet him. Waldstein could not do otherwise than follow him.

Bethlen had carried on his war preparations as long as he could in secret, and it was not until the 21st of August that he addressed to the Emperor a letter of complaint, in which he charged that the conditions of the last peace concluded between them had not been fulfilled. This letter might be regarded as a declaration of war, for it was but a few days later that he left his residence in Transylvania, advanced into Hungary, where he formed a junction with the auxiliaries sent him by the Sultan, and came in collision with Waldstein at Gran. No decisive battle, however, as both parties anxiously expected, took place between the hostile armies, but only skirmishes. Waldstein was afterwards reproached with a too dilatory pursuit of the enemy; he was also charged with want of ability in the prosecution of the war in Hungary, because he avoided a decisive battle. It must, however, be admitted in his defence that he had not the needed cavalry force and that his infantry had suffered greatly in their long march. He wanted, moreover, supplies, and was therefore much concerned in view of the consequences of a possible defeat, and, as early as the 18th of September, advised the Emperor, through his father-in-law, to negotiate with Bethlen. The latter also had lost his confidence of success, and had, through the Palatine, made offers of peace to the Emperor, which he excused to those around him by his continued failure to effect a junction with Mansfeld. This took place, as we have already observed, on the 15th of October, but did not change his decision, although he still had frequent skirmishes with the enemy. The question with him now was how he might secure to himself the auxiliaries sent him from Germany, or at least their cannon and arms, and still get rid of Mansfeld. The latter purpose he was supposed to have effected by persuad-

ing Mansfeld to make a journey to Venice in order to obtain a subsidy from the Senate there. We do not, however, believe that the cunning adventurer allowed himself to be outwitted by the Prince, but conjecture that he entered upon the journey by way of Dalmatia to Venice because he felt himself hopelessly ill, and sighed for better care than he could obtain in Hungary. He only reached Bosnia, where, in a hamlet, on the night preceding the 30th of November, death overtook him.

To pass a final judgment as to Mansfeld's capabilities and character seems, after all that we have related in regard to him, superfluous. His talent for enlisting with small means an army and supporting the same by plunder was as incontestable as his personal courage, which he often so brilliantly exhibited. Eminent talents as a military commander he did not show, and yet his indifferent success may have been largely due to the defective quality of his troops. In regard to his character, a judgment so favorable cannot be formed. In pursuing plunder as a trade, he developed every bad quality, and in his selfishness often injured the interests of his friends as well as those of his enemies. That he was unworthy of the formers' trust he showed by his frequent transactions with the Emperor, which admit of no other explanation than that fidelity to his party was not with him a point of honor. The disorders of the time contributed, indeed, much towards forcing him into this career of adventure; but it is quite as true that he possessed a natural bent in this direction, and took no care to avoid the defilement to which he was exposed in such a career.

Meanwhile the negotiations between the Emperor and
the preliminary arrangements for an
re afterwards zealously prosecuted

towards the conclusion of a peace, and this was finally consummated (December 28, 1626) in Presburg. In this the concessions made in earlier treaties with the Prince of Transylvania were renewed, except that the yearly payment of 50,000 florins to which the Emperor had obligated himself in Nikolsburg was now to cease, and also the conveyance of the Principalities of Oppeln and Ratibor was definitively relinquished. The army of Mansfeld was to be disbanded, and was to return home in companies of a hundred men each.

As these peace negotiations were not concealed from the Duke of Weimar, he sought to hinder them as far as possible and to persuade the Prince to persist in the contest. At his request a Danish commissioner, Joachim von Mitzlaff, came to Hungary and labored to the same end. The Prince was not wanting in promises to both of them; he placed before them the sure prospect of his aid for the following year, but still concluded the peace, and paid in this no regard to his late allies, except that he violated that clause of the treaty which stipulated the disbanding of Mansfeld's army, and allowed the whole to return in a body to Silesia. This army was reduced by hunger, hardship, and battle to less than a fifth of its number. The Duke of Weimar too fell a prey to his exertions shortly before the army entered upon its homeward march.

VI.

As long as Waldstein remained in the Lower Saxon Circle, Tilly had repeatedly, but always in vain, desired a union of the two armies. It was only after he had won the battle at the Bridge of the Elbe that Waldstein con-

sented to unite with Tilly ; and yet he did not carry this into effect, because he was obliged to pursue Mansfeld to Silesia and Hungary, and so satisfied himself with leaving a few thousand men at the service of the general of the League. Before their junction, and while Waldstein still tarried on German soil, Tilly took Minden by storm ; on which occasion his victorious troops behaved like cannibals. He then attempted the siege of Göttingen, which he continued for seven weeks, when his end was attained by the withdrawal of the Danish garrison (August 12th). During the siege Count Fürstenberg gained a victory over a section of the Danish army at Rössing, near Galenberg (July 27th). After the taking of Göttingen, Tilly moved against Nordheim, and reached its vicinity on the 15th of August. Christian resolved that in this instance he would, at whatever cost, check the enemy's progress ; and to this end advanced to Nordheim and forced the general of the League—who would not fight until his union with the imperialist troops which were left for him—to withdraw. After the union, which took place at Geismar on the 22d of August, Tilly again advanced, and Christian retired, but was nearly overtaken by his enemy on the night preceding the 26th of August. Early in the morning the King hastened his retreat ; was indeed attacked, but still it came to no earnest action. On the 27th of August, however, still some hours before sunrise, when Christian desired further to continue his retreat, Tilly sent some cavalry regiments hastily in pursuit of the retreating Danes, which unceasingly annoyed them and also caused them considerable losses. This continued from four to nine o'clock in the morning, until finally Christian determined to make a stand, as he could only in this way save his greatly imperilled rear. General Fuchs

warned him of the danger of a battle, and offered to rescue the imperilled rear ; but a tart reply of the King closed his mouth. He now gave his directions for the battle, entrusting Fuchs with the lead of the first division, while he himself was to command the centre, and Rheingrave Otto Louis the last division. The lines of his army extended from where the brook Mittelbeck crosses the old road as far as Lutter.

It was not until two o'clock in the afternoon that Tilly became convinced of his enemy's intention to fight, and then, having given the required orders, he advanced to the attack. At first the Danish troops bravely maintained their position, drove back with heavy losses several of the assailing regiments, and were already advancing aggressively over the brook ; but Tilly incited his men to the contest, repulsed the enemy, and the battle took for the Danes a most disastrous turn. A portion of their infantry was completely destroyed by the enemy's cavalry, and two of their cavalry regiments were driven into a morass, and there annihilated. Thus the battle at Lutter on the Barenberg ended in the entire defeat of Christian. His loss amounted to 8,000 killed and 2,000 prisoners, and all his artillery and a great part of his baggage fell into the victor's hands. The remains of the defeated army he collected at Wolfenbüttel, retreated over the Elbe, and quartered them chiefly upon Holstein and Mecklenburg. Tilly followed up his victory by occupying the Duchy of Brunswick with garrisons, turning its resources to his own use, and subjecting the province of Lüneburg to the same infliction. He removed his troops to winter-quarters, and did not even attempt to cross the Lower Elbe. Waldstein's regiments passed, however, into the Mark of Brandenburg for their winter-quarters,

in order to apply to the Elector the thumb-screws long since prepared for him.

VII.

Christian IV., Mansfeld, and Bethlen were not the only foes which the Emperor had, in the course of the year 1626, to encounter. His enemies sought to place obstacles in his way by inciting his subjects to a new insurrection. The expedition of Mansfeld through Silesia and Moravia was made in the hope that the inhabitants of these countries would attach themselves to it. Even to Bohemia and Austria the Palsgrave's friends directed their attention, and hoped that the peasantry, driven by unceasing oppression and robbery to desperation, would be stirred up to new resistance. Christian sent emissaries to these lands in order to prepare them, by promises of early assistance, for rising.

Circumstances assumed for the Emperor in Upper Austria a state the more perilous, since not only the peasantry, but a great portion of the nobility also, were hostile to him in consequence of their hatred, which he had incurred by carrying through his proceedings for confiscation and his reformatory decrees. In the year 1624 he had taken a decisive step for the reactionary reformation by issuing a decree for the banishment of all the Protestant clergy and teachers, within eight days, from the country, thereby forbidding all religious services except the Catholic. The nobleman and the countryman took it equally hard that they were bereft of their accustomed consolation; and their complaint was the more just because the priests sent to them were wolves, and not shepherds, for they led mostly "knavish lives"—such at

least was the statement, doubtless an impartial one, of the Bavarian governor. The decree of 1624 was supplemented by a second, in which all Protestant worship was not only forbidden, but all the inhabitants were required to profess the Catholic faith by the coming Easter, or leave the country on being paid one-tenth of the value of their property. An exception was made only in favor of those noblemen who had been resident for fifty years in the land; which, however, was to be applied only to their persons, and not to their families: these might indeed remain, though they continued Protestants, but their children were to be educated as Catholics. We remark here that this decree was afterwards repeated with all kinds of threats, and so far attained its purpose that the number of Protestants constantly diminished.

The proceedings under the decree of confiscation were closed on the 27th of February, 1625, by an imperial edict addressed to the Temporal Estates of Upper Austria, and which, on account of its contents, deserves here to be mentioned. The sentences of confiscation pronounced against those rebels who had died or fled were, by this edict, confirmed; the other Estates were admitted to grace, but only on the condition that they should fully conform to the imperial enactments relating to religion, resign to the Emperor all ecclesiastical prefectures and fiefs so far as these were destined for pastors and benefices, renounce in his favor their right to control the treasury and incomes of the Estates—that is, abandon all independent management of their own treasury and incomes—and finally, as a further penalty of their rebellion, they were to pay a million florins with the express stipulation that this penal sum be not collected of their subjects or tenants or of any who had remained true, but

must be raised among themselves. Against this decree arose a great cry of distress. The Estates emphasized the impossibility of paying the large amount demanded by referring to the hardships and the taxation to which they had been subjected by Maximilian of Bavaria. Their complaint resulted only in a reduction of this penal sum to 600,000 florins; all the other points of their complaint were dismissed. The embitterment against the imperial and the Bavarian administrations was equally great among the nobles and the peasants of Upper Austria, and the insurrection of the peasantry which followed was for this reason the more fearful, because the nobility did not stand with self-sacrificing fidelity by the Emperor, as did the new landowners in Bohemia, but, in spite of the interests of the Estates themselves, abetted the exciting measures and led the insurrection.

The first accounts of a dangerous movement among the peasantry in Austria reach back to the spring of 1625, and are connected with the installation of a Catholic pastor in the church at Zwiespalten. Peasants, to the number of 5,000, gathered and expelled the pastor and the proprietary patron, and then laid siege to the Castle of Frankenburg. Maximilian, who held Austria in pawn, directed his governor to proceed without mercy to take the ringleaders and hang them up on the highways. The direction was strictly followed; seventeen peasants were thus disposed of, and the rest for the time intimidated. At Easter, however, of the following year (1626) the nobility and burghers were required by imperial command to receive the communion in the Catholic Church; those who refused were driven into exile, or threatened with having soldiers quartered upon them, by which measures they were subjected not only to oppression, but to impoverishment;

and finally the peasants, also, were pressed by all kinds of forcible expedients to yield, until they were driven to complete desperation. On the 17th of May the insurrection broke out on both sides of the Danube. The movement was headed by the peasant, Stephen Fadinger, and his brother-in-law, Zeller. Thousands of their companions in suffering obeyed their call, and before the beginning of June the spirit of rebellion had taken possession of the whole land. When Christian IV. was informed of the outbreak, he sent the preacher, Scultetus, to Upper Austria to further foment the desired agitation.

The manner in which Fadinger so organized the peasant forces as to deal to the Bavarian and imperial troops blow after blow, and confine them to Linz and Enns, shows him to have been a man of exceptional talents and ability. As early as June 20th, he surrounded Linz with 50,000 men, and a few days later addressed a call to the nobility of Upper Austria to join the common cause of a free religious belief. Whether he would have succeeded in leading the movement on to victory is indeed a matter of doubt; he died in July, 1626, from a wound, and his brother-in-law also was killed a few days later. The death of the two leaders, the difficulty of providing for the army, which had already increased to 80,000 men, and the strengthening of the imperial force from which they had sustained several defeats, caused the peasants, as early as August, to enter into negotiations. On the 7th of September an armistice was concluded with them; this was followed by further negotiations which led to the opening of the passes, trade and travel were to become free, the peasants were to surrender their arms and ask for pardon. There was therefore no concession made to them in the matter of religion; they were simply offered

pardon in case they should return to loyalty. In fact, the greater portion of the peasantry resumed their peaceful occupations, and the insurrection seemed to approach its end.

The Elector of Bavaria was not very well pleased with the negotiations of the imperial commissioners; he regarded them as betraying weakness, and believed that respect for his own government and that of the Emperor could be restored only by decided action. When, however, on the 18th of September, the armistice came to an end, and fresh Bavarian forces, as also a division of imperialists, commanded by Duke Adolphus of Holstein, entered the land at Haffnerzell and conducted themselves, not as a peaceful garrison in a pacified country, but as a pack of knaves let loose, the peasants rose against the troops of Holstein and the Bavarian General Lindlo, and defeated them to the point of annihilation. This occurrence greatly excited the peasants and revived their courage. They complained that preparation had been made for an attack without notice of the termination of the armistice, and deemed themselves justified in paying no further regard to the terms of the reconciliation agreed upon with the imperial commissioners. Again intestine war with all its horrors broke out anew, and the rage of the peasantry vented itself not only upon the soldiers, but also upon the Catholic people. The monastery of Schlägl and many castles, parsonages, and market-towns were burnt; the Bavarian and imperial troops were several times defeated, and especially the detested governor, Herbersdorf, who was advancing against the peasants with a force of 1,500 men

In this rising peril the Emperor and Maximilian summoned all their forces into action to subdue the peasants.

The Elector had several weeks before sent for Baron von Pappenheim, who was then in the Spanish service in Italy, and confided to him the command of the forces of Upper Austria. The new general, having made all due preparation for the assault, advanced in union with the imperialists, and defeated, at Efferding, the peasant army stationed there (November 9, 1626); he was equally successful at Gmunden and Vöcklabruck, and finally at Wolfseck, where the leader of the peasants, a mysterious person, who usually went by the name of the Student, was killed. The miserable supply of arms and the defective discipline of the peasants made it probable from the beginning that they would fail in the contest with a skilful general; but what bravery and contempt of death could do was done by them in this series of struggles, which superabounded in horror-awakening scenes. The insurrection was now put down; only small bands here and there ventured a resistance to which desperation drove them, and, when this was abandoned, then began in Linz the executions against the numerous prisoners. The land suffered far more by these events than by those of the year 1620.

In Bohemia, as well as in Austria, the efforts of the Emperor's foes produced their fruits. The peasants rose in the course of the summer of 1626 in various bloody insurrectionary movements, strolled about, marking their course with plunder and murder, and throwing the government into extreme alarm. Here, however, the new land-owners united with the imperial soldiers, and in this way they succeeded, by employing the severest measures, in mastering the insurrection, in doing which they were specially aided by Waldstein, who was concerned that his own lands should not be devastated. The insurrection

in Bohemia was in this instance a transient episode, which alarmed, but did not weaken, the owners of the soil. The Vienna statesmen resolved to reap the fruits of their victory in a remodelling of the Constitution of the country.

VIII.

In our discussion of the written opinion which the imperial counsellors handed to their sovereign after the battle of the White Mountain, it was suggested that, in addition to the punishment of the insurgents, there was recommended a radical change of the constitutional relations and the suppression of Protestantism. The manner in which this latter advice was carried out has been explained; the first measure was the persecution of the Ultraquistic clergy; then followed the same course in the case of the Lutheran pastors. With these measures were connected, towards the end of the year 1622, a general decree of banishment against all Protestant pastors, so that only Catholic worship should be exercised. In many places these orders were not carried out; pastors were more or less openly harbored, meetings were held to receive their words of consolation, which did not, however, prevent the daily decline of Protestantism. The Catholics strengthened their position first in the cities by everywhere occupying the churches, and strictly insisting that no Protestant conventicles should be allowed, and that any who attended such should be severely punished. At the same time there were repeated ordinances requiring the attendance of the laity at the Catholic churches. These measures were already attended with success, because among the cultured classes the number of those who entertained Protestant sentiments were daily dimin-

ished by banishments or emigrations, and the resisting power of those who remained was thus paralyzed. The last step was taken in the year 1627, when the "Renewed Regulations" were published. These recognized none but Catholics as under the protection of the laws.

By this revision the old laws, which were enacted in the days of Ladislas II., and afterwards supplemented by some further ordinances, were entirely abrogated. These laws having become practically obsolete after the year 1620, many consultations took place in regard to the projection of a new scheme of the statutes, the most thorough of which was held during the Emperor's presence in Prague, in April, 1623. But not until 1625 was a commission appointed to consider the various suggestions, and present a complete draft of a Constitution. The commission consisted of the Regent of Bohemia, Prince Liechtenstein, the Duke of Friedland, the Vice-President of the Imperial Court Council, Peter Henry von Strahendorf, Privy Counsellor von Werdenberg, the Bohemian Vice-Chancellor, Otto von Nostiz, Dr. Melander, Dr. Hillebrand, and Dr. Hassold. The Chancellor, Lobkowitz, was left out of this commission, as we have reason to suppose, because, notwithstanding the attachment he had shown to the imperial house, he did not in this instance favor the tendency to absolutism, and was unwilling that the political rights of his countrymen should suffer injury. The commission was to keep three points in mind: they were to take care that the royal authority should be secured against further question, that the Catholic religion should be placed on firm ground, and finally that guarantees should be provided in favor of those noblemen who had received naturalization in Bohemia. After the commission had in several sessions revised the articles relat-

ing to public rights, they ceased to hold sessions and entrusted the revision of the portion of the old laws which related to private rights to Dr. Melander. It was long before the work was finished and ready to be printed. This took place in the year 1627, and only in the German language, although a Bohemian translation was prepared with the intention of having it printed, and indeed 135 sheets were printed, and then the work was interrupted and the German text was made to suffice. In Ferdinand's public proclamation of the new law, and in the law itself, he often refers to the fact that he had conquered the land by the sword, and that the people had thereby forfeited their rights and left him free to make such changes as he deemed proper.

The first change relates to the succession to the throne, and by it that certain elective right which the Estates possessed of an approving vote was repealed, and the crown was declared simply hereditary. When it is considered that the worst form of government is intimately connected with the free election of the King, it will appear that this change did no injustice to the Bohemian nation. Not so with those articles which gave the King the sole legislative right, and the Diet of the Estates a decisive vote only in the matter of taxes. In the remaining articles it was provided that the Diet (Landtag) should be made up of four Estates, and that accordingly the clergy should form an Estate by itself, and those only who adhered to the Catholic religion should be admitted. In the choice of his highest officials the King retained full freedom; these were not, as before, to be irremovable, but might, after the lapse of five years, be removed from their offices. The decisions of the courts should not any longer be final, but should be subject to review by the King; and by him

alone could naturalization, which had formerly been subject to the action of the Estates, be conferred. The use of the German language was now placed on a level with that of the Bohemian as to legal authority, and accordingly the law of 1615, which made Bohemian the only legal language of the country, was repealed. The laws of Moravia were revised in like manner with those of Bohemia.

On the 10th of May, 1627, the King signed the proclamation for the introduction of the new legislation, and from this moment forward Bohemia's development forsook the old traditions. No opposition was raised to the political side of the Constitution; whence should this come, since the greater part of the nobility had been driven from their possessions and their places occupied by new proprietors, and in the cities the greater part of the burghers, sentenced under the confiscation act to the loss of their houses, had fallen into penury? Against the religious enactments, however, the greater portion of the people still braced themselves, and could not be brought by menaces to receive the sacraments in the Catholic Church. It was resolved, therefore, to proceed to forcible reformatory action; to which resolution the counsel of Father Lamormain contributed most. Having been consulted by the Emperor, the confessor advised the use of the most stringent measures, using the words: "Severe pressure will bring the people to their reason."* By an edict, published July 31, 1627, the Emperor announced that he had appointed a Commission of Reformation, which was to go from place to place and instruct the contumacious in the Catholic religion. If any did not obey

* "Der harte Druck den Leuten Verstand gebe."

the instruction given and abandon their errors, they were to leave the country within six months. Now arose a lamentation which brought to mind the worst sufferings of the war. The Reformatory Commission was attended by a band of soldiers, who were quartered upon the refractory, and who forced them to payments which were increased each day. Some yielded at once that they might save something from their small possessions, or else they emigrated with what they had. Many, however, remained till their last shilling was gone, and were obliged finally, when stripped of everything, to submit. Scenes occurred in which the cruelty of the one side and the sacrificing spirit of the other vied with the most noted examples which can be found in the history of the religious persecutions of other times and other peoples. Again numerous parishes of the peasantry in the northern part of the country arose in rebellion ; but what they could not effect the year before when external circumstances were more favorable, they did not now effect : the insurrection was put down and the leaders capitally punished. Nevertheless the desired reformation was not carried through in the year 1627, or in the years following.

After the publication of the new laws, the Emperor determined to visit Bohemia and call there a Diet for the approval of his new regulations, which should, however, have the further purpose of crowning his second wife, and also of crowning his son as the incontestable hereditary lord of the land. The coronation of the Empress took place on the 21st of November, and the numerous festivities of this occasion were followed, on the 24th, by the homage of the Estates, which they were bound, by the new Constitution, to render to the Emperor. On the 25th occurred the coronation of Ferdinand III.

[NOTE.—The words used in the translation of the legislative terms of the last section of this chapter will not convey to the reader in England, much less in the United States, their true ideas, unless he shall dismiss the conceptions to which he is accustomed in his own country. The terms, *Landesordnung* (laws of the land), *Gesetze* (laws), *Verfassung* (constitution), are here used interchangeably in reference to the scheme introduced at this time. It was in this sense a constitution that it was the foundation upon which the more detailed legislation was to be built. But it has little in common with the brief general legislation which the term designates in America, or that progressive growth which is indicated by the word in England. The whole distinction is best set forth by the narrative, which brings before us, in the account of the new legislation, the legislative, judiciary, and executive departments all united in the person of the King. He claims in this scheme the right, not only to enact the constitutional law, but all the details which its application shall call for, to appoint its judicial and executive officers, and then, whenever he should choose to do so, to take the final decision out of the hands of his own judges, and of course the execution belonged to him. This has the merit of being the simplest of all systems.—T.R.]

CHAPTER IX.

THE PEACE OF LUBECK AND THE EDICT OF RESTITUTION.

I. The Differences between France and England. II. The War in the Year 1627. III. The Complaints against Waldstein. IV. The Peace of Lübeck. V. The Edict of Restitution. VI. Magdeburg.

I.

HEAVILY as the defeat at Lutter fell upon the King of Denmark, it did not discourage him, because he was at that time still hoping that the insurrectionary movements in Austria and Bohemia and Bethlen's alliance would fully employ the imperial forces, and that, with the aid of the French and English subsidies, he should be able to defend himself against Tilly. It was his design in the ensuing spring to move at the head of an army, which he intended, by new enlistments, to raise to 40,000 men, and, in the coming contest, to turn to good account his recent experiences. It depended only upon his having the needed supply of money at command, and especially upon England's paying the promised monthly subsidy of £30,000, and making up also, in due time, that which was unpaid. In view of this state of the case, he sent embassies to London and Paris.

We have stated above how the calling of Richelieu into the ministry wrought in giving a new spirit to the French government, by causing it to return to the way marked out by Henry IV. In pursuance of this policy, the enemies of the Hapsburgs were baited with subsidies and

other inducements. This course was pursued in the war which Christian was waging. Richelieu had, immediately after entering the ministry, formed intimate relations with England. Henrietta, the King's sister, was betrothed to the Prince of Wales, which not only put an end to the friendship between Spain and England, but also strengthened Louis XIII. against the Huguenots, to whom England could not any longer properly render support. Nevertheless there was an insurrection of the Huguenots under the lead of the two brothers, Dukes Rohan and Soubise, fomented in this instance by Spain, in which the royal troops sustained several defeats. When the Duke of Buckingham came to France to attend to England Queen Henrietta—who was not married to Charles until after James' death—he attempted to mediate in favor of the Huguenots; but his offer was rejected by Richelieu, and thus the two ministers separated in mutual pique, though, if we are to believe the French memoirists, the political difference was not the chief cause of this reciprocal aversion, but rather the wife of Louis XIII., with whose charms both Richelieu and Buckingham were supposed to have been smitten. This did not, moreover, affect injuriously the alliance between France and England; the navies of England and Holland united in the support of the French against Rochelle. But as the further persecution of the Huguenots offended the religious sense of the English and Dutch, they withdrew their ships.

It was, indeed, questionable whether in these circumstances France, in case she further prosecuted the war against the Huguenots, would fulfil the promises made to Christian; the prospect became still darker when the English began to find fault with the contract which had been

made in regard to the marriage of Charles with Henrietta of France. The conditions of this marriage could not but lead to disputes, for not only did they provide for freedom to the Catholics in the profession of their faith and for the admission of Catholic priests into England, but also granted to the Queen the right to retain her French servants and to control the education of her children to the age of thirteen years. Buckingham, however, used his influence to induce the Huguenots to lay down their arms in order that France might be free to apply all her force against the Hapsburgs. Thus by the English mediation was effected a peace (February 5, 1626), by which the position of the Huguenots was not for the time made worse, and they were left in possession of their places of defence.

Richelieu had, however, concluded this peace only for the purpose of preparing himself for a new attack. He desired to provide an efficient fleet, so as to act independently of the aid of England and Holland. In applying to this end the proceeds of his strict financial management, he took advantage of a conspiracy, at the head of which stood the King's brother, and which was directed against his life, or at least his position, in order to bring its leaders to trial, and effect, in defiance of their rank, either their imprisonment or their capital execution. A meeting of the Notables, which he called for December 2, 1626, made provision for the various administrative measures, especially for a naval armament and the demolition of all those fortifications in cities and castles which imperilled the public safety, took measures for the increase of the royal incomes, and was then dissolved with the best feeling towards himself, the result of all which was that he had in his hands the means of vigor-

ous action both at home and abroad, and was free to take up the cause of Christian. It was at this moment that Christian's envoys came to London and Paris and demanded the fulfilment of the assurances given, and at the same time made bitter complaints that Charles I. had paid so little regard to the obligations which he had assumed by treaty. According to the treaty concluded at the Hague, England was bound, from the 20th of May, 1625, onward, to pay £30,000 sterling monthly, which would amount to more than £570,000, of which sum as yet only £60,000 had been paid. These figures show satisfactorily that Christian had been deceived, for how could he suppose that a royal promise, confirmed by solemn treaty, would be so badly kept? He made his complaints in London and Paris, and received re-assurances at both places, which were not, however, realized. The reason why Charles I. was so outrageously untrue to his obligations existed partly in the growing disputes in England, which had made the chasm between the King and his Parliament still broader than it was in the days of his father, and partly in the war in which he was involved with France.

The quarrels with Parliament originated immediately after James' death, when the House of Commons became aware of the concessions which had been made to the Catholics in the French marriage contract. The House then made the hated Duke of Buckingham responsible for this contract, and refused to pay the subsidies for the German war, in order thus to force him to resign. Charles I., jealous of his rights as was his father, but still more ready to take up the glove, dissolved the Parliament (August, 1625), retained his minister, and procured the money he needed by arbitrary measures, such

as forced loans and the like. He had the daring to conclude, in December, 1625, the alliance at the Hague, and bind himself to large payments, which, as we have seen, he did not make. He hoped to allay the displeasure of the Commons by revoking the ordinances in favor of the Catholics; but when, in the following year, he summoned Parliament again to meet, he showed himself still more stubborn than the year before. The Parliament was willing to grant the King subsidies to the amount of £500,000, to pay his debts and to redeem the royal domains which James had pawned, if he would on his part dismiss the Duke of Buckingham and call him to account for his official administration. This demand offended the King still more, and, instead of conceding it, he dissolved the Parliament a second time (July, 1626).

While Charles I. was so violently offending public opinion in England, he still felt the necessity of meeting the main complaint of his subjects, which was, that he and his minister had committed a culpable indiscretion in the matters of religion. Instead of doing this by supporting the Palsgrave, and punctually paying the subsidies promised to the King of Denmark, he irritated France by violating the conditions of his marriage with the Princess Henrietta, and by giving support to the Huguenots. On the 9th of August, 1626, he issued an edict by which all the French domestics of his wife must leave England; and when the Queen herself stood in tears at the window, lamenting to see them depart, he tore her in his wrath from the lattice, so that blood came from the scratches which she received in her hands. The complaints of France at his violations of the treaty of marriage, he answered by allowing English ships to pursue with impunity a course of piracy, so that French mer-

chant vessels could nowhere sail in security. Richelieu saw with great dislike the hostile tendency in English politics, because it thwarted his plans in regard to the Hapsburgs, by compelling him to apply to the fitting out of a navy to repel these attacks the State incomes which he would fain have used in aid of Christian IV. He was, indeed, forced to make concessions to the strict Catholic party of the court, and conclude a treaty with Spain against England (April 20, 1627). Much to his satisfaction, however, this treaty realized nothing towards fulfilling the hope cherished by the Catholics; for Spain furnished, in the war which followed, really no aid.

The open rupture between the rulers of France and England took place on the 28th of April, 1627, on which day Charles I. forbade his subjects all commerce with France; and this action Louis answered eleven days later by a similar prohibition. The Huguenots now made preparation throughout France for further hostilities, supposing themselves sure of support from England. The Duke of Lorraine, also, who was anxious to end his connection with France and enter into a more agreeable one with the German Empire, armed himself in the sure expectation that upon the first hostile act the influential Catholics who were displeased with Richelieu's governmental system would place obstacles in his way. All the results which he had as yet attained now became doubtful. To his good fortune, however, Buckingham's attack with his fleet upon the island of Ré, near Rochelle, was repulsed. Richelieu now employed all the resources of France, together with his own savings, in the preparation of a naval armament and troops adequate to the emergency, and thus not only prevented any decisive success on the part of the English, but also kept the Huguenots

of Southern France from coming to the relief of Rochelle. The Duke of Lorraine also remained in suspense so long as no decided successes had attended the arms of England. When, on the 15th of August (1627), the French army surrounded Rochelle, with the design of capturing and destroying this base of the Huguenots' support, Buckingham made an unsuccessful attempt to take possession of the Fort of St. Martin on the island of Ré, and thus to thwart the efforts of the besiegers. He was finally indeed obliged to leave the island, while the anxieties of the besieged in Rochelle were constantly increased by the operation of the siege, at which both Richelieu and the King were present.

Richelieu's entire attention was now given to Rochelle, although the effectiveness of the royal forces was diminished by Rohan, who had succeeded in stirring up the Huguenots in Languedoc to insurrection. What bravery, military skill, inventive genius, and money could supply was made use of in the siege of Rochelle : and all this was needed, together with the untiring zeal of the Cardinal, to keep up the spirit of the troops, as there were single siege operations which called for months in the execution. And yet Richelieu would have been much longer in gaining his end, if famine and exhaustion had not paralyzed the besieged city's resisting power. The leaders of the Huguenots, however, and especially the indefatigable Mayor Guiton, who burned with fanatical enthusiasm, labored to inspire the people to a desperate resistance, and at the same time repeatedly asked imploringly the aid of Charles I. But Charles had already begun to perceive his error in making war with France ; Buckingham, whose honor was bound up in the success of the contest which his intrigues had called forth, had, in the meantime,

fallen by the assassin's hand (August 23, 1628), and consequently the arrival of the English auxiliary fleet was delayed until September (1628). And then, unfortunately, this fleet brought no relief, for it was wrecked in its attempt to enter the harbor with its supplies of provisions and other needs of the besieged. Richelieu had, by artificial obstructions, such as the building of a weir, made the entrance of the English impossible, and what these obstructions could not do was done by the French troops, who boldly met the enemy.

Rochelle could hold out no longer. Half the population had fallen a prey to famine and various diseases, and the remainder had been reduced to shadows and could no longer carry their weapons. On the 28th of October they resolved to capitulate, and on the following day sent to the King a deputation, the members of which fell before him fainting with exhaustion. When the victors made their entry they stumbled in the streets and houses upon hundreds of corpses, for the dead were no longer buried, because the indifference of desperation had seized the survivors, and they went wandering around like spectres. The self-sacrificing and spirited defence of Rochelle—the population of which did not surrender until all power of resistance was exhausted—served the people of Magdeburg, a few years later, as their guiding light and an example worthy of their imitation. Richelieu was now in a situation to carry out his plan against the Hapsburgs, which, from the year 1629, he did with a redoubled zeal.

II.

In view of the contest between France and England, which had been in preparation since the last months of

the year 1626, and which came to an outbreak in the following spring, it is readily conceived that neither Louis nor Charles could fulfil the obligations which they had assumed to Christian IV., and that the latter was obliged to depend upon his own resources in the further prosecution of the war. Thus it came to pass that in the year 1627 the war turned out everywhere favorably to the Emperor.

Waldstein, when he had ended the war with Bethlen, took up his winter-quarters in Moravia and Silesia, and, as he could not here pursue the same course as in the previous year in Germany, his men soon began to suffer the want of all necessaries. He assailed the Emperor with complaints and entreaties; he threatened him with a withdrawal: but all was ineffectual to the production of any considerable stir in Vienna; he was directed to drive out the remains of Mansfeld's men—who had returned to Silesia, and were living there by plunder—and then to proceed to Germany. At the end of April he arranged indeed, though badly, for carrying out this direction; but it was not until the 23d of May that he left Vienna to enter upon the campaign. Having augmented his own forces by the addition of those troops which were stationed in Bohemia, he commanded an army of 10,000 horse and 22,000 foot, a force clearly sufficient quickly to overthrow an enemy who, with all his re-enforcements and enlistments, numbered but 14,000 men. When Waldstein took his leave of Leucker, the Bavarian ambassador in Vienna, he promised that, after ending the war in Silesia, he would come fully to the support of Count Tilly, and held out the hope that the Elector of Brandenburg would be humbled. "This Elector," said he, "has long enough played a deceptive game with the Emperor; he must be taught his duty to respect ~~his~~ Imperial Majesty."

The imperial general had scarcely made his appearance in Silesia, when the hostile troops were everywhere driven from the field, and maintained themselves only in a few cities. Desperation seized the country, and an insurrection was expected, and would have been greeted with joy in Vienna, because it would have enabled the Emperor to institute confiscations at pleasure. In the month of July, Waldstein confided to General Marradas the reduction of the cities still held by the enemy, and made arrangements to withdraw to the Lower Saxon Circle. In fact, a patent was executed on the 14th of July, authorizing him in connection with Tilly to execute the imperial will against the Estates of the Circle. As early as the 28th of August he was in Perlberg, and on the 1st of September went to Lauenburg for a personal interview with Tilly.

When the general of the League renewed in the spring the war with Christian, he complained of the smallness of his force and the perils to which he was exposed from an embittered population, and requested the Emperor to order to his support the troops of Waldstein, which were still in the Mark of Brandenburg. His complaints brought small help from this source, and he was left to carry out, with little beyond his own forces, the work assigned him. This was rendered easier to him by Christian's inability to increase his army as he desired, so that Tilly gained ground daily, and was able to advance over the Elbe. In the midst of these contests the remains of the troops, which had been driven from Silesia, and had with extreme difficulty forced their way through, arrived at Christian's camp. Waldstein, who had closely followed their steps, formed a junction with Tilly at Pötrau on the Stocknitz, and the two combined overcame all resistance.

The troops of the Emperor and the League spread themselves in Holstein, took place after place, and finally made an assault on the city of Rendsburg, situated on the northern boundary, which the Danes were obliged, on the 14th of October, to surrender; upon which surrendered Waldstein advanced into Schleswig. To the loss of territory and income was now added a deep demoralization, which gave the King of Denmark reason to apprehend further defeats. Waldstein now took possession of the Duchy of Mecklenburg, and demanded of the Emperor that the Dukes be subjected to the ban for espousing the cause of the enemy, and that the Duchy should be given to indemnify him for his advances of money to the imperial treasury. The Emperor consented, pronounced the ban, and, on the 19th of January, 1628, invested his marshal with the Duchy of Mecklenburg. This act was conceived by the Protestants of Germany as the culmination of arbitrary power and the herald of further outrages, for the Dukes of Mecklenburg had not proceeded more offensively against the Emperor than had most of the Princes of Lower Germany, nor so much so as had the Elector of Brandenburg, who now could not but apprehend that his turn was near. Not only did the Protestants declaim against this deed of violence, but even the Catholics unanimously condemned it, and refused to recognize Waldstein as Duke of Mecklenburg. It is plain, however, from these facts that the chances of war had, during the entire year 1627, decided adversely to the King of Denmark and his allies.

At the end of the year 1626, Christian had, in some way, of which we are not informed, sought from the Infanta at Brussels her mediation with the Emperor in relation to a treaty of peace. During the following year

no further advances were made, and the war was carried on, and resulted as narrated above. Did not the Emperor also feel the need of peace, or would he not offer conditions acceptable to Denmark?

The Emperor felt indeed, in spite of all his victories, the burdens of the war pressing more heavily with each day, and was, as early as the beginning of the year 1627, resolved to summon a new Diet of Princes for the purpose of receiving its sanction of the measures decided upon in Regensburg, and since that time so severely criticised. He cherished the hope that the Protestants would now, in consequence of their defeats, be more yielding, and that peace might be restored. When this intention became known in Germany, the four Catholic Electors addressed to the Emperor the request that an ambassador representing England and the Palsgrave might be admitted to this Diet, on the ground that no peace would be likely to endure which should be concluded without the concurrence of these two Princes. This request, which looked evidently to a partial restoration of the Palsgrave, was taken into account in Vienna, and by the mediation of the Dukes of Würtenberg and Lorraine with the Palsgrave, or rather with his two representatives, Rustorf and Pawel, negotiations took place at Kolmar, July 5 to 18, 1627. Prince Eggenberg had, as conditions of the Palsgrave's possible restoration to grace, established the following points: The Palsgrave must beg the Emperor's pardon; acknowledge the conveyance of the electoral dignity to Maximilian; tolerate the Catholic religion in the Lower Palatinate, where it had already been introduced; and pay the Emperor an indemnity sufficient to redeem Upper Austria and Lusatia. We observe here that the Emperor would probably have

been satisfied if the Palsgrave would have given up the Electorate and the Upper Palatinate. Frederic did not reject these conditions in the rude manner of his earlier decisions; he was willing to beg the Emperor's pardon, as also to consent to the Catholic worship in several restored cloisters, and even to yield to Duke Maximilian the electoral title, and alternately with him to exercise the electoral functions, if the Electorate were to be restored to him undivided after his rival's death. He would not, however, consent to the payment of an indemnity, and therefore declined the only condition which could have brought about a reconciliation with the Emperor, and the negotiations were closed without any result.

Meanwhile the original plan in Vienna had been changed; an Electoral Diet was to be summoned, to meet in Mühlhausen, and care had been taken that Maximilian should participate in it. In the year 1624 Saxony had determined to acknowledge his electoral dignity, and the Elector of Brandenburg now did the same, and, in view of the perils which threatened him, he could not do otherwise, but he expressly declared that he was unwilling by this step to prejudice the rights of the Palsgrave's children. This Diet began its deliberations on the 18th of October, 1627. The Electors of Cologne and Saxony were present in person, the others by their ambassadors; the Emperor was represented by Baron von Strahlendorf, the Vice-President of the Imperial Court Council. In the name of his sovereign, Strahlendorf demanded that the College should give satisfactory answers to several questions, and that these should be in the form of a written opinion. The questions related—I, to the conditions under which the peace of the Empire might be restored, and the hostility of the King of Denmark and

the Palsgrave effectually remedied; 2, the indemnification which the Emperor might claim for the damage done him; 3, the obtaining of money, so that the soldiers might be paid up and discharged; and 4, the aid which the Emperor demanded from the Empire in case the peace should not be restored.

It became evident, within a few days after the opening of the deliberations, that the Emperor would derive no special benefit from the Diet, and that its joint action would not favor his policy, for the hostility of Brandenburg had even increased since the year 1623, although this might not be openly expressed, and the Elector of Saxony maintained, though with good will to the Emperor, his neutrality. In what way should an agreement be effected with the Catholic Electors in support of the imperial policy? Thus no joint determination was formed as to the basis of a peace with Denmark and the Palsgrave. Everything was either left to the Emperor's option, or it was advised that the matter be taken up where it was left when the negotiations at Brunswick were broken off. In this apparent harmony was involved a world of discords, which would spring up as soon as the Catholic and Protestant Electors were obliged to assume their positions in regard to the terms of peace which the Emperor had presented; the Protestants would never have consented to the terms of peace which Tilly and Waldstein, acting evidently under instruction from the League, had placed before the King of Denmark on the 4th of September. These required that he should give up the ecclesiastical foundations in the Lower Saxon and Westphalian Circles, cede Holstein to the Emperor, and indemnify him for the expenses of the war. It was only in relation to the pardon of the Palsgrave that the

Electoral College agreed upon a proposition which, in its main points, harmonized with the conditions which the Emperor had presented at the meeting at Colmar. To the imperial question in regard to indemnification for the expenses of the war, the College refrained from any definite answer, on the pretext that this could not be given until actual negotiations should be in progress. The real reason, however, for withholding an answer, was that neither Catholics nor Protestants were willing to stand security to the Emperor for the payment of the damages sustained or the dues to the army. In regard to the support of the Emperor in the unexpected event of failing to agree upon a peace with Denmark, the Electors promised to render such support. The Emperor, could he only have looked upon this action as sincere on the part of the Protestant Electors, might have deemed it an important result. This was not, however, the real fact, for they secretly reserved to themselves the liberty to act their pleasure.

If the Emperor had cherished the hope that he would secure the harmony of the Electoral College, and that the Electors would cordially attach themselves to him and strengthen his authority, he had been under a delusion. The Protestants, and especially Brandenburg, were irritated afterwards, as they had been before, by the consequences of the war as favoring the Catholics, nor could the Emperor any longer trust implicitly to those of his own faith. This last remark may take our readers by surprise, as no loosening of the bands of this alliance has hitherto appeared. Really, however, from the opening of the year 1627 there had broken out between the Emperor and the League grave differences, the grounds of which we shall now proceed to state, because they formed one of the points of the deliberations at the Diet at Mühlhausen.

III.

These differences had their ground in the sufferings which were spread abroad by the imperial army, not only in the Protestant, but also in the Catholic, lands of Germany. When Waldstein, in the year 1626, entered upon his expedition to Hungary, he left a portion of his troops for Tilly's support, and at the same time issued an order for further enlistments. During the ensuing winter this work had to be carried on with greater activity, because he had lost a great part of his army in the Hungarian campaign, and because he desired, after having conquered the enemy, then stationed in Silesia, to appear with a decisive force upon the war theatre of Germany. The places of enrolment in the territories of the imperial cities and several of the minor Protestant Princes no longer satisfied him: he must also extend his enlistments to the lands of the Princes of the League, and, first of all, those of the Bishops, and these Princes were obliged to provide for the first equipment and support of the enlisted troops, as the imperial cities had formerly been. This sacrifice they would perhaps have made, if Waldstein had relieved the Bishops by immediately, upon their enlistment, removing his troops to the scene of the war. But he had no thought of this, and scarcely had he removed those of one enrolment before he ordered another, and the trouble had no end. Previous to the Electoral Diet at Mühlhausen there had been held a Diet of the League at Würzburg, which determined to make complaint of this abuse, and sent for this purpose an embassy to Vienna (April, 1627). The answer received was not, however, encouraging. The Emperor promised that his army

should preserve a better discipline, and that in future enlistments an understanding should be had with the sovereign of each territory concerned. He promised neither the removal of the troops, nor the discontinuance of the enlistments. When the ambassadors of the League raised objections to the imperial decision, some promises were added, but never kept. In fact, Waldstein, in the spring of 1627, may have had nearly 60,000 men under his standards. To the demand, that he should discharge a part of these, the answer given in Vienna was, that there was no money to pay them what was due, which answer served only to increase the alarm. For what would be the state of things if the debt went on thus increasing?

Waldstein was at this time in Vienna, and it was chiefly he who inspired the Emperor's adverse or evasive answer to the complaints of the League. If he disregarded these complaints because he had no other way than at the expense of the League of supporting the needed troops, there might be brought many reasons in his defence, and especially this, that the Emperor could not be under obligation to expend a farthing of his own income in a war carried on in Germany in the interests of the German Catholics. The costs of the war belonged properly to the lands where it was carried on. Nor did the League neglect this consideration: their complaint related not to necessary, but to superfluous, armaments, for it was now apparent that Waldstein had at his command an army far greater than was necessary against his enemies in Silesia and Christian IV. What was the real cause of this strange and perilous course of action?

Just at this time, Leucker, the Bavarian ambassador in Vienna, made some singular communications to his sovereign. He reported, as current topics in the imperial court,

the restoration of the Emperor's authority in Germany, and the necessity of limiting the power of the Electors. Had Waldstein reflected air-castles of this kind before the Emperor's vision, and thus obtained his concurrence in the raising of an army which should suffice, not only as against Christian IV., but also as against the League? It may be that he sought by such pictures to keep the Emperor in good spirits; but the latter did not allow himself to be greatly misled by them, for in the beginning of August, 1627, when Waldstein was in Silesia, the Emperor urgently besought him to respect the complaints of the Catholic Electors, and discharge a part of his men. The imperial marshal did not, however, yield, and we know no other reason for his course than that his aim had been directed to the acquisition of one or another of the greater principalities of the Empire, and perhaps he was laboring for the imperial ban against the Elector of Brandenburg, who was at work, secretly indeed and under various pretexts, but yet constantly and decidedly to defeat the measures of the Emperor. If Waldstein desired to ask of the Emperor that he be invested with this possession, it was necessary that he should be well armed to sustain it. He had, in fact, his eye upon Mecklenburg, and we have already related in what manner he appropriated this Duchy.

As the Emperor gave promises, but no relief of the abuses complained of by the Princes of the League, and these abuses were rather increasing than lessening, the consequent ill-will grew stronger, and the Catholic Electors gave it expression at Mühlhausen. To these complaints were added those of the envoys of Brandenburg, whose sovereign had to suffer in 1626 from the quartering upon his people of imperial soldiers, against whom,

furthermore, Waldstein had since then exercised every kind of injustice and robbery, in order, as is with reason supposed, to torment the Elector to such a pitch of desperation as to bring him to an open insurrection against the Emperor. Even the Elector of Saxony, of whose territory Waldstein but touched the borders, and upon whom he had nevertheless inflicted damage, then he of Bavaria, who had not, indeed, suffered from the quartering or the enlistment, but as a member of the League took up the cause of his friends—in short, all the Electors addressed a memorial to the Emperor, in which they protested against that method of robbery by which his army was enlarged, and then, instead of being turned against the enemy, was left standing at the places of enlistment. The paper was indeed replete with severe invective ; but when one reads the accounts of the fearful tyranny exercised by the imperial soldiers—how they collected contributions at pleasure, how they took from the countryman all he had for the carrying on of his work—then a conception is formed of the import of the complaints, and these are found to be justified by written statements. The Assembly at Mühlhausen desired to entrust an Elector with the delivery of the memorial. John George of Saxony was the one selected to go to Vienna, and become there the interpreter of the general irritation ; but he, as well as the other Electors, objected to taking upon themselves the burden of this mission, and they sent a simple ambassador charged with it.

The unanimity with which the complaints were made and the embassy determined upon, would have placed the Emperor in the greatest perplexity, and would probably have moved him to the reduction of his army, if Maximilian of Bavaria had not offered him a helping

hand and restored his mind to a tranquil state. The Elector played on this occasion a double part. His ambassadors at Mühlhausen had concurred in the charges, and he had himself afterwards set his name to the memorial. In Vienna he apologized through a special ambassador, Tanner of Buchenriedt, his Chief Justice, for his course at Mühlhausen. Through him he declared that he could readily perceive why the Emperor was not willing to reduce his army and cease to quarter them where he desired ; he advised him to do no more than take measures for the prevention of excesses on the part of his troops. Two reasons led the Elector to this equivocal action : *First*, he feared that if the Emperor should withdraw his troops from Catholic territory, the Protestants would demand the same in relation to his own troops and those of the League. It lay, therefore, in the interests of Maximilian as well as of Ferdinand to decline the exercise of any influence upon the disposition of the army. The *second* reason was that Maximilian's welfare lay in the retaining of the Emperor's good will, for the Electorate was only conferred upon him personally, while his most earnest desire was that it should be made hereditary in his family. If he pressed the Emperor in regard to his army and compelled him to disarm, he would incur the danger that a peace would be made with Christian IV., carrying with it the restoration of the Palsgrave, or at least his children's investiture with the Electorate. To prevent this and determine the Emperor irrevocably in his favor, Maximilian must be yielding towards him.

The friendly feeling of the Elector of Bavaria led the Emperor to send Count Trautmansdorff to Munich in order thus to come to an understanding with the Elector on all the important questions of the situation, and es-

pecially those of the Danish peace negotiations and the publication of the Edict of Restitution. This latter point had been started at the meeting at Mühlhausen by the Ecclesiastical Electors; they there demanded the removal of their "grievances," having specially in view the restoration of the institutions which had been taken from them since the religious peace of Augsburg. At the imperial court there was a disposition to comply with this wish, for in this way the Emperor could provisionally use the administration of the institutions which were to be confiscated, appropriate their incomes, and when restored to the Church, they could be used as dotations for younger sons, and in this manner a firm footing could be established in North Germany. The Emperor only feared that such robbery committed upon those who had hitherto held these institutions would call into existence a new alliance against him, and desired therefore to reserve the publication of the Edict until after the close of the war with Denmark, and still, at the same time, to secure by treaty the aid of the League. In answering the questions put to him, the Elector of Bavaria demanded that the Emperor should immediately publish the Edict of Restitution, and gave him at the same time some general advice in regard to the peace to be concluded with Denmark. On the whole, his answer showed that he highly appreciated a good understanding with the Emperor, because the latter had promised full satisfaction to his wishes in the matter of the Electorate. Count Trautmansdorff closed with him, February 22 (1628), a treaty by which the Elector finally renounced his claim upon Upper Austria, and in return received, as an indemnity for his expenditures, the Upper Palatinate, together with all those parts of the Lower Palatinate which lay on the right bank

of the Rhine. On this occasion the Emperor yielded to the Elector's request that he would make over the Electorate to him as a hereditary possession. This secret action soon became unsatisfactory to the Elector, and in the month of June he requested the Emperor to make it known to the Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg, in order that it might be generally acknowledged. Ferdinand did not accede to this desire, and for several years that decision in regard to the Palatinate Electorate, which had been prevented by the unanimous opposition of the Protestants in the Diet of Deputies at Regensburg, did not become known in Germany. In the arcade of the royal residence at Munich is a fresco painting representing the conveyance, in 1628, of the hereditary Electorate. The conveyance did not, however, take place, either as a festive or as an individual act, in this way; it followed only as a consequence of the written instrument; nothing in this representation, but the year 1628, is correct.

During the transactions with the Elector of Bavaria the Emperor did not feel moved to return a friendly answer to the memorial of complaint sent from Mühlhausen. He did not indeed neglect to promise a better discipline; but this was of no account, if Waldstein should go on finding new places of enlistment until he should have raised his army to 130,000 men. In spite of the financial stress, the horizon of the future was never seen from the imperial court tinged with so roseate a hue, or, to employ a better expression, never had the plans there been so far-reaching, as in the year 1628. Upper Austria had been redeemed, and the same was expected in case of Lusatia; the Edict of Restitution was in preparation, and its incomes must for a long time flow into the imperial treas-

ury ; nay, conquests even were planned. In the month of December, 1627, the imperial ambassador at the court of Spain was authorized to offer the sale of Jutland and Schleswig—both of which countries the Emperor intended to wrest from Denmark—to Philip IV. In January, 1628, he withdrew the offer of Schleswig, designing to keep this for himself, and sell only Jutland. Indeed he was inclined, having aimed the blow with apparent success at the Dukes of Mecklenburg, to go on and subject still other German Princes to the ban. The advantages of these sentences of ban were indeed less to the Emperor than to Waldstein, who desired in this way to obtain remuneration for his own services ; it was Waldstein, too, who urged the Emperor on in his policy of advance, and in his headquarters were heard such menacing words as those which Leucker had reported the year before. "The Electors must be taught good morals"—so said Waldstein without reserve ; "the succession to the imperial crown belonged to the Emperor's son without any election to it, and he [Waldstein] hoped to render the house of Austria a good service." It was the desire of the imperial court to obtain a firm footing on the Baltic, to which end Stralsund must be conquered, and Lübeck persuaded to accede to the imperial policy. The German Catholics would have raised no objections to several of these plans, because some of them would have tended to their advantage ; but they desired to retain the power which they had acquired, and would not therefore consent either to make the imperial crown hereditary, or to ensure their own material ruin by longer bearing the robberies which had been committed upon them, and hence would not tolerate Waldstein's army with its present numbers and rules of conduct.

The displeasure of the Princes of the League culminated when they learned how little regard was paid to their complaints by the statesmen of Vienna, and when Tilly was obliged to take up winter-quarters for his troops in Catholic territory, because the imperial soldiery held possession of all the productive Protestant lands. The significance of this displeasure was suddenly augmented when it was not merely shared by Maximilian of Bavaria, which had long been true, but when this Prince took the lead in the complaints. This change of conduct in the Elector began in the spring of 1628, after the Electorate had been made hereditary to him; he would no longer tolerate the endeavors of a military commander to overthrow that old German system of government in which his ambition and talents had raised him to a position of eminence, and which system, for this reason, pleased him well.

Maximilian introduced his measures by a report to the Elector of Mentz in regard to the threatening language of Waldstein, in which he requested Mentz to take counsel with his other colleagues as to whether it were not better that they should all make a journey together to the imperial court, unite in a complaint of the fearful plunderings committed by the Emperor's army, and demand its reduction. The new Elector of Mentz, George Frederic von Greifenklau—Schweikard had died in 1626—was not to be persuaded to so unusual a step, because he knew that the Emperor did not sanction Waldstein's remarks. Ferdinand, with whom an intimate connection with the League was the starting-point of his policy, had assured him, through Metternich, Dean of the Cathedral of Mentz, that, "truly as he desired to look upon the face of God, he had never had any intention, wish, or thought,

and now had none, of reducing the liberties of the Electors and Estates of the Roman Empire, or diminishing at all its constitutional provisions; and if he knew that any one of his servants or officers cherished such a design, he would have him beheaded." Mentz was so convinced of the truth of these words that he would not support Maximilian's endeavors otherwise than by requesting the Emperor to call a meeting of the Electors, at which he should himself be present in person. At this meeting counsel could be taken in regard to the election of Ferdinand III. to the imperial throne, as also in regard to the affairs of the army.

When Maximilian received the adverse answer of the Archbishop, he determined, upon his own responsibility, to send an ambassador to the imperial court, which was then resident in Prague (April 21, 1628), with the request that the imperial troops be withdrawn from Swabia and Franconia, and that these sections be assigned to the troops of the League for their support. He directed his ambassador to employ energetic terms, to the effect that, if the Emperor would not allow the League to occupy this region with its soldiers, he must intend the breaking up of its army. The ambassador acquitted himself of his trust and visited Waldstein also, who was then present in Prague; but could effect nothing, for the Emperor insisted that Tilly should withdraw the regiments quartered in Franconia, in order that the imperial soldiers might be distributed there.

After Waldstein's departure the feeling at the court did not remain so trustful. It could not be denied that the complaints made by the League were just, and it was determined to make some account of them, for which purpose Count Collalto was sent to Munich; and if the

promises which he made there had been realized, a part of the grievances would have been remedied. The Emperor, according to these, was to discharge 4,000 mounted men and send another 4,000 of the same, part to Poland and part to the Spanish Netherlands, so that the Catholic provinces would be relieved of the support of the 8,000. If peace should be definitively concluded with Turkey, then there were to be larger diminutions. The Emperor directed General Collalto also to defend Waldstein against the base slanders in reference to his (the Emperor's) design to overthrow the Constitution of the Empire, and to direct Maximilian's attention to Waldstein's great services. Maximilian, by his answer, showed that he was not satisfied with the explanations. He was not disposed to break out into jubilations over the promised reductions, but would wait until he should see them carried out. As to Waldstein, he declared that he had no complaint to make against him personally, but that he deemed it improper that he should tolerate, to say nothing of himself uttering that which could not be reconciled with the existing state of government in Germany.

Maximilian proved to be but too nearly right in withholding his exultation over the imperial promises while they should remain unfulfilled. Instead of the 8,000 cavalry, as promised, only 3,000 were discharged, which was done by the breaking up of thirty companies. But this reduction was only apparent, because the discharged men were taken to fill up regiments that were incomplete. As this perfidy was laid to the charge of the Duke of Friedland alone, the Catholic Electors, at a consultation held at Bingen, resolved not only to complain of Waldstein to the Emperor, but boldly to demand his removal. Maximilian made himself interpreter of these complaints and

demands, and sent Count Wolkenstein to Vienna with instructions to resort even to threats if his demands should not be compliantly met. If, in defiance of the united request of the Electors, the imperial army should not be reduced, the Estates of the Empire would feel compelled, by the extremity of their stress, "to seize upon other means for the defence and conservation of themselves and their lands, rather than stand longer subject to the discretion of the imperial soldiery and their officers." These words involved the threat that the Estates would treat the imperial troops as enemies, and no longer allow themselves to be robbed by them. Wolkenstein was not to demand Waldstein's removal: Maximilian would not encroach so far as this upon the imperial rights.

We have repeatedly observed that the Emperor's interests all lay in a good understanding with the League; he was, therefore, ready to yield at once. Of the 240 cavalry companies which were quartered in the Empire, he was willing to discharge 200, thus diminishing the cavalry by 20,000. But his good will was not sufficient to secure the end. If these mounted men were to be discharged, they must also be paid, and the entire amount of their wages from the moment of their enlistment was still due them; for all that both officers and men had obtained by robbery, and which in many instances exceeded the amounts due them a hundredfold, was not reckoned as pay. The imperial government had not the needed money, so that the Emperor's perplexity may well be conceived: he had made a promise, which he could on the best supposition fulfil only by the willing and unselfish co-operation of his field-marshal and by the prompt laying of new contributions in Germany. Determined to do all in his power, Ferdinand sent his War Counsellor,

Baron von Questenberg, to Waldstein (September 5, 1628), not to command, but, as considerately as possible, to "beg," that he would further the promised discharges and deduct the contributions which had already been levied from the pay of the men. He also requested him to be careful not further to arouse the suspicions of the Estates of the Empire by his remarks, since nothing was further from his (the Emperor's) mind than the subversion of the Constitution, and that if he now desired to raise his son to the imperial throne, it would be by a free election.

The Emperor's wish was so far followed by Waldstein that he reduced the troops stationed in South Germany to 5,000 foot and 3,000 horse. But by occupying most of the places of quartering in North Germany with his men, which were nominally placed at 100,000 foot and 30,000 horse, he compelled Tilly to quarter his troops upon Catholic territory. The hope of relief in South Germany proved therefore delusive, since, in place of the imperialists, the soldiers of the League came in, and more than this, it was feared that Waldstein designed systematically to break up the army of the League and build his absolute dominion upon the ruins. There was a desire to be armed for this possible event, and it was therefore determined to call at Heidelberg a Diet of the League.

This meeting was attended (February 1, 1629) by all the Princes of the League, either in person or by their representatives, who, after several weeks of discussion, agreed to send another embassy to Vienna to ask for a general reduction of the army and for the offer of easier terms of peace to the King of Denmark. They at the same time resolved to hold in readiness 27,000 foot and 4,000 horse until they should learn the issue of the embassy. They intended to resist by force the troops of


Waldstein in case these should crowd those of the League out of their quarters. The embassy consisted of ten persons, of whom the most prominent were Rheinhard von Metternich, Dean of the Cathedral of Mentz, and Count Wolkenstein. Before reporting the result which they brought about, we must turn our attention to other weighty events, especially the conclusion of the Danish peace, the publication of the Edict of Restitution, and the endeavors of Waldstein to establish himself in Magdeburg.

IV.

The peace negotiations with Denmark were not earnestly taken up until the year 1629, after the war had, during the previous year, been prosecuted with uniform success. Waldstein occupied himself in the year 1628, not only in the contest with the King of Denmark, but kept his eye fixed upon the occupation of some of the most important Baltic ports. His first attempt was to besiege Stralsund, by the surrender of which he would have gained a commanding position on the Baltic. Negotiations had already been opened, July 14, 1628, the terms of which were that the city should pay a contribution, admit the imperial troops within its walls, and abandon all hostile alliances. But these negotiations were carried on by the city only in pretence, for, some days previous to this, Stralsund had concluded an alliance with Gustavus Adolphus, who at once landed a division of troops in the city, to which its defence was entrusted. As the imperialists, for want of adequate provisions, had suffered great losses, and the supply was becoming still more stinted when the Danish

STRALSUND.

Insulae Rügen pars.—A section of the Island of Rügen. Mariæ Balticæ pars.—A section of the Baltic, i. e., the Straßburg from which Sound the City was doubtless named. Verdrocken Landt.—Waste Lands. Three bridges over these led to the City. The letters a, b, etc., to l, indicate the City-gates; the letter m, the Blue Tower. Der Holm.—Fortified Island of Dänholm.



fleet approached Stralsund, Waldstein, who had sworn that he would take the city, even though it were fastened with chains of iron to heaven itself, was obliged to raise the siege. The King of Denmark now attempted to occupy the Island of Rügen, which was garrisoned by 8,000 imperialists; he failed, however, of his end, but took possession of the Island of Usedom, passed over thence to the mainland, and there extended his occupation. Waldstein now collected quickly the needed force to oppose the further advances of the King of Denmark, whom he defeated at Wolgast (September 2, 1628). This defeat caused Christian to pursue earnestly the peace negotiations.

We have already indicated the basis upon which the Emperor was disposed to conclude a peace. From a communication which he sent to the King of Spain we also learn that he hoped to obtain the Peninsula of Jutland and convey it to Saxony in exchange for Lusatia, and that he would at the same time demand that Christian should close the Sound against all his enemies. Waldstein and Tilly were authorized to conduct the negotiations, though in fact neither of them took any part in person, but both sent their representatives with full powers to Lubeck, where they met the Danish commissioners on the 21st of January, 1629. On the 10th of February, the questions of form were settled, and the Danes presented their terms of peace. They called for the restoration of the whole Lower Saxon Circle to the condition, as to proprietorship, in which it stood before the war, and for the payment of the damages which had been caused by the troops of the Emperor and those of the League. They also required the Emperor to pledge his support to the King of Denmark in case he

should be assailed from any source on account of the peace. It cannot be said that these conditions sounded modest, as coming from a defeated party; and so, of course, there was no thought, on the imperial side, of their acceptance. The other party now decided to come forward with their propositions, in regard to which, however, Waldstein and Tilly, who were not in the same place, must interchange views back and forth, and not until the 12th of March was the result received in Lubeck. The victor demanded that Christian should relinquish Holstein, Schleswig, and Detmold, and deliver up Jutland to the Elector of Saxony, to be held by him until the time when the latter, having received payment for services rendered to the Emperor, was bound to restore Lusatia to its former sovereign. Further, the King must renounce for himself and his son all claims upon the North German ecclesiastical foundations, indemnify the Emperor and the League for their expenditures in the war, and close the Sound against the Emperor's enemies. When the Danish plenipotentiaries learned these conditions, they declared that they should be obliged to break off the negotiations; for what was the need of negotiating if nothing was to be left to the King but the islands which could not be taken from him, and if he must, in addition to all, pay an indemnity?

The imperial side now moderated its demands. Waldstein empowered his representatives to ask of the King of Denmark no cession of territory and no further indemnification for damages, if he would but renounce his claim to the ecclesiastical institutions in question and pay 5,000,000 thalers. These conditions showed a violent descent from the previous ones; and yet Christian would only give up the ecclesiastical property, and bind himself

to no indemnity for damages by the war. The attitude of the League in relation to the Emperor at this time was such that there could be no mutual action relatively to Denmark, and Waldstein felt that he must now be more guarded in his action towards the League than he needed to be towards Denmark, and therefore accepted these conditions, and, jointly with Tilly, ratified the peace by his signature on the 7th of June, 1629. The treaty, which was afterwards confirmed by the Emperor, provided that Christian should, for himself and his son, renounce all claims to the North German ecclesiastical foundations; that he should enter again into the possession of his territories; that the proceedings for confiscation should be withdrawn; and that the parties should mutually renounce all claims to indemnification for the costs of the war. The giving way on the part of the Emperor, which is so marked in these conditions of peace, was not caused solely by concern in regard to the League, but partly by an apprehension that Sweden would join Denmark and fan anew the flames of war. There were no better means of preventing the union of these two powers, so jealous of each other, than by sparing Denmark in the treaty. Gustavus Adolphus desired admission, in his own name and in behalf of Stralsund, to the Lubeck negotiations; but his demand was refused, and thus, without further loss of time, the peace was concluded.

V.

Our readers will remember that, on the occasion of the meeting at Mühlhausen, the Catholics addressed to the Emperor a request for the removal of their grievances.

They desired not merely protection against further injustice, but demanded also the return of the ecclesiastical domains, which the Protestants had taken from them since the year 1555. The Vienna government would gladly have placed the Catholics back in the possession of their institutions, and had been for years occupied in preparing for this measure in the imperial cities, by compelling them to restore to their original purposes the monasteries and churches which they had appropriated since the year 1555. Nay, the authorities in Vienna desired to demand the return also of the institutions which had fallen into the hands of the Protestants before the Augsburg religious peace—so far as these were in immediate connection with the Empire—on the ground that in the religious peace the claim of the Catholics had been renounced only in case of those not situated in imperial territory. The opinion on this point was requested from the Electors of Mentz and Bavaria, who both praised the plan, but deemed it premature. Thus the Edict of Restitution, after much deliberation, was, at the end of the year 1628, concluded, and received the Emperor's signature on the 6th of March, 1629. It ordered that those monasteries and ecclesiastical foundations subject to any Prince of the Empire—that is, not under the immediate jurisdiction of the Emperor, and which, up to the time of the treaty of Passau, were Catholic—should be given up to the Catholics, and that the same should be done in case of the foundations immediately subject to the Emperor, which the Protestants had taken possession of since the peace of Augsburg. By this decree not only were numerous princely proprietors menaced in regard to their incomes, and thousands of families thrust from the prosperous condition which they had built upon the change of circumstances since 1552

and reduced to beggary, but hundreds of thousands of human beings were given up to be religiously revolutionized by violent measures ; for Ferdinand expressly reserved to the future owners the right of reformation. North Germany was, therefore, like Bohemia, to suffer from confiscations and from a reactionary reformation, and care was also taken that the confiscations should be extended to other than the ecclesiastical lands ; they were to be carried out against all the immediate and mediate Estates of the Empire that had joined the King of Denmark and served him in the war. If all these orders had been carried into execution, the silence of the grave would have spread itself over North Germany, and a portion of its great landed property would have been thrown into the hands of foreigners.

A few days after the publication of the Edict, the Emperor appointed numerous commissioners for each Circle of the Empire, with directions to ascertain what had been alienated from the Church, and with the right also to effect the restitution by calling in the aid of the troops of the League, or the imperialists. As the commissioners could proceed but gradually, and only when they had armed support at their side, they had, in the course of this year and the following one, sequestered less than half of the confiscated bishoprics and cloisters—the archbishoprics of Magdeburg and Bremen, and the bishoprics of Minden, Werden, Halberstadt, and Ratzeburg being the chief of these. Those six bishoprics belonging to the Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg, which had been taken into possession, were not alienated, and that on various grounds. In the case of Brandenburg, it was the desire of the government not to begin the work until considerable progress had been made in the other Circles, while it favored the

Elector of Saxony because it had been agreed at the Diet of Mühlhausen, in 1620, that those Princes who should aid the Emperor in the conquest of Bohemia should not be forcibly expelled from the foundations held by them. We shall not further trouble the reader with the details of these forcible restitutions, except in the instances of Magdeburg and Halberstadt, in which the facts are of special importance.

VI.

Even before the issue of the Edict of Restitution, Waldstein advised the Emperor to sequester the sees of Magdeburg and Halberstadt, and convey them, with the Papal sanction, to his son, Leopold William. Nor was it Waldstein's concern for the greatness of the imperial house, but a view of the necessities of his own army, which inspired this advice, for he at the same time declared that the Archduke must renounce his claim to the incomes of the two sees, because these would have to be applied to the army. The Emperor concurred in the proposition, and attempted first to obtain possession of the bishopric of Halberstadt, in which he was favored by the fact that it was at the time vacant. Although its notorious administrator, Christian, shortly before his death, which occurred during the Danish war, had renounced his bishopric in favor of the Danish King's second son, the Cathedral Chapter did not acknowledge this transfer, but made a new election, which the Emperor refused to acknowledge. Caraffa, the Papal Nuncio, now labored to incite the Vienna statesmen to decisive action, because the occasion was so opportune for the acquisition

of the foundation, since a number of the Cathedral canons were Catholic, and those who were Protestant could now be intimidated by threats. The advice was followed, and, as the result of the new election, the Emperor's son, the Archduke Leopold William, was raised to the episcopal throne, and the bishopric which, ninety years before, and therefore earlier than the date of the treaty of Passau, was in Protestant hands, was wrested from them, and that too without any special exercise of violence.

What had been so happily executed in Halberstadt was to be attempted in Magdeburg. Prince Christian William, of the family of Hohenzollern, had come into possession of this archbishopric, acted as its administrator, and, at the opening of the Thirty Years' War, assumed a part, not indeed unfriendly to the Emperor; but, in the further progress of events, even the most peaceably disposed Princes were obliged to take sides: and he took the side of the King of Denmark, was driven from the archbishopric, deposed by the Chapter of the Cathedral, and a son of the Elector of Saxony put in his place. The Emperor did not, however, recognize this action, and, as he could not compel the Chapter to make another choice, he simply desired the Pope to convey the archbishopric to his son, the Bishop of Halberstadt, with which desire Urban VIII. complied.

Waldstein, who had already exhausted all the rest of the territory of the archbishopric, now attempted to establish himself in the city itself, and demanded that it receive and sustain an infantry regiment. The citizens, who foresaw that any yielding would lead to ceaseless annoyances and ultimate ruin, rejected the demand, and began in haste to repair their fortifications, that they might secure themselves against either a surprise or a

siege. These precautions irritated the imperial commander, and as early as the end of March, 1629, he sent an order from Güstrow—where, on account of the peace negotiations which were in progress at Lubeck, he was then residing—for a blockade of the city, which he held so closely guarded by a few thousand men as not only to suspend trade and the entrance of provisions, but so that the citizens could only at the peril of life go forth from their walls.

In this situation the citizens of Magdeburg were obliged to act with the greatest firmness. They attempted, indeed, by a deputation to Waldstein and the offer of a sum of money, to free themselves from his vise, and at the same time armed as strongly as they could, and even made sallies against the blockading force, because it was only in this way that they could effect the entrance of the necessities of life. Their successes increasingly irritated the imperial marshal, and he would gladly in the beginning of July have broken up his camp at Güstrow, for the purpose of besieging the city, if he had not been occupied, in addition to many other cares, in organizing a government for Mecklenburg. The Hanse Towns attempted to intercede with him in behalf of Magdeburg, while the city itself also addressed a memorial to the Emperor entreating him to have their differences investigated by a commission, as the head of which they suggested the Elector of Saxony, and to confirm in advance its action. To show its good will, the city was willing to deliver up the corn which had been captured in an attack upon the imperialists. The memorial was favorably received in Vienna so far as this, that it was there perceived that Waldstein desired only to rob Magdeburg, and the Emperor was unwilling to increase

the embitterment which was already felt in Germany towards the imperial army. A message was therefore sent to Waldstein expressive of the desire that he would adjust the matter in an amicable way, and be content with a payment in money.

Waldstein made, however, no account of this decision when a deputation of the Hanse Towns appeared at his headquarters at Wollmirstedt, and in Magdeburg's name offered to restore the corn and to make a payment in aid of the imperial soldiery. The Prince did not even allow the deputation, when they entered his apartment, to make their statement, but declared that he should not prove himself a fool by resting satisfied with the return of their booty, but should make sure of the city and place a garrison in it. A few days afterwards the Syndic of Magdeburg, Dr. Denhardt, made an attempt to negotiate with him on the same basis as that assumed by the Hanse Towns; to whom he behaved with still greater rudeness, demanding not only the admission of a garrison, but that a number of those persons who had taken part in the last assault should be condemned to death, and that two especially should be surrendered to him. "I must have the garrison!"—these were his closing words. "I shall enter the city; so much is certain. I shall bring the two fellows out that I may strike off their heads. . . . And if I do not get *their* heads, it shall cost the city 2,000 other heads. That is my intention."

From Wollmirstedt, Waldstein went to Halberstadt, and it was supposed that he now intended to commence the siege of Magdeburg in earnest. To the complete surprise of the people of Magdeburg, however (instead of the siege), a reconciliation took place—a result, no doubt, of the increasing differences between Waldstein and the

League, which made the imperial commander deem it unadvisable to draw his strings too tight. The peaceful understanding between Waldstein and Magdeburg was introduced by an armistice which Count Pappenheim, who, as it appears, commanded the besieging force, granted to the city in order that the Hanse Towns might have opportunity further to prosecute their proffered mediation. How deeply interested the Hanse Towns were in the hard-pressed city appears in their offer of armed assistance in case a peaceful adjustment should not be effected. When their envoys, attended by several citizens of Magdeburg, appeared in Halberstadt, Waldstein made use of very different language; he was willing to forgive the city if in the future it should cause the Emperor no more trouble. His advance found an echo; the Magdeburg Syndic gave assurance, in the name of the citizens, of the truest fidelity for the future, and the contest was peaceably settled. The raising of the siege and the removal of the imperial troops were agreed to and immediately executed. The fear of the League did much towards causing this softening down. We leave the question unanswered as to how much was contributed to this result by the determined action of the Hanse Towns, which made no secret of their decision to intervene with arms, the opportune appearance of the celebrated Dutch diplomat, Aitzema, who, under instructions from the States-General, protested against the further oppression of Magdeburg, and threatened to take counter-measures, and, finally, the knowledge of Sweden's alliance with Stralsund and the menaced interposition of Gustavus Adolphus. Waldstein may have feared that the issue in the case of Magdeburg might be as in that of Stralsund, and, as he was sure of the hostility of the

League, chose in this case to yield (beginning of October, 1629).

During the negotiations, Waldstein demanded the payment of 200,000 thalers. When, however, the representatives of Magdeburg declared their inability to pay more than 150,000 thalers, the Hanseatic deputies agreed to make up the amount. This spirit of sacrifice might have shamed the imperial commander, if he had been a man of humane feeling, or had possessed any regard for the growing distress of the people. As, however, he was incapable of such qualms of feeling, there must have been other reasons why he refused the money, with the words: "Never mind! we now perceive that the city of Magdeburg, as well as all the Hanse Towns, design to persevere in their devotion to the Emperor: we shall, as an act of grace, remit the whole sum, that we may show that we do not wage war for money." Perhaps he desired also to give the League a thrust, for he added: "We perceive that the Hanse Towns imagine that we intend to execute the imperial Edict of Restitution; of this, however, we have no intention: the Edict cannot stand, and we assure the Hanse Towns that nothing will be required of them in this respect, for the religious peace cannot be subverted in this way." It was here that Waldstein first appeared as defender of the religious peace of Germany. Did he hope that these words would multiply their echoes in the bosoms of Protestants, make them more ready to bear the burden of supporting his army, and perhaps to aid him in the apprehended contest with the League? At least he did not use words of so broad an import, and at the same time so damaging to the Emperor, without a definite purpose.

Nor did he content himself with this one utterance

against the Edict of Restitution ; he made like expressions also to an ambassador of the Elector of Saxony, who came to him in November (1629), in which he employed the most cutting terms ; these we shall here repeat, because the ambassador reported them with exactness to his sovereign, and their correctness is beyond question. Waldstein declared that he did not approve of the Edict ; that for its execution "he should not permit the use of the army placed under his command, and should make no inquiry as what opinions the Prince v. Eggenberg, Father Lamormain, and others like them might entertain ; his design was simply and solely to maintain the reputation of his Imperial Majesty, our Most Gracious Sovereign, to conserve his Empire and defend it against all foreign enemies." It is known that in his servants and officers he made no distinctions founded upon religious belief ; that he promoted the members of the Evangelical confessions to the highest positions in peace and war, and gave them equal confidence with the Catholics.

These broad assurances met in the Elector of Saxony a mistrustful rather than friendly reception. John George well knew that Waldstein would neither withdraw nor discharge his troops. He made, therefore, no account of what he said, nor did he heed the thrust aimed at the League. Since the ban pronounced against the Dukes of Mecklenburg, and the ill-treatment which the Elector of Brandenburg had, since the year 1628, received, and which by the Edict of Restitution became an actual cruelty, all confidence in the imperial commander had vanished, and even so peaceful and quiet-loving a spirit as that of the Elector of Saxony could no longer be misled by his fair words. It had also, no doubt, become known to him that when the Elector of Brandenburg, at the end of April, 1629, sent an

envoy to Waldstein with a request for alleviation in the increasing contributions levied upon him, this was promptly dismissed and the envoy's person treated with contempt. For the imperial general responded to the respectful salutation of the ambassador with but a silent nod, and during the two audiences granted him, each of which lasted over an hour, did not even ask him to take a seat. The coarse and imperious manner in which he bore himself, and which appeared on every occasion where there was aught but full concurrence in his will, made it impossible for him to win allies in Germany.

The envoy would perhaps have been better treated if Waldstein had not been casting his covetous glances upon the Mark of Brandenburg with a desire to procure the ban of the Elector. An imprudent step of the latter, which, in the comfortless condition of his finances and the growing demands of Waldstein, might easily have been taken, would have offered the coveted opportunity. It was the good fortune of George William that in this day of trial he yielded a ready ear to his old confidential counsellor, Adam von Schwarzenberg. The Protestants reproached Schwarzenberg with having, as a Catholic, improperly advised the Elector and occasioned his unworthy attitude during the years just passed. We shall not question that this reproach was in a measure just, and that the Elector would have acted more worthily had he come out and joined the confederation which he had taken the lead in forming; in the year 1629, however, his security rested in an absolute reserve and a silent bearing of all burdens, and we therefore think that he did well in following Schwarzenberg's counsels in so far as they suggested quiet. His further advice to form an alliance with Poland against Sweden, George William rightly rejected.

As the stress increased, the Elector had no choice but to send another embassy to Waldstein, which he committed to a no less person than Margrave Sigismund of Brandenburg. He was not better received in Halberstadt, where Waldstein and Tilly were both staying, than the two former envoys had been. A seat was, indeed, offered him, but no grateful response was made to the salutation of the Elector, nor was any greeting offered in return. It was evident that he designed to avoid all friendly intercourse with a Prince whom he meant to rob. Tilly declared to the Margrave, on the latter's visit to him, that he saw for the Elector no help but in joining the Emperor against the Swedes, and thus effecting the surrender of Stralsund.

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
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
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
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
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






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